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Physical & Cyber Security Modeling Interfacing Through Dante and ARCADE

Physical security is increasingly facing new threats from cyber attackers, for which there is little research in the way of characterizing this threat. This report discusses the efforts to combine cyber and physical security modeling tools to investigate this novel combinatorial threat space. To accomplish this, the Dante force-on-force modeling and simulation software and the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) were integrated. Dante provides a 3D environment which models the physical world, while ARCADE provides the cyber and control systems world.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Physical Lab Security: Before and After World War II

Physical security during World War II was important to maintaining the secrecy of the Manhattan Project, the government’s wartime effort to create the atomic bomb. In a perceived race against Nazi Germany to do so, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Lab’s first director, and General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, needed a secluded place to build the clandestine Lab.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantum Lock Technologies: Innovation Crossroads Final Report

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022). Below is a photograph of myself at an energy substation where we plan to eventually apply our technology.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

CRADA Number NFE-20-08292 with Quantum Lock Technologies LLC (CRADA Final Report)

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Quantum Lock Technologies: Innovation Crossroads Final CRADA Report

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022). Below is a photograph of myself at an energy substation where we plan to eventually apply our technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗

INTEGRATION OF FLEX EQUIPMENT AND OPERATOR ACTIONS IN PLANT FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELS WITH DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of the total cost of power generation, with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interaction with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined that physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants. Labor costs continue to rise in the U.S., so any measures to reduce the cost of operating a nuclear power plant will need to include a reduction in labor. The physical security pathway within the DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) portable equipment performance with Force on Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant. Two different FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial Force on Force tool are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in INL’s dynamic modeling tool EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework integrating FLEX equipment with Force on Force models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Methods for the Enhancement of Security Probabilistic Risk Assessments

The US Department of Energy is exploring the methods associated with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and how they could be used to enhance physical security evaluations for nuclear facilities. A brief review of both international and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission physical security assessment methods is presented. From this review, and with an understanding of the technical elements associated with a traditional nuclear safety PRA, several observations are made pertaining to where physical security analysis methods could be enhanced. These observations principally support and enhance the answers within a physical security context to the risk triplet: (1) What can go wrong? (2) What is the likelihood? and (3) What are the consequences? Finally, benefits and technical challenges toward the development of a full security PRA are presented.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

An Advanced Cyber-Physical System Security Testbed for Substation Automation

A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) testbed serves as a powerful platform for testing and validating cyber intrusion detection and mitigation strategies in substations. This study presents the design and development of a CPS testbed that can effectively assess the real-time dynamics of a substation. Cyber attacks exploiting IEC 61850-based SV and GOOSE protocols are demonstrated using the testbed, along with an analysis on attack detection. Realistic timing measurements are obtained, and the time frames for deploying detection and mitigation strategies are evaluated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Precoder Design for Physical-Layer Security and Authentication in Massive MIMO UAV Communications

Supporting reliable and seamless wireless connectivity for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has recently become a critical requirement to enable various different use cases of UAVs. Due to their widespread deployment footprint, cellular networks can support beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) communications for UAVs. In this paper, we consider cellular connected UAVs (C-UAVs) that are served by massive multiple input-multiple-output (MIMO) links to extend coverage range, while also improving physical layer security and authentication. Here, we consider Rician channel and propose a novel linear precoder design for transmitting data and artificial noise (AN). We derive the closed-form expression of the ergodic secrecy rate of CUAVs for both conventional and proposed precoder designs. In addition, we obtain the optimal power splitting factor that divides the power between data and AN by asymptotic analysis. Then, we apply the proposed precoder design in the fingerprint embedding authentication framework, where the goal is to minimize the probability of detection of the authentication tag at an eavesdropper. In simulation results, we show the superiority of the proposed precoder in both secrecy rate and the authentication probability considering moderate and large number of antenna massive MIMO scenarios.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Dante

SAND2022-12905 O Dante is a physical security simulation package used in evaluating protective staffing and physical security elements against adversarial threats. Dante simulates force-on-force scenarios in a batch Monte Carlo process. Analysts use the included Scenario Editor to define the scenarios for their site and then execute and analyze the results using the Batch Manager tool. Dante provides insight into how well a security system performs against threats and lets analysts mine the results for key indicators of system performance. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Hart, Brian↗

Evaluation of IEC 62443 Standard Gaps for Electric Grid Substation Model Use Case

This report presents an evaluation of the IEC 62443 standards in the context of electric grid substations, as part of a collaborative effort among Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The primary objective is to assess the applicability of these standards to enhance cybersecurity measures for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) within the energy sector. The evaluation identifies strengths, such as the scalability of security levels and the structured lifecycle guidance provided by IEC 62443. However, it also highlights significant gaps, including limited integration of physical security, insufficient guidance for legacy systems, and challenges in addressing emerging threats like supply chain vulnerabilities. Recommendations for refining the standards are proposed, including the need for tailored guidance for securing legacy systems, integrating physical security with cybersecurity frameworks, and enhancing interoperability across multi-vendor environments. By addressing these gaps, the IEC 62443 standards can be strengthened to ensure comprehensive cybersecurity for electric grid substations, thereby supporting the resilience and reliability of critical energy infrastructure.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security - Advanced Delay Technologies

As a new generation of reactors is developed, reducing the cost of physical security without impacting the required system effectiveness will help to make new reactors economical. This report discusses several access delay technologies available to help improve the overall effectiveness of the physical security system. These technologies include both passive and active delay elements, as well as guidance on best practices related to security by design principles.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Site Integration and Regulatory Considerations for a Nuclear Power Plant Colocated with Industrial Facilities: Colocation Studies for a Petroleum Refinery, Methanol Plant, and Wood Pulp Plant

This research explores the colocation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) with industrial applications. Three existing industrial sites were considered to demonstrate the siting process and illuminate technological gaps for future work. The three applications demonstrated for colocation here are a petroleum refinery, a methanol production plant, and a pulp and paper plant. This study uses a modified version of the EPRI siting criteria to explore the geological and demographic characteristics of the location of the current industrial site, as well as exploring external hazards from the industrial plant and its surrounding land use. Data was collected from public databases to estimate site characteristics. We then discuss how the site characteristics may impact the ability to colocate an NPP with an industrial application. The application site and 5 additional sites were explored for each application to give a general indication of the siting implications for an NPP in each area. The hazards for each industrial application was also explored to determine how colocation may impact reactor safety. The following gaps have been identified and should be explored in future research on colocation of NPPs with petroleum refineries, methanol plants, and pulp and paper plants: - There is a variety of industrial use, hazards, and pipelines in the surrounding area. A more thorough review of these hazards should be considered for colocation. - In general, the whole region around some applications seems to have softer soil, with implications for large site preparation costs. Further site investigations should prioritize looking into the geotechnical conditions. - Applications along coastlines are susceptible to flooding and hurricanes. The benefits of colocation should be weighed against the potential design implications. - The benefits of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in place should be explored further. If heat supply from the NPP is not required or not feasible due to the distance between the NPP and the application, there may be an opportunity to supply hydrogen to the plant through an existing pipeline. - Because there are several collocated industrial plants in the regions for the refinery and methanol plant, the benefits of sharing resources from the NPP should be explored further. This may open up additional sites for colocation. The following knowledge gaps were identified for the colocation of NPPs with these three industries, and industrial applications in general. These gaps are: - While the STAND tool contains many important characteristics for the reactor siting process, it is not calibrated for the colocation of NPPs with industrial facilities. - There are aspects of both the NPP and industrial application that need to be quantified for a siting analysis. Particularly, we need to understand the water intake requirements for NPPs and each application. - Further work may focus on adapting the STAND site comparison methodology to comparison of sites for co-location. This will involve using the data documented in this report as a starting point and performing a comprehensive and quantitative comparison. - Without spending significant resources, it would be impossible to gather data for each site to evaluate all aspects of siting. One approach to finding data and understanding its implications to siting is looking at FSARs for existing plants. For example, most sites considered in this study have small Vs30 values, indicating soft soil. However, there are NPPs located in the vicinity of most of the sites (e.g., Waterford Steam Electric Station near New Orleans) and reviewing available site characteristics and geotechnical data for these NPPs, might provide further information for siting. - The siting analysis in this study indicates that colocation of the NPP with the industrial site could be difficult based on external hazards, cooling requirements, weather, or population. We need to determine the impact of distance between the two facilities on cost and quality of energy transport. - This study did not touch on socioeconomic impacts for NPP colocation with industrial facilities. The input-output analysis methodology could be applied to the communities referenced in this study to determine the socioeconomic impact of these projects. - Similarly, the impacts of colocation on emergency planning was not explored in this study. The impacts on emergency planning infrastructure are somewhat related to the socioeconomic impacts, and could be explored using a similar methodology. - This study also did not address physical and cybersecurity, which will be important aspects of co-location [ref] . Cybersecurity will be important, regardless of the distance, but physical security will be important if the facilities are located very closely. Physical security might also be important for the steam lines between the plants, unless they are determined to be non-safety significant. - In many site l

08 HYDROGEN↗