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DOE OSTI2020

Autonomous Monitoring of Nuclear Repositories: Current State of the Art and Future Directions

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning, including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out- standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static. Activities must encompass verification of the design, prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, we discuss the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed-loop autonomation to complete tasks. We explore the feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Lastly, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system.

geologic repository, safeguards, IAEA, Robotics↗

DOE OSTI2024

ATR NEXSHARE Fact Sheet

This fact sheet will provide information for the database of experimental facilities supported by the IAEA as outlined below: NEXSHARE: As part of the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI), the IAEA proposes to establish a Network for global cooperation and resource sharing for experiments and code validation between experimental facilities, SMRs design organizations, International Organizations and Technical Support Organizations (TSOs). The proposed Network, NEXSHARE, will be done in collaboration with the OECD/NEA. EXPERIMENTAL FACILITY DATABASE: As part of this activity, the IAEA is compiling a database of experimental facilities applicable to SMRs (including water cooled, high temperature gas cooled, molten salt and fast neutron spectrum reactors). This database will also form part of NEXSHARE and will be documented in an IAEA publication.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Conceptual Design for a Mobile Application to Support Infield Inventory Activities

This paper introduces an inventory assistant being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that we believe will empower users to perform inventory activities at nuclear facilities more accurately, reliably, and quickly. Inventory activities at nuclear facilities are often conducted using pen and paper, which can be time-consuming, tedious, and susceptible to reading or transcription errors. The proposed inventory assistant would replace the paper-based process used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nuclear facility operators, or verification monitors to complete an inventory of nuclear and non-nuclear items. In general, the inventory assistant would ingest an inventory list, distribute assigned items from the inventory list to one or more mobile devices, enable inventory teams to record their observations in the field, and then enable an inventory lead to integrate and reconcile the observations to produce a final report. The assistant consists of two software components—one for the inventory teams to record observations in the field (In-Field Observations App [IFOA]) and one for the inventory lead to reconcile the inventory list with observations (Distribution, Integration, and Reconciliation Application [DIRA]). This paper introduces the overall workflow of the inventory assistant and describes the IFOA user experience in more detail. To demonstrate the concept, the authors present a use case of IAEA inspectors conducting item counting and tag checking activities of UF6 cylinders at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with a large number of UF6 cylinders (e.g., thousands). These activities can currently require 30–40 person-days of inspection to complete. Based on experiences during an exercised performed at the IAEA by the ORNL team in 2016, we believe an inventory assistant could allow the IAEA to complete item counting and tag checking using the global identifier or the operator’s barcode in 8–10 person-days of inspection. We would expect other users (e.g., facility operators or verification monitors) to also benefit from significant time savings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Unattended Single Channel Analyzer (USCA) FY20 Summary Report

In FY20 LANL was funded to design, fabricate, test and document an instrument that can be used by the IAEA for gamma ray measurements in scintillator applications. This instrument, the Unattended Single Channel Analyzer (USCA), will be part of the family of IAEA unattended instruments and completes the suite of most used data acquisition needs provided by the previously designed UNAP instrument. The USCA is designed to meet all the same IAEA requirements designed into the UMSR and UDCM. The new instrument has the same look and feel making it simple for agency staff to move between instruments. This project taps into all the design functions developed during the UMSR and UDCM development. Along with the design and fabrication of a USCA, this project included production of a prototype for IAEA testing and a complete set of documentation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2020

Autonomous Inspection of Geologic Repositories: Current State of the Art and Future Directions

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning, including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out- standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static. Activities must encompass verification of the design, prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, we discuss the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed loop autonomation to complete tasks. We explore the feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Lastly, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Knowledge Transfer and Training in Safeguards for Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities (Project Final Report for FY2022)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

DOE OSTI2024

FY2024 Mid-Year Report: Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Cask Top Fast Neutron Mapping

This project is developing a prototype scanner array verification system for detection of missing fuel assemblies in spent-fuel storage casks. The prototype consists of six fast-neutron scintillator detectors mounted to a linear actuator frame that is placed on the top of a spent fuel cask to scan across all fuel assembly positions. The scanner array was assembled and tested at LLNL in prior years. A field test schedule has been requested at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Cask Farm site for FY2024. Following the Field Test, we will present results and discuss the technology with the IAEA. The IAEA may have special requirements for portability, shipping, lifting, and installation. We will incorporate additional improvements to the system based on lessons learned from the Field Test and feedback from the IAEA. If successful, the technology can be transferred to the IAEA or other stakeholders for assessment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

29 th International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (Project Summary)

Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) has hosted the International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities since 1978. This course is the flagship training course of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On behalf of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Sandia manages, develops, and coordinates all course materials, and works closely with the IAEA to arrange all logistical details for the course ITC-29 incorporated some updates to the facility models, based on feedback received in ITC-28 and the ITC-29 dry run. In addition, all the graphics were refreshed after ITC-28 and implemented in the posters, data handbooks, etc. As in ITC-28, the ITC-29 staff worked closely with the IAEA on course materials, including a peer review process to ensure all course materials were aligned with Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and other relevant international guidance documentation from the IAEA. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ITC-29 was postponed twice and eventually took place in the late summer/early fall of 2022. Due to ongoing COVID-19 restrictions and safety requirements, the number of participants was reduced by about 31 percent from 59 participants in ITC-28 to 41 in ITC-29. As a result, the number of subgroups also decreased from eight in ITC-28 to six for ITC-29. This enabled the Sandia team to implement more opportunities for social distancing, particularly in the large classrooms. Despite the challenges, ITC-29 still passed a significant milestone, with the one-thousandth participant of the international training course attending during this event. Finally, the ITC staff continued the use of its improved method of evaluation to capture participants’ satisfaction with the updated course and to gather feedback concerning future improvements. This document provides a brief description of ITC-29, including a summary of lessons learned and key recommendations for future development efforts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2022

Gamma Spectrometry Code Rodeo for Uranium Enrichment—FY 2021 Report

In FY22, the participating Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories continued the work on the project “Gamma Spectrometry Code Rodeo for Uranium Enrichment”. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) continued their efforts to acquire spectra using uranium sources. A collimator (with side and back shields) was custom designed and constructed at ORNL. Spectra were acquired at ORNL using the uranium enrichment standards supplied by New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) and the collimated M400 detector. Spectra were also acquired using steel absorbers of different thickness placed between the source and the collimated M400 detector. The plan was to ship the collimator to LLNL so that spectra could be acquired using the LLNL detector in collimated geometries. This activity was suspended since problems were noticed with the performance of the LLNL M400 detector. Also, it was brought to light to the project team that some of the aspects of the M400 detector had been updated by the vendor H3D in response to requests by the IAEA. In February 2021, the ORNL and LLNL M400 detectors were returned to the H3D factory in order to resolve the problems with the LLNL detector and to update ORNL and LLNL detectors to the same configuration as the M400 supplied to the IAEA. H3D repaired the LLNL M400 and performed the IAEA updates on both the ORNL and LLNL detectors. ORNL and LLNL received the detectors in April 2021. Data acquisition was continued using the upgraded detectors. ORNL re-collected the spectra using point sources and the NBL standards in uncollimated and collimated geometries. The collimator was shipped from ORNL to LLNL. Spectra were acquired at LLNL through Q4 of FY22. When the ORNL spectra were examined closely, it became apparent that there were spurious artifacts present in some of the spectra. This rendered suspect the ORNL spectra collected in June/July 2021 time frame. ORNL contacted H3D and per H3D’s advice, the M400 detector was returned to H3D for repairs in mid-August 2021. H3D diagnosed the problem and established that the root cause was the extra tight packaging that created a strain on the CZT crystals, causing one of them to break down. The repaired M400 was returned to ORNL in early September 2021. ORNL re-started data acquisition for the third time. Data was continued to be acquired at ORNL and LLNL through September 2021. The ORNL and LLNL data will be shared with the principal investigators from the analyzing laboratories. The GADRAS code and FRAM have been developed to have the capability to analyze the M400 spectra. Good quality spectra from FY21 have been analyzed using modified versions of GADRAS and FRAM. The spectra have also been analyzed using the GEM code. The analysis results from GADRAS, FRAM and GEM codes are presented and discussed in this report. Some preliminary results from FRAM and GEM analysis were presented in February 2021 at the U-Pu Isotopics Workshop sponsored by the IAEA. CZTU code is being modified to analyze M400 spectra. Data collection, code development and analysis will be continued in FY22 as per the FY22 Project Work Plan (PWP).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Examining Autonomous Inspection of Geologic Repositories

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out-standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static as activities must encompass verification of the design prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material, including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, it discusses the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed loop autonomation to complete tasks. The feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks is explored, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Finally, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system

autonomous monitoring↗

DOE OSTI2020

Generation IV Benchmarking of TRISO Fuel Performance Models Under Accident Conditions Final Report

The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) is a co-operative international endeavor of fourteen members organized to carry out the research and development needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next generation nuclear energy systems. GIF selected six reactor technologies, amongst which is the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) that is primarily dedicated to the cogeneration of electricity and hydrogen. The technical basis for VHTR is the tristructural isotropic (TRISO)-coated particle fuel, the graphite as the core structure, helium coolant, as well as the dedicated core layout and lower power density to removal decay heat in a natural way. At the heart of safety features of the VHTR concept lie the TRISO fuel particles that are designed to keep their structural integrity and retain fission products at temperatures up to 1600°C. As part as the design and future operation of VHTRs, a key aspect is the accurate prediction of fuel performance under irradiation and accident conditions. Modeling and simulation allow prediction of TRISO fuel behavior when subject to neutron flux and in high temperature accident scenarios. The refinement of the fuel performance models and codes is performed by comparison to in-pile and out-of-pile experimental data that reproduce the expected irradiation conditions in high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). Historically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a benchmark dedicated to the validation of predictive methods for fuel and fission product behavior through the Coordinated Research Program CRP-2 (IAEA, 1997). CRP-2 was later updated to cover fuel fabrication, quality assurance, irradiation performance, safety testing, and spent fuel. The scope of the resulting CRP-6 benchmarks focused on HTGR fuel performance and fission product release (IAEA, 2012). Taking advantage of additional TRISO fuel fabrication, irradiation, and safety testing campaigns, GIF launched a Generation IV Benchmarking of TRISO Fuel Performance Models under Accident Conditions in late 2015. This GIF benchmark is a three-year program steered by Idaho National Laboratory (INL, USA). The other participants include the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA, Japan) and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI, Korea). The objectives of the benchmark are to: follow on the IAEA CRP benchmarks, (2) model fission product release under accident conditions, (3) compare results obtained by the fuel performance modeling codes of the benchmark participants, and (4) compare these code predictions to experimental data. Safety tests chosen for modeling include the first and second experiments of the Advanced Gas Reactor program (AGR-1 and AGR-2) and the High Flux Reactor (HFR) EU1bis experiment. This report presents the results obtained by the three research institutions using their respective fuel performance modeling codes. Comparisons of the corresponding fission product release predictions are made with experimental data from AGR-1, AGR-2, and HFR-EU1bis. The benchmark results show good agreements between all participants but also show a general trend of over-prediction of the experimental release data, which is mainly attributed to the use of over-estimated diffusion coefficients.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Legal and Regulatory Aspects Related to Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for Safeguards Implementation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is exploring the use of innovative technologies such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to address safeguards verification challenges such as difficulties in accessing nuclear material in high radiation environments, and remotely located installations, as well as to increase the efficiency of safeguards implementation by automating repetitive and time-consuming tasks. As UAS continue to advance and their use becomes more frequent in high security conscious industries such as nuclear, their advantages in contributing to greater safety and security may weigh in favor of their use. However, as the IAEA begins to use these technologies, the legal, policy, and operational considerations associated with these advanced technologies will also need to be considered to identify any key opportunities, challenges, or areas of concern for the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will explore these areas and identify important considerations for the IAEA and its Member States to consider as the use of UAS is explored further for safeguards applications. It will also provide a series of recommendations for anticipating and addressing legal, regulatory, and policy challenges related to the use of UAS for safeguards implementation.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗

DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2020

Infrared spectroscopic method for uranium isotopic analysis

A high performance infrared (HPIR) system was developed and demonstrated for the infrared absorption analysis of {sup 235}U and {sup 238}U isotopes in uranium hexafluoride gas samples. Sweeping the quantum cascade laser light source over the spectral range and sampling via a high-rate analog-to-digital converter provided 0.0005 cm-1 spectral resolution, which allowed for high-precision measurements of the isotopic peak shift. A data analysis method was developed using principal component analysis to predict the isotope weight % content of {sup 235}U. The HPIR precision, accuracy, and error were evaluated for a wide range of isotopic ratio samples (0.287 – 93.7 weight % {sup 235}U), and the results were compared to the International Target Values (ITVS) set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for non-destructive and destructive analytical techniques. The method meets or surpasses the IAEA ITVs for non-destructive analysis of samples with isotopic content of depleted to highly enriched. The results also demonstrated the capability of the HPIR system to correctly predict the {sup 235}U weight % content of a mislabeled sample whose isotopic distribution was validated by mass spectroscopic measurements. The HPIR measurement is nondestructive and, thus, allows for confirmatory analyses of the exact sample at a designated IAEA lab if higher-resolution or a certified analysis is needed. (author)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Stochastic Approaches for Calculating and Aggregating Detection Probabilities for Nuclear Material Diversion

The authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 significant quantities (SQ), using typical International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5 gamma spectrometer. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2022

Candidacy Renewal Report for ICERR Designation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established a designation for an International Centre based on Research Reactors (ICERR). The intention of this designation is to provide a vehicle for IAEA member states to access international research-reactor and ancillary nuclear research and development infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made a commitment to world leadership in the development of advanced nuclear energy, science, and technology. To this end, DOE has established programs and initiatives to enhance this leadership role. ICERR designation constitutes an important step in achieving the DOE vision. DOE, represented by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), is submitting this application for re-designation as an IAEA ICERR. Both INL and ORNL have a decades-long and storied history that supports nuclear research, development, and deployment both nationally and internationally. Both have a history of safe and efficient nuclear operations and have demonstrated a track record of international collaboration and cooperation. INL and ORNL are home to two primary and two secondary research reactors. The primary reactors are Advanced Test Reactor at INL, and High-Flux Isotope Reactor at ORNL. Secondary reactors include: Neutron Radiography Reactor at INL, Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility at INL, and INL Advanced Test Reactor: Critical Facility (ATRC). ICERR designation will also include numerous ancillary facilities at both laboratories, including the following: Multiple post-irradiation examination facilities at both INL and ORNL, Radiochemistry hot-cell facilities at ORNL, INL nuclear-fuel-fabrication and materials-science facilities, and INL and ORNL radiological and nuclear analytical capabilities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Considerations for Regulation and Practical Implementation of Analyses of Inadvertent Human Intrusion - 20169

Recommendations from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identify the need to consider potential inadvertent human intrusion into a near-surface radioactive waste disposal facility when developing limits for radionuclide concentrations that can be disposed. The recommendations also provide perspective on expectations for performance criteria and general assumptions for such analyses. Inadvertent human intrusion analyses are conducted to address the potential failure of institutional controls and loss of memory of a disposal facility. The analyses consider potential consequences of human actions that result in unknowingly bringing waste to the surface. Inadvertent human intrusion scenarios consider potential impacts to someone involved in an activity that actually disturbs the waste (e.g., drilling or excavation of a basement) or that exposes the person to emanations from the waste (e.g., radioactive gases) and also for the case where there may be longer term exposures to waste that has been brought to the surface. In practice, inadvertent human intrusion analyses have proven to be a critical consideration for the development of waste classification systems and for the determination of disposal requirements and limitations on wastes that can be disposed at shallow depths. The IAEA implemented a project on Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive waste (HIDRA) to further explore the regulatory expectations and practical implementation of analyses of potential inadvertent human intrusion. The paper begins with a discussion of international recommendations related to consideration of inadvertent human intrusion and then summarizes examples of some topical considerations related to addressing inadvertent human intrusion that are being discussed as part of the second phase of the HIDRA project. The topical considerations are planned to be addressed in a formal IAEA publication. All information in this paper simply reflects on-going project discussions and no formal recommendations are implied for these topical considerations at this time. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

International network of nuclear structure and decay data evaluators

Compilation, evaluation and dissemination of nuclear data are arduous tasks that rely on contributions from experts in both the basic and applied sciences communities whose efforts are coordinated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF) includes the most extensive and comprehensive set of nuclear structure and decay data evaluations performed by the international network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data evaluators (NSDD) under the auspices of the IAEA. In this report we describe the recent NSDD activities supported by the IAEA and provide some future perspectives.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗