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DOE OSTI2012

Rattling Nucleons: New Developments in Active Interrogation of Special Nuclear Material

Active interrogation is a vigorous area of research and development due to its promise of offering detection and characterization capabilities of special nuclear material in environments where passive detection fails. The primary value added by active methods is the capability to penetrate shielding - special nuclear material itself, incidental materials, or intentional shielding - and advocates hope that active interrogation will provide a solution to the problem of detecting shielded uranium, which is at present the greatest obstacle to interdiction efforts. The technique also provides a unique benefit for quantifying nuclear material in high background-radiation environments, an area important for nuclear material safeguards and material accountancy. Progress has been made in the field of active interrogation on several fronts, most notably in the arenas of source development, systems integration, and the integration and exploitation of multiple fission and non-fission signatures. But penetration of interrogating radiation often comes at a cost, not only in terms of finance and dose but also in terms of induced backgrounds, system complexity, and extended measurement times (including set up and acquisition). These costs make the calculus for deciding to implement active interrogation more subtle than may be apparent. The purpose of this review is thus to examine existing interrogation methods, compare and contrast their attributes and limitations, and identify missions where active interrogation may hold the most promise.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Technical Basis for Design Life Extension of the SAVY-4000 Series Nuclear Material Packaging System from Five Years to Fifteen Years

The DOE Manual, M441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging, approved March 7, 2008, provides detailed packaging requirements for protecting workers from exposure to nuclear materials stored outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier. The SAVY-4000 Series nuclear material packaging system is a DOE Manual 441.1-1 compliant storage system used at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The purpose of this report is to document the technical basis and DOE approval for the initial 5-year design life of the SAVY-4000 Series and to summarize, with supporting detailed technical reports as references, the technical basis for extending the design life from 5 years to 15 years.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Rules of Use Report Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Trends and Patterns in the Evolving Threat to Radioactive and Nuclear Material Transportation

Roughly 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported worldwide each year via commercial transportation vectors. Many of these can be considered a significant movement of risk-significant quantities of radioactive and nuclear material. A strong argument can be made to support the idea that transportation presents the greatest vulnerability in radioactive sealed source and nuclear material life-cycles. Historical and current information strongly suggests adversarial interest in obtaining radiological and nuclear materials with the intent of malicious use. In this context, it is necessary to understand the current trends and patterns in transportation threats as they apply to these materials in order to better understand security needs and current adversarial methods and mind-set.The authors propose to summarize current threats posed to radiological and nuclear materials during the transportation phase of the lifecycle. The paper and ensuing presentation will focus on a review of historical events where the adversarial intent was to disrupt the transportation phase of nuclear and radioactive material with malicious intent, as reported in open source literature. Its purpose is to better understand the nature of current and past transportation incidents involving these materials in order to clarify the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities they reveal. Relevant incidents involving transportation of these materials will be discussed as well as the historical trends associated with these events. A regional perspective based on an analysis of transportation incidents involving these materials will be discussed. While not necessarily predictive of the types of malicious disruptions that might occur in the future, this study will provide a rich information source from which lessons can be gleaned pertinent to the potential security and public safety threats posed by the transportation of commercial radioactive and nuclear material.

Shannon, Michael↗

DOE OSTI2015

Detection Of Special Nuclear Materials Tagged Neutrons

In order to detect Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) in unattended luggage or cargo containers in the field of homeland security, fissions are induced by 14 MeV neutrons produced by an associated particle DT neutron generator, and prompt fission particles correlated with tagged neutron are detected by plastic scintillators. SMN produce high multiplicity events due to induced fissions, whereas nonnuclear materials produce low multiplicity events due to cross-talk, (n,2n) or (n,n'γ) reactions. The data acquisition electronics is made of compact FPGA boards. The coincidence window is triggered by the alpha particle detection, allowing to tag the emission date and direction of the 14 MeV interrogating neutron. The first part of the paper presents experiment vs. calculation comparisons to validate MCNP-PoliMi simulations and the post-processing tools developed with the data analysis framework ROOT. Measurements have been performed using different targets (iron, lead, graphite), first with small plastic scintillators (10 x 10 x 10 cm{sup 3}) and then with large detectors (10 x 10 x 100 cm{sup 3}) to demonstrate that nuclear materials can be differentiated from nonnuclear dense materials (iron, lead) in iron and wood matrixes. A special attention is paid on SNM detection in abandoned luggage. In the second part of the paper, the performances of a cargo container inspection system are studied by numerical simulation, following previous work reported in. Detectors dimensions and shielding against the neutron generator background are optimized for container inspection. Events not correlated to an alpha particle (uncorrelated background), counting statistics, time and energy resolutions of the data acquisition system are all taken into account in a realistic numerical model. The impact of the container matrix (iron, ceramic, wood) has been investigated by studying the system capability to detect a few kilograms of SNM in different positions in the cargo container, within 10 min acquisitions. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2022

Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55 (FY22 Rules of Use Report)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2013

Muon Tracking to Detect Special Nuclear Materials

Previous experiments have proven that nuclear assemblies can be imaged and identified inside of shipping containers using vertical trajectory cosmic-ray muons with two-sided imaging. These experiments have further demonstrated that nuclear assemblies can be identified by detecting fission products in coincidence with tracked muons. By developing these technologies, advanced sensors can be designed for a variety of warhead monitoring and detection applications. The focus of this project is to develop tomographic-mode imaging using near-horizontal trajectory muons in conjunction with secondary particle detectors. This will allow imaging in-situ without the need to relocate the objects and will enable differentiation of special nuclear material (SNM) from other high-Z materials.

muon, special nuclear material, SNM↗

DOE OSTI2021

Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation

Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

12 C(p,p') 12 C Reaction ( E p =19.5–30 MeV) for Active Interrogation of Special Nuclear Material

Passive detection of special nuclear material (SNM) is challenging due to its inherently low rate of spontaneous emission of penetrating radiation, the relative ease of shielding, and the fluctuating and frequently overwhelming background. Active interrogation, the use of external radiation to increase the emission rate of characteristic radiation from SNM, has long been considered to be a promising method to overcome those challenges. Current active-interrogation systems that incorporate radiography tend to use bremsstrahlung beams, which can deliver high radiation doses. Low-energy ion-driven nuclear reactions that produce multiple monoenergetic photons may be used as an alternative. The 12 C ( p , p ' ) 12 C reaction is one such reaction that could produce large yields of highly penetrating 4.4- and 15.1-MeV gamma rays. This reaction does not directly produce neutrons below the approximately 19.7 MeV threshold, and the 15.1-MeV gamma-ray line is well matched to the photofission cross section of 235 U and 238 U . In this article, we report the measurements of thick-target gamma-ray yields at 4.4 and 15.1 MeV from the 12 C ( p , p ' ) 12 C reaction at proton energies of 19.5, 25, and 30 MeV. Measurements are made with two 3 -in. EJ-309 cylindrical liquid scintillation detectors and thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at 0 ° and 90 ° , with an additional 1.5 -in. Na I ( Tl ) cylindrical scintillation detector at 0 ° . We estimate the highest yields of the 4.4- and 15.1-MeV gamma rays of 1.65 × 10 10 and 4.47 × 10 8 sr - 1 μ C - 1 at a proton energy of 30 MeV, respectively. The yields in all experimental configurations are greater than in a comparable deuteron-driven reaction that produces the same gamma-ray energies— 11 B ( d , n γ ) 12 C . However, a significant increase of the neutron radiation dose accompanies the proton energy increase from 19.5 to 30 MeV.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2017

Nuclear Material Monitoring in Molten Salt Systems using Cyclic Voltammetry

As designs for the next generation of nuclear power plants and reprocessing facilities develop, molten salt based systems are receiving increasing attention as fuel containment, cooling and reprocessing media. Traditionally, aqueous systems for power production and fuel reprocessing are associated with well-developed methods for the monitoring and accountancy of nuclear material. Many of these techniques are proving insufficient in providing the same information in molten salt systems. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has called for the continued evaluation of advanced measurement techniques in systems such as molten salt as part of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). Cyclic voltammetry (CV) is an electrochemical technique that offers promising applications in molten salt systems for the in situ monitoring of nuclear material. A technique such as CV offers a method for monitoring nuclear material in a system relying on molten salt for power production, cooling or reprocessing. Cyclic voltammetry has been shown to provide information regarding the diffusion of electroactive species in molten salt. Once a diffusion coefficient data base is assembled, CV can be performed on molten salt systems to determine concentrations of species in situ.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2019

Evaluating Corrosion Effects on the Stainless Steel Components of the SAVY-4000/Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers: FY19 Update

This report provides an update of the FY19 corrosion observations, laboratory studies, and mitigation efforts for the nuclear material storage program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nuclear material packages outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier must meet packaging, surveillance, and testing requirements designed to protect workers from airborne contamination per Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging.1 The SAVY-4000 containers were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in conjunction with Nuclear Filter Technology as a manually-compliant container system for staging and storage of plutonium for LANL and the DOE complex.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2017

U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal Program - 17027

The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal program, also known as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (FRR SNF AP), was established by the U.S. Department of Energy in May 1996. The program's mission provides a disposition pathway for certain U.S. origin spent nuclear fuel and weapons-grade nuclear material. The program concluded on May 12, 2016. Irradiation must have been stopped by this date to remain eligible for return. An additional three year window is allowed for fuel cooldown and transportation of SNF elements. The end of this shipping window is May 12, 2019. This paper provides an update on recent program accomplishments, current program initiatives, and future activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2012

Advanced Sample Environments for In Situ Neutron Diffraction Studies of Nuclear Materials

Generation IV nuclear reactor concepts, such as the supercritical-water-cooled nuclear reactor (SCWR), are actively researched internationally. Operating conditions above the critical point of water (374˚C, 22.1 MPa) and fuel core temperature that potentially exceed 1850˚C put a high demand on the surrounding materials. For their safe application, it is essential to characterize and understand the material properties on an atomic scale such as crystal structure and grain orientation (texture) changes as a function of temperature and stress. This permits the refinement of models predicting the macroscopic behavior of the material. Neutron diffraction is a powerful tool in characterizing such crystallographic properties due to their deep penetration depth into condensed matter. This leads to the ability to study bulk material properties, as opposed to surface effects, and allows for complex sample environments to study e.g. the individual contributions of thermo-mechanical processing steps during manufacturing, operating or accident scenarios.

Atomic & Molecular Physics(74)↗

DOE OSTI2012

Comprehensive Nuclear Materials

This book encompasses a rich seam of current information on the vast and multidisciplinary field of nuclear materials employed in fission and prototype fusion systems. Discussion includes both historical and contemporary international research in nuclear materials, from Actinides to Zirconium alloys, from the worlds leading scientists and engineers. Synthesizes pertinent current science to support the selection, assessment, validation and engineering of materials in extreme nuclear environments. The work discusses the major classes of materials suitable for usage in nuclear fission, fusion reactors and high power accelerators, and for diverse functions in fuels, cladding, moderator and control materials, structural, functional, and waste materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2015

Rapid response sensor for analyzing Special Nuclear Material

Rapid in-situ analytical techniques are attractive for characterizing Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Present techniques are time consuming, and require sample dissolution. Proof-of-principal studies are performed to demonstrate the utility of employing low energy neutrons from a portable pulsed neutron generator for non-destructive isotopic analysis of nuclear material. In particular, time-sequenced data acquisition, operating synchronously with the pulsing of a neutron generator, partitions the characteristic elemental prompt gamma-rays according to the type of the reaction; inelastic neutron scattering reactions during the ON state and thermal neutron capture reactions during the OFF state of the generator. Thus, the key challenge is isolating these signature gamma- rays from the prompt fission and β-delayed gamma-rays that are also produced during the neutron interrogation. A commercial digital multi-channel analyzer has been specially customized to enable time-resolved gamma-ray spectral data to be acquired in multiple user-defined time bins within each of the ON/OFF gate periods of the neutron generator. Preliminary results on new signatures from depleted uranium as well as modeling and benchmarking of the concept are presented, however this approach should should be applicable for virtually all forms of SNM.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2025

Microscopic Measurement: Need for Nuclear Material Sample Specimen Characterization Capability

The Surveillance, Fabrication, and Off-Site Operations team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is beginning an update to the nuclear material machining lab in Superblock. Plutonium and other nuclear materials tend to accelerate the aging process for equipment and machines that would otherwise be maintainable for long lives. They have their lifespans shortened from deteriorated seals, embrittled polymer components, accelerated corrosion, and damage to electronics from exposure to radioactive materials. The cost of installation of equipment into a glove box (GB) tends to outstrip the cost of the equipment itself. Due to the magnification of cost, the historical approach to equipment installs has been to purchase and install the highest-quality and most robust equipment available to maximize time between failures and updates. To make room for the installation of a new lathe, the inspection GB is being moved to a different location within the machining lab. As part of the overall effort, the equipment within the inspection GB is being revisited. Current measurement capabilities are antiquated and starting to become problematic due to age. Advances in metrology are sought for more comprehensive characterization of scientific samples. This document aims to identify several options for the replacement of current measurement equipment and identify a system for purchase and eventual installation. The intention is not to select the cheapest system, but rather to identify a system that best meets the needs of both the operators and principal investigators (PI). Following the convention of the SYSM-5620 Design Thinking and System Engineering, it was determined that a laser confocal measurement system from Keyence is the most suitable option for our programmatic need. Form factor, capability, and maintainability were considered. Along with stakeholder input, to ensure the best decision for the Nuclear Material Technology Program.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Measuring 3D Profilometry of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers: Novacam TubeInspect Capabilities Report

The SAVY-4000 container series is a general-purpose interim storage container for nuclear materials, developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is the first vented, general-use nuclear material container to be demonstrated as meeting the requirements outlined in DOE M 441.1-1, the Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. Due to the challenging radiation, thermal, and corrosive storage conditions that the SAVY containers must endure, continuous surveillance techniques are employed to ensure the containers meet all safety standards and specifications. These inspections are typically performed by human operators, who check for issues such as corrosion, O-ring deterioration, corrosion, filter integrity, and potential manufacturing defects. However, human inspections alone are not sufficient, and automated inspection technologies, such as the ATIS system, as well as other automated systems are also utilized. The MicroCam TubeInspect, developed by Novacam Technologies Inc., is designed to address the challenges of understanding how manufacturing variations in the SAVY-4000 container series may affect performance. It is a 3D profilometry measurement system that enables detailed analysis of surface features, including defects, surface roughness, and manufacturing variations. This advanced tool significantly enhances rapid surveillance techniques for both pristine and used containers. In this study, container properties such as surface roughness, thickness, and geometric attributes like circularity are measured for SAVY-4000 containers. Artificially corroded or dented containers are examined to demonstrate the MicroCam's ability to quantify defects. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, comparing the MicroCam results to those obtained using more precise instruments such as confocal microscopy. This comparison aims to provide valuable insights into container quality, durability, and potential improvements in manufacturing processes.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2014

Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗