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At least 91 records · Page 5

HYDROGEN AND VOC RETENTION IN WASTE BOXES

The Hanford Waste Management Project Master Documented Safety Analysis (MDSA) (HNF-14741, 2003) identifies derived safety controls to prevent or mitigate the risks of a single-container deflagration during operations requiring moving, venting or opening transuranic (TRU)-waste containers. The issue is whether these safety controls are necessary for operations involving TRU-waste boxes that are being retrieved from burial at the Hanford Site. This paper investigates the potential for a deflagration hazard within these boxes and whether safety controls identified for drum deflagration hazards should be applied to operations involving these boxes. The study evaluates the accumulation of hydrogen and VOCs within the waste box and the transport of these gases and vapors out of the waste box. To perform the analysis, there were numerous and major assumptions made regarding the generation rate and the transport pathway dimensions and their number. Since there is little actual data with regards to these assumptions, analyses of three potential configurations were performed to obtain some indication of the bounds of the issue (the concentration of hydrogen or flammable VOCs within a waste box). A brief description of each of the three cases along with the results of the analysis is summarized.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF SHIPPING PACKAGE 9975-02028

Destructive and non-destructive examinations have been performed on specified components of shipping package 9975-02028. For those attributes that were also measured during the field surveillance, no significant changes were observed. Four conditions were identified that do not meet inspection criteria. These conditions are subject to additional investigation and disposition by the Surveillance Program Authority. The conditions include: (1) The lead shield was covered with a white corrosion layer; (2) The lead shield height exceeds drawing requirements; (3) Mold was observed on the lower fiberboard subassembly; and (4) Fiberboard thermal conductivity in the axial direction exceeded the specified range. The Surveillance Program Authority was notified of these conditions and will document the disposition by surveillance report. All other observations and test results met identified criteria, or were collected for information and trending purposes. The Savannah River Site (SRS) stores packages containing plutonium (Pu) materials in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The Pu materials are packaged per the DOE 3013 Standard and stored within Model 9975 shipping packages in KAC. The KAC facility DSA (Document Safety Analysis) credits the Model 9975 package to perform several safety functions, including criticality prevention, impact resistance, containment, and fire resistance to ensure the plutonium materials remain in a safe configuration during normal and accident conditions. The Model 9975 package is expected to perform its safety function for at least 12 years from initial packaging. The DSA recognizes the degradation potential for the materials of package construction over time in the KAC storage environment and requires an assessment of materials performance to validate the assumptions of the analysis and ultimately predict service life. As part of the comprehensive Model 9975 package surveillance program, destructive examination of package 9975-02028 was performed following field surveillance in accordance with Reference. Field surveillance of the Model 9975 package in KAC included nondestructive examination of the drum, fiberboard, lead shield and containment vessels. Results of the field surveillance are provided in Attachment 1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

BALLISTICS TESTING OF THE 9977 SHIPPING PACKAGE FOR STORAGE APPLICATIONS

Radioactive materials are stored in a variety of locations throughout the DOE complex. At the Savannah River Site (SRS), materials are stored within dedicated facilities. Each of those facilities has a documented safety analysis (DSA) that describes accidents that the facility and the materials within it may encounter. Facilities at the SRS are planning on utilizing the certified Model 9977 Shipping Package as a long term storage package and one of these facilities required ballistics testing. Specifically, in order to meet the facility DSA, the radioactive materials (RAM) must be contained within the storage package after impact by a .223 caliber round. In order to qualify the Model 9977 Shipping Package for storage in this location, the package had to be tested under these conditions. Over the past two years, the Model 9977 Shipping Package has been subjected to a series of ballistics tests. The purpose of the testing was to determine if the 9977 would be suitable for use as a storage package at a Savannah River Site facility. The facility requirements are that the package must not release any of its contents following the impact in its most vulnerable location by a .223 caliber round. A package, assembled to meet all of the design requirements for a certified 9977 shipping configuration and using simulated contents, was tested at the Savannah River Site in March of 2011. The testing was completed and the package was examined. The results of the testing and examination are presented in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SRS K-AREA MATERIAL STORAGE - EXPANDING CAPABILITIES

In support of the Department of Energy’s continued plans to de-inventory and reduce the footprint of Cold War era weapons’ material production sites, the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, located in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at the Savannah River Site reservation, has expanded since its startup authorization in 2000 to accommodate DOE’s material consolidation mission. During the facility’s growth and expansion, KAMS will have expanded its authorization capability of material types and storage containers to allow up to 8200 total shipping containers once the current expansion effort completes in 2014. Recognizing the need to safely and cost effectively manage other surplus material across the DOE Complex, KAC is constantly evaluating the storage of different material types within K area. When modifying storage areas in KAC, the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) must undergo extensive calculations and reviews; however, without an extensive and proven security posture the possibility for expansion would not be possible. The KAC maintains the strictest adherence to safety and security requirements for all the SNM it handles. Disciplined Conduct of Operations and Conduct of Projects are demonstrated throughout this historical overview highlighting various improvements in capability, capacity, demonstrated cost effectiveness and utilization of the KAC as the DOE Center of Excellence for safe and secure storage of surplus SNM.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhancing Staging Capabilities at the Device Assembly Facility

The radioactive material limits allowed by the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Device Assembly Facility (DAF) can support larger quantities than the floor space will accommodate. In order to maximize the full staging bunker capability, National Security Technologies, LLC, (NSTec) is developing a plan to take advantage of these high inventory limits and evaluate staging options such as shelves, racks, and mezzanines. This plan will investigate cost and evaluate U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex-wide alternatives used at other sites (Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility, Pantex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, etc.) that addressed similar situations.

staging, NMMP, nuclear material, DAF↗

NuScale Power Module Instrumentation

The safe and efficient operation of any nuclear power plant (NPP) depends on accurate and timely measurement of the primary system temperature, pressure, level, flow, and neutron flux. Integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) or small modular reactors (SMRs) present unique challenges to instrumentation and control (I&C) sensors and their maintenance strategies. More specifically, the calibration and response time of these sensors may have to be verified periodically to ensure that they maintain their required degree of accuracy and speed of response. A review of technical reports and safety analysis documentation of the NuScale Power Module (NPM) by Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation (AMS), together with NuScale engineers, confirms that the I&C sensors within the NPM will need to be testable as installed to verify their static and dynamic performance at plant operating conditions. Sensor placement and installation as well as the process conditions expected in natural circulation integral SMRs like the NPM are very different from those in large scale NPPs with conventional primary system loop piping. In particular, reactor coolant system (RCS) flows are more complex and flow rates much lower, the average containment temperature is higher, nuclear radiation levels in some areas are greater, and the accessibility of sensors for hands-on maintenance is very limited. These challenges among others related to I&C sensors can be overcome by adapting existing I&C sensor test methods, developing new techniques for non-conventional I&C sensors, and incorporating online monitoring (OLM) technologies into the I&C architecture of the plant to verify the calibration and response time of sensors within the NPM prior to startup, during operation, and during subsequent refueling outages. These methods and technologies will be demonstrated and validated through a research and development (R&D) grant recently awarded to AMS by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to facilitate timely deployment of the first NuScale SMR in the United States and to enable efficient I&C maintenance strategies during the life of the plant. Lastly, this paper presents the R&D plan for the DOE project with a focus on temperature measurement needs of NuScale.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Progress Updates for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project - 16281

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Project is vital to the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) mission to clean up radioactive waste at the Hanford Site, located in southeastern Washington State. The overall WTP Project objective is to design, build, and commission the facilities and systems that will treat and immobilize approximately 56 million gallons of radioactive waste stored in Hanford's 177 underground storage tanks. The combination of technologies in the WTP makes it a first-of-a-kind facility at a scale larger than ever built for radioactive waste processing. The WTP includes several facilities that will contribute to waste processing: (1) the Pretreatment (PT) Facility, which is designed to receive waste retrieved from the Hanford tank farms and separate it into low-activity and high-level waste streams; (2) the Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility, which will vitrify the low-activity waste stream; (3) the High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, which will vitrify the high-level waste stream; (4) the Analytical Laboratory (Lab), which will support both vitrification facilities' operations; and (5) the Balance of Facilities (BOF), which will provide industrial support capabilities and infrastructure, like electricity and steam, needed for WTP operations. In 2012, DOE suspended production work on the WTP's Pretreatment (PT) Facility and to a lesser degree the High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility because of unresolved technical issues associated with those facilities. DOE has established an approach that would facilitate immobilization of tank waste to begin as early as practicable without waiting for completion of work to resolve the technical issues associated with the PT and HLW Facilities. This approach enables LAW treatment to begin before the PT and HLW facilities are completed by transferring low activity waste directly from the Hanford tank farms to the LAW Facility - referred to as Direct Feed LAW (DFLAW). ORP has placed the highest priority on completing the Low Activity Waste Facility, Balance of Facilities, and Analytical Laboratory (collectively known as LBL) in support of the planned phased start to the Hanford Tank waste treatment mission. DOE has requested, and the WTP contractor has delivered contract modifications proposals for: (1) design of a permanent capability to accommodate DFLAW in WTP; (2) procurement and construction of modifications to enable DFLAW operations in WTP, and (3) completion of LBL work scope in the current contract through hot commissioning in a manner to accommodate a phased start toward completing the WTP mission. DOE is reviewing and approving contract modifications in a sequence and schedule that allows for an orderly completion of the LBL Facilities and to begin treating low-activity tank waste as soon as practicable. In August 2014, ORP authorized the WTP contractor to resume all engineering work necessary to finalize the design of the HLW Facility. Authorization for HLW equipment procurements and construction is forthcoming, based on conditions that must be satisfied for a full release of these activities, including completion of an update to the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis. DOE has also established a comprehensive plan for resuming production activities for the PT Facility that is similar to the process established and implemented for the HLW Facility. Resolution of the technical issues and establishment of a revised safety basis are key prerequisites to resuming engineering, procurements, and construction. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

What's in WIPP? Packaging TRU Waste to Enhance WIPP's Capacity - 16515

Beginning in 1999, and continuing for 15 years, the US DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository successfully disposed of defense Transuranic (TRU) waste. Six of the originally planned ten disposal panels were filled before two unrelated accidents temporarily halted disposal operations in February 2014. Based on counting the gross volume of all containers emplaced in WIPP to date, a little more than half of the legislated volume capacity has been subscribed (91,000 cubic meters). This paper describes the many different packaging configurations that have been used to ship TRU waste to WIPP, and makes observations that may enhance the repository capacity when shipments resume. The contents of shipments to WIPP are limited by many requirements of the repository waste acceptance criteria. These criteria derive from three primary sources; 1) the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), issued by the NRC for Type B shipping packaging used by WIPP; 2) The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, issued by the New Mexico Environment Department; and 3) the WIPP facility's own Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), developed under DOE's regulation 10CFR830. To meet these criteria, various TRU waste forms have been packaged in different ways, with varying packaging efficiency. Of course, there is an overall upper limit on WIPP's volume capacity that was legislated as part of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The volume counted against this limit has been calculated by simply summing the volumes of individual payload containers shipped to and emplaced at WIPP. This method counts significant non-waste volumes inside the containers due to over-packing inner containers and partially filled containers. Without some change to how disposal volumes are calculated, or how waste is packaged, the amount of TRU waste yet to be shipped to WIPP could exceed the legislated capacity. Concepts to enhance the packaging efficiency of future waste shipments to WIPP are presented. Approximate estimates of the waste versus non-waste volumes that have been emplaced to date are discussed. This paper only considers contact handled TRU waste (i.e., contact dose rates < 2 mSv/hr). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The DOE Unreviewed Safety Question Process, Addressing New Information For Credible Nuclear Accidents

The Department of Energy (DOE) Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process is in use for hazardous nuclear facilities operated within the DOE nuclear complex. DOE, which is the federal nuclear safety regulator for its nuclear facilities, requires that each nuclear facility have a Documented Safety Analysis that defines the controls for each credible accident based on a detailed accident analysis. The DOE USQ process provides key mechanisms for formally identifying to the regulator potential accident analysis issues at operating nuclear facilities including those that stem from emergent or new information on hazards. The DOE USQ process provides for formal evaluation of those emergent issues and for determining the need for formal regulator (DOE) review and approval of any resulting immediate or long-term actions. Regarding the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, lessons learned on the evaluation and disposition of new information have been noted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the National Research Council. These organizations noted that: - when new information indicates the potential for conditions that could significantly reduce safety margins or exceed current design assumptions, a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences should be conducted, and - if the new information analysis results in substantial changes to the risk profile or could impact the function of important safety systems, then compensatory actions or countermeasures need to be established without delay. The objective of this paper is to raise awareness regarding the salient requirements and guidance of the DOE USQ process used at DOE's operating nuclear facilities that bear on handling of emergent or new information on hazards and that address the lessons learned noted above by INPO and the National Research Council. There is no analysis or intent to make any implications regarding how use of the DOE USQ process might have affected events at Fukushima. The DOE USQ process, when applied as intended at DOE nuclear facilities, addresses lessons learned identified by INPO and the National Research Council regarding use of emergent or new information on hazards. The DOE USQ process ensures a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences resulting from new information on hazards. When the new information analysis results in substantial changes to the risk profile or shows an impact to the function of important safety systems, the DOE USQ process calls for compensatory actions or countermeasures to be established in a timely manner. The DOE USQ process ensures a formal evaluation by the regulator and approval of the planned actions addressing the vulnerabilities made know by new information on hazards. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of the Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Idaho National Laboratory Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility - 19143

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been constructed, has received operational approval from the Department of Energy (DOE), and is expected to receive its first waste shipment in FY 2019. The RH LLW Disposal Facility will support the needs of INL and the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF). RH LLW destined for the facility includes waste currently in storage from previous programs and projects conducted at INL; newly generated waste from programs and projects conducted at INL; and waste from NRF spent fuel processing activities. This new facility supports RH LLW disposal needs for the ongoing mission of INL and NRF. Waste to be disposed of at the RH LLW Disposal Facility may exhibit dose rates that range from 0.002 Sv/hr to 600 Sv/hr. Waste types include resins and activated metals as well as surface-contaminated debris generated from existing and new missions. The total number of canisters currently planned for disposal at the RH LLW Disposal Facility is 939 with the possibility of future expansion. The projected waste volume to be disposed of is 3,100 m{sup 3}. The RH LLW Disposal Facility will receive a wide variety of RH LLW and is in preparations to receive its first canisters in FY 2019. Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and the radioactive waste management basis have been developed and implemented in accordance with the applicable DOE Order. In order to ensure that DOE requirements and guidance were appropriately implemented in the RH LLW Disposal Facility WAC, the project worked closely with the DOE Low Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (LFRG) representatives and followed the applicable DOE standard. This paper provides an overview of the development of the WAC, including waste and waste generator certification requirements, for the RH LLW Disposal Facility. The paper illustrates the importance of maintaining strong ties to the development and revision of the RH LLW Disposal Facility Performance Assessment (PA), Documented Safety Analysis, Facility Procedures, Readiness Reviews, DOE Order, and applicable Technical Standards. The paper also provides an overview of the RH LLW Disposal Facility, WAC generator certification requirements, distinctive challenges to acceptance of legacy waste, and the unique approach the RH LLW Disposal Facility has taken to ensure compliance with PA driven limits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 13: TRU Waste Generator Sites - Implementation of the New US DOE WIPP WAC

This panel focused on the next phase of the US National Transuranic (TRU) Program (NTP) to support shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP: located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA). Topics include program changes to increase waste stream approval efficiency, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)/Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), TRUPACT-III and Remote Handled (RH) shipments, lessons learned from NTP waste certification and transportation, and NTP transportation stakeholder engagement and support programs. Presentations proposed include: 1 - National TRU Program Update (Kenneth Princen, US DOE (USA)); 2 - WIPP WAC (Rev 9) Implementation (Mark Pearcy, Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (USA)); 3 - Remote-Handled (RH) TRU Waste Update (J.R. Stroble, US DOE (USA)); 4 - National TRU Program Transportation Stakeholder Engagement and Support (James Mason, US DOE (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Basis Development for the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) Demonstration - 19596

The Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system has been installed at Savannah River Site (SRS) to supplement the existing salt waste treatment facilities. The TCCR system is intended to demonstrate the capability of ion exchange (IX) technology to remove Cs-137 from high level liquid waste. Separation is performed by Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) IX media. The media is stored in shielded columns within a small enclosure. Following processing in the TCCR system, decontaminated waste can receive further treatment and be dispositioned at other SRS facilities. The Cesium-laden columns will instead be removed from the enclosure and transported to another location on site for interim storage. Developing the safety basis for the TCCR system and integrating it into the documented safety analysis for existing facilities presented a unique challenge. Most notably, utilizing new methodologies to analyze new hazards resulted in unexpectedly high consequences. The TCCR system therefore required more rigorous controls than had initially been anticipated. However, the integrated control set developed for the TCCR system should have little impact on its operating capabilities and will allow it to begin operating in 2019. This may lay the foundations for future utilization of similar systems at SRS and across the Department of Energy complex. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE Hanford Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR) Update: Fabrication and Factory Acceptance Testing - 20300

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) System is a modular, quickly-deployable, and passively safe system for efficiently removing solids and cesium from alkaline liquid waste raffinate created by fuel processing on the Hanford site. This paper provides an overview of the project with particular emphasis on completion of fabrication and factory acceptance testing (FAT). All TSCR System components are inside three enclosures known as the Process Enclosure, Ancillary Enclosure, and Control Enclosure. The Process Enclosure is seismic design category II (SDC-II) and built to withstand the rigors of transportation and lifting, high winds, volcanic ash fall, and heavy precipitation (snow) over a temperature range of -25 to 115 deg. F. The Process Enclosure and Control Enclosure were fabricated in AVANTech's Columbia, SC facility, while the Ancillary Enclosure was fabricated in AVANTech's Richland, WA facility. The design and preliminary documented safety analysis were completed in December 2019, with all work being performed in accordance with ASME NQA-1 quality assurance requirements. The Process Enclosure, Ion Exchange Columns (IXCs), and several other TSCR components have a nuclear safety function and are designated as safety significant structures, systems, and components (SS-SSCs). The NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) process was used to identify critical characteristics in order to accept materials and items used for fabrication of several safety significant TSCR components. This paper also addresses unique aspects and challenges of implementing CGD in DOE facilities and systems. After fabrication and preliminary testing, the Process and Control Enclosures were shipped to AVANTech's Richland facility where the complete TSCR System was setup and connected in a represented layout and configuration that will be used on the Hanford site. Test tanks and pumps were put in place and connected to the TSCR Process Enclosure in a manner that mimicked interfacing Double Shell Tanks in the 241-AP Tank Farm. The TSCR System was then tested/operated under conditions equivalent to those planned for onsite operation. Testing was separated into five separate phases as defined below: - Phase 1: Confirmation of TSCR System readiness for the FAT; - Phase 2: Verification of TSCR System operation under standard conditions; - Phase 3: Demonstration of TSCR System operation under non-standard conditions; - Phase 4: Demonstration of ion exchange media removal from an IXC; and - Phase 5: Completion of TSCR System lift plans and site mobilization. The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), participated in all phases of testing. Testing at AVANTech's Richland Facility allowed WRPS personnel to familiarize themselves with TSCR operations in a radiologically clean facility prior to onsite mobilization. Engineering and operations personnel gained valuable experience that allowed them to better refine onsite operational protocols and procedures - including handling and movement of IXCs with a forklift. This paper describes the technologies used by the TSCR System as well as how these technologies are deployed and operated to advance the Hanford mission of safely, efficiently, and effectively treating tank waste. It also provides detailed information on fabrication and FAT, including operational data from simulated tank waste runs. A project schedule for WRPS' planned construction acceptance testing, operational acceptance testing, and actual tank waste treatment is provided. This presentation should be of great interest to parties responsible for the design, testing, and mobilization of modular NQA-1 technologies for the treatment of raffinate and similar liquid wastes containing high concentrations of radioactive cesium. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluating Liquid Waste Transfers and their Impacts to the SRS Tank Farm to Support Operations and Closure

The Liquid Waste (LW) contractor at the Savannah River Site, Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), supports the storage, processing, and safe disposition of legacy, radioactive liquid waste. The LW Tank Farms contain approximately 127 million liters (33.5 million gallons) of liquid waste within 43 active, underground waste tanks. To meet mission critical milestones for the closure of waste tanks and processing of 34 million liters (9 million gallons) of salt waste per year by the LW Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), an increase in Tank Farm operations, including waste tank transfers, is required. Waste is compiled in salt and sludge batches in the Tank Farms and transferred to SWPF and the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for treatment. All waste tank transfers, such as waste removal and batch compilation transfers, must be pre-evaluated to ensure Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requirements are met via Evaluated Transfer Approval Forms (ETAFs). Facility conditions and configurations may change as a result of a waste transfer. These changes must be reflected in the Tank Farms Emergency Response Datasheet (ERD), which contains data utilized for operation and emergency situations.

Peterson, Shelby R.↗

Tank 11H Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution and Inhalation Dose Potential Analyses at Savannah River Site – 26018

Currently, there is approximately 34 million gallons of high-level radioactive tank waste in the Tank Farm at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The ultimate goal of operations at the Tank Farm is to remove the high level waste (HLW) from the tanks followed by stabilization of the waste through vitrification of the HLW into glass or grouting the decontaminated waste into saltstone. After bulk removal of the HLW consisting of sludge, saltcake, and supernatant, further efforts are made to reduce the residual waste present in the tank in order to declare preliminary cease waste removal (PCWR) signifying completion of HLW removal. These reduction efforts can include tank washing to remove soluble salts and radioisotopes and dissolution of solids including aluminum. Aluminum in the form of gibbsite and boehmite is relatively insoluble in water. Through addition of aqueous sodium hydroxide, the aluminum can be dissolved at mild temperatures. In order for the waste tank to meet closure mode requirements of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), which includes the Tank Farm, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), a component of the safety basis, the inhalation dose potential (IDP) and the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate of the stored waste must be demonstrated to be lower than their respective designated limits. These parameters are calculated from measured radiochemical analyses of isotopes that emit a high amount of radioactivity including Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Am-241, and Cm-244. Following the low temperature aluminum dissolution (LTAD) process, Tank 11H slurry samples were pulled from the tank and sent to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to measure the extent of aluminum dissolution, hydroxide concentration, densities of slurry and supernatant, weight percent solids analyses, and radionuclide activities. The analyses of the composite sample found that approximately 90% of the total aluminum in the slurry was dissolved, indicating successful reduction of the insoluble aluminum in the waste tank. Additionally, the weight percent insoluble solids (slurry basis) measurement of the composite sample was found to be approximately 1%, demonstrating that minimal solids still remain in the tank. Finally, the radiochemical analyses of the composite sample determined that the waste contents of the tank met the IDP and radiolytic hydrogen generation rate requirements of the CSTF DSA. These measurements have shown that the LTAD process in Tank 11H was successful in waste reduction efforts and a positive step towards declaring PCWR and tank closure at SRS.

Dekarske, John [Savannah River National Laboratory↗

BENCHMARKING UPGRADED HOTSPOT DOSE CALCULATIONS AGAINST MACCS2 RESULTS

The radiological consequence of interest for a documented safety analysis (DSA) is the centerline Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) incurred by the Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual (MOI) evaluated at the 95th percentile consequence level. An upgraded version of HotSpot (Version 2.07) has been developed with the capabilities to read site meteorological data and perform the necessary statistical calculations to determine the 95th percentile consequence result. These capabilities should allow HotSpot to join MACCS2 (Version 1.13.1) and GENII (Version 1.485) as radiological consequence toolbox codes in the Department of Energy (DOE) Safety Software Central Registry. Using the same meteorological data file, scenarios involving a one curie release of {sup 239}Pu were modeled in both HotSpot and MACCS2. Several sets of release conditions were modeled, and the results compared. In each case, input parameter specifications for each code were chosen to match one another as much as the codes would allow. The results from the two codes are in excellent agreement. Slight differences observed in results are explained by algorithm differences.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 1: Reference Design Document (RDD)

The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.

Source record↗