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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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The use of software fault trees for requirements identification and analysis in an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is described.
The DOE/NASA Stirling Engine Project Office has required that contractors make safety considerations an integral part of all phases of the Stirling engine development program. As an integral part of each engine design subtask, analyses are evolved to determine possible modes of failure. The accepted system safety analysis techniques (Fault Tree, FMEA, Hazards Analysis, etc.) are applied in various degrees of extent at the system, subsystem and component levels. The primary objectives are to identify critical failure areas, to enable removal of susceptibility to such failures or their effects from the system and to minimize risk.
Computer program for Monte Carlo simulation of fault trees in analysis of large complex systems
Reliability analysis of fault tolerant computer systems for critical applications is complicated by several factors. These modeling difficulties are discussed and dynamic fault tree modeling techniques for handling them are described and demonstrated. Several advanced fault tolerant computer systems are described, and fault tree models for their analysis are presented. HARP (Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor) is a software package developed at Duke University and NASA Langley Research Center that is capable of solving the fault tree models presented.
This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.
This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.
Object-oriented fault-tree representation unifies evaluation of reliability and diagnosis of faults. Programming/fault tree described more fully in "Object-Oriented Algorithm For Evaluation Of Fault Trees" (ARC-12731). Augmented fault tree object contains more information than fault tree object used in quantitative analysis of reliability. Additional information needed to diagnose faults in system represented by fault tree.
The ability to identify contaminants associated with experiments and facilities is directly related to the safety of the Space Station. A means of identifying these contaminants has been developed through this contracting effort. The delivered system provides a listing of the materials and/or chemicals associated with each facility, information as to the contaminant's physical state, a list of the quantity and/or volume of each suspected contaminant, a database of the toxicological hazards associated with each contaminant, a recommended means of rapid identification of the contaminants under operational conditions, a method of identifying possible failure modes and effects analysis associated with each facility, and a fault tree-type analysis that will provide a means of identifying potential hazardous conditions related to future planned missions.
NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) program is developing several MagicDraw SysML models to support the development of high performance Nuclear Thermal Rocket Engines (NTRE). Currently, the Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO) project is aiming to perform the first ever flight demonstration of an NTRE, and NASA is developing a DRACO Insight Project Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) model to capture, define, analyze, and report on the flight and ground test system architecture, functional behavior, requirements, risks, and lessons learned. Additional models are in work for engine component trade trees, fault detection sensor coverage analysis using a Goal Function Tree (GFT) plugin, stakeholder engagement, and technology maturation projects. The GFT plugin is the Galois, Inc. Failure Recovery Instruction Generation using Automata derived from Traditional Engineering models (FRIGATE) tool. A new capability for Jira to MagicDraw data sharing using the OpenPDM collaboration platform is under development with partner Victory Solutions, Inc. to enhance risk impact analysis.
The reliability of rocket engine systems was analyzed by using probabilistic and fuzzy logic techniques. Fault trees were developed for integrated modular engine (IME) and discrete engine systems, and then were used with the two techniques to quantify reliability. The IRRAS (Integrated Reliability and Risk Analysis System) computer code, developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was used for the probabilistic analyses, and FUZZYFTA (Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis), a code developed at NASA Lewis Research Center, was used for the fuzzy logic analyses. Although both techniques provided estimates of the reliability of the IME and discrete systems, probabilistic techniques emphasized uncertainty resulting from randomness in the system whereas fuzzy logic techniques emphasized uncertainty resulting from vagueness in the system. Because uncertainty can have both random and vague components, both techniques were found to be useful tools in the analysis of rocket engine system reliability.
One inherent characteristic of requrements engineering is a lack of certainty during this early phase of a project. Nevertheless, decisions about requirements must be made in spite of this uncertainty. Here we describe the context in which we are exploring this, and some initial work to support elicitation of uncertain requirements, and to deal with the combination of such information from multiple stakeholders.
FTC, Fault-Tree Compiler program, is reliability-analysis software tool used to calculate probability of top event of fault tree. Five different types of gates allowed in fault tree: AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE OR, INVERT, and M OF N. High-level input language of FTC easy to understand and use. Program supports hierarchical fault-tree-definition feature simplifying process of description of tree and reduces execution time. Solution technique implemented in FORTRAN, and user interface in Pascal. Written to run on DEC VAX computer operating under VMS operating system.
We present a dynamic fault tree model of the benchmark propulsion system, and solve it using Galileo. Dynamic fault trees (DFT) extend traditional static fault trees with special gates to model spares and other sequence dependencies. Galileo solves DFT models using a judicious combination of automatically generated Markov and Binary Decision Diagram models. Galileo easily handles the complexities exhibited by the benchmark problem. In particular, Galileo is designed to model phased mission systems.
Our work to date in connecting risk tools hs had successes, but also has revealed there to be significant impediments to information exchange between them. These impediments stem from the well-known phenomenon of 'semantic dissonance' - mismatch between conceptual assumptions made by the separately developed tools. This issue represents a fundamental challenge that arises regardless of the mechanism of information exchange. This paper explains the issue and illustrates it with reference to our experiences to date connecting several risk tools. We motivate this work, present and discuss the solutions we have adopted to surmount these impediments, and the implications this work has for future efforts to integrate risk tools.
Fault-Tree Compiler (FTC) program, is software tool used to calculate probability of top event in fault tree. Gates of five different types allowed in fault tree: AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE OR, INVERT, and M OF N. High-level input language easy to understand and use. In addition, program supports hierarchical fault-tree definition feature, which simplifies tree-description process and reduces execution time. Set of programs created forming basis for reliability-analysis workstation: SURE, ASSIST, PAWS/STEM, and FTC fault-tree tool (LAR-14586). Written in PASCAL, ANSI-compliant C language, and FORTRAN 77. Other versions available upon request.
Traditionally fault models are represented by trees. Recently, digraph models have been proposed (Sack). Digraph models closely imitate the real system dependencies and hence are easy to develop, validate and maintain. However, they can also contain directed cycles and analysis algorithms are hard to find. Available algorithms tend to be complicated and slow. On the other hand, the tree analysis (VGRH, Tayl) is well understood and rooted in vast research effort and analytical techniques. The tree analysis algorithms are sophisticated and orders of magnitude faster. Transformation of a digraph (cyclic) into trees (CLP, LP) is a viable approach to blend the advantages of the representations. Neither the digraphs nor the trees provide the ability to handle heuristic knowledge. An expert system, to capture the engineering knowledge, is essential. We propose an approach here, namely, expert network analysis. We combine the digraph representation and tree algorithms. The models are augmented by probabilistic and heuristic knowledge. CLIPS, an expert system shell from NASA-JSC will be used to develop a tool. The technique provides the ability to handle probabilities and heuristic knowledge. Mixed analysis, some nodes with probabilities, is possible. The tool provides graphics interface for input, query, and update. With the combined approach it is expected to be a valuable tool in the design process as well in the capture of final design knowledge.
This paper presents an informal quantitative analysis of the F18 flight control system (FCS). The analysis technique combines a coverage model with a fault tree model. To demonstrate the method's extensive capabilities, we replace the fault tree with a digraph model of the F18 FCS, the only model available to us. The substitution shows that while digraphs have primarily been used for qualitative analysis, they can also be used for quantitative analysis. Based on our assumptions and the particular failure rates assigned to the F18 FCS components, we show that coverage does have a significant effect on the system's reliability and thus it is important to include coverage in the reliability analysis.
System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.