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Initial Developments in Modeling Graphite Behavior

Graphite is used in High Temperature Reactor designs as a moderator, reflector and core material responsible for protecting the fuel and maintaining structural stability. From a safety perspective, it is imperative to be able to predict how graphite will behave under reactor operating conditions which may compromise the core’s structural integrity or fuel’s safety performance. The following report summarizes recent modeling work undertaken at Idaho National Laboratory which focuses on graphite degradation behavior. One phenomenon which is explored in this report and can cause significant degradation to graphite properties is oxidation. Oxidation behavior in graphite is highly temperature dependent. At low temperatures, oxygen can fully penetrate a component and cause a homogeneous damage profile. At high temperatures, only the graphite near the surface of a component is affected. Understanding and modeling this temperature dependence is essential to predicting graphite behavior. In this report, three graphite models are discussed. The first model is used to investigate strength loss after low temperature oxidation. It does this by generating an approximate graphite microstructure then determining the required load to cause crack propagation. It has been shown that the model reproduces the quasi brittle stress versus strain relationship observed in graphite. Strength loss results from the model are shown to match experimental values. The second model investigates strength loss under high temperature oxidation conditions. This model is more applicable to full scale graphite components where the oxidation damage is often inhomogeneous throughout a component. The third model computes stresses in graphite under reactor conditions. Specifically, the model incorporates the effect of creep, irradiation dose, thermal strains, and oxidation in order to predict internal stresses in a component. All of these models are implemented in the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE), an open source, parallel finite element framework.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Model Package Report: Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release Model (CASWR Model)

This document describes the implementation of a solid waste form release model in GoldSim for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) Update. This Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release model (CASWR model) was designed to generate deterministic radionuclide release rates for Hanford’s Central Plateau solid waste disposal sites using single realizations of release model coefficients. Five generalized waste form types are used for the conceptual model of waste release: surplus reactor block, cement, soil-debris, grouted residual waste, and ancillary equipment. The surplus reactor block waste form consists of radionuclide leaching from surplus production graphite reactor core blocks via unspecified processes (White et al., 1984 as cited in PNNL-15965). The cement waste form represents solidified wastes whose permeability is much lower than that of the surrounding soil. The soil-debris waste form type is defined as unconsolidated waste mixed with soil material. Tanks and canyon complexes comprise the grouted residual waste form such that their solid waste will be grouted and capped with a surface barrier at the completion of their cleanup. Finally, the ancillary equipment waste form constitutes contaminant releases from ancillary and auxiliary waste form residues associated with tank farms at closure. Individual sub-models are implemented to numerically represent a respective waste form within the CASWR Model: Surplus Reactor Block Sub-model, Cement Sub-model, SoilDebris Sub-model, Grouted Residual Waste Sub-model, and Ancillary Equipment Submodel. Advection is assumed to be the primary transport process governing the release of radionuclides in the Ancillary Equipment and Soil-Debris Sub-models. Diffusion is assumed to be the primary release process in the Grouted Residual Waste and Cement Sub-models. An unspecified zero-order release process is considered in the Surplus Reactor Block Sub-model due to the lack of information regarding actual processes involved in irradiated graphite leaching. The Surplus Reactor Block, Cement, and SoilDebris Sub-models were compared against analytical solutions (PNNL-11800, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the 200 Area Plateau of the Hanford Site). The agreement between results of these analytical solutions and the corresponding waste form models verified their correct implementation in GoldSim. A 1-D modeling abstraction approach for the Grouted Residual Waste and Ancillary Equipment Sub-models was adopted from existing Performance Assessment (PA) models. Despite the simplifications made in these sub-models, they were found to be appropriate representations of the waste forms, similar to what was used in the Waste Management Area C PA model (RPP-ENV-58782, Performance Assessment of Waste Management Area C, Hanford Site, Washington, Rev. 0). A sensitivity analysis was conducted to identify the most influential parameters in each waste form sub-model. Suggestions for considering pH-dependent and redox-dependent release mechanisms are formulated through the development of a conditional constant approach in GoldSim.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Identifying Challenges in Safeguards for Metallic Fuel Fabrication Facilities

As new advanced reactors gain popularity, there is an increasing interest in metallic fuel fabrication for fast reactors. While metallic fuels themselves are not a new idea, as many of the first reactors employed metallic fuels, new designs, compositions, and fabrication methods are appearing throughout the nuclear community. As the interest grows and facilities are constructed, both domestic and international safeguards will need to be heavily involved to support safeguards-by-design (SBD) measures from the start. This work compiles a review of historical and modern fuel types and fabrication methods, fabrication processes, safeguards gaps, and potential safeguards solutions. Metallic nuclear fuel types have been around for many decades and were included in some of the first reactors including the Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-I and -II, the Fermi 1 reactor, the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), and the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR). These reactors used various compositions including pure uranium (U) metal, U-zirconium (Zr) alloys, plutonium (Pu)-aluminum (Al) alloys, U-fissium (Fs) alloys, U-Pu-Zr alloys, and U-molybdenum (Mo) alloys [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. These small alloying additions are included to improve the material properties of the pure U metal. The alpha-phase U (stable below 661C) suffers elongation in one direction causing grain boundary cracking and increasing creep rate due to irradiation growth, thermal cycling, and preferential crystal orientation. It is ideal to utilize the gamma-phase U (typically stable above 769C) by adding small amounts of alloying elements such as Zr or Mo to stabilize this phase down to room temperature [3]. Additionally, some research has been focused on U with transuranic (TRU) elements present, typically coming from the used fuel recycling process. Including these elements in fast reactor fuel can aid in the reduction of nuclear waste by burning minor long-lived actinides. However, the additions of TRU elements can cause concerns to arise when trying to fabrication or safeguard metallic fuels. A typical metallic fuel element is shown in Figure 1. Sodium is added into the cladding to create a thermal bond between the fuel slug and cladding wall. The fuel slug is then inserted and the end plug is welded on to the top of the fuel element. A gas plenum is left to create a headspace for gaseous fission products to escape rather than continue to build in the fuel itself [1, 5]. Other fuel element geometries exist as well, such as the Lightbridge twisted cruciform geometry shown in Figure 2 [6]. This design allows for better cooling performance and provides room for fuel rod swelling without impacting the fuel rod diameter. There are many different fabrication methods for metallic fuels, which is one of the many benefits of these fuel types. Many of these fabrication methods are relatively easy and cost-efficient. The most popular fabrication method is injection casting, sometimes called vacuum induction melting (VIM), shown in Figure 3 [4, 8, 9, 7, 10]. This method was largely used for EBR-II fuel fabrication. The injection casting system is contained inside of a vessel consisting of a Y2O3-coated graphite crucible surrounded by an induction coil with ZrO2-coated quartz molds suspended above the crucible. The fuel feedstock is placed inside of the graphite crucible and melted using the induction furnace. The induction furnace utilizes a dual frequency with the high frequency melting the feedstock and the low frequency causing stirring of the melted feedstock to form a homogeneous mixture. The mixture is heated to approximately 1600C in an argon environment. The vessel is evacuated and then the quartz molds are lowered into the graphite crucible containing the molten metal and the vessel is repressurized to inject the metal fuel upwards into the molds. The molds are removed and then shattered to release the fuel slugs. This fabrication method was used to fabricate 39,000 metallic fuel pins for EBR-II. While injection casting has been the most common metallic fuel fabrication method throughout the decades, many other methods have been explored including low-pressure gravity casting, microwave casting, continuous casting, centrifugal casting, coextrusion, and many others [11, 12, 8, 13, 14, 15]. Some of these methods aim to mitigate challenges that arise with americium (Am) volatilization during the casting process for TRU-containing fuel feedstocks, an issue with injection casting. Coextrusion is one of the methods explored at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and has been utilized for the initial fabrication tests of Lightbridge's unique fuels, as well as other metallic fuels with cladding coextruded. In this process, large billets are formed and machined and then inserted into a molten salt bath for approximately 30 minutes. The billets are then loaded into the extrusion press and extruded. This process can be seen in Figure 4 [15].

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Multi-scale fission product release model with comparison to AGR data

TRistructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle fuel is central to several advanced, high-temperature reactor designs. Each particle consists of a fuel kernel encapsulated by three layers of carbon and ceramics that prevent the release of fission products and ensure physical integrity. Despite outstanding retention properties, fission product release has been observed from intact particles. To better understand and quantify fission product release from TRISO particles, a multiscale, mechanistic model of fission product transport is being developed by the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program. Previous work focused on silver (Ag) transport and improved Ag release predictions. The work described in this report builds on this experience to better understand cesium (Cs) transport in silicon carbide (SiC), the main barrier to the release of fission products. Atomistic simulations provide bulk and grain boundary (GB) Cs diffusivities in SiC, which are used by phase field simulations in the mesoscale code Marmot to determine the temperature, microstructure, and irradiation-dependent Cs diffusivity at the mesoscale in SiC. This approach attributes the different temperature regimes experimentally observed for Cs diffusivities in SiC to a transition from bulk-dominated diffusivity at high temperatures to a GB-dominated regime at low temperatures, providing new insight. The multiscale, mechanistic effective diffusivity is then implemented in the fuel performance code BISON and further validated by comparing Cs release predictions from Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)-1 and AGR-2 post-irradiation measurements. The new model improves BISON’s predictability. This document also reports improvements made on Ag transport modeling by accounting for different GB types having different diffusivities. Moreover, this report details preliminary efforts to model palladium (Pd) attack of the SiC at the mesoscale using a phase field approach. Pd attack and its impact on accelerated Ag transport remains a misunderstood phenomenon, and we use the model to demonstrate that the formation of lamellae that has been observed in experiments can be explained by the reaction of Pd with SiC to form alternating layers of graphite and Pd 2 Si. This effort aims to improve our understanding of the reaction and eventually provide a model for BISON to account for Pd penetration and its effects on fission product release.

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AGR-3/4 TRISO Fuel Compact Ceramography

The combined third and fourth irradiation in the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) program (AGR-3/4) contained tristructural isotropic (TRISO)-coated particle fuel and designed-to-fail (DTF) fuel particles. The DTF particles were only coated with highly anisotropic pyrocarbon (PyC) so they would purposely fail during the AGR-3/4 irradiation and provide a source of fission products for measurement. To observe the post-irradiation morphology of these DTF particles and the TRISO-coated particles, three AGR-3/4 compacts were mounted in epoxy, sectioned above their centerlines, and ground/polished. Three rounds of grinding/polishing and optical microscopy were performed so that the particles could be observed at multiple planes. Each compact contained approximately 1,872 TRISO particles and exactly 20 DTF particles. The three AGR-3/4 compacts examined covered a wide temperature range and featured both the hottest average irradiation temperature (1375°C) and the coldest/lowest burnup (872°C and 5.5% fissions per initial metal atom) of any compacts to undergo post-irradiation examination (PIE) in the AGR program to date. A total of 29 DTF particles were located and observed via microscopy across the three compacts. All the DTF particles observed via microscopy had completely failed PyC coatings. Some different DTF kernel and PyC morphologies were observed that have been attributed to the differences in irradiation temperature and/or burnup. At low and medium irradiation temperatures (roughly 850 to 1050°C), it appears irradiation-induced dimensional changes in the DTF PyC caused it to fracture and fold in on itself, and the kernel deformed to accommodate this PyC deformation. The extent of DTF kernel deformation to accommodate DTF PyC buckling tended to be greater for the medium-temperature fuel compared to the cold fuel. In the high-irradiation-temperature compact (1375°C), the DTF PyC layer appears to have completely reacted chemically with the kernel material. The only material surrounding the DTF particles in this hot compact resembles the compact matrix material. Observations of the TRISO-coated driver fuel particles and fuel compact graphitic matrix were also made. The TRISO particle kernels in the medium-temperature compact (1047°C), and many in the high-temperature compact (1375°C), showed morphologies consistent with what was seen in AGR-1 and AGR-2. In other TRISO particles from the high-temperature compact, a spatial gradient in the kernel appearance was evident. Here the cool side of the kernel (away from the center of the compact) had a much darker appearance (like that of the buffer and pyrocarbon). This is the first observation of this kind of kernel spatial gradient in AGR fuel. It is believed that the high irradiation temperature of that compact (an average of 1375°C) activates or accelerates an unidentified chemical reaction, and the temperature gradient within the fuel causes a sharp spatial gradient. The low-temperature/low-burnup compact also showed unique kernel morphologies where the TRISO-coated particles had clearly distinguishable oxide and carbide phases at the center of the kernel, an oxide rind surrounding this, and remnants of a carbide skin surrounding the oxide rind. These are features observed in the as-fabricated fuel that are no longer present in higher burnup fuel. Occasional gaps between the outer pyrolytic carbon (OPyC) and graphitic matrix material were observed in all compacts. Gaps were most often found in the small, matrix-filled spaces between adjacent particles. Finally, buffer morphologies in AGR-3/4 TRISO particles were like those observed in AGR-1 and AGR-2, and the buffer fracture frequencies in AGR-3/4 and AGR-2 TRISO particles were plotted versus fast neutron fluence and irradiation temperature. In AGR-3/4 the buffer fracture rate was highest (23%) for an irradiation temperature of 1047°C and a fast fluence of 5.18E25 n/m 2 . Increasing the irradiation temperature to 1375°C reduced the buffer fracture rate to 14%. Reducing the irradiation temperature to 872°C and the fast fluence by a factor of 3 reduced the buffer fracture rate to 7%. The temperature and fluence dependencies observed for AGR-3/4 buffer fracture were consistent with those observed in AGR-2. Lower fluences and/or higher temperatures significantly reduced the buffer fracture frequencies. Lower buffer fracture frequencies were also observed at lower temperatures as long as the fluence was also significantly reduced. This is believed to be due to lower fluence resulting in less irradiation-induced dimensional change (shrinkage) of the buffer, and a higher temperature promoting enhanced creep relaxation of stresses within the buffer, leading to less buffer fracture.

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Uncertainty Quantification of Calculated Temperatures for the AGR 5/6/7 Experiment

This report documents the quantification of uncertainty of the calculated temperature data for the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) 5/6/7 fuel irradiation experiment conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho National Laboratory in support of the Advanced Reactor Technologies? research and development program. Recognizing uncertainties inherent in physics and thermal simulations of the AGR 5/6/7 capsules, the results of the numerical simulations are used in combination with statistical analysis methods to improve qualification of measured data. The calculated fuel temperatures for AGR tests are also used for validation of the fission product transport and fuel performance simulation models. These crucial roles of the calculated fuel temperatures in ensuring achievement of the AGR experimental program objectives require accurate determination of the model temperature uncertainties. This report covers temperature uncertainty results for each of the five AGR 5/6/7 capsules. To quantify the uncertainty of calculated temperatures determined using the ABAQUS finite element heat transfer code, this study identifies and analyzes model parameters of potential importance to the calculated temperatures of fuel compacts and thermocouples. The selection of input parameters for uncertainty quantification is based on the ranking of their influences upon temperature predictions. Thus, selected input parameters include those with high sensitivity and those with the largest uncertainty. Propagation of model parameter uncertainty and sensitivity is then used to quantify the overall uncertainty of calculated temperatures. Measurement uncertainty, analysis of modeling assumptions, and expert judgment are used as the basis to quantify the uncertainty range for selected input parameters. The input uncertainties are dynamic, accounting for the effect of unplanned events and changes in thermal properties of capsule components over extended exposure to high temperatures and fast neutron irradiation. The sensitivity analysis performed in this work went beyond the traditional local sensitivity. Using experimental design, analysis of pairwise interactions of model parameters was performed to establish sufficiency of the time dependent first order (linear) expansion terms in constructing the temperature response surface. To achieve completeness, uncertainty propagation made use of pairwise noise correlations of model parameters. Furthermore, using an interpolation scheme over the input parameter domain, the analysis obtains time dependent sensitivity over the test campaign duration. This allows computation of uncertainty for the calculated fuel temperatures and the calculated graphite temperatures at thermocouple locations during the entire irradiation period.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 3, July-September 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 325 Safety of Framatome Advanced Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Designs by J. A. Charles and D. Lange, 333 Book Review of Nuclear Accidents: Intervention Levels for the Protection of the Public by H. B. Piper; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 335 Living PRA Computer Systems by S. C. Dinsmore and H.-P. Balfanz, 343 Summary of ICAP Assessments of RELAP5/MOD2 by W. E. Driskell and R. G. Hanson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 352 Thermal Performance Monitoring System at Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant by H.-J. Chao, Y.-P. Lin, G.-H. Jou, L.-Y. Liao, and Y.-B. Chen; DESIGN FEATURES: 358 Warning Systems for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies by J. H. Sorensen and D. S. Mileti; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 371 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 382 Steam Generator Tube Performance: Experience with Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors During 1985 by O. S. Tatone and R. L. Tapping, 400 Systems Interaction Analyses: Concepts and Techniques (Part II) by M. D. Muhlheim and G. A. Murphy, 413 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 416 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 440 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 460 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 466 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 470 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31, 1989; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 334 Proceedings Published, 351 CEC Seminar on Methods and Codes for Assessing the Off-Site Consequences of Nuclear Accidents, 357 Short Course on Multiphase Flow and Heat Transfer: Bases and Applications in A: The Nuclear Power Industry B: The Process Industries, 357 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, 478 International Topical Meeting on the Safety, Status, and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities, 475 The Authors.

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Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels

Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.

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AGR-5/6/7 Fuel Fabrication Report

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE NE) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification program (referred to as AGR Fuel program hereafter) are pursuing qualification of tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel for use in high temperature gas cooled reactors (HTGRs). The AGR Fuel program was established to provide a fuel qualification data set in support of the licensing and operation of an HTGR. BWX Technologies Nuclear Operations Group (BWXT-NOG) was subcontracted to fabricate the fuel for the AGR program. Several investments and innovations were realized in preparation to fabricate fuel for the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation experiments that brought fuel fabrication fully out of the laboratory and into engineering-scale operations. These included: • Increased the kernel fabrication line capacity and uniformity • Upgraded ancillary support equipment and processes for the tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coating furnace • Demonstrated efficient production of the matrix precursor powder by dry jet milling of co mingled components • Demonstrated an engineering-scale method for quick and efficient overcoating TRISO particles with the matrix precursor • Demonstrated an automated, multi cavity compacting system with a volumetric feed system • Demonstrated a combined-cycle thermal treatment furnace These changes increased production rates of some of these processes by an order of magnitude or more while eliminating the use of flammable solvents, multiple grinding and sorting operations, and the weighing out of individual die charges. Three fuel kernel lots were fabricated for production of the fuel for AGR-5/6/7. The initial lot (J52R-16-39316) was certified to fuel specifications but was not used because the kernels had a high fraction of internal fissures that caused an unacceptable fraction of the kernels to fragment when charged to the coating furnace where the TRISO coating would be deposited. Fragmented kernels increased the dispersed uranium in the particles and produced a worrisome fraction of dimpled particles with an elevated probability of in-pile failure. After some efforts to identify the cause of the fissure formation, two additional lots were produced with much lower fissure fractions, J52R-16-69317 and 69318. The latter kernel lot was a backup to the first and was not needed. Multiple kernel batches were composited to form each of the lots so as to simulate a commercial-scale operation where kernel batches would also be composited. Multiple TRISO coating runs were performed and the product characterized so that several could be composited into a TRISO lot. TRISO lot J52R-16-98005 conformed to all fuel specifications except the mean outer pyrocarbon (OPyC) layer thickness was thinner than specified. Furthermore, it was determined that the TRISO lot had a dispersed uranium fraction (DUF) that might result in the compacts not meeting the DUF specification. A review of the role of the OPyC layer and consequences of the DUF by the Technical Coordination Team and INL concluded that the fuel was acceptable for use in the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation experiment. The TRISO particles were overcoated with the matrix precursor that had been produced in a jet-milling operation. The overcoating was performed in equipment originally designed to coat pharmaceuticals. The overcoating process performed well; producing highly spherical and uniform overcoats requiring little upgrading and no recycle or rework. TRISO particles were overcoated with the matrix precursor to achieve nominal volumetric packing fractions (PFs) of TRISO particles of 25% and 40% for the irradiation experiments. The 40% PF compacts occupy the first and fifth test capsule in the test train while the inner three capsules are loaded with 25% PF compacts. The resinated graphite matrix precursor powder was a derivative of the German A3-27 matrix formulation, which differs from previous AGR irradiation campaigns that used an A3-3 formulation. Jet milling of the matrix powder precursor produced a finer mean graphite particle size than the milling operations used for the A3-3 matrix powder precursor. Changes made in the matrix formula and equipment yielded compacts with significantly higher matrix density than was attained in previous AGR irradiation campaigns. The changes in the matrix formulation and the means of milling the powders also complicated resolution of the three fuel compact defect fractions, DUF, exposed kernel fraction (EKF), and the silicon carbide defect fraction (SDF). Characterization data from BWXT-NOG had some anomalous results, so samples of the fuel compacts and overcoated TRISO particles were also analyzed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to ensure that the defect fractions were accurately characterized.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Examining Graphite Degradation in Molten Salt Environments: A Chemical, Physical, and Material Analysis

Molten-salt reactors (MSRs) are Generation IV nuclear reactors that use liquid salt as a coolant and/or fuel. In several MSR designs, graphite serves as a moderator and/or reflector. However, due to limited experimental data and operational experience, our understanding of graphite behavior in molten salt environments remains incomplete. This report aims to identify the degradation mechanisms of nuclear graphite in MSRs, detail the mechanisms of each factor, and provide an initial assessment of their impact on the structural integrity of graphite components. This assessment is based on an extensive literature review and insights from subject matter experts. Furthermore, given the limited data, a modeling strategy using existing Grizzly software is proposed for a more thorough analysis where appropriate. Additionally, it presents mitigation strategies where applicable. The report covers physical degradation mechanisms such as infiltration, erosion, and abrasion, as well as chemical degradation mechanisms including fluorination, intercalation, corrosion, and oxidation. Molten salt can infiltrate the porous structure of graphite, leading to several detrimental effects. Entrapment of fissile products within the graphite pores can cause radiation damage and could pose challenges in the handling and disposal of contaminated components. The differential thermal expansion between the infiltrated salt and graphite, along with internal stress from pressurized molten salt and volumetric heating, can compromise the structural integrity of graphite. To mitigate these effects, employing ultra-fine graphite grades and applying sealants and coatings are effective strategies. A computational model based on coupled solid mechanics and heat transfer phenomena could be used to predict the internal stresses using Grizzly software. In pebble-bed MSRs, graphite fuel pebbles can cause abrasion against reactor components due to friction and wear. The severity of wear is influenced by various factors such as temperature, environment, and the presence of lubricants. Tribological studies reveal that higher temperatures and molten salt environments, such as FLiBe, significantly reduce wear rates compared to dry conditions. Additionally, the chemical composition of the salt can further optimize graphite's tribological performance. Long-term wear effects can be modeled by incorporating surface defects into the geometry and predict stresses under thermal and radiation effects using Grizzly software. Chemical degradation of graphite in a molten salt environment can occur through fluorination and intercalation. Fluorination can occur via replacement of hydrogen or oxygen atoms, or at the active sites, but does not cause structural degradation. Intercalation, on the other hand, can lead to exfoliation, where layers of graphite separate and peel away, damaging the graphite. Protective coatings can enhance graphite's resistance to intercalation. Graphite generally exhibits good chemical stability in molten salt environments, though it can corrode under specific conditions, particularly in the presence of impurities or oxidants. Studies have shown that protective coatings, such as plasma-sprayed partially stabilized zirconia (PSZ), can effectively prevent such degradation. Corrosion behavior varies significantly with different graphite grades and coating applications, underscoring the need for detailed studies on uncoated and coated graphite to understand and mitigate corrosion mechanisms in MSRs. Research indicates that the presence of oxidants and impurities can accelerate graphite degradation in molten salts, making it essential to explore acceptable impurity limits. Oxidation is another critical degradation mechanism, leading to weight loss and structural damage due to the formation of CO and CO 2 from the reaction of carbon atoms with oxygen. This process creates new porosity and compromises graphite's integrity. While extensive research on graphite oxidation has been conducted for gas-cooled reactors, studies specific to MSRs are limited. Findings from the coal industry suggest that molten alkali metal salts can significantly accelerate graphite oxidation, a hypothesis worth exploring for fluoride salts in MSRs. Understanding oxidation behavior in MSRs is vital for developing protective measures. The analysis of post-irradiated graphite from the MSRE experiment demonstrated exceptional chemical compatibility with molten fluoride salt, suggesting that the extent of chemical attack on graphite largely depends on the salt's infiltration capability. Therefore, the use of ultra-fine grade graphite could help mitigate chemical degradation effects. Existing oxidation modeling capabilities in Grizzly, which use reaction-diffusion equations to model graphite-air interactions, could be adapted to simulate the chemical degradation effects of graphite in molten salt environments.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

AGR-5/6/7 Thermal Model with Non-uniform Gas Gaps

Fuel compact temperatures are a crucial factor in assessing the irradiation performance of tri-structural isotropic fuel particles. In the absence of direct measurement, fuel compact temperatures were calculated using a three-dimensional finite element thermal model, which is subject to simulation uncertainty. The most dominant factor in the uncertainty of calculated fuel temperatures is the gas gap uncertainty due to the nub-to-shell clearance caused by a design error of AGR-5/6/7 capsules. The thermal model was revised to examine the most probable graphite offset position for six different days during the irradiation for Capsules 1 and 2. The analysis varied the offset distance and azimuthal direction at both the top and bottom of the holder. The best-fit offset was estimated based on the minimum root mean square error of the residuals (measured minus calculated) for the operational thermocouples (TCs). From these results, the following conclusions were made: (1) The holder offsets led to slightly lower average temperatures but wider temperature variations (lower minimum and higher peak fuel temperatures) for both Capsule 1 and Capsule 2. (2) During earlier cycles (162A–164B), when numerous TCs were still operational, the best-fit offset distance varied over a specific range for both the top and bottom ([0.002–0.0035 in.] for Capsule 1 and [0.003-0.004 in] for Capsule 2). In contrast, the offset azimuthal direction varied widely, especially for the offset at the bottom of the Capsule 1 holder. This is because holder movement was somewhat constrained at the top of Capsule 1 by the TC leads running through the capsule head and into the holder and by the through tubes in Capsule 2, but the Capsule 1 bottom did not have this type of constraint. (3) During later cycles, when all TCs failed, applying the maximum possible offset of 0.006 in. to the northwest direction for both the top and bottom resulted in a calculated peak fuel temperature of 1557? in Capsule 1 (i.e., a 135? increase from 1422? with zero offset on September 20, 2019 (166A)); the maximum offset of 0.0068 in. to the south for both top and bottom resulted in a calculated peak fuel temperature of 1110°C in Capsule 2 on April 20, 2020 (i.e., a 116? increase from 994? with zero offset (168A)). High peak fuel temperatures in Capsule 1 during Cycle 166A could be the cause of massive particle failure near the end of this cycle. (4) Even though the highest temperature at the tip of Type-N TCs, such as TC-1-7, slightly exceeded 1000?, the temperature along the TC wire reached as high as 1335? assuming an offset of 0.006 in. in the northwest of Capsule 1 holder near the end of Cycle 166A. This temperature significantly exceeds the temperature threshold at which TC degradation is expected to occur, ultimately contributing to considerable particle failures in Capsule 1. For eight Type-N TCs in Capsule 2, the peak TC line temperature was much lower (i.e., 1029°C for TC-2-5), assuming maximum offset of 00068 in. to the south during cycle 168A.

advanced gas reactors↗

AGR-5/6/7 Final Release-to-Birth Ratio Data Analysis

AGR-5/6/7 is the last of a series of Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) experiments conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in support of development and qualification of tristructural isotropic (TRISO) low-enriched fuel for use in the high-temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR). AGR configuration and irradiation conditions are based on prismatic HTGR technology that is distinguished primarily through the use of helium coolant, a low-power-density ceramic core capable of withstanding very high temperatures, and TRISO-coated particle fuel. The AGR tests provide valuable irradiation-performance data to support fuel process development, qualify fuel for normal operation and accident conditions, and support development and validation of fuel performance and fission-product (FP) transport models and codes. Each AGR test consists of multiple independently controlled and monitored capsules containing fuel compacts placed in a graphite cylinder shrouded by a steel shell. Release-to-birth ratios (R/B) for fission-gas isotopes released from each capsule are calculated from release rates, measured by germanium detectors in the Fission Product Monitoring System (FPMS) installed downstream from each capsule, and birth rates calculated using numerical models of FG generation. The R/Bs are a critical measure of the ability of the fuel kernel, the particle coating layers, and the compact matrix to retain fission-gas atoms, preventing their release into the sweep-gas flow, and the impact of initially defective particles and/or particle-coating failures that occur during irradiation. For fission-gas isotopes, particle failure is defined as failure of all coating layers, allowing gaseous fission atoms to escape from a particle. During the first five cycles (162B ? 165A), R/Bs were stable in the 10-8?10-6 range, and no in-pile particle failures were observed, based on the gross gamma counts. The maximum R/B value of around 2 ? 10-6 for Kr-85m resulted from the presence of as-fabricated exposed kernels (based on the high exposed kernel fraction), the dispersed uranium, and high fuel particle temperatures in Capsule 1. Comparison of capsule-measured R/Bs from these early cycles to predictions using the previously developed AGR R/B model demonstrated FG release from the AGR-5/6/7 TRISO fuel was comparable to that of previous experiments. In addition, the Kr-85m R/B per-exposed-kernel values are comparable to R/B values obtained in AGR-3/4 irradiation experiment and four irradiation experiments performed during 1980s: (1) HRB-17/18, (2) COMEDIE-BD1, (3) HFR B1, and (4) HRB-21. In contrast, all measured R/B values are lower than predictions by the commonly used Richards and German models, which are intentionally conservative. A large number of in-pile particle failures occurred in Capsule 1 by the end of Cycle 166A. During the final four cycles (166A ? 168A), apparent damage to the Capsule 1 gas line appeared to cause FG leakage from that capsule into the other four capsules, resulting in an increase in fission gas (FG) detected in the effluent for all capsules. Isolation of the Capsule 1 gas line during the last three cycles also prevented measurement of its FG release. Thus, R/Bs in all capsules after Cycle 166A are highly uncertain because of undefined amount of leakage from Capsule 1, especially for long-lived isotopes. A few hundred in-pile particle failures were estimated for Capsule 1 before the end of Cycle 166A, but the total number of failures is unknown due to the lack of FG release data in the later cycles. Based primarily on evidence from the gross gamma counts during Cycle 168A, approximately 15 particles failed in Capsule 3 and four particles failed in Capsule 2. In-pile failures in Capsule 3 were anticipated because this capsule was designed to operate beyond the HTGR normal operating temperature range. In contrast, no in-pile failures were identified in the top two capsules (4 and 5) based on the absence of the typical spikes in gross gamma counts and low failure estimates using the AGR model, developed in INL/EXT-14-32970, for R/B of the short-lived isotopes (Kr-89 and Xe-137) with minimal leakage from Capsule 1.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AGR-5/6/7 Thermal Model with Non-uniform Gas Gaps

Fuel compact temperatures are a crucial factor in assessing the irradiation performance of tri-structural isotropic fuel particles. In the absence of direct measurement, fuel compact temperatures were calculated using a three-dimensional finite element thermal model, which is subject to simulation uncertainty. The most dominant factor in the uncertainty of calculated fuel temperatures is the gas gap uncertainty due to the nub-to-shell clearance caused by a design error of AGR-5/6/7 capsules. The thermal model was revised to examine the most probable graphite offset position for six different days during the irradiation for Capsules 1 and 2. The analysis varied the offset distance and azimuthal direction at both the top and bottom of the holder. The best-fit offset was estimated based on the minimum root mean square error of the residuals (measured minus calculated) for the operational thermocouples (TCs). From these results, the following conclusions were made: (1) The holder offsets led to slightly lower average temperatures but wider temperature variations (lower minimum and higher peak fuel temperatures) for both Capsule 1 and Capsule 2. (2) During earlier cycles (162A–164B), when numerous TCs were still operational, the best-fit offset distance varied over a specific range for both the top and bottom ([0.002–0.0035 in.] for Capsule 1 and [0.003-0.004 in] for Capsule 2). In contrast, the offset azimuthal direction varied widely, especially for the offset at the bottom of the Capsule 1 holder. This is because holder movement was somewhat constrained at the top of Capsule 1 by the TC leads running through the capsule head and into the holder and by the through tubes in Capsule 2, but the Capsule 1 bottom did not have this type of constraint. (3) During later cycles, when all TCs failed, applying the maximum possible offset of 0.006 in. to the northwest direction for both the top and bottom resulted in a calculated peak fuel temperature of 1557? in Capsule 1 (i.e., a 135? increase from 1422? with zero offset on September 20, 2019 (166A)); the maximum offset of 0.0068 in. to the south for both top and bottom resulted in a calculated peak fuel temperature of 1110°C in Capsule 2 on April 20, 2020 (i.e., a 116? increase from 994? with zero offset (168A)). High peak fuel temperatures in Capsule 1 during Cycle 166A could be the cause of massive particle failure near the end of this cycle. (4) Even though the highest temperature at the tip of Type-N TCs, such as TC-1-7, slightly exceeded 1000?, the temperature along the TC wire reached as high as 1335? assuming an offset of 0.006 in. in the northwest of Capsule 1 holder near the end of Cycle 166A. This temperature significantly exceeds the temperature threshold at which TC degradation is expected to occur, ultimately contributing to considerable particle failures in Capsule 1. For eight Type-N TCs in Capsule 2, the peak TC line temperature was much lower (i.e., 1029°C for TC-2-5), assuming maximum offset of 00068 in. to the south during cycle 168A.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AGR-5/6/7 Thermal Model with Non-uniform Gas Gaps

Fuel compact temperatures are a crucial factor in assessing the irradiation performance of tri-structural isotropic fuel particles. In the absence of direct measurement, fuel compact temperatures were calculated using a three-dimensional finite element thermal model, which is subject to simulation uncertainty. The most dominant factor in the uncertainty of calculated fuel temperatures is the gas gap uncertainty due to the nub-to-shell clearance caused by a design error of AGR-5/6/7 capsules. The thermal model was revised to examine the most probable graphite offset position for six different days during the irradiation for Capsules 1 and 2. The analysis varied the offset distance and azimuthal direction at both the top and bottom of the holder. The best-fit offset was estimated based on the minimum root mean square error of the residuals (measured minus calculated) for the operational thermocouples (TCs). From these results, the following conclusions were made: (1) The holder offsets led to slightly lower average temperatures but wider temperature variations (lower minimum and higher peak fuel temperatures) for both Capsule 1 and Capsule 2. (2) During earlier cycles (162A–164B), when numerous TCs were still operational, the best-fit offset distance varied over a specific range for both the top and bottom ([0.002–0.0035 in.] for Capsule 1 and [0.003-0.004 in] for Capsule 2). In contrast, the offset azimuthal direction varied widely, especially for the offset at the bottom of the Capsule 1 holder. This is because holder movement was somewhat constrained at the top of Capsule 1 by the TC leads running through the capsule head and into the holder and by the through tubes in Capsule 2, but the Capsule 1 bottom did not have this type of constraint. (3) During later cycles, when all TCs failed, applying the maximum possible offset of 0.006 in. to the northwest direction for both the top and bottom resulted in a calculated peak fuel temperature of 1557? in Capsule 1 (i.e., a 135? increase from 1422? with zero offset on September 20, 2019 (166A)); the maximum offset of 0.0068 in. to the south for both top and bottom resulted in a calculated peak fuel temperature of 1110°C in Capsule 2 on April 20, 2020 (i.e., a 116? increase from 994? with zero offset (168A)). High peak fuel temperatures in Capsule 1 during Cycle 166A could be the cause of massive particle failure near the end of this cycle. (4) Even though the highest temperature at the tip of Type-N TCs, such as TC-1-7, slightly exceeded 1000?, the temperature along the TC wire reached as high as 1335? assuming an offset of 0.006 in. in the northwest of Capsule 1 holder near the end of Cycle 166A. This temperature significantly exceeds the temperature threshold at which TC degradation is expected to occur, ultimately contributing to considerable particle failures in Capsule 1. For eight Type-N TCs in Capsule 2, the peak TC line temperature was much lower (i.e., 1029°C for TC-2-5), assuming maximum offset of 00068 in. to the south during cycle 168A.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗