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At least 91 records · Page 5

Safety Considerations for Advanced Material Irradiation at the ATR

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a light water reactor with aluminum-clad driver fuel. A primary mission of the ATR is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This support necessarily requires irradiation of advanced materials such as sodium, fuel salts, and metal eutectics. Irradiation of advanced materials in the ATR environment presents a challenge when completing accident analyses and demonstrating compliance to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Many advanced materials have the possibility to react with the ATR protective barriers such as the cladding or primary coolant system (PCS) boundary during postulated accident scenarios. Further, molten fuel experiments fall outside of the standard regulatory framework for dose consequence analyses. ATR is currently developing new safety analysis methods to support irradiation of advanced materials. The primary considerations for this development are 1) experiment containment design requirements, 2) primary coolant system response to an experiment containment failure, and 3) dose analyses for molten fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proposed Adaptation of the Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800, Chapter 4 (Reactor) for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors and Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors

This report provides a proposed adaptation of a previous regulatory gap analysis of Chapter 4 (Reactor) of NUREG-0800 , Standard Review Plan (SRP) for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition, for applicability to advanced reactors; specifically, the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) and the modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (mHTGR). SRP Chapter 4, which addresses reactor components, was selected for the review because of the possible significant differences in advanced non-light water reactor (non-LWR) technologies compared with the current LWR-based Chapter 4. SFR and mHTGR technologies were chosen for this gap analysis because of their diverse designs and the availability of significant historical design detail. This report satisfies M3AT-16OR2001042, “Complete Development of an Advanced Reactor Adaptation of Chapter 4 NUREG-0800,” in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Advanced Reactor Technology program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Performance and Safety Parameters for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

A Monte Carlo depletion model for the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) Cycle 400 and its use in calculating parameters of relevance to the reactor performance and safety during the reactor cycle are presented in this paper. This depletion model was developed to serve as a reference for the design of a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for an ongoing study to convert HFIR from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to LEU fuel; both HEU and LEU depletion models use the same methodology and ENDV/B-VII nuclear data as discussed in this paper. The calculated HFIR Cycle 400 parameters, which are compared when available with measurement data from critical experiments performed at HFIR, data included in the HFIR Safety Analysis Report (SAR), or data reported by previous calculations, provide a basis for verification or updating of the corresponding SAR data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A qualitative assessment of current CCF guidance based on a review of safety system digital implementation changes with evolving technology - 148

This paper is a summary of a study performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate current policy on software common-cause failure (CCF). The study reported in this paper is one of several that contributed to the technical basis to inform NRC staff. The study first reviewed policies and assessment guidance as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, 'Instrumentation and Controls', in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. The study then examined instrumentation and controls (I and C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF remains appropriate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed. The methodology adopted was to review the vendors' technology and software implementation processes for digital safety systems as technology evolved. The following three representative safety systems were selected to provide illustrative examples: - Eagle 21 was selected to represent vintage microprocessor-based technology used from the 1980's to mid-1990's, - TELEPERM XS (TXS) was selected to represent second generation microprocessor-based technology used from the mid-1990's to the 2000's, and - The advanced logic system (ALS) was selected to represent the latest trend of using technology based on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Technology implementations were reviewed in light of the basic premise of the NRC in BTP 7-19 (Revision 6), that software-based or software-logic-based digital system development errors are a credible source of CCF and therefore are susceptible to CCF because identical copies of the software-based logic and architecture are present in redundant divisions of safety-related systems. BTP 7-19 categorizes firmware and logic developed from software-based development systems all under software. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

ECAR-6440 Rev 2 MARVEL Hazard Evaluation

This hazard evaluation supports the Microreactor Applications Research, Validation, and Evaluation (MARVEL) Project’s design effort and the development of the preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA) (addendum to safety analysis report [SAR]-420, “Transient Reactor Test [TREAT] Facility FSAR”) (SAR-420-ADD-1). The hazard evaluation process for the MARVEL project for compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” follows a process similar to the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) as outlined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-18-04, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development,” and supporting documents. The LMP process is adapted to fit Department of Energy (DOE) reactor regulatory requirements as applicable and appropriate using a graded approach based on the MARVEL microreactor design. This approach provides reasonable assurance of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 830 for protection of the public, workers, and environment.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Experimental Fuels Facility Re-categorization Based on Facility Segmentation

The Experimental Fuels Facility (EFF) (MFC-794) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) located on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site was originally constructed to provide controlled-access, indoor storage for radiological contaminated equipment. Use of the facility was expanded to provide a controlled environment for repairing contaminated equipment and characterizing, repackaging, and treating waste. The EFF facility is also used for research and development services, including fuel fabrication. EFF was originally categorized as a LTHC-3 radiological facility based on facility operations and facility radiological inventories. Newly planned program activities identified the need to receive quantities of fissionable materials in excess of the single parameter subcritical limit in ANSI/ANS-8.1, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors” (identified as “criticality list” quantities in DOE-STD-1027-92, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,” Attachment 1, Table A.1). Since the proposed inventory of fissionable materials inside EFF may be greater than the single parameter sub-critical limit of 700 g of U-235 equivalent, the initial re-categorization is Hazard Category (HC) 2 based upon a potential criticality hazard. This paper details the facility hazard categorization performed for the EFF. The categorization was necessary to determine (a) the need for further safety analysis in accordance with LWP-10802, “INL Facility Categorization,” and (b) compliance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements.” Based on the segmentation argument presented in this paper, the final hazard categorization for the facility is LTHC-3. Department of Energy Idaho (DOE-ID) approval of the final hazard categorization determined by this hazard assessment document (HAD) was required per the DOE-ID Supplemental Guidance for DOE-STD-1027-92 based on the proposed downgrade of the initial facility categorization of Hazard Category 2.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Failure mode analysis of the FFTF heating and ventilation system 25

This document was prepared as a supplemental study to Chapter 9.4 of the FFTF Final Safety Analysis Report and is included as a Category A reference in FFTF System Design Description 25, Heating and Ventilation System. It contains the single failure mode analysis on all the heating and ventilation systems that are essential to the safety of the plant, and confirms the adequacy of the system design to accommodate single failures without jeopardizing overall plant safety.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Gap Analysis of Storage Conditions between NNSS and LANL for SAVY 4000 Use

As part of the gap analysis for utilizing the SAVY 4000® at NNSS, the hydrogen gas generation rate and the effect of atmospheric pressure changes on the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) of the SAVY container must be evaluated because the nuclear material characteristics and atmospheric conditions will not be the same for NNSS and LANL. This paper documents this analysis and demonstrates that the LANL SAVY Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is bounding with respect to the Nevada facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calculation of Hazard Category 2/3 Threshold Quantities Using Contemporary Dosimetric Data

The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology and selection of input data utilized to calculate updated Hazard Category 2 and Hazard Category 3 Threshold Quantities (TQs) using contemporary dosimetric information. The calculation of the updated TQs will be considered for use in the revision to the Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard (STD-) 1027-92 Change Notice (CN)-1, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.” The updated TQs documented in this report complement an effort previously undertaken by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which in 2014 issued revised Supplemental Guidance documenting the calculation of updated TQs for approximately 100 radionuclides listed in DOE-STD-1027-92, CN-1. The calculations documented in this report complement the NNSA effort by expanding the set of radionuclides to more than 1,250 radionuclides with a published TQ. The development of this report was sponsored by the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Safety (AU-30) within the Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety, and Security organization.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Performance and safety parameters for the high flux isotope reactor

A Monte Carlo depletion model for the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) Cycle 400 and its use in calculating parameters of relevance to the reactor performance and safety during the reactor cycle are presented in this paper. This depletion model was developed to serve as a reference for the design of a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for an ongoing study to convert HFIR from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to LEU fuel; both HEU and LEU depletion models use the same methodology and ENDF/B-VII nuclear data as discussed in this paper. The calculated HFIR Cycle 400 parameters, which are compared with measurement data from critical experiments performed at HFIR, data included in the HFIR Safety Analysis Report (SAR), or data reported by previous calculations, provide a basis for verification or updating of the corresponding SAR data. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Things to Consider When Upgrading a Non-Power Reactor to a Digital I&C System

Non-Power Reactor (NPR) licensees are increasing their use of state-of-the-art digital technology in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems because digital systems offer improved reactor control, information processing, and information storage. In Generic Letter GL 95-02, the NRC recognized that the design characteristics specific to the new digital electronics could result in failure modes and system malfunctions that either were not considered during the initial plant design or not evaluated in sufficient detail in the safety analysis report. These concerns include potential common mode failures. A conversion from analog to digital I&C systems in NPRs solves some problems while potentially introducing others. Good design, engineering, review, and testing can identify and minimize these risks.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Fabrication Lessons Learned of Transportation Packaging from the Perspective of a Design Authority - 20322

This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fundamental approaches for analysis thermal hydraulic parameter for Puspati Research Reactor

The 1-MW PUSPATI Research Reactor (RTP) is the one and only nuclear pool type research reactor developed by General Atomic (GA) in Malaysia. It was installed at Malaysian Nuclear Agency and has reached the first criticality on 8 June 1982. Based on the initial core which comprised of 80 standard TRIGA fuel elements, the very fundamental thermal hydraulic model was investigated during steady state operation using the PARET-code. The main objective of this paper is to determine the variation of temperature profiles and Departure of Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) of RTP at full power operation. The second objective is to confirm that the values obtained from PARET-code are in agreement with Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for RTP. The code was employed for the hot and average channels in the core in order to calculate of fuel’s center and surface, cladding, coolant temperatures as well as DNBR’s values. In this study, it was found that the results obtained from the PARET-code showed that the thermal hydraulic parameters related to safety for initial core which was cooled by natural convection was in agreement with the designed values and safety limit in SAR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Using FENOSOL{sup TM} Phenolic Foam as a Shock Absorber for Type B Packaging - 17256

Type B and fissile material transportation packages are designed to withstand deformation from dynamic forces experienced during impacts in hypothetical accident conditions. A critical aspect is to ensure the containment system is not breached. The package design normally includes impact limiters made up of a shell filled with energy-absorbing material. Various types of materials are used as energy absorbers, including wood, foam, and honeycomb structures. Synthetic foam is an ideal material for impact limiters; it has isotropic material properties, it acts as a heat insulator during fire conditions, and it maintains structural integrity at high temperatures. In addition, the density of the foam may be controlled during the manufacturing process, allowing the cask designer flexibility to select the right density for each application. The foam properties can be used as inputs for numerical simulations of dynamic impacts. These simulations are a key component of the safety analysis report for Type B transportation casks. Robatel has recently invested in equipment to produce FENOSOL{sup TM} phenolic foam in our factory for use in our cask designs. This acquisition was made jointly between Robatel and the CEA, with Robatel ensuring the industrialization of the product. In the past decade, this foam was successfully integrated into more than 10 European cask designs, and there has been extensive in-laboratory characterization of its properties. FENOSOL{sup TM} has already been accepted by the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) as a shock absorbing material for use in cask designs. Since the acquisition of the phenolic foam production process by Robatel, a new research and development program has been launched to provide more accurate information to our clients, extend the range of application of this foam, and to improve its properties. Robatel has built an extensive database of material characteristics through the use of a universal mechanical tester, a scanning electron microscope, and a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer. In addition, Robatel has successfully implemented FENOSOL{sup TM} in two recent cask designs. This included scale model drop testing of a 9 meter drop in three orientations, and a pin puncture drop test. Robatel is in the process of producing FENOSOL{sup TM} samples for testing according to ASTM standards. Various densities will be included in the study. The testing will include duro-meter hardness, specific heat, thermal conductivity, compressive strength and modulus, and tensile strength. Once the testing is complete, Robatel will compile the data in the form of product specification sheets for each density. These information sheets and test reports will be used to validate FENOSOL{sup TM} for use in future impact limiters for the North American Type B cask market. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mars 2020 Risk Integration and Uncertainty Working Group Status Report, FY 2017

This report provides a list of accomplishments of the Mars 2020 Risk Integration and Uncertainty Working Group for the fiscal year 2017 which includes participation in the Technical Information Meeting #2, review and comments on the methodologies and results provided in the Mars 2020 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Draft Databook, development of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment model in the risk assessment program SAPHIRE using the data provided in the SAR Databook, and an independent launch risk analysis based on the Mars 2020 launch vehicle’s lineage and design similarity to other launch vehicles.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Advances in Integral and Separate Effects Experiments for Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors

This paper focuses on the progress being made in water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) advanced integral effects and separate effects experiments for reactor licensing. SMRs, considered modular in design, are mostly factory-built and then shipped to the reactor site. Of the several types of SMR designs available, water-cooled SMRs are likely to receive regulatory approval faster than others, as most of the technologies involved (e.g., the fuel and coolant technologies) are matured. However, the unique safety systems of SMRs, which depend on specific SMR design features, require integral and separate effects experiments to achieve reactor licensing. Thus, of the many SMR designs being proposed, only a few have successfully undergone licensing and reached the final development and demonstration stage. Many nuclear vendors and newcomer companies are investing millions of dollars to develop integral and separate effects testing facilities for preparing final safety analysis reports to include in licensing applications. Development and analysis of these experimental facilities is costly and takes about four to five years. The unique challenges involved can be reduced when stakeholders synergistically apply lessons learned, knowing the critical role played by advancements in experiments that support the licensing of SMR safety systems. Identification of knowledge/research gaps with the phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) and designing experimental facilities focusing on the phenomena of interest (POI) and figures of merit (FOMs) are pivotal to select the critical path to successful design demonstration and licensing application.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Qualitative Assessment of Current CCF Guidance Based on a Review of Safety System Digital Implementation Changes with Evolving Technology

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is initiating a new rulemaking project to develop a digital system common-cause failure (CCF) rule. This rulemaking will review and modify or affirm the NRC's current digital system CCF policy as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls, in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG)-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (ML033580677). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is providing technical support to the NRC staff on the CCF rulemaking, and this report is one of several providing the technical basis to inform NRC staff members. For the task described in this report, ORNL examined instrumentation and controls (I&C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF is adequate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗