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At least 91 records · Page 5

Size-dependent characteristics of ultra-fine oxygen-enriched nanoparticles in austenitic steels

Here, a coordinated investigation of the elemental composition and morphology of ultra-fine-scale nanoparticles as a function of size within a variety of austenitic oxide dispersion-strengthened (ODS) steels is reported. Atom probe tomography was utilized to evaluate the elemental composition of these nanoparticles. Meanwhile, the crystal structures and orientation relationships were determined by high resolution transmission electron microscopy. The nanoparticles with sufficient size (>4 nm) to maintain a Y2Ti2-xO7-2x stoichiometry were found to have a pyrochlore structure, whereas smaller YxTiyOz nanoparticles lacked a well-defined structure. The size-dependent characteristics of the nanoparticles in austenitic ODS steels differ from those in ferritic/martensitic ODS steels.

atom probe tomography↗

Context-Enriched Identification of Particles with a Convolutional Network for Neutrino Events

Particle detectors record the interactions of subatomic particles and their passage through matter. The identification of these particles is necessary for in-depth physics analysis. While particles can be identified by their individual behavior as they travel through matter, the full context of the interaction in which they are produced can aid the classification task substantially. We have developed the first convolutional neural network for particle identification which uses context information. This is also the first implementation of a four-tower siamese-type architecture both for separation of independent inputs and inclusion of context information. The network classifies clusters of energy deposits from the NOvA neutrino detectors as electrons, muons, photons, pions, and protons with an overall efficiency and purity of 83.3% and 83.5%, respectively. We show that providing the network with context information improves performance by comparing our results with a network trained without context information.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community began developing effective safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency unannounced access inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. Uranium enrichment capacity has continued to expand on all fronts in the last few years. GCEP capacity is expanding in anticipation of the eventual shutdown of the less-efficient GDPs, the termination of the U.S.-Russia HEU blend-down program slated for 2013, and the possible resurgence of nuclear reactor construction as part of an expected 'Nuclear Renaissance'. Overall, a clear trend in the world profile of uranium enrichment plant operation is the continued movement towards multinational projects driven by commercial and economic interests. Along this vein, the safeguards community is continuing to develop new safeguards techniques and technologies that are not overly burdensome to enrichment plant operators while delivering more effective and efficient results. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2009, including profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is a revision of a 2007 report on the same topic; significant changes in world enrichment programs between the previous and current reports are emphasized. It is based entirely on open-source information, which is dependent on published sources and may therefore not be completely accurate or reflect the most recent developments. Consequently, readers should not assume that information cited here has the endorsement of either ORNL or the U.S. Department of Energy. We are merely reporting what's been reported. In addition, this report briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, including implementation of HSP recommendations.

Laughter, Mark D↗

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future, but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) began developing effective safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency unannounced access (LFUA) inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2007, including profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is based on open-source information, which is dependent on unclassified sources and may therefore not reflect the most recent developments. In addition, it briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, including implementation of HSP recommendations.

Laughter, Mark D↗

Scoping study to expedite development of a field deployable and portable instrument for UF6 enrichment assay

The primary objective of the present study is to identity the most promising, viable technologies that are likely to culminate in an expedited development of the next-generation, field-deployable instrument for providing rapid, accurate, and precise enrichment assay of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). UF6 is typically involved, and is arguably the most important uranium compound, in uranium enrichment processes. As the first line of defense against proliferation, accurate analytical techniques to determine the uranium isotopic distribution in UF6 are critical for materials verification, accounting, and safeguards at enrichment plants. As nuclear fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent around the world, international nuclear safeguards and interest in UF6 enrichment assay has been growing. At present, laboratory-based mass spectrometry (MS), which offers the highest attainable analytical accuracy and precision, is the technique of choice for the analysis of stable and long-lived isotopes. Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors the production of enriched UF6 at declared facilities by collecting a small amount (between 1 to 10 g) of gaseous UF6 into a sample bottle, which is then shipped under chain of custody to a central laboratory (IAEA’s Nuclear Materials Analysis Laboratory) for high-precision isotopic assay by MS. The logistics are cumbersome and new shipping regulations are making it more difficult to transport UF6. Furthermore, the analysis is costly, and results are not available for some time after sample collection. Hence, the IAEA is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at enrichment plants. In-field isotopic analysis of UF6 has the potential to substantially reduce the time, logistics and expense of sample handling. However, current laboratory-based MS techniques require too much infrastructure and operator expertise for field deployment and operation. As outlined in the IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012–2023, one of the IAEA long-term R&D needs is to “develop tools and techniques to enable timely, potentially real-time, detection of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) production in LEU (Lowly Enriched Uranium) enrichment facilities” (Milestone 5.2). Because it is common that the next generation of analytical instruments is driven by technologies that are either currently available or just now emerging, one reasonable and practical approach to project the next generation of chemical instrumentation is to track the recent trends and to extrapolate them. This study adopted a similar approach, and an extensive literature review on existing and emerging technologies for UF6 enrichment assay was performed. The competitive advantages and current limitations of different analytical techniques for in-field UF6 enrichment assay were then compared, and the main gaps between needs and capabilities for their field use were examined. Subsequently, based on these results, technologies for the next-generation field-deployable instrument for UF6 enrichment assay were recommended. The study was organized in a way that a suite of assessment metric was first identified. Criteria used in this evaluation are presented in Section 1 of this report, and the most important ones are described briefly in the next few paragraphs. Because one driving force for in-field UF6 enrichment assay is related to the demanding transportation regulation for gaseous UF6, Section 2 contains a review of solid sorbents that convert and immobilized gaseous UF6 to a solid state, which is regarded as more transportation friendly and is less regulated. Furthermore, candidate solid sorbents, which show promise in mating with existing and emerging assay technologies, also factor into technology recommendations. Extensive literature reviews on existing and emerging technologies for UF6 enrichment assay, covering their scientific principles, instrument options, and current limitations are detailed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, the technological gaps as well as start-of-the-art and commercial off-the-shelf components that can be adopted to expedite the development of a fieldable or portable UF6 enrichment-assay instrument are identified and discussed. Finally, based on the results of the review, requirements and recommendations for developing the next-generation field-deployable instrument for UF6 enrichment assay are presented in Section 6.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

On Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) UF 6 Tests for 1.5" Sch40 SS Pipe, Revision 1

As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants while working within budgetary constraints. The “Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants” (GCEPs) developed by the IAEA Division of Concepts and Planning in June 2006, defines the three primary Safeguards objectives to be the timely detection of: 1) diversion of significant quantities of natural (NU), depleted (DU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) from declared plant flow, 2) facility misuse to produce undeclared LEU product from undeclared feed, and 3) facility misuse to produce enrichments higher than the declared maximum, in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The ability to continuously and independently (i.e. with a minimum of information from the facility operator) monitor not only the uranium mass balance but also the 235 U mass balance in the facility could help support all three verification objectives described above. Two key capabilities required to achieve an independent and accurate material balance are 1) continuous, unattended monitoring of in-process UF 6 and 2) monitoring of cylinders entering and leaving the facility. The continuous monitoring of in-process UF 6 would rely on a combination of load-cell monitoring of the cylinders at the feed and withdrawal stations, online monitoring of gas enrichment, and a high-accuracy net weight measurement of the cylinder contents. The Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is the instrument that would continuously measure the time-dependent relative uranium enrichment, E(t), in weight percent 235 U, of the gas filling or being withdrawn from the cylinders. The OLEM design concept combines gamma-ray spectrometry using a collimated NaI(Tl) detector with gas pressure and temperature data to calculate the enrichment of the UF 6 gas within the unit header pipe as a function of time. The OLEM components have been tested on ORNL UF 6 flow loop. Data were collected at five different enrichment levels (0.71%, 2.97%, 4.62%, 6.0%, and 93.7%) at several pressure conditions. The test data were collected in the standard OLEM N.4242 file format for each of the conditions with a 10-minute sampling period and then averaged over the span of constant pressures. Analysis of the collected data has provided enrichment constants that can be used for 1.5” stainless steel schedule 40 pipe measurement sites. The enrichment constant is consistent among all the wide range of enrichment levels and pressures used.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Hybrid Enrichment Assay Methods for a UF6 Cylinder Verification Station: FY10 Progress Report

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing the concept of an automated UF6 cylinder verification station that would be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until the arrival of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. At the center of this unattended system is a hybrid enrichment assay technique that combines the traditional enrichment-meter method (based on the 186 keV peak from 235U) with non-traditional neutron-induced high-energy gamma-ray signatures (spawned primarily by 234U alpha emissions and 19F(alpha, neutron) reactions). Previous work by PNNL provided proof-of-principle for the non-traditional signatures to support accurate, full-volume interrogation of the cylinder enrichment, thereby reducing the systematic uncertainties in enrichment assay due to UF6 heterogeneity and providing greater sensitivity to material substitution scenarios. The work described here builds on that preliminary evaluation of the non-traditional signatures, but focuses on a prototype field system utilizing NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) spectrometers, and enrichment analysis algorithms that integrate the traditional and non-traditional signatures. Results for the assay of Type-30B cylinders ranging from 0.2 to 4.95 wt% 235U, at an AREVA fuel fabrication plant in Richland, WA, are described for the following enrichment analysis methods: 1) traditional enrichment meter signature (186 keV peak) as calculated using a square-wave convolute (SWC) algorithm; 2) non-traditional high-energy gamma-ray signature that provides neutron detection without neutron detectors and 3) hybrid algorithm that merges the traditional and non-traditional signatures. Uncertainties for each method, relative to the declared enrichment for each cylinder, are calculated and compared to the uncertainties from an attended HPGe verification station at AREVA, and the IAEA’s uncertainty target values for feed, tail and product cylinders. A summary of the major findings from the field measurements and subsequent analysis follows: • Traditional enrichment-meter assay using specially collimated NaI spectrometers and a Square-Wave-Convolute algorithm can achieve uncertainties comparable to HPGe and LaBr for product, natural and depleted cylinders. • Non-traditional signatures measured using NaI spectrometers enable interrogation of the entire cylinder volume and accurate measurement of absolute 235U mass in product, natural and depleted cylinders. • A hybrid enrichment assay method can achieve lower uncertainties than either the traditional or non-traditional methods acting independently because there is a low degree of correlation in the systematic errors of the two individual methods (wall thickness variation and 234U/235U variation, respectively). This work has indicated that the hybrid NDA method has the potential to serve as the foundation for an unattended cylinder verification station. When compared to today’s handheld cylinder-verification approach, such a station would have the following advantages: 1) improved enrichment assay accuracy for product, tail and feed cylinders; 2) full-volume assay of absolute 235U mass; 3) assay of minor isotopes (234U and 232U) important to verification of feedstock origin; single instrumentation design for both Type 30B and Type 48 cylinders; and 4) substantial reduction in the inspector manpower associated with cylinder verification.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Reactor and fuel cycle performance of light water reactor fuel with 235 U enrichments above 5%

Recent advances in nuclear fuel materials research, particularly on the topic of accident-tolerant fuels, have brought up potential opportunities for expanding the operating envelope of existing light water reactors. As many of the performance improvements offered by these technologies may be most fully realized by increasing fuel enrichment beyond the standard 5% limit, this paper examines the potential reactor performance and fuel cycle performance of low-enriched uranium oxide fueled light water reactors by generically considering pressurized water reactors with 235 U enrichment from 5 to 7%. Advanced cladding, including accident-tolerant cladding, has the potential to increase fuel burnup limits related to hydrogen in the cladding that coincide with those limits associated with end-of-life reactivity. Therefore, higher enrichment will be necessary in order to realize the higher fuel burnups. This work includes evaluation of the fuel cycle length, discharge burnup, reactivity coefficients, and fuel cycle performance, including radioactive waste and environmental impact metrics per unit energy generated. The analysis was performed using the evaluation metrics from the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Evaluation and Screening Study. The reactor performance and safety analysis show that enrichments between 5 and 7% would have similar fuel temperature and moderator temperature coefficients. However, the soluble boron coefficient would decrease in magnitude, requiring more corrosive boric acid in the coolant or other methods of reactivity control during the fuel cycle. At these higher enrichments the maximum burnup at the rim of the fuel pellet would increase by almost a factor of two, which is expected to impact the formation of high-burnup structure in the fuel and the corresponding thermo-mechanical fuel properties. The fuel cycle performance assessment shows that increasing enrichment reduces the quantity of high-level waste disposed per unit energy generated, but it increases the natural resource requirements normalized to a gigawatt-electricity-per-year basis. Another impact is the slightly higher discharge burnup, resulting in somewhat different activity levels of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste radioactivity at 100 and 100,000 years after fuel discharge. The environmental impacts—including land use, water use, carbon emission, and radiological exposure—are of the same magnitude per unit energy generated. Finally, however, the impacts are distributed differently. Less than 5% enrichment has marginally more impact on the back-end of the fuel cycle, and greater than 5% enrichment has marginally more impact on the front-end of the fuel cycle. Ultimately, no neutronic or reactor safety hindrances to employing light water reactor fuel with enrichments greater than 5% are identified; given the achievable reactor performance benefits with advanced fuels, further practical exploration of increased enrichment fuel is recommended.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗