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Summary

An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system. The MSET process is divided into four distinct and separate parts: (1) Completion of the questionnaire that assembles information about the operations of every aspect of the MPC&A system; (2) Conversion of questionnaire data into numeric values associated with risk; (3) Analysis of the numeric data utilizing the MPC&A fault tree and the SAPHIRE computer software; and (4) Self-assessment using the MSET reports to perform the effectiveness evaluation of the facility's MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. If the need for system improvements or upgrades is indicated when the system is analyzed, MSET provides the capability to evaluate potential or actual system improvements or upgrades. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time. The system can be reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential system improvement can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance and reveals where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk. The functional model, the system risk assessment tool, and the facility evaluation questionnaire are valuable educational tools for MPC&A personnel. These educational tools provide a framework for ongoing dialogue between organizations regarding the design, development, implementation, operation, assessment, and sustainability of MPC&A systems. An organization considering the use of MSET as an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of its MPC&A system will benefit from conducting a complete MSET exercise at an existing nuclear facility.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Material Control and Accounting Design Considerations for High-Temperature Gas Reactors

The subject of this report is domestic safeguards and security by design (2SBD) for high-temperature gas reactors, focusing on material control and accountability (MC&A). The motivation for the report is to provide 2SBD support to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project, which was launched by Congress in 2005. This introductory section will provide some background on the NGNP project and an overview of the 2SBD concept. The remaining chapters focus specifically on design aspects of the candidate high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) relevant to MC&A, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, and proposed MC&A approaches for the two major HTGR reactor types: pebble bed and prismatic. Of the prismatic type, two candidates are under consideration: (1) GA's GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor), and (2) the Modular High-Temperature Reactor (M-HTR), a derivative of Areva's Antares reactor. The future of the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) for NGNP is uncertain, as the PBMR consortium partners (Westinghouse, PBMR [Pty] and The Shaw Group) were unable to agree on the path forward for NGNP during 2010. However, during the technology assessment of the conceptual design phase (Phase 1) of the NGNP project, AREVA provided design information and technology assessment of their pebble bed fueled plant design called the HTR-Module concept. AREVA does not intend to pursue this design for NGNP, preferring instead a modular reactor based on the prismatic Antares concept. Since MC&A relevant design information is available for both pebble concepts, the pebble-bed HTGRs considered in this report are: (1) Westinghouse PBMR; and (2) AREVA HTR-Module. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program (FCR&D), which contains an element specifically focused on the domestic (or state) aspects of SBD. This Material Protection, Control and Accountancy Technology (MPACT) program supports the present work summarized in this report, namely the development of guidance to support the consideration of MC&A in the design of both pebble-bed and prismatic-fueled HTGRs. The objective is to identify and incorporate design features into the facility design that will cost effectively aid in making MC&A more effective and efficient, with minimum impact on operations. The theft of nuclear material is addressed through both MC&A and physical protection, while the threat of sabotage is addressed principally through physical protection.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

System Effectiveness

An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. It is critical that a nuclear facility conduct a thorough self-assessment of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system to evaluate system effectiveness. Self-assessment involves vulnerability analysis and performance testing of the MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. Analysis of the MPC&A system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. Self-assessment helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's MPC&A system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MPC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MPC&A functions based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time and reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential performance improvement or system upgrade can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance. The analyses reveal where performance degradation has the greatest detrimental impact on total system risk and where performance improvements have the greatest reduction in system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction actually achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Electrical substation grid testbed for DLT applications of electrical fault detection, power quality monitoring, DERs use cases and cyber-events

Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substation, and are associated with customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs). The integrity and confidentiality of data from these IEDs, like power meters and protective relays, is crucial. Blockchain technology could improve the resilience of microgrids by improving the security of data sharing. The penetration of customer-owned DERs (renewable energy sources) and the increasing deployment of IEDs can lead to integrate power system applications with Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). In this study, we implemented the electrical faulted phase detection and power quality monitoring algorithms with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. In addition, the DERs (wind turbine farms) use case and protective relay cyber-event tests were assessed, by using the CGG system with DLT. In the experimental model, the testbed was created by using a real-time simulator and CGG system with power meters/ protective relays in-the-loop. The data collected from the CGG system and IEDs were compared with the same time stamp source. These results had shown the successful assessment of protection, control and monitoring applications using a CGG system with DLT. In the future, the ESGT with DERs and the CGG system will be used in other power system applications, based on implementing smart contracts between electrical utilities with customer-owned DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Trans-oceanic Remote Power Hardware-in-the-Loop: Multi-site Hardware, Integrated Controller, and Electric Network Co-simulation

Electric system operators are increasingly concerned with the potential system-wide impacts of the large-scale integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) including voltage control, protection coordination, and equipment wear. This prompts a need for new simulation techniques that can simultaneously capture all the components of these large integrated smart grid systems. This paper describes a novel platform that combines three emerging research areas: power systems co-simulation, power hardware in the loop (PHIL) simulation, and lab-lab links. The platform is distributed, real-time capable, allows for easy internet-based connection from geographically-dispersed participants, and is software platform agnostic. We demonstrate its utility by studying real-time PHIL co-simulation of coordinated solar PV firming control of two inverters connected in multiple electric distribution network models, prototypical of U.S. and Australian systems. Here, the novel trans-pacific closed-loop system simulation was conducted in real-time using a power network simulator and physical PV/battery inverter at power at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Golden, CO, USA and a physical PV inverter at power at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation's Energy Centre in Newcastle, NSW, Australia. This capability enables smart grid researchers throughout the world to leverage their unique simulation capabilities for multi-site collaborations that can effectively simulate and validate emerging smart grid technology solutions.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Conversion of Questionnaire Data

During the survey, respondents are asked to provide qualitative answers (well, adequate, needs improvement) on how well material control and accountability (MC&A) functions are being performed. These responses can be used to develop failure probabilities for basic events performed during routine operation of the MC&A systems. The failure frequencies for individual events may be used to estimate total system effectiveness using a fault tree in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Numeric risk values are required for the PRA fault tree calculations that are performed to evaluate system effectiveness. So, the performance ratings in the questionnaire must be converted to relative risk values for all of the basic MC&A tasks performed in the facility. If a specific material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) task is being performed at the 'perfect' level, the task is considered to have a near zero risk of failure. If the task is performed at a less than perfect level, the deficiency in performance represents some risk of failure for the event. As the degree of deficiency in performance increases, the risk of failure increases. If a task that should be performed is not being performed, that task is in a state of failure. The failure probabilities of all basic events contribute to the total system risk. Conversion of questionnaire MPC&A system performance data to numeric values is a separate function from the process of completing the questionnaire. When specific questions in the questionnaire are answered, the focus is on correctly assessing and reporting, in an adjectival manner, the actual performance of the related MC&A function. Prior to conversion, consideration should not be given to the numeric value that will be assigned during the conversion process. In the conversion process, adjectival responses to questions on system performance are quantified based on a log normal scale typically used in human error analysis (see A.D. Swain and H.E. Guttmann, 'Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications,' NUREG/CR-1278). This conversion produces the basic event risk of failure values required for the fault tree calculations. The fault tree is a deductive logic structure that corresponds to the operational nuclear MC&A system at a nuclear facility. The conventional Delphi process is a time-honored approach commonly used in the risk assessment field to extract numerical values for the failure rates of actions or activities when statistically significant data is absent.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

International Nuclear Security

This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; and (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Status of Activities to Implement a Sustainable System of MC&A Equipment and Methodological Support at Rosatom Facilities

Under the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program, the Material Control and Accounting Measurements (MCAM) Project has supported a joint U.S.-Russian effort to coordinate improvements of the Russian MC&A measurement system. These efforts have resulted in the development of a MC&A Equipment and Methodological Support (MEMS) Strategic Plan (SP), developed by the Russian MEM Working Group. The MEMS SP covers implementation of MC&A measurement equipment, as well as the development, attestation and implementation of measurement methodologies and reference materials at the facility and industry levels. This paper provides an overview of the activities conducted under the MEMS SP, as well as a status on current efforts to develop reference materials, implement destructive and nondestructive assay measurement methodologies, and implement sample exchange, scrap and holdup measurement programs across Russian nuclear facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former "Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security" at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that "good security is 20% equipment and 80% people." Although eliminating the "human factor" is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Developments in the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Engineering Degree Program at Tomsk Polytechnic University

Over the last six years, Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU) has developed a 5½ year engineering degree program in the field of Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A). In 2009 the first students graduated with this new degree. There were 25 job offers from nuclear fuel cycle enterprises of Russia and Kazakhstan for 17 graduates of the program. Due to the rather wide selection of workplaces, all graduates have obtained positions at nuclear enterprises. The program was developed within the Applied Physics and Engineering Department (APED). The laboratory and methodological base has been created taking into consideration the experience of the similar program at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI). However, the TPU program has some distinguishing features such as the inclusion of special courses pertaining to fuel enrichment and reprocessing. During the last two years, three MPC&A laboratories have been established at APED. This was made possible due to several factors such as establishment of the State innovative educational program at TPU, assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy through Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the financial support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and some Russian private companies. All three of the MPC&A laboratories are part of the Innovative Educational Center “Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation,” which deals with many topics including research activities, development of new curricula for experts training and retraining, and training of master’s students. In 2008, TPU developed a relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was familiarized with APED’s current resources and activities. The IAEA has shown interest in creation of a master’s degree educational program in the field of nuclear security at TPU. A future objective is to acquaint nuclear fuel cycle enterprises with new APED capabilities and involve the enterprises in the scientific and educational projects implemented through the Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Center. This paper describes the development of the MPC&A engineering degree program and future goals of TPU in the field of nonproliferation education.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Material Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Implementation Plan: Lab-Scale Demonstration of Advanced Safeguard and Security Systems

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is working towards the goal of developing and demonstrating the next generation of nuclear materials management for the peaceful use of civilian nuclear energy. A major milestone of the campaign is the “Lab-scale demonstration of an advanced safeguards and security system,” due in 2020. This implementation plan describes how tools developed in the MPACT campaign will be used to meet this milestone. These tools consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modelling, simulation and integration of data and information for safeguard and security analysis. The plan is focused on demonstrating an advanced safeguard and security systems for electrochemical processing plants, but also identifies activities needed to address advanced reactor, aqueous processing and other advanced fuel cycle facilities. A key component to achieving the 2020 milestone is the development of a virtual distributed test bed that incorporates the instruments, data, analysis tools, and models currently under development and provides a framework to link and normalize the data in a way that simulates a facility, including uncertainty quantification. This virtual distributed test bed will integrate computer simulated facilities that make up a fuel cycle of interest, with distributed test beds located in actual operating facilities and laboratories. The MPACT campaign recently issued roadmaps for both Modelling & Simulation and Advanced Integration which address this component, and activities necessary to achieve the 2020 milestone. Research, development and testing of specific technologies have been supported by the MPACT campaign in coordination with other DOE-NE and DOE-NNSA programs. These technologies provide the essential data needed by the safeguard and security systems, and feed into the data analysis and facility models. This plan will identify these technologies, their current status and activities needed to demonstrate the technologies at the laboratory scale. Wherever possible, test of technologies in field conditions using suitable nuclear materials will be used to define performance. Where necessary, surrogate materials and/or simulation will be used to provide useful information for the demonstration. When completed, the 2020 milestone will provide a demonstration of advanced safeguard and security technologies, including advanced modelling, simulation and analysis approaches, applied to electrochemical processing. It will also identify applications of the technology and approaches in other advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Charaterization of Emerging Computing Architectures for Dynamic Simulation of Future Power Grids with Large-Scale Power Electronics

The increasing penetration of power electronics in power grids significantly raises the computing requirements in a real-time (and/or fast) simulation of the power grid. The real-time simulation is an enabler for evaluating controllers, protection systems, new equipment, and twinning. In this paper, emerging computing architectures such as tensor processing units (TPU), neural/neuromorphic processing units (NPU), and quantum processing units (QPU) are introduced and characterized for the real-time (and/or fast) simulation of power electronics-dominated power grids. The metrics and the process to characterize emerging computing architectures to perform real-time (and/or fast) simulations of future power grids with power electronics are discussed. Three of the emerging computing units are characterized based on these metrics and the process developed. This characterization will enable identification and comparison of emerging computing architectures that can perform real-time (and/or fast) simulation of future power grids.

Choi, Jongchan↗

Automated Controller Hardware-In-The-Loop Testbed for EV Charger Resilience Analysis

This paper focuses on the development of a tool that includes an automated testbed with controls, protection, and communications integrated into a real-time system to provide a platform to generate data sets for failure modes and effects analysis. This tool establishes a value for automation of data generation for different scenarios and addresses the gap of nonexistent field data for different applications and use cases. The features of this tool can further be expanded to include multiple power electronics models, communication protocols, and scaled system architectures. This general framework was evaluated for a DC fast charger system use case to provide quantitative solution for resiliency.

Starke, Michael↗

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗

Microgrid Design, Development and Demonstration - Final Report for Phase I and Phase II

This document constitutes GE’s final report for the Microgrid Design, Development and Demonstration program for DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Award DE-FC02-05CH11349. It contains the final report for Phase I in Appendix I, and the results the work performed in Phase II. The program goal was to develop and demonstrate a Microgrid Energy Management (MEM) framework for a broad set of Microgrid applications that provides unified controls, protection, and energy management. This project contributed to the achievement of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Renewable and Distributed Systems Integration Program goals by developing a fully automated power delivery microgrid network that: - Reduces carbon emissions and emissions of other air pollutants through increased use of optimally dispatched renewable energy, - Increases asset use through integration of distributed systems, - Enhances reliability, security, and resiliency from microgrid applications in critical infrastructure protection, constrained areas of the electric grid, etc. - Improves system efficiency with on-site, distributed generation and improved economic efficiency through demand-side management.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

2017 NE-4 Nuclear Technologies Research and Development (NTRD) Achievements Report

Fiscal year (FY) 2017 initiated new and reestablished presidential and departmental nuclear energy priorities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) that will: • Support the Administration’s priorities to achieve U.S. energy dominance and economic prosperity through U.S. technology leadership • Support DOE-NE mission priorities and goals for the existing nuclear fleet, advanced reactor pipeline and national fuel cycle infrastructure • Focus on early stage research, and effective cooperation with industry, academia, and other government agencies • Propose investments to maintain and improve capabilities and infrastructure to conduct leading-edge science, research, and technology development. DOE-NE’s mission priorities will focus on the existing nuclear fleet, advanced reactor pipeline, and fuel cycle infrastructure. Therefore, the DOE Nuclear Technology Research and Development (NE-4) mission aligned to (1) support the research and development (R&D) of innovative reactor technologies that may offer improved safety, functionality, and affordability and (2) conduct research to reduce long-term technical barriers for advanced nuclear energy systems, including space fission systems. Key activities to execute this mission include: • To achieve the NE-4 mission priorities, two major programs with eight R&D campaigns are engaged in impactful research, development, demonstration, and deployment: Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) Program • Fuel Cycle Options Campaign evaluates complex fuel cycle options and provides performance metrics on various systems and scenarios to improve the knowledge of interdependencies between technologies and different systems. • Advanced Fuels Campaign performs science-based R&D on accident tolerant fuels in addition to advanced light-water reactor (LWR) fuel and transmutation fuel. • Joint Fuel Cycle Studies (JFCS) is a collaboration with the Republic of Korea to assess the feasibility and nonproliferation of electrochemical recycling to manage used fuel. • Material Recovery and Waste Form Development (MRWFD) Campaign researches advanced fuel cycle material recovery and waste management capabilities to improve fuel cycle performance with less processing and waste generation. • Material Protection, Control, and Accountability Technologies (MPACT) Program develops tools and capabilities to secure the next generation nuclear materials management and safeguards for nuclear fuel cycles. Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Program • Fast Reactors Campaign targets benefits in either resource utilization or waste management and possesses favorable features for small reactor applications and plutonium management. • Gas-Cooled Reactors Campaign seeks to raise the technological readiness of high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) and other reactor concepts utilizing coated particle fuel, graphite, or helium coolant by performing high risk, enabling research and development that commercial developers are unable or unwilling to undertake in the current energy market. • ART Energy Conversion (EC) Project provides solutions to convert heat from an advanced reactor to useful products that support commercial application of the reactor designs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Design and Integration of High Precision Superconducting Magnet Power Supply Systems

This paper reviews the design and integration approach being taken to power more than 400 superconducting magnets in Electron Ion Collider (EIC) by power supplies ranging from 20V to 400V and 100A to 18kA. A major challenge is to integrate existing legacy power supplies with new high current systems and maximize performance and reduce costs. Successful implementation requires coordinated integration of power convertors, current regulation, quench protection, energy extraction, machine protection, controls and existing accelerator infrastructure.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗