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At least 91 records · Page 5

Guidelines for Implementing Advanced Distribution Management Systems: Requirements for DMS Integration with DERMS and Microgrids

This guideline focuses on the integration of DMS with DERMS and microgrids connected to the distribution grid by defining generic and fundamental design and implementation principles and strategies. It starts by addressing the current status, objectives, and core functionalities of each system, and then discusses the new challenges and the common principles of DMS design and implementation for integration with DERMS and microgrids to realize enhanced grid operation reliability and quality power delivery to consumers while also achieving the maximum energy economics from the DER and microgrid connections.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Influence of Planetary Protection Guidelines on Waste Management Operations

Newly outlined missions in the Space Exploration Initiative include extended human habitation on Mars. During these missions, large amounts of waste materials will be generated in solid, liquid and gaseous form. Returning these wastes to Earth will be extremely costly, and will therefore likely remain on Mars. Untreated, these wastes are a reservoir of live/dead organisms and molecules considered to be "biomarkers" i.e., indicators of life). If released to the planetary surface, these materials can potentially confound exobiology experiments and disrupt Martian ecology indefinitely (if existent). Waste management systems must therefore be specifically designed to control release of problematic materials both during the active phase of the mission, and for any specified post-mission duration. To effectively develop waste management requirements for Mars missions, planetary protection guidelines must first be established. While previous policies for Apollo lunar missions exist, it is anticipated that the increased probability of finding evidence of life on Mars, as well as the lengthy mission durations will initially lead to more conservative planetary protection measures. To facilitate the development of overall requirements for both waste management and planetary protection for future missions, a workshop was conducted to identify how these two areas interface, and to establish a preliminary set of planetary protection guidelines that address waste management operations. This paper provides background regarding past and current planetary protection and waste management issues, and their interactions. A summary of the recommended planetary protection guidelines, anticipated ramifications and research needs for waste management system design for both forward (Mars) and backward (Earth) contamination is also provided.

Hogan, John A.↗

Earth Observations to Assess Impact of Hurricane Katrina on John C. Stennis Space Center

The peril from hurricanes to Space Operations Centers is real and is forecast to continue; Katrina, Rita, and Wilma of 2005 and Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne of 2004 are sufficient motivation for NASA to develop a multi-Center plan for preparedness and response. As was demonstrated at SSC (Stennis Space Center) in response to Hurricane Katrina, NASA Centers are efficiently activated as local command centers, playing host to Federal and State agencies and first responders to coordinate and provide evacuation, relocation, response, and recovery activities. Remote sensing decision support provides critical insight for managing NASA infrastructure and for assisting Center decision makers. Managers require geospatial information to manage the federal city. Immediately following Katrina, SSC s power and network connections were disabled, hardware was inoperative, technical staff was displaced and/or out of contact, and graphical decision support tools were non-existent or less than fully effective. Despite this circumstance, SSC EOC (Emergency Operations Center) implemented response operations to assess damage and to activate recovery plans. To assist Center Managers, the NASA ASP (Applied Sciences Program) made its archive of high-resolution data over the site available. In the weeks and months after the immediate crisis, NASA supplemented this data with high-resolution, post-Katrina imagery over SSC and much of the affected coastal areas. Much of the high-resolution imagery was made available through the Department of Defense Clear View contract and was distributed through U.S. Geological Survey Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science "Hurricane Katrina Disaster Response" Web site. By integrating multiple image data types with other information sources, ASP applied an all-source solutions approach to develop decision support tools that enabled managers to respond to critical issues, such as expedient access to infrastructure and deployment of resources, provision of temporary shelter, logistical control of critical supplies, and the mobilization and coordination of assets from ground crews to aircraft/airspace management. Furthermore, ASP developed information products that illustrate risks to SSC's infrastructure from surge, inundation, and flood. Current plans include developing wind-risk prototype products for refinement and adoption into EOC plans.

Graham, William D.↗

LSE-61: Rubin Observatory Data Management System (DMS) Requirements

This document contains the top-level requirements for the Data Management subsystem of the LSST, when combined with the Data Management-related requirements in the LSST System Requirements (LSR, LSE-29) and Observatory System Specifications (OSS, LSE-30).

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NDMAS System and Process Description

Experimental data generated by the Very High Temperature Reactor Program need to be more available to users in the form of data tables on Web pages that can be downloaded to Excel or in delimited text formats that can be used directly for input to analysis and simulation codes, statistical packages, and graphics software. One solution that can provide current and future researchers with direct access to the data they need, while complying with records management requirements, is the Nuclear Data Management and Analysis System (NDMAS). This report describes the NDMAS system and its components, defines roles and responsibilities, describes the functions the system performs, describes the internal processes the NDMAS team uses to carry out the mission, and describes the hardware and software used to meet Very High Temperature Reactor Program needs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan, Revision 0

The purpose of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Integrated Sampling Plan (referred to herein as the Plan) is to provide a comprehensive, integrated approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the needs and objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. Implementation of this Plan will provide high-quality data required by the UGTA Activity for ensuring public protection in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP). The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements relevant to assessing the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing. This Plan identifies locations to be sampled by corrective action unit (CAU) and location type, sampling frequencies, sample collection methodologies, and the constituents to be analyzed. In addition, the Plan defines data collection criteria such as well-purging requirements, detection levels, and accuracy requirements; identifies reporting and data management requirements; and provides a process to ensure coordination between NNSS groundwater sampling programs for sampling of interest to UGTA. This Plan does not address compliance with requirements for wells that supply the NNSS public water system or wells involved in a permitted activity.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Spaceport operations for deep space missions

Space Station Freedom is designed with the capability to cost-effectively evolve into a transportation node which can support manned lunar and Mars missions. To extend a permanent human presence to the outer planets (moon outposts) and to nearby star systems, additional orbiting space infrastructure and great advances in propulsion system and other technologies will be required. To identify primary operations and management requirements for these deep space missions, an interstellar design concept was developed and analyzed. The assembly, test, servicing, logistics resupply, and increment management techniques anticipated for lunar and Mars missions appear to provide a pattern which can be extended in an analogous manner to deep space missions. A long range, space infrastructure development plan (encompassing deep space missions) coupled with energetic, breakthrough level propulsion research should be initiated now to assist in making the best budget and schedule decisions.

Holt, Alan C.↗

Lessons Learned in Systems Engineering Availability and Recommendations for Mission Technical Leaders

In spaceflight missions at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the Mission System Engineer (MSE) is the technical leader of the overall engineering team and also is the Independent Engineering Technical Authority. The responsibility of this role includes the definition of the mission design architecture, concept of operations, and mission requirements, management of risk throughout the development, and verification and validation of the final system performance and function amongst other duties. This responsibility inherently requires time management, enabling focus on a balanced development with appropriate risk. Time is the most valuable resource of the MSE. The system engineer’s availability to interact with the development team (often product or component design leads and technicians, often in different worksites) to discover and mitigate mission risks during development is key to mission success. This paper presents examples from Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Landsat 9, and Neutron star Interior Composition ExploreR (NICER) which represent in-house and out-of-house hardware builds. These examples demonstrate how interactions between the Mission Systems Engineers and other project and partner engineers result in discovery of critical risks, leading to early mitigation with significant cost and performance savings. These three missions would have suffered test failures or on-orbit failures had their MSEs not set aside time to visit engineers and technicians that were working on key pieces of space flight hardware. Availability is more than just time; it is openness to listen to concerns and questions. It begins by building a level of trust in the team that it is safe to ask questions or share concerns without the fear of blame or additional workload. It also requires enabling informal conversations (over lunch, coffee, in the clean room, or at the team members desk, etc.) where key information can be exchanged, and team members may even provide an easy-to-implement mitigation idea for another subsystem. Availability is a highly valuable commodity and completely non-obvious to protect and optimize. The natural tendency of engineers is to keep themselves busy with solving problems that they know about. This paper is encouraging MSEs to resist this tendency to try and solve all the complex problems themselves and actively devote daily time to learning and solving problems that are found with informal communications with other team members.

Lessons Learned↗

Management Approach for NASA's Earth Venture-1 (EV-1) Airborne Science Investigations

The Earth System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) Program Office (PO) is responsible for programmatic management of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Science Mission Directorate's (SMD) Earth Venture (EV) missions. EV is composed of both orbital and suborbital Earth science missions. The first of the Earth Venture missions is EV-1, which are Principal Investigator-led, temporally-sustained, suborbital (airborne) science investigations costcapped at $30M each over five years. Traditional orbital procedures, processes and standards used to manage previous ESSP missions, while effective, are disproportionally comprehensive for suborbital missions. Conversely, existing airborne practices are primarily intended for smaller, temporally shorter investigations, and traditionally managed directly by a program scientist as opposed to a program office such as ESSP. In 2010, ESSP crafted a management approach for the successful implementation of the EV-1 missions within the constructs of current governance models. NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements form the foundation of the approach for EV-1. Additionally, requirements from other existing NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs), systems engineering guidance and management handbooks were adapted to manage programmatic, technical, schedule, cost elements and risk. As the EV-1 missions are nearly at the end of their successful execution and project lifecycle and the submission deadline of the next mission proposals near, the ESSP PO is taking the lessons learned and updated the programmatic management approach for all future Earth Venture Suborbital (EVS) missions for an even more flexible and streamlined management approach.

Guillory, Anthony R.↗

Global Security Program Management Plan

The Global Security Directorate mission is to protect against proliferant and unconventional nuclear threats –regardless of origin - and emerging new threats. This mission is accomplished as the Los Alamos National Laboratory staff completes projects for our numerous sponsors. The purpose of this Program Management Plan is to establish and clearly describe the GS program management requirements including instructions that are essential for the successful management of projects in accordance with our sponsor requirements. The detailed information provided in this document applies to all LANL staff and their subcontractors that are performing GS portfolio work. GS management is committed to a culture that ensures effective planning, execution, and achievement of measurable results in accordance with the GS mission. Outcomes of such a culture result in better communication, delegated authority, accountability, and increased emphasis on safely and securely achieving GS objectives.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA's acquisition requirements for configuration management

A viewgraph presentation on NASA's acquisition requirements for configuration management (CM) goes over CM requirements for single mission and multi-mission orientations, CM automation and CALS implementation initiatives, NASA implementation of DOD standards and DID's (data item descriptions), impact of traceability in NASA CM support, NASA's CM efforts in modifying/upgrading equipment, and CM control of multi-vendor hardware.

Coletta, Mark P.↗

Space shuttle program: Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory. Volume 7: Logistics management plan

The logistics management plan for the shuttle avionics integration laboratory defines the organization, disciplines, and methodology for managing and controlling logistics support. Those elements requiring management include maintainability and reliability, maintenance planning, support and test equipment, supply support, transportation and handling, technical data, facilities, personnel and training, funding, and management data.

Source record↗

Baseline experimental investigation of an electrohydrodynamically assisted heat pipe

The increases in power demand and associated thermal management requirements of future space programs such as potential Lunar/Mars missions will require enhancing the operating efficiencies of thermal management devices. Currently, the use of electrohydrodynamically (EHD) assisted thermal control devices is under consideration as a potential method of increasing thermal management system capacity. The objectives of the currently described investigation included completing build-up of the EHD-Assisted Heat Pipe Test bed, developing test procedures for an experimental evaluation of the unassisted heat pipe, developing an analytical model capable of predicting the performance limits of the unassisted heat pipe, and obtaining experimental data which would define the performance characteristics of the unassisted heat pipe. The information obtained in the currently proposed study will be used in order to provide extensive comparisons with the EHD-assisted performance observations to be obtained during the continuing investigation of EHD-Assisted heat transfer devices. Through comparisons of the baseline test bed data and the EHD assisted test bed data, accurate insight into the performance enhancing characteristics of EHD augmentation may be obtained. This may lead to optimization, development, and implementation of EHD technology for future space programs.

Duncan, A. B.↗

Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts management and control requirements for NASA space flight programs

This document establishes electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts management and control requirements for contractors providing and maintaining space flight and mission-essential or critical ground support equipment for NASA space flight programs. Although the text is worded 'the contractor shall,' the requirements are also to be used by NASA Headquarters and field installations for developing program/project parts management and control requirements for in-house and contracted efforts. This document places increased emphasis on parts programs to ensure that reliability and quality are considered through adequate consideration of the selection, control, and application of parts. It is the intent of this document to identify disciplines that can be implemented to obtain reliable parts which meet mission needs. The parts management and control requirements described in this document are to be selectively applied, based on equipment class and mission needs. Individual equipment needs should be evaluated to determine the extent to which each requirement should be implemented on a procurement. Utilization of this document does not preclude the usage of other documents. The entire process of developing and implementing requirements is referred to as 'tailoring' the program for a specific project. Some factors that should be considered in this tailoring process include program phase, equipment category and criticality, equipment complexity, and mission requirements. Parts management and control requirements advocated by this document directly support the concept of 'reliability by design' and are an integral part of system reliability and maintainability. Achieving the required availability and mission success objectives during operation depends on the attention given reliability and maintainability in the design phase. Consequently, it is intended that the requirements described in this document are consistent with those of NASA publications, 'Reliability Program Requirements for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors,' NHB 5300.4(1A-l); 'Maintainability Program Requirements for Space Systems,' NHB 5300.4(1E); and 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors,' NHB 5300.4(1B).

Source record↗