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The paper describes at a high-level the network-form game framework (based on Bayes net and game theory), which can be used to model and analyze safety issues in large, distributed, mixed human-automation systems such as NextGen.
Numerous unmanned aircraft systems operating at low altitudes to deliver goods and services may one day become ubiquitous in our cities. In the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) framework, such a concept is envisioned, where aerial vehicles operate beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) within specifically reserved and time stamped “corridors” in the airspace. For example, these corridors or operational intent volumes can connect an aerial vehicle’s origin site to its destination site for package delivery operations. There may also be more than one corridor available for an aerial vehicle to choose from and often different corridors may intersect with one another. Thus, it is imperative to ensure flight trajectories belonging to different aerial vehicles are not in conflict. Per the UTM CONOPs, we assume that a vehicle almost always stays inside its corridor or operational volume. This work provides a framework for strategic deconfliction of UTM or package delivery drones, where we schedule the departure time of all vehicles subject to various temporal constraints (including the corridor deconfliction at the intersections). We present the “multi-route weighted package delivery problem” which serves as an exemplifying model for strategic deconfliction in UTM. In the multi-route weighted package delivery problem, a graph network is given which consists of a set of depots (source) and drop-off (destination) nodes, with multiple routes (defined as a sequence of waypoints) connecting the depots to drop-off nodes. In addition, routes are weighted by the associated ground risk and total travel distance for package delivery. The goal is for a known set of aerial vehicles to depart from the depots, choose a route and take off time, while avoiding conflicts with other aerial vehicles, and minimizing both risk and distance traveled. We provide a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulation of the problem, as well as a heuristic solution based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) – a method used in game theory and artificial intelligence – to overcome limitations inherent to optimal solvers. Computational results show the advantages of using MCTS over the MILP formulation; the former can provide a sub-optimal solution quickly, and may sometimes even reach an optimal solution, whereas the latter may not even produce a solution in reasonable time. Furthermore, results from both the MILP formulation and MCTS methods were validated using a preliminary agent-based simulator implementing the UTM concept of operations. Thus, the MCTS method can be seen as a scalable solution to the complex multi-route weighted package delivery problem and may possibly be extended to similar complex optimization problems.
A key objective in the Urban Air Mobility program at NASA is to intelligently perform an autonomous flight in a complex urban environment under all weather conditions with guaranteed levels of safety. To accomplish this, the mission manager (central decision-making module) of the vehicle needs to make informed decisions between various Courses of Action (CoA) based on its' interpretation of the inputs it receives. If an off-nominal event is detected either based on the amalgamation of sensor data or the use of machine learning models, the mission manager may greatly benefit from identification of the input features that most likely contributed to that specific event. Such an understanding is usually not possible to obtain from the classical machine learning models (deep learning) due to the inherent black box like structure. However, this understanding is achieved using eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) models that provide a human interpretable rationale for the predictions made. This work presents a game theory inspired XAI model for the off-nominal assessment of autonomous flights. The proposed approach based on Shapley values is model agnostic, provides local as well as global explanation and satisfies the four axioms (efficiency, symmetry, dummy, additivity) to achieve fair contribution. The versatility of the approach is first demonstrated on a simulated dataset in which the significance of each input to flight phase prediction is clearly identified. Subsequently, data from simulated flight trajectories are fed into the model which reveal the input features that most likely contributed to a rotor failure event thereby empowering the mission manager to take the appropriate CoA.
A key objective in the Urban Air Mobility program at NASA is to intelligently perform an autonomous flight in a complex urban environment under all weather conditions with guaranteed levels of safety. To accomplish this, the mission manager (central decision-making module) of the vehicle needs to make informed decisions between various Courses of Action (CoA) based on its' interpretation of the inputs it receives. If an off-nominal event is detected either based on the amalgamation of sensor data or the use of machine learning models, the mission manager may greatly benefit from identification of the input features that most likely contributed to that specific event. Such an understanding is usually not possible to obtain from the classical machine learning models (deep learning) due to the inherent black box like structure. However, this understanding is achieved using eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) models that provide a human interpretable rationale for the predictions made. This work presents a game theory inspired XAI model for the off-nominal assessment of autonomous flights. The proposed approach based on Shapley values is model agnostic, provides local as well as global explanation and satisfies the four axioms (efficiency, symmetry, dummy, additivity) to achieve fair contribution. The versatility of the approach is first demonstrated on a simulated dataset in which the significance of each input to flight phase prediction is clearly identified. Subsequently, data from simulated flight trajectories are fed into the model which reveal the input features that most likely contributed to a rotor failure event thereby empowering the mission manager to take the appropriate CoA.
A new operational concept has been proposed in Upper Class E airspace at or above 60,000 feet (Flight Level / FL600), which will allow operators of diverse vehicle characteristics to cooperatively manage and share their operational intents with neighboring operators to avoid conflict. There is a consensus in the community that negotiation for strategic deconfliction is needed, but there are no specific guidelines for how the negotiation should be conducted. There is a need for a structured and cooperative way to resolve the conflict between a wide variety of aircraft projected to be operating in Upper Class E for the negotiation to be carried out routinely. The use of negotiation models are a promising solution that can resolve conflict risks during flight in real-time while taking into account the uncertainty of future vehicle positions and dynamic business considerations. A two-party negotiation model has been researched, but as the traffic demand grows, there is a higher likelihood of conflict involving multiple aircraft that would require a method to handle multi-party conflict. This paper proposes a cooperative multi-party negotiation model inspired by game theory concepts for application to flight trajectory negotiation in Upper Class E traffic management. This model can be applied in flight with operators communicating directly after a potential conflict is detected. Some of the model’s benefits include allowing business costs to be private to operators, allowing operators to collaborate together to find conflict-free flight trajectories, and being compatible with different aircraft and operation types. This model provides a structured procedure for conflict resolution that can handle conflict involving multiple parties, assuming each operator is willing to take on a small cost to themselves in order to reduce the total cost to the group.
The dominating set problem has many practical applications but is well-known to be NP-hard. Therefore, there is a need for efficient heuristic algorithms, especially in applications such as ad hoc wireless networks. Most distributed algorithms proposed in the literature assume that each node has knowledge of the network structure. We propose a distributed heuristic algorithm that uses two rounds of communication, and where each node has only local information, both in terms of network structure and dominating set assignment. First, each node calculates a local centrality measure to determine whether it is part of the dominating set D. The second round guarantees D is a dominating set by adding any non-dominated nodes. We compare several centrality measures and show that the Shapley centrality, derived from the Shapley value in game theory, is theoretically motivated and performs well in practice on several synthetic and real-world networks.
Persistent Immersive Synthetic Environments (PISE) are not just connection points, they are meeting places. They are the new public squares, village centers, malt shops, malls and pubs all rolled into one. They come with a sense of 'thereness" that engages the mind like a real place does. Learning starts as a real code. The code defines "objects." The objects exist in computer space, known as the "grid." The objects and space combine to create a "place." A "world" is created, Before long, the grid and code becomes obscure, and the "world maintains focus.
The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.
General discussion of the theory of differential games with two players and zero sum. Games starting at a fixed initial state and ending at a fixed final time are analyzed. Strategies for the games are defined. The existence of saddle values and saddle points is considered. A stochastic version of a differential game is used to examine the synthesis problem.
In this paper, we extend existing turret defense differential game formulations involving a turn-constrained turret and mobile agent to include specified final time and a constraint. For the purposes of this analysis, the specified final time may represent some exogenous input, perhaps representing the time at which some other event will take place. As for the constraint, it represents a no-fly zone for the mobile agent. The scenario is formulated as a two-player, zero-sum differential game and solved via the method of characteristics (i.e., back-propagation of equilibrium trajectories). Three different trajectory types make up the solution: trajectories that end with the turret aligned with the mobile agent, trajectories that end with the mobile agent on the constraint boundary, and regular trajectories.
The evolving transformation with the proliferation of distributed energy resources and advanced metering, necessitates advanced distribution systems to integrate and orchestrate a large number of grid-edge devices while also serving multiple system-level objectives such as resilience, decarbonization, equity and other system mandates. The parallel deployment and control of resources towards achieving diverse objectives may lead to conflicts between applications that want to control overlapping sets of device setpoints, potentially leading to oscillatory behavior and suboptimal performance. This work aims at leveraging game theoretic framework to drive cooperative behavior among competitive applications. The work proposes a weighted-consensus based game design to facilitate conflict resolution through consensus-building iterations for modular platform. Simulation-based evaluation on a sample test system demonstrates the performance the proposed deconfliction strategy in resolving operational conflicts and achieving close-to-optimal trade off among the applications. Results also compare the proposed strategy with a distribution optimization approach and illustrate it effectiveness in diverse apps regardless of their design while also incentivizing apps with flexible design.
The goal of this project was to develop and use domain-aware machine learning formulations, based on the Koopman Operator (KO), for modelling multi-scale, multi-disciplinary (e.g., multi-physics), and/or multi-agent systems. The project developed these formulations for the following cases: • Systems with dynamics at two separate time scales, • Systems with a bi-level hierarchical control structure, • Systems with bi-level hierarchical control and dynamics at two separate time scales (the lower level controls operating at the faster time scale), and • Systems with n separate but interacting agents/disciplines (with/without control, respectively); the controls for each agent could include bi-level hierarchical control and dynamics at two separate time scales as described above. The project then defined a set of dynamical systems consisting of different nonlinear oscillators that could be used to test these different formulations and then subsequently learned the KO models for those systems. With the KO models, we were able to do the following: • Quantify system stability, including both long-term and transient behavior, • Quantify the effects of feedbacks between the different time scales and agents/disciplines in terms of those feedbacks’ effects on system stability, • Replace a standard Proportional-Integral (PI) control in the hierarchical control structure with a KO-based Linear-Quadratic Regular (LQR), a form of optimal control, • Calculate optimal supervisory control policies a) with and without time scale separated dynamics at the lower level control levels and b) with both PI and KO-based LQR lower level control policies, and • Calculate dynamic Nash equilibria for multi-agent systems where each agent makes its own control decisions.
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games - dynamic model for nonequilibrium situations
Variational methods to solve pursuit-evasion differential game
Continuous sequential decision for derivation of minimum search time for determining one nonzero mean process in presence of finite number of hypotheses
Variational methods used to solve pursuit-evasion differential game and manual control
Reduction of solution of game of pursuit for survival payoff to solution of Cauchy problem for first order partial differential equation