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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Identification of Top Dose Producing Radionuclides Produced by Research and Test Reactors

Nuclear fission produces more than 1,000 radioactive isotopes, each having different half-lives and producing unique characteristic emissions (e.g., alpha, beta, gamma), which makes it challenging to quickly and accurately assess radiological impacts resulting from sabotage (e.g., atmospheric transport, projected dose). Since many of the radionuclides produced by nuclear fission contribute an insignificant dose compared to other radionuclides, identifying the top dose-producing radionuclides will accelerate and simplify radiological assessments of research and test reactor releases. Here, we identify the fission radionuclides that contribute significant dose, enabling assessors to conduct consistent, simple, rapid and accurate radiological assessments.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Pebble Bed Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Microreactor Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a microreactor and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for microreactors. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all microreactor designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

GIF Supercritical Water Cooled Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Supercritical Water-cooled Fast reactor (SCFR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) SCWR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the SCWR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of SCWR system designers. It updates the SCWR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF SCWR SSC, follows the highlevel paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the PR&PP features of the eight proposed GIF SCWR designs. Two small modular reactors, the Canadian SSR and the Canada/China/Europe ECC-SMART are also mentioned. An overview of the fuel cycles for the GIF designs are provided. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

GIF Gas Cooled Fast Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Gas-cooled Fast reactor (GFR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) GFR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the GFR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of GFR system designers. It updates the GFR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF GFR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the PR&PP features of the GIF GFR 2400 MWth reference design. The ALLEGRO reactor is also described. The EM2 and HEN MHR reactor are mentioned. An overview of fuel cycle for the GFR reference design and for the ALLEGRO reactor are provided. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

GIF Very High Temperature Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the VHTR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of VHTR system designers. It updates the VHTR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF VHTR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the key points of PR&PP features extracted from the reference designs of VHTRs under consideration in various countries. A major update from the 2011 report is an explicit distinction between prismatic block-type VHTRs and pebble-bed VHTRs. The white paper also provides an overview of the TRISO fuel and fuel cycle. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements

Next-generation reactors will be able to use risk to inform and performance base the licensing of many aspects of the reactor, facility, and site design, including attributes of physical security. There are several factors related to security, including site topography, reactor design, and physical protection system components, to consider when designing the physical protection system into the overall facility design and plan of operation. With the versatility of advanced reactors, especially micro reactors, methods are needed to simplify and quickly evaluate potential timelines for designing a site configuration. This report describes an approach to generate qualitative and quantitative insights using a risk-informed simulation. The modeling process is described in detail, focusing on three aspects: (1) the facility mission time (the time required to control the plant until safe), (2) the attacker timeline (the time to potential sabotage), and (3) the response timeline (the time to counter the facility attack). The modeling capabilities also are extended to include facility physical phenomena such as thermal-hydraulics and heat transfer to capture realistic representation of dynamic changes to a facility. While the plant models and examples are hypothetical and do not represent a real facility, these modeling approaches could be used for future security-by-design engineering in advanced reactors. The outputs and insights from the modeling approach may be used to modify and optimize the security posture of a facility by efficiently making modifications to the model and seeing the overall impact from the modification. Lastly, use of the approach described in this report can also provide the technical basis for a physical protection program, describing how the facility and security strategy will cope with off-normal events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation

Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Testing and Evaluation of Security Response at High-Consequence Nuclear Facilities

High-consequence nuclear facilities are required to implement a physical protection system (PPS) capable of preventing a design basis threat (DBT) adversary from completing radiological sabotage or theft of nuclear material. Response forces are a core component of the PPS. A rigorous testing and evaluation program is required to ensure that the response forces are appropriately trained and equipped and are capable of meeting the regulatory and mission requirements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

U.S. Domestic Security-by-Design: On Site Response Force Strategies

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost- effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and microreactors. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR and microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility and microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and onsite response forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs and microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can lead to efficient security systems that utilize an onsite response force. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

U.S. Domestic Molten Salt Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, economical, and effective physical protection systems (PPS). The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a molten salt reactor (MSR) and show how to effectively design a PPS with a reduced staffing headcount. Specifically, this work focuses on integrating PPS design features into a developed facility layout by making minor modifications to building structures. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D©, PathTrace©, and Blender©, were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic MSR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and responders were added into the model based on defending the hypothetical MSR facility against a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT). Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4–8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic MSRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for small modular reactors (SMRs). The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Modularization of Small Modular Reactor Facilities: Physical Protection Recommendations

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. In consideration of the economic viability of small modular reactor (SMR) facilities, many designers and utilities are considering a modular approach to the construction and operation of these facilities. This modular approach considers building and operating a first unit; once the first reactor is in operation, construction will begin on a second reactor. This process would allow the vendor or utility to ensure production of energy and financial income while the second reactor is under construction. This project evaluates the feasibility of modular construction in terms of physical protection and identifies several recommendations for vendors and utilities considering this approach. To conduct this evaluation, a hypothetical three-unit SMR facility was developed, a physical protection system (PPS) was considered for the design, and a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT) was used to evaluate this PPS. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4-to-8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for SMRs considering modular construction. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Security-by-Design Recommendations for Domestic and International Deployments

This report outlines methods vendors can use to incorporate security-by-design (SeBD) into their microreactor facility design to support and address security for both U.S. and international deployment. The team developed a hypothetical below-grade microreactor with a physical protection system (PPS) to protect the microreactor against acts of theft and sabotage and evaluated it against two adversary attack scenarios defined by a group of adversary subject matter experts (SMEs). The hypothetical microreactor facility consists of two distinct buildings. The first is the above-grade protected area (PA) entry control point (ECP) building, which houses security personnel responsible for conducting screenings and managing access to the PA. The second building is the reactor building, which features both an above-grade floor and a below-grade floor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

URC/HRC Selection Guidance

Given the importance of the URC and HRC thresholds as part of a physical security program that is designed to protect against radiological sabotage, it is important to provide guidance on how to assign those thresholds consistent with a State’s level of risk tolerance. Without such guidance, most States will be challenged to establish appropriate thresholds or appropriately establish regulations. This document provides guidance on establishing dose limits and where they apply, as well as the timeframe for which the dose limits should be measured. For dose limits, it offers examples of established thresholds based on safety and emergency response thresholds. Whereas, for timeframes, a process to identify possible timeframes is offered.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2025

Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.4 Users’ Manual

The Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.4 (RSAC-7) is the newest version of the RSAC legacy code. RSAC-7 calculates the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. Users generates a fission product inventory from either reactor operating history or a nuclear criticality event. RSAC-7 models the effects of high-efficiency particulate air filters or other cleanup systems and calculates the decay and ingrowth during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment. Doses are calculated for inhalation, air immersion, ground surface, ingestion, and cloud gamma pathways. RSAC-7 is used as a tool to evaluate accident conditions in emergency response scenarios, radiological sabotage events, and safety basis accident consequences. This users’ manual contains the mathematical models and operating instructions for RSAC-7. Instructions, screens, and examples are provided to guide the user through the functions provided by RSAC-7. This program is designed for users who are familiar with radiological dose assessment methods.

73 - NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Nuclear Security Risks for HALEU Fuels

There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Technical Evaluation of Self-Protection Dose Rates in U.S. Domestic Nuclear Security Policy

U.S. nuclear security policy uses radiation self-protection as a basis for reducing material attractiveness, but existing dose-rate criteria may not reflect the time scales of theft or sabotage. This report evaluates whether the commonly cited 1 Gy/h at 1 m criterion can plausibly cause adversary task failure during short-duration malicious acts.

Fritchie, Jacob Wesley [Sandia National Laboratori↗