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DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Security Interface Considerations for Regaining Control of Discovered Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Recognizing that regaining control of orphan radioactive and nuclear material is challenging, the international community has developed requirements and guidance to support countries in addressing the problem. However, limited guidance is available on the practical nuclear security related issues that arise when nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC) is encountered and efforts are undertaken to regain control. For example, the IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-19, “National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources”, provides recommendations on a methodology for establishing a national strategy for regaining control of orphan sources. However, except for Pu239 in radioactive sources, nuclear material is outside the scope of this safety guide, and practical safety and security measures below the level of national strategy are not discussed adequately.This paper discusses the interfaces between the stakeholder groups and the responsibilities of each when encountering common scenarios that deal with MORC transitioning to regulatory control. The stakeholders include but are not limited to individuals who encounter MORC, and providers of formal and informal transport systems, and traditional and ad hoc storage solutions. This paper explores practical legal, financial, and institutional issues that hinder implementation of required safety and security practices. This paper also offers strategies that can be implemented on the individual, organizational, national, and international level to regain control of MORC.

Shannon, Michael↗

DOE OSTI2023

Recent Radioactive Material Package Testing Experiences at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was a pioneer in the testing of radioactive material shipping packages and has been performing such tests for over 50 years. Currently, except for Type B thermal tests, testing is performed at the purpose-built Packaging Research Facility that is located at the National Transportation Research Center - a U.S. Department of Energy User Facility. Packages used for the transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials must be capable of meeting normal conditions of transportation (NCT) requirements and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) requirements as defined in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71. Evaluation of package designs to these criteria typically involves a combination of analysis and physical testing. Required physical tests include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Packaging Evaluation Facility (PEF) at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) provides an inclusive testing capability for a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. Since PATRAM 2019, ORNL has performed several sets of tests including testing of two designs of the Defense Program Package (DPP-3 and DPP-1) and several Special Form Capsules. This paper provides an overview of the testing performed as well as a summary of advancements made to the ORNL package testing program during that time.

Martinez, Oscar↗

DOE OSTI2023

Methods of isolating radioactive mercury and uses thereof

Provided herein are methods of isolating and using radioactive mercury. In particular, provided herein are methods of isolating radioactive mercury including the use of a thiacrown ether, and using the isolated radioactive mercury in therapeutic and/or imaging applications.

Despotopulos, John↗

DOE OSTI2023

Evaluating and Countering the Insider Threat to the Radioactive Source Supply Chain

The modern supply chain is a global enterprise and little drove this home more than the global COVID-19 pandemic which sent economic shockwaves throughout the world. Many goods became scarce, as products were delayed, in limited supply, or simply not available. The suddenly diminished supply collided with still high demand and led to greatly increased costs. This was particularly true for the radioactive source supply chain. The pandemic introduced extensive delays for construction projects, slowed the transport of radiological materials to facilities, interrupted treatment deliveries, and impaired the mobility of contractors across the industry. All of these concerns not only adversely affected the economy, but also impacted the safety and security of radiological material, potentially raising national security concerns. The vulnerability of the supply chain, a critical element in an increasingly interconnected world, was exposed. One example that challenged the adaptive capacity of the overall supply chain is the Ever Given container ship, which became stuck in the Suez Canal in 2020. This accident immediately shut down shipments that accounted for 12% of global trade, with long-term impacts estimated to be much larger. Developing the ability to anticipate and react in real-time to sudden changes has quickly become a necessity, particularly in industries that deal with the transport of hazardous material. The reaction to these dramatic incidents was to largely focus attention and resources on protecting the supply chain from external threats. However, the threat to the radioactive material supply chain from insiders intimately involved in the process may be even greater and remains a blind spot that requires increased attention. Recent events revealed the blueprint for targeting and disrupting that supply chain, so the potential for a malicious insider—or a manipulated, unwitting insider—to take advantage of this vulnerability is elevated, creating security concerns for radiological industries. This paper examines and analyzes the potential insider threat to the radioactive source supply chain and recommends steps to take to counter this possibility.

Kinney, Justin↗

DOE OSTI2023

Low-Radioactivity Argon for Rare-Event Searches

39Ar and 42Ar produce irreducible backgrounds for several argon-based dark matter and neutrino experiments. The use of low-radioactivity underground argon (UAr) could be a solution to the problem. The DarkSide-50 experiment demonstrated that argon derived from underground sources can contain a much lower concentration of 39Ar than atmospheric argon. Following this success, the Global Argon Dark Matter Collaboration (GADMC) is procuring hundreds of tons of UAr for the DarkSide-20k detector. To serve the broader community need, it is increasingly important to identify new sources of low-radioactivity argon. In addition, understanding the underground production mechanisms of argon radioisotopes and devising methods to measure them at ultra-low levels is necessary. The use of low-radioactivity argon could be crucial to expanding the physics goals and sensitivity of next-generation large-scale argon-based experiments.

Radioargon isotopes, Underground argon, Isotope pr↗

DOE OSTI2025

Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Packaging Technology group proposed a closure design for the outer packaging of a prototype Type B shipping package being developed for the Department of Energy (DOE). The closure design provides an efficient means of securing the containment vessel (CV) within the radioactive material packaging. This design has a simplified operation, requires less components, and less maintenance when compared to current radioactive material package closure methods. This paper will review and discuss the materials, designs, processes, and testing activities that were considered and pursued in the development of the novel closure for the outer packaging of new radioactive material shipping packages.

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗

DOE OSTI2020

Peer Review Comments on the Authorized Limits Technical Document (OREM-19-2573) for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at the U.S. Department of Energy Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Argonne National Laboratory is assigned responsibility by DOE/EM-4 to conduct a peer review of the proposed Authorized Limits (ALs) for disposal of waste containing residual radioactive material at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ALs document package (Document Number OREM-19-2573, dated May 2020) was sent to Argonne by DOE on June 1, 2020 (Oak Ridge 2020a). Argonne started the review immediately and held several BlueJeans meetings with Oak Ridge and DOE to discuss review comments. The first BlueJeans meeting was June 17, 2020. Oak Ridge presented a briefing of the AL package, followed by discussion of the assumptions, methodology, and parameters used in the analysis. A follow-up BlueJeans meeting was held on June 24, 2020, at which Argonne presented both general and specific review comments in PowerPoint slides. This set of slides - Review Comments on the “Authorized Limits for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at DOE Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee” - was then emailed to Oak Ridge and DOE after the BlueJeans meeting on June 24, 2020. A PDF version of this slide set is included as Appendix A.