ISO TC85/SC5/WG8 “Nuclear Criticality Safety” Meeting [Slides]
This presentation is on meeting resolutions and agendas for the May 2022 Working Group 8 (WG8) Meeting.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This presentation is on meeting resolutions and agendas for the May 2022 Working Group 8 (WG8) Meeting.
This presentation begins with an Introduction and the current Status to ANS-8. The presentation then segues into active projects and some new projects. The lecture concludes with some highlights and insights to take away.
Abstract not provided.
Not provided.
Since 1945, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has performed critical experiments, primarily at the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) at Technical Area 18 (TA-18). Since 2011, these experiments have been conducted by the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), operated by LANL, at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These experiments utilize various types of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Some of these experiments utilize what is referred to as the Rocky Flat Shells, which are called such as they came from the Rocky Flats Plant. These concentric hemi-shells are made of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which is 93 w/o 235U. Fig. 1. Subset of the Rocky Flat Shells LANL is designing a new subcritical hands-on experiment with the goal of achieving a neutron multiplication in the range of 50 to 200, which correlates to Keff values of 0.98 to 0.995. ANSI/ANS-1 is the standard for Conduct of Critical Experiments which governs critical operations at NCERC. Section 3.9 of ANSI/ANS-1 states that when manipulating a critical assembly by hand, the predicted k eff of a known configuration should not exceed 0.95 (a neutron multiplication of 20). This presents a challenge, as this system would have a higher multiplication than 20 and the assembly would have to remain subcritical in normal and credible accident scenarios. To ensure the safety of such an assembly, the different normal and abnormal conditions that could alter the criticality 1 MCNP® and Monte Carlo N-Particle® are registered trademarks owned by Triad National Security, LLC, manager and operator of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any third party use of such registered marks should be properly of the system must be considered and analyzed. If such a condition is deemed to be credible, it will be further investigated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code. If the results of these simulations show that a k eff larger than one could be possible, modifications to the assembly will be made until such an event is deemed no longer possible.
Abstract not provided.
LANL has devoted a substantial amount effort toward the MCNP6.3 release over the past year by improving many of their processes, infrastructure, and capabilities. Many new resources in support of the MCNP code and DOE NCSP applications are coming online now. LANL is excited to receive feedback on all of the new and improved capabilities that will be packaged with MCNP6.3.
The NCSP training and education program has been conducted since 2011 and has trained over 591 students. 388 students have been trained in the 2-week hands-on course for practitioners and 203 students have been trained in the 1-week manager courses. The course is continuously improved using lessons-learned from the prior year, and new course content is added as necessary. Special courses are developed and offered periodically at the discretion of the NCSP manager. The updated manager course for CSOs was successfully piloted at NCERC in June 2020 and was successfully piloted at Sandia in April 2022. Students interested in taking the courses should visit the DOE NCSP website for additional information about all course offerings and for information about course registration.
For light nuclei, preliminary work extends the evaluation from 6.5 MeV to ~ 10 MeV. For 139 La, the team delivered full evaluation in fast region to ORNL, including covariances. For sup>235 U, RPI data simulations, the team performed simulations and showed some improvement for neutrons below 5 MeV. Some of the changes needed for more improvement might not be supported by the current format. Some of the changes above 12 MeV to account for the angular distribution of preequilibrium neutrons require a change in the PFNS evaluation procedure.
Godiva IV is a fast burst critical assembly constructed of approximately 65 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel alloyed with 1.5 percent molybdenum for strength. Godiva is one of the last such critical assemblies in the United States, and can be used for studies of super-prompt critical behavior as well as irradiations and demonstrations. A demonstration of a Godiva burst is usually performed as a highlight of the hands-on portion of the Criticality Safety Training Classes taught at the National Criticality Experiment Research Center (NCERC). The Godiva burst is used to demonstrate the concept of super-prompt critical and the time-scale of a criticality accident. In addition, several NCSP projects have been conducted on Godiva IV over the past two years. One experiment focused on collecting data to support multiphysics simulations using Photo-Doppler Velocimetry (PDV) to measure surface movement and gamma detectors to measure the burst output as the burst develops from background to peak over ten orders of magnitude. Another experiment was performed to demonstrate the functionality of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) system developed for installation in the Y-12 Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The system must not only respond to a criticality event and alarm, but must also be shown to operate in a high dose environment.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Abstract not provided.
The agenda for the presentation includes the following topics: Requirements; How is criticality safety practiced; criticality safety evaluations; fissionable material operation review; and, procedures.
The computational bias of criticality safety computer codes must be established through the validation of the codes to critical experiments. A large collection of suitable experiments has been vetted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) and made available in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook). More than 600 cases from this handbook have been prepared and reviewed within the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID), which is maintained by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The performance of the KENO V.a and KENO-VI Monte Carlo codes within the SCALE 6.2.4 code system is assessed using the VALID models of benchmark experiments. A range of nuclear cross section libraries based on Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF)/B-VII.1 in both multigroup (MG) and continuous energy (CE) formats is considered. The critical experiments available to validate the KENO V.a code cover 15 broad categories of systems. These systems use a range of fissile materials, including a range of uranium enrichments, various plutonium isotopic vectors, and some mixed uranium/plutonium oxides. The physical forms of the fissile material also vary and are represented as metal, solutions, or arrays of rods or plates in a water moderator. The neutron energy spectra of the systems also vary and cover fast, intermediate, mixed, and thermal spectra. Over 550 of the total cases use the KENO V.a code for the four nuclear data libraries considered in this report.
At the end of this briefing, personnel should be able to: • Define concepts associated with criticality safety margin • Provide and understand practical applications that illustrate safety margin concepts • Describe how safety margin is addressed in criticality safety evaluations • Improve documentation and communication of safety margin • Connect these concepts to related statements in the ANS-8 Standards • Find numerous applications for handbook data.
The agenda for the presentation is as follows: Human Factors; Accident Review (Tokai Mura, Siberian Chemical Combine); Procedures; Accident Review (Los Alamos Waste Recovery); Environmental Distractions; Accident Review (Idaho Fuel Reprocessing); and, Equipment Reliability.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
This report documents a study performed to investigate the requirements for criticality safety benchmark experiments for high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel in transportation applications. In this work, an exploratory application model, the “Pebble Tanker,” was developed to represent TRISO fuel in a transportation scenario for an analysis of the validation basis in industrial quantities. An aspect of the criticality validation process involves assessing the “similarity” between application and experimental benchmark systems through an integral index parameter evaluation. Here, this includes propagating nuclear data uncertainties and calculating a correlation coefficient (hereinafter referred to as “c k ”) to evaluate the similarity of benchmark experiments compared with the application Pebble Tanker model. Finding sufficient critical benchmark experiments allows for the evaluation of bias and bias uncertainty, thus determining the upper subcritical limit (USL) of the transportation package. A target k eff of ~0.94 was used in this work to establish appropriate modeling conditions, reflecting a reasonable estimate for a USL. Two container models were investigated: one with the Hermes-type pebble and one with the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)–type pebble. The models were simplified, considering only fuel, containment structure, and either water or air. This allows a focus on the underlying physics of applications involving TRISO fuel pebbles using the Pebble Tanker model. A crucial consideration is the transport package's ability to safely hold pebbles while flooded, maintaining subcritical conditions. Tools available in the SCALE 6.3.1 suite—the CSAS6-Shift, TSUNAMI-3D-Shift, and TSUNAMI-IP sequences—were employed for neutronics and sensitivity and uncertainty (S/U) analysis of the Pebble Tanker. Findings demonstrated sufficient available critical experiment benchmarks to perform a validation of the Pebble Tanker in the most reactive state, i.e., when the Tanker is flooded.