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Characterization of 6 Li-loaded pulse-shape-discriminating plastic scintillators

Lithium-loaded organic plastic scintillators combine sensitivity to γ rays with the ability to detect both fast and slow neutrons, making them valuable for applications in nuclear security and in basic nuclear and particle physics. The goal of this work is to characterize the neutron response of two custom lithium-loaded organic plastic scintillators developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Both are ternary polystyrene-based formulations containing 1.5 wt.% 6 Li salts of isobutyric acid, but they differ in their primary and secondary dye compositions: one uses m-terphenyl as the primary fluor and with Exalite 404 as the wavelength shifter, whereas the other uses 2,5-diphenyloxazole (PPO) and 9,10-diphenyl-anthracene, respectively. The temporal response of the scintillators was measured via time-correlated single photon counting for γ-ray and neutron events. The proton light yield was measured using the double time-of-flight technique from 1.3 to 15 MeV at the 88-Inch Cyclotron at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. For the slow neutron response, an AmBe source moderated with polyethylene was used, and the light output from the 6 Li(n,α)t reaction was characterized. Differences in ionization quenching and temporal response were observed between the two materials with the PPO-containing scintillator exhibiting higher ionization quenching. These results provide performance benchmarks that can guide the design and optimization of future lithium-loaded plastic scintillators for use in basic science and applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND

Synergistic effects of Al, Ga, and In doping on ZnO nanorod arrays grown via citrate-assisted hydrothermal technique for highly efficient and fast scintillator screens

To be used as efficient alpha particle scintillator in the fields of nuclear security, nuclear nonproliferation and high-energy physics, scintillator screens must have high light output and fast decay properties. While there has been a great deal of progress in scintillation efficiency, achieving fast decay time properties are still a challenge. In this work, the near band edge (NBE) UV luminescence and alpha particle induced scintillation properties of vertically aligned densely packed ZnO nanorods (NRs) doped with Al, Ga, and In have been thoroughly investigated. The high crystalline hexagonal wurtzite structure with a strong orientation through the c -axis plane (002) and aspect ratios in the range 13–22 have been observed for all ZnO NRs. Electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) analysis exhibited paramagnetic signals at g ≈ 1.96 for all ZnO NRs. A cost effective green hydrothermal synthesis technique was employed to grow well-aligned NRs. Using citrate as an additive acting as a strong reducing agent in the solution during the crystal growth, defects on the surface are significantly suppressed, thereby enhancing the NBE UV emission. Significantly higher NBE UV emission was observed from the top surface of ZnO NRs in cathodoluminescence (CL) microscopy. Results show that citrate assisted donor doping of ZnO NRs not only reduces the defect emission and NBE self-absorption, but also induces fast decay time (~ 600–700 ps), which makes ZnO NRs a good candidate for fast alpha particle scintillator screens used in associated particle imaging for time and direction tagging of individual neutrons generated in D–T and D–D neutron generators.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE

Viscosity Measurements in Extreme Conditions

Radiation-hydrodynamics simulations are critical to the NNSA complex for understanding high energy density physics and for addressing problems in national security science. However, current rad-hydro codes typically do not account for viscosity, which generally leads to large uncertainties in problems involving mixing of materials under shock loading. This report details progress made towards experimental measurements of fluid viscosity at high pressures and temperatures achieved by shock wave compression techniques, as well as complementary material model development and hydrodynamic simulations.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE

Digital Twin Technology for Safety, Security, and Training in Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling

The increasing complexity of spent nuclear fuel handling requires significant resources to ensure safety, security, and personnel training. As nuclear facilities have continued to advance in scale and technology, the integration of digital tools has become indispensable. Among these tools, digital twins, which are virtual models of physical systems, are emerging as invaluable tools for enhancing safety protocols, security measures, and training in the nuclear sector. These models were conceptualized in the Industry 4.0 revolution. Digital twins can process data from physical systems in real time (by using sensors), include multiple code packages to enable simulations of different physics applications, and even implement artificial intelligence or machine learning techniques for advanced data processing. Despite the advantages that digital twins provide, challenges still exist regarding their widespread implementation. For instance, data used by a digital twin must be accurate to ensure that the digital twin is accurately tuned. Furthermore, if insecure digital twins are targeted by hackers, then they can pose serious risks to the security and safety of nuclear facilities.

Digital twins

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Small Modular Reactor and Microreactor Security-by-Design Lessons Learned: Integrated PPS Designs

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security into the design process can provide robust, cost-effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this report is to capture lessons learned by the Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program that may be beneficial for other advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) vendors to use when developing security systems and postures. This report will capture relevant information that can be used in the security-by-design (SeBD) process for SMR and microreactor vendors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL

Modularization of Small Modular Reactor Facilities: Physical Protection Recommendations

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. In consideration of the economic viability of small modular reactor (SMR) facilities, many designers and utilities are considering a modular approach to the construction and operation of these facilities. This modular approach considers building and operating a first unit; once the first reactor is in operation, construction will begin on a second reactor. This process would allow the vendor or utility to ensure production of energy and financial income while the second reactor is under construction. This project evaluates the feasibility of modular construction in terms of physical protection and identifies several recommendations for vendors and utilities considering this approach. To conduct this evaluation, a hypothetical three-unit SMR facility was developed, a physical protection system (PPS) was considered for the design, and a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT) was used to evaluate this PPS. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4-to-8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for SMRs considering modular construction. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

INS Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructional Video Materials- FY 25 Full Scripts

Each section of the Adhesive TID Process Demonstration is broken down into subparts as referenced in the outline contained in the Contents section, these are referenced as Activity Sections. The structure of the Adhesive TID Process Demonstration items is, to the best of the writer’s ability, in the order of events that the NMAC mitigating techniques are performed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P

INS Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructional Video Materials- FY 25 Guides

This training video provides an essential guide to understanding and utilizing Tamper Indicating Devices (TIDs), with a specific focus on a common Mylar (Adhesive) variety during the application process. TIDs are a critical part of nuclear security, used to detect unauthorized access to sensitive materials or facilities. The Mylar (adhesive) TID employes a tamper-evident film integrated into the TID that visually indicates any tampering attempts. This video will explain how an example Mylar (adhesive) TID works, demonstrate proper installation techniques, and highlight how to interpret its indicators to ensure the security of nuclear materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN

Identifying neutron sources using recoil and time-of-flight spectroscopy

Identification of neutron sources is central to nuclear physics and its applications, from planetary science to nuclear security, yet direct source discrimination from measured neutron spectra remains fundamentally elusive. Here, we introduce a Bayesian protocol that directly infers source ensembles from measured neutron spectra by combining full-spectrum template matching with probabilistic evidence evaluation. Applying this protocol to recoil and time-of-flight spectroscopy, we recover single- and two-source configurations with strong statistical significance (beyond 4⁢𝜎) at event counts as low as ∼10 3 . These results demonstrate that neutron spectral signatures can be leveraged for robust source identification, opening a new observational window for both fundamental research and operationally driven applications.

neutron physics

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructions for Use and Supplementary Documentation

This document describes the use of exercise kits (called NMAC Kits) developed to support training and technical engagements sponsored by DOE/NNSA Office of Nuclear Security (INS) in the use of nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) methodologies in support of nuclear security. INS has previously used other similar kits that were originally designed to support NMAC training for international safeguards purposes. These new kits are specifically designed to be used in nuclear security training and emphasis the role NMAC plays in nuclear security as well as security against the insider threat. Planning for the development of these kits is described in LA-UR-24-30063, FY24 NMAC Kits Upgrade and served as the initial framework for the development of the new NMAC Kit material in FY25.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P

Quantum Key Distribution Applicability to Smart Grid Cybersecurity Systems

To meet the increasing demand for electricity and to have a more reliable and resilient electric grid against conventional and extreme events, grid modernization is more crucial now than ever before. This will require the development and deployment of devices that provide advanced communication capabilities. The overall efficiency, reliability, and resilience of the smart grid will be inextricably linked to the exchange of information between these devices. Unfortunately, the increased information flow will increase the potential attack surface and introduce new vulnerabilities. While a smarter grid will depend critically on information flow, these benefits will be accrued only if that information can be protected. Nowadays, information is secured in smart grids primarily through cryptography. However, with the increasing number of sophisticated attacks as well as the increasing computational power, the security of the “classical” cryptographic algorithms is threatened. Quantum information science offers solutions to this problem, specifically quantum key distribution (QKD), which provides a means for the generation and secure distribution of symmetric cryptographic keys. The security of QKD stems ultimately from the very nature of quantum physics. In this paper, we investigate the applicability of QKD to the various smart grid sectors and specific use cases. We have identified 18 smart grid use cases of interest for QKD suitability together with 7 QKD factors used for the assessment of the various use cases. For each use case, the impact to security of the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability is specified. In addition, the suitability of QKD is assessed for each use case with respect to multiple factors.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Security Assessment of an LBP16-Protocol-Based Computer Numerical Control Machine

Subtractive manufacturing systems, specifically, computer numerical control machines, have revolutionized the manufacturing industry. Computer numerical control machining is the preferred method for producing finished parts due to its efficiency, speed and suitability for high-volume production. Securing computer numerical control machines is a priority. Compromises or disruptions of these machines can result in significant downtime, loss of productivity and financial loss. This study examines the vulnerabilities and risks associated with computer numerical control machines, in particular, systems utilizing the LBP16 protocol for controller-machine communications. The study reveals that an adversary can execute cyber-physical attacks such as sabotage and denial of service. The potential security threats emphasize the importance of implementing robust security measures to mitigate the cyber risks to computer numerical control machines.

Forihat, Yahya [Virginia Commonwealth University,

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Kit Participant Guides

You work at a facility that stores large amounts of nuclear material in varying containerizations. Management has just approved the establishment of a tamper indicating device program in order to cut down on the effort required to conduct inventories, and to enhance overall control of nuclear materials within the site boundary. You have been assigned, along with your colleagues, to conduct an initial assessment to determine the ideal TID types to be used at your facility. You will apply TIDs to a variety of apparatuses that are representative of the closure mechanisms on different containers and entry points to rooms and vaults onsite.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P