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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2017

Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground: Year 2 Assessment.

The goal of the Eyes On the Ground project is to develop tools to aid IAEA inspectors. Our original vision was to produce a tool that would take three-dimensional measurements of an unknown piece of equipment, construct a semantic representation of the measured object, and then use the resulting data to infer possible explanations of equipment function. We report our tests of a 3-d laser scanner to obtain 3-d point cloud data, and subsequent tests of software to convert the resulting point clouds into primitive geometric objects such as planes and cylinders. These tests successfully identified pipes of moderate diameter and planar surfaces, but also incurred significant noise. We also investigated the IAEA inspector task context, and learned that task constraints may present significant obstacles to using 3-d laser scanners. We further learned that equipment scale and enclosing cases may confound our original goal of equipment diagnosis. Meanwhile, we also surveyed the rapidly evolving field of 3-d measurement technology, and identified alternative sensor modalities that may prove more suitable for inspector use in a safeguards context. We conclude with a detailed discussion of lessons learned and the resulting implications for project goals. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground: Final Report

This report summarizes the work performed under the Sandia LDRD project "Eyes on the Ground: Visual Verification for On-Site Inspection." The goal of the project was to develop methods and tools to assist an IAEA inspector in assessing visual and other information encountered during an inspection. Effective IAEA inspections are key to verifying states' compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaties. In the course of this work we developed a taxonomy of candidate inspector assistance tasks, selected key tasks to focus on, identified hardware and software solution approaches, and made progress in implementing them. In particular, we demonstrated the use of multiple types of 3-d scanning technology applied to simulated inspection environments, and implemented a preliminary prototype of a novel inspector assistance tool. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, and gathers the abstracts and references for the publication and reports that were prepared as part of this work. We then describe work in progress that is not yet ready for publication. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2018

Eyes On the Ground (Final Report)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2019

Uranium Enrichment Plant Characteristics - A Training Manual for the IAEA

One of the primary objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Training Program is to help new inspectors gain knowledge and develop skills that will be required for them to carry out their duties. The formal instructional program for inspectors within the Agency begins with the Introductory Course on Agency Safeguards (ICAS). Time and resource constraints dictate that this course is devoted specifically to safeguards-related information with the assumption that the students have a basic familiarity with nuclear technology. In some cases, a new inspector’s prior experience may have been specialized to the extent that he is unfamiliar with the basic technology of some of the types of nuclear facilities he will be inspecting. In other cases, a student may find it useful to review the English vocabulary for technical terms he may have encountered in another language. A glossary of important terms is provided in Appendix A.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Safeguards: Feature Extraction for Machine Learning Enrichment Analysis of UF 6 Cylinders

With the increasing international interest in using nuclear material as sources of energy, comes the growing concern that we may see an increase in proliferation threats. Uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) is used in the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium enrichment. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitor the enrichment levels of UF 6 stored in transportation cylinders, to ensure the enrichments match that of a facility operator’s declarations. However, only a characteristic subset of UF 6 cylinders can be measured by inspectors from the IAEA during these inspections. In turn, the inspector may not identify a cylinder whose enrichment levels do not match the facility declarations. Therefore, our team attempts to develop a machine learning network that could determine the enrichment percentage of cylinders as they enter and exit facilities. The machine learning model must be robust against spectral variations due to factors that are internal and external to the UF 6 cylinder. Such factors include but are not limited to the speed and distance of the moving vehicle, cylinder type, cylinder orientation, and fill level. Many features in the spectral continuum can be used to identify and correct for some of these variations. As a consequence, the model must extract numerous features in the continuum. We investigate new approaches in continuum subtraction to verify enrichment percentage: interpolation and extrapolation of lines at the notable characteristic spectral peaks. It was determined that there was no clear answer on which method proved superior, therefore the decision was made to implement both new methods into the current codebase. We currently rely on synthetic training and testing data to analyze the results and fine tune our models but hope to test the system on measured data soon.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2022

Remote Monitoring Systems/Remote Data Transmission for International Nuclear Safeguards.

The use of remotely transmitted data from a nuclear facility under international nuclear safeguards to an inspectorate headquarters has been rapidly growing since inception as its value in reducing inspection effort and cost is demonstrated. There are opportunities for further growth moving forward including (1) the number of spent fuel casks in dry interim storage are increasing, leading to strain on inspection resources and potentially increased radiation exposure to inspectors, (2) the frequency of encapsulating spent nuclear fuel for final disposal in geological repositories occurs at a rate that may lead to the need for on-site inspectors unless systems can be developed to remotely transmit data, and (3) new facility types such as small modular reactors may rely heavily on remotely transmitted data due in part to remote locations of operation and mobility. Challenges need to be addressed too and include (1) hesitancy to implement remote data transmission by states, (2) data collection, transmission, security, and analysis, and (3) reliable power and communications. This report examines the evolution, equipment deployed, status, and opportunities/challenges of remote data transmission moving forward.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1989

Inspection In Overhead Spaces Containing Asbestos

Procedure for inspection in spaces above dropped ceilings that contain asbestos saves time and effort without sacrificing safety. With new method, only items of safety equipment needed are glove bag, storage bag, and roll of adhesive tape. Inspector tapes glove bag tightly to support grid around ceiling tile to be removed. With hands in gloves inspector lifts tile gently and places it aside. Extending head and shoulders into bag, inspector examines space above ceiling with help of flashlight.

Bell, Jacque↗

NASA NTRS1993

The NASA competitive placement plan for positions GS-15 and below (including trades and labor positions)

This plan provides the framework for selection based on merit from among the best qualified candidates available. Selections will be made without regard to political, religious, or labor organization affiliation or nonaffiliation, marital status, race, color, sex, national origin, nondisqualifying disability, or age. This plan does not guarantee promotion but rather ensures that all qualified available candidates receive fair and equitable consideration for positions filled under these competitive procedures. Announcing a vacancy under this plan is only one method of locating applicants for a position and can be used in conjunction with other methods. Subject to applicable law and regulation, selection of an individual to fill a position is the decision of management, as is the decision as to the method(s) to be used in identifying candidates. This plan is applicable to all NASA Installations. It covers all positions in the competitive service at (and below) the GS/GM-15 level (including all trades and labor positions), except positions in the Office of the Inspector General. The requirements herein are not intended to, nor should they be construed to limit in any way, the independent personnel authority of the Inspector General under the Inspector General Act, as Amended.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1996

Static measurement of the thickness of the ablative coating of the solid rocket boosters

The Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) used to launch the Space Shuttle are coated with a layer of ablative material to prevent thermal damage when they reenter the earth's atmosphere. The coating consists of a mixture of cork, glass, and resin. A new coating (Marshall Convergent Coating, MCC-2) was recently developed that is environmentally complaint. The coating must meet certain minimum thickness standards in order to protect the SRB. The coating is applied by a robot controlled nozzle that moves from the bottom to top, as the rocket part rotates on a table. Several coats are applied, building up to the desired thickness. Inspectors do a limited amount of destructive 'wet' testing. This involves an inspector inserting a rod in the wet coating and removing the rod. This results in a hole that, of course, must be patched later. The material is cured and the thickness is measured. There is no real-time feedback as the coating is being applied. Although this might seem like the best way to control thickness, the problems with 'blowback' (reflected material covering the sensor) are formidable, and have not been solved. After the thermal coating is applied, a protective top coat is applied. The SRB part is then placed in a oven and baked to harden the surface. The operations personnel then measure the thickness of the layer using the Kaman 7200 Displacement Measuring System. The probe is placed on the surface. One person (the inspector) reads the instrument, while another(the technician) records the thickness. Measurements are taken at one foot intervals. After the measurements are taken, the number of low readings is tabulated. If more than 10 percent of the points fall below the minimum value, there is a design review, and the part may be stripped of coating, and a new coating is applied. There is no other analysis.

Harrison, Harry C.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Effect of Liquid Penetrant Sensitivity on Probability of Detection

The objective of the task is to investigate the effect of liquid penetrant sensitivity level on probability of detection (POD) of cracks in various metals. NASA-STD-5009 currently requires the use of only sensitivity level 4 liquid penetrants for NASA Standard Level inspections. This requirement is based on the fact that the data used to establish the reliably detectable flaw sizes penetrant inspection was from studies performed in the 1970s using penetrant deemed to be equivalent only to modern day sensitivity level 4 penetrants. However, many NDE contractors supporting NASA Centers routinely use sensitivity level 3 penetrants. Because of the new NASA-STD-5009 requirement, these contractors will have to either shift to sensitivity level 4 penetrants or perform formal POD demonstration tests to qualify their existing process. We propose a study to compare the POD generated for two penetrant manufactures, Sherwin and Magnaflux, and for the two most common penetrant inspection methods, water washable and post emulsifiable, hydrophilic. NDE vendors local to GSFC will be employed. A total of six inspectors will inspect a set of crack panels with a broad range of fatigue crack sizes. Each inspector will perform eight inspections of the panel set using the combination of methods and sensitivity levels described above. At least one inspector will also perform multiple inspections using a fixed technique to investigate repeatability. The hit/miss data sets will be evaluated using both the NASA generated DOEPOD software and the MIL-STD-1823 software.

Parker, Bradford H.↗

DOE OSTI2011

Design of an Unattended Environmental Aerosol Sampling and Analysis System for Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

The resources of the IAEA continue to be challenged by the rapid, worldwide expansion of nuclear energy production. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) represent an especially formidable dilemma to the application of safeguard measures, as the size and enrichment capacity of GCEPs continue to escalate. During the early part of the 1990's, the IAEA began to lay the foundation to strengthen and make cost-effective its future safeguard regime. Measures under Part II of 'Programme 93+2' specifically sanctioned access to nuclear fuel production facilities and environmental sampling by IAEA inspectors. Today, the Additional Protocol grants inspection and environmental sample collection authority to IAEA inspectors at GCEPs during announced and low frequency unannounced (LFUA) inspections. During inspections, IAEA inspectors collect environmental swipe samples that are then shipped offsite to an analytical laboratory for enrichment assay. This approach has proven to be an effective deterrence to GCEP misuse, but this method has never achieved the timeliness of detection goals set forth by IAEA. Furthermore it is questionable whether the IAEA will have the resources to even maintain pace with the expansive production capacity of the modern GCEP, let alone improve the timeliness in reaching current safeguards conclusions. New safeguards propositions, outside of familiar mainstream safeguard measures, may therefore be required that counteract the changing landscape of nuclear energy fuel production. A new concept is proposed that offers rapid, cost effective GCEP misuse detection, without increasing LFUA inspection access or introducing intrusive access demands on GCEP operations. Our approach is based on continuous onsite aerosol collection and laser enrichment analysis. This approach mitigates many of the constraints imposed by the LFUA protocol, reduces the demand for onsite sample collection and offsite analysis, and overcomes current limitations associated with the in-facility misuse detection devices. Onsite environmental sample collection offers the ability to collect fleeting uranium hexafluoride emissions before they are lost to the ventilation system or before they disperse throughout the facility, to become deposited onto surfaces that are contaminated with background and historical production material. Onsite aerosol sample collection, combined with enrichment analysis, provides the unique ability to quickly detect stepwise enrichment level changes within the facility, leading to a significant strengthening of facility misuse deterence. We report in this paper our study of several GCEP environmental sample release scenarios and simulation results of a newly designed aerosol collection and particle capture system that is fully integrated with the Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) uranium particle enrichment analysis instrument that was developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2010

Enrichment Assay Methods for a UF6 Cylinder Verification Station

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s entire cylinder inventory. These enrichment assay methods interrogate only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume, and are time-consuming and expensive to execute for inspectors. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended measurement system capable of automated enrichment measurements over the full volume of Type 30B and Type 48 cylinders. This Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The focus of this paper is the development of nondestructive assay (NDA) methods that combine “traditional” enrichment signatures (e.g. 185-keV emission from U-235) and more-penetrating “non-traditional” signatures (e.g. high-energy neutron-induced gamma rays spawned primarily from U-234 alpha emission) collected by medium-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers (i.e. sodium iodide or lanthanum bromide). The potential of these NDA methods for the automated assay of feed, tail and product cylinders is explored through MCNP modeling and with field measurements on a cylinder population ranging from 0.2% to 5% in U-235 enrichment.

safeguards↗

DOE OSTI2016

Combining Inspection and Unattended Monitoring: Statistical Analysis of Timely Detection

Process monitoring traditionally relies on facility operator measurements. New concepts for future inspection regimes include inspectorate-owned systems that enable unattended monitoring (UM) of all declared material flow \cite{smith_potential}. If such systems can be established as viable alternatives, they may provide an important new capability: a true inspector's estimate of MUF that can achieve the efficiency and effectiveness goals outlined by the IAEA. A rigorous statistical framework for comparing traditional and new methodologies is needed to evaluate this potential and enable inspectorates to optimally balance UM and sampling in the context of timely detection and cost constraints. Recognizing that these are only two among a wide range of safeguards activities that support mass balance evaluation to detect missing material, this paper compares UM to traditional safeguards sampling in terms of detection probabilities as a function of time based on simplistic material loss scenarios, and shows how the detection probabilities can be rather easily combined. Using this approach can help enable tradeoff analysis and optimal resource allocation.

international safeguards↗

DOE OSTI2022

Integration of the Kromek D3S Detector and Spot Robot For Secondary Inspections

Inspecting vehicles and containers for the presence of nuclear material is a challenging task for border control and security. When performed manually by inspectors, this task also has an associated risk of exposing the inspectors to unknown radiation. With the advent of agile, easy-to-program, quadruped robots like the Boston Dynamics Spot, automation of secondary inspection can improve the efficiency of the inspection process and alleviates the radiation risks to inspectors. In this project, Brookhaven National Laboratory and the University of Massachussetts at Lowell explored how to automate a simple secondary inspection mission. The Spot robot comes with its own software development kit (SDK) that allows clients/users to write custom code in the Python programming language to control the robot. Spot also has a payload computer called Spot-CORE, which runs the Ubuntu Linux operating system and allows users to integrate external sensors, such as a radiation detector, with Spot. In this study, the Kromek D3S detector has been integrated with Spot via the Spot-CORE, allowing Spot to capture gamma spectra and neutron counts for a specified acquisition period. Two custom routines, search and confirmation, have been developed and executed in this specified order. The search routine directs Spot to go around the nearest obstacle, e.g., vehicle and container, in a preset distance and step to collect gamma and neutron gross counts with the D3S detector. The radiation data and the robot location corresponding to each step are stored and fed to the confirmation routine at the end of the search. The confirmation routine then navigates Spot to the locations of the highest gamma or neutron counts to perform a long, e.g., one minute, measurement, and gives the operators the signature gamma spectra and neutron counts at the hotspots. This paper presents a detailed description of this automated system along with results of the preliminary tests in identifying the location and signature of a 137Cs radiation source in a vehicle.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2014

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

DOE OSTI2016

Improved uncertainty quantification in nondestructive assay for nonproliferation

This paper illustrates methods to improve uncertainty quantification (UQ) for non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements used in nuclear nonproliferation. First, it is shown that current bottom-up UQ applied to calibration data is not always adequate, for three main reasons: (1) Because there are errors in both the predictors and the response, calibration involves a ratio of random quantities, and calibration data sets in NDA usually consist of only a modest number of samples (3–10); therefore, asymptotic approximations involving quantities needed for UQ such as means and variances are often not sufficiently accurate; (2) Common practice overlooks that calibration implies a partitioning of total error into random and systematic error, and (3) In many NDA applications, test items exhibit non-negligible departures in physical properties from calibration items, so model-based adjustments are used, but item-specific bias remains in some data. Therefore, improved bottom-up UQ using calibration data should predict the typical magnitude of item-specific bias, and the suggestion is to do so by including sources of item-specific bias in synthetic calibration data that is generated using a combination of modeling and real calibration data. Second, for measurements of the same nuclear material item by both the facility operator and international inspectors, current empirical (top-down) UQ is described for estimating operator and inspector systematic and random error variance components. A Bayesian alternative is introduced that easily accommodates constraints on variance components, and is more robust than current top-down methods to the underlying measurement error distributions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2018

Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations. A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This study describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms. Finally, the results are summarized, and sources and magnitudes of uncertainties are identified, and the impact of analysis uncertainties on the ability to confirm operator declarations is quantified.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗