Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “safe”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 883 records · Page 49
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1987

Jet pump-drive system for heat removal

The invention does away with the necessity of moving parts such as a check valve in a nuclear reactor cooling system. Instead, a jet pump, in combination with a TEMP, is employed to assure safe cooling of a nuclear reactor after shutdown. A main flow exists for a reactor coolant. A point of withdrawal is provided for a secondary flow. A TEMP, responsive to the heat from said coolant in the secondary flow path, automatically pumps said withdrawn coolant to a higher pressure and thus higher velocity compared to the main flow. The high velocity coolant is applied as a driver flow for the jet pump which has a main flow chamber located in the main flow circulation pump. Upon nuclear shutdown and loss of power for the main reactor pumping system, the TEMP/jet pump combination continues to boost the coolant flow in the direction it is already circulating. During the decay time for the nuclear reactor, the jet pump keeps running until the coolant temperature drops to a lower and safe temperature where the heat is no longer a problem. At this lower temperature, the TEMP/jet pump combination ceases its circulation boosting operation. When the nuclear reactor is restarted and the coolant again exceeds the lower temperature setting, the TEMP/jet pump automatically resumes operation. The TEMP/jet pump combination is thus automatic, self-regulating and provides an emergency pumping system free of moving parts.

French, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2008

ISS Contingency Attitude Control Recovery Method for Loss of Automatic Thruster Control

In this paper, the attitude control issues associated with International Space Station (ISS) loss of automatic thruster control capability are discussed and methods for attitude control recovery are presented. This scenario was experienced recently during Shuttle mission STS-117 and ISS Stage 13A in June 2007 when the Russian GN&C computers, which command the ISS thrusters, failed. Without automatic propulsive attitude control, the ISS would not be able to regain attitude control after the Orbiter undocked. The core issues associated with recovering long-term attitude control using CMGs are described as well as the systems engineering analysis to identify recovery options. It is shown that the recovery method can be separated into a procedure for rate damping to a safe harbor gravity gradient stable orientation and a capability to maneuver the vehicle to the necessary initial conditions for long term attitude hold. A manual control option using Soyuz and Progress vehicle thrusters is investigated for rate damping and maneuvers. The issues with implementing such an option are presented and the key issue of closed-loop stability is addressed. A new non-propulsive alternative to thruster control, Zero Propellant Maneuver (ZPM) attitude control method is introduced and its rate damping and maneuver performance evaluated. It is shown that ZPM can meet the tight attitude and rate error tolerances needed for long term attitude control. A combination of manual thruster rate damping to a safe harbor attitude followed by a ZPM to Stage long term attitude control orientation was selected by the Anomaly Resolution Team as the alternate attitude control method for such a contingency.

Bedrossian, Nazareth↗
NASA NTRS2008

Unmanned Aircraft System Control and ATC Communications Bandwidth Requirements

There are significant activities taking place to establish the procedures and requirements for safe and routine operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the barriers to overcome in achieving this goal is the lack of sufficient frequency spectrum necessary for the UAS control and air traffic control (ATC) communications links. This shortcoming is compounded by the fact that the UAS control communications links will likely be required to operate in protected frequency spectrum, just as ATC communications links are, because they relate to "safety and regularity of flight." To support future International Telecommunications Union (ITU) World Radio Conference (WRC) agenda items concerning new frequency allocations for UAS communications links, and to augment the Future Communications Study (FCS) Technology Evaluation Group efforts, NASA Glenn Research Center has sponsored a task to estimate the UAS control and ATC communications bandwidth requirements for safe, reliable, and routine operation of UAS in the NAS. This report describes the process and results of that task. The study focused on long-term bandwidth requirements for UAS approximately through 2030.

Henriksen, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2008

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Launch Abort System Guidance and Control Analysis Overview

Aborts during the critical ascent flight phase require the design and operation of Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) systems to escape from the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and return the crew safely to the Earth. To accomplish this requirement of continuous abort coverage, CEV ascent abort modes are being designed and analyzed to accommodate the velocity, altitude, atmospheric, and vehicle configuration changes that occur during ascent. Aborts from the launch pad to early in the flight of the CLV second stage are performed using the Launch Abort System (LAS). During this type of abort, the LAS Abort Motor is used to pull the Crew Module (CM) safely away from the CLV and Service Module (SM). LAS abort guidance and control studies and design trades are being conducted so that more informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle abort requirements, design, and operation. This paper presents an overview of the Orion CEV, an overview of the LAS ascent abort mode, and a summary of key LAS abort analysis methods and results.

Davidson, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Ground Handling of Batteries at Test and Launch-site Facilities

Ground handling of flight as well as engineering batteries at test facilities and launch-site facilities is a safety critical process. Test equipment interfacing with the batteries should have the required controls to prevent a hazardous failure of the batteries. Test equipment failures should not induce catastrophic failures on the batteries. Transportation requirements for batteries should also be taken into consideration for safe transportation. This viewgraph presentation includes information on the safe handling of batteries for ground processing at test facilities as well as launch-site facilities.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Orion Emergency Mask Approach

Emergency mask approach on Orion poses a challenge to the traditional Shuttle or Station approaches. Currently, in the case of a fire or toxic spill event, the crew utilizes open loop oxygen masks that provide the crew with oxygen to breath, but also dumps the exhaled oxygen into the cabin. For Orion, with a small cabin volume, the extra oxygen will exceed the flammability limit within a short period of time, unless a nitrogen purge is also provided. Another approach to a fire or toxic spill event is the use of a filtering emergency masks. These masks utilize some form of chemical beds to scrub the air clean of toxic providing the crew safe breathing air for a period without elevating the oxygen level in the cabin. Using the masks and a form of smoke-eater filter, it may be possible to clean the cabin completely or to a level for safe transition to a space suit to perform a cabin purge. Issues with filters in the past have been the reaction temperature and high breathing resistance. Development in a new form of chemical filters has shown promise to make the filtering approach feasible.

Tuan, George C.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Human Rating Requirements for NASA's Constellation Program

NASA s Constellation Program (CxP) will conduct a series of human space expeditions of increasing scope, starting with missions supporting the International Space Station and expanding to encompass the Moon and Mars. Although human-rating is an integral part of all CxP activities throughout their life cycle, NASA Procedural Requirements document NPR 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements (HRR) for Space Flight Systems, defines the additional processes, procedures, and requirements necessary to produce human-rated space systems that protect the safety of crew members and passengers on these NASA missions. In order to be in compliance with 8705.2B the CxP must show appropriate implementation or progression toward the HRR, or justification for an exception. Compliance includes an explanation of how the CxP intends to meet the HRR, analyses to be performed to determine implementation; and a matrix to trace the HRR to CxP requirements. The HRR requires the CxP to establish a human system integration team (HSIT), consisting of astronauts, mission operations personnel, training personnel, ground processing personnel, human factors personnel, and human engineering experts, with clearly defined authority, responsibility, and accountability to lead the human-system integration. For example, per the HRR the HSIT is involved in the evaluation of crew workload, human-in-the-loop usability evaluations, determining associated criteria, and in assessment of how these activities influenced system design. In essence, the HSIT is invaluable in CxP s ability to meet the three fundamental tenets of human rating: the process of designing, evaluating, and assuring that the total system can safely conduct the required human missions; the incorporation of design features and capabilities that accommodate human interaction with the system to enhance overall safety and mission success; and the incorporation of design features and capabilities to enable safe recovery of the crew from hazardous situations.

Berdich, Debbie↗
NASA NTRS2009

ISS Expeditions 16 & 17: Chemical Analysis Results for Potable Water

During the twelve month span of Expeditions 16 and 17 beginning October of 2007, the chemical quality of the potable water onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was verified safe for crew consumption through the return and chemical analysis of water samples by the Water and Food Analytical Laboratory (WAFAL) at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Reclaimed cabin humidity condensate and Russian ground-supplied water were the principle sources of potable water and for the first time, European groundsupplied water was also available. Although water was transferred from Shuttle to ISS during Expeditions 16 and 17, no Shuttle potable water was consumed during this timeframe. A total of 12 potable water samples were collected using U.S. hardware during Expeditions 16 and 17 and returned on Shuttle flights 1E (STS122), 1JA (STS123), and 1J (STS124). The average sample volume was sufficient for complete chemical characterization to be performed. The results of JSC chemical analyses of these potable water samples are presented in this paper. The WAFAL also received potable water samples for analysis from the Russian side collected inflight with Russian hardware, as well as preflight samples of Rodnik potable water delivered to ISS on Russian Progress vehicles 28 to 30. Analytical results for these additional potable water samples are also reported and discussed herein. Although the potable water supplies available during Expeditions 16 and 17 were judged safe for crew consumption, a recent trending of elevated silver levels in the SVOZV water is a concern for longterm consumption and efforts are being made to lower these levels.

Straub, John E., II↗
NASA NTRS2008

Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) Cost-Benefit Analysis

Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) are designed to prevent space launch vehicles from flight through environments conducive to natural or triggered lightning and are used for all U.S. government and commercial launches at government and civilian ranges. They are maintained by a committee known as the NASA/USAF Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP). The previous LLCC for anvil cloud, meant to avoid triggered lightning, have been shown to be overly restrictive. Some of these rules have had such high safety margins that they prohibited flight under conditions that are now thought to be safe 90% of the time, leading to costly launch delays and scrubs. The LLCC for anvil clouds was upgraded in the summer of 2005 to incorporate results from the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM) experiment at the Eastern Range (ER). Numerous combinations of parameters were considered to develop the best correlation of operational weather observations to in-cloud electric fields capable of rocket triggered lightning in anvil clouds. The Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) was the best metric found. Dr. Harry Koons of Aerospace Corporation conducted a risk analysis of the VAHIRR product. The results indicated that the LLCC based on the VAHIRR product would pose a negligible risk of flying through hazardous electric fields. Based on these findings, the Kennedy Space Center Weather Office is considering seeking funding for development of an automated VAHIRR algorithm for the new ER 45th Weather Squadron (45 WS) RadTec 431250 weather radar and Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) radars. Before developing an automated algorithm, the Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) was tasked to determine the frequency with which VAHIRR would have allowed a launch to safely proceed during weather conditions otherwise deemed "red" by the Launch Weather Officer. To do this, the AMU manually calculated VAHIRR values based on candidate cases from past launches with known anvil cloud LLCC violations. An automated algorithm may be developed if the analyses from past launches show VAHIRR would have provided a significant cost benefit by allowing a launch to proceed. The 45 WS at the ER and 30th Weather Squadron (30 WS) at the Western Range provided the AMU with launch weather summaries from past launches that were impacted by LLCC. The 45 WS provided summaries from 14 launch attempts and the 30 WS fkom 5. The launch attempts occurred between December 2001 and June 2007. These summaries helped the AMU determine when the LLCC were "red" due to anvil cloud. The AMU collected WSR-88D radar reflectivity, cloud-to-ground lightning strikes, soundings and satellite imagery. The AMU used step-by-step instructions for calculating VAHIRR manually as provided by the 45 WS. These instructions were used for all of the candidate cases when anvil cloud caused an LLCC violation identified in the launch weather summaries. The AMU evaluated several software programs capable of visualizing radar data so that VAHIRR could be calculated and chose GR2Analyst from Gibson Ridge Software, LLC. Data availability and lack of detail from some launch weather summaries permitted analysis of six launch attempts from the ER and none from the WR. The AMU did not take into account whether or not other weather LCC violations were occurring at the same time as the anvil cloud LLCC since the goal of this task was to determine how often VAHIRR provided relief to the anvil cloud LLCC at any time during several previous launch attempts. Therefore, in the statistics presented in this report, it is possible that even though VAHIRR provided relief to the anvil cloud LLCC, other weather LCC could have been violated not permitting the launch to proceed. The results of this cost-benefit analysis indicated VAHIRR provided relief from the anvil cloud LLCC between about 15% and 18% of the time for varying 5-minute time periods based on summaries fkom six launch attempts and would have allowed launch to proceed that were otherwise "NO GO" due to the anvil cloud LLCC if the T-0 time occurred during the anvil cloud LLCC violations.

Bauman, William H., III↗
NASA NTRS2008

Investigation, Analysis, and Testing of Self-contained Oxygen Generators

Self Contained Oxygen Generators (SCOGs) have widespread use in providing emergency breathing oxygen in a variety of environments including mines, submarines, spacecraft, and aircraft. These devices have definite advantages over storing of gaseous or liquid oxygen. The oxygen is not generated until a chemical briquette containing a chlorate or perchlorate oxidizer and a solid metallic fuel such as iron is ignited starting a thermal decomposition process allowing gaseous oxygen to be produced. These devices are typically very safe to store, easy to operate, and have primarily only a thermal hazard to the operator that can be controlled by barriers or furnaces. Tens of thousands of these devices are operated worldwide every year without major incident. This report examines the rare case of a SCOG whose behavior was both abnormal and lethal. This particular type of SCOG reviewed is nearly identical to a flight qualified version of SCOG slated for use on manned space vehicles. This Investigative Report is a compilation of a NASA effort in conjunction with other interested parties including military and aerospace to understand the causes of the particular SCOG accident and what preventative measures can be taken to ensure this incident is not repeated. This report details the incident and examines the root causes of the observed SCOG behavior from forensic evidence. A summary of chemical and numerical analysis is provided as a background to physical testing of identical SCOG devices. The results and findings of both small scale and full scale testing are documented on a test-by-test basis along with observations and summaries. Finally, conclusions are presented on the findings of this investigation, analysis, and testing along with suggestions on preventative measures for any entity interested in the safe use of these devices.

Keddy, Christopher P.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Orion Emergency Mask Approach

Emergency mask approach on Orion poses a challenge to the traditional Shuttle or Station approaches. Currently, in the case of a fire or toxic spill event, the crew utilizes open loop oxygen masks that provide the crew with oxygen to breath, but also dumps the exhaled oxygen into the cabin. For Orion, with a small cabin volume, the extra oxygen will exceed the flammability limit within a short period of time, unless a nitrogen purge is also provided. Another approach to a fire or toxic spill event is the use of a filtering emergency masks. These masks utilize some form of chemical beds to scrub the air clean of toxic providing the crew safe breathing air for a period without elevating the oxygen level in the cabin. Using the masks and a form of smoke-eater filter, it may be possible to clean the cabin completely or to a level for safe transition to a space suit to perform a cabin purge. Issues with filters in the past have been the reaction time, breakthroughs, and high breathing resistance. Development in a new form of chemical filters has shown promise to make the filtering approach feasible.

Tuan, George C.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Aerobot Autonomy Architecture

An architecture for autonomous operation of an aerobot (i.e., a robotic blimp) to be used in scientific exploration of planets and moons in the Solar system with an atmosphere (such as Titan and Venus) is undergoing development. This architecture is also applicable to autonomous airships that could be flown in the terrestrial atmosphere for scientific exploration, military reconnaissance and surveillance, and as radio-communication relay stations in disaster areas. The architecture was conceived to satisfy requirements to perform the following functions: a) Vehicle safing, that is, ensuring the integrity of the aerobot during its entire mission, including during extended communication blackouts. b) Accurate and robust autonomous flight control during operation in diverse modes, including launch, deployment of scientific instruments, long traverses, hovering or station-keeping, and maneuvers for touch-and-go surface sampling. c) Mapping and self-localization in the absence of a global positioning system. d) Advanced recognition of hazards and targets in conjunction with tracking of, and visual servoing toward, targets, all to enable the aerobot to detect and avoid atmospheric and topographic hazards and to identify, home in on, and hover over predefined terrain features or other targets of scientific interest. The architecture is an integrated combination of systems for accurate and robust vehicle and flight trajectory control; estimation of the state of the aerobot; perception-based detection and avoidance of hazards; monitoring of the integrity and functionality ("health") of the aerobot; reflexive safing actions; multi-modal localization and mapping; autonomous planning and execution of scientific observations; and long-range planning and monitoring of the mission of the aerobot. The prototype JPL aerobot (see figure) has been tested extensively in various areas in the California Mojave desert.

Elfes, Alberto↗
NASA NTRS2009

Carbon Dioxide - Our Common "Enemy"

Health effects of brief and prolonged exposure to carbon dioxide continue to be a concern for those of us who manage this pollutant in closed volumes, such as in spacecraft and submarines. In both examples, considerable resources are required to scrub the atmosphere to levels that are considered totally safe for maintenance of crew health and performance. Defining safe levels is not a simple task because of many confounding factors, including: lack of a robust database on human exposures, suspected significant variations in individual susceptibility, variations in the endpoints used to assess potentially adverse effects, the added effects of stress, and the fluid shifts associated with micro-gravity (astronauts only). In 2007 the National Research Council proposed revised Continuous Exposure Guidelines (CEGLs) and Emergency Exposure Guidelines (EEGLs) to the U.S. Navy. Similarly, in 2008 the NASA Toxicology Group, in cooperation with another subcommittee of the National Research Council, revised Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMACs). In addition, a 1000-day exposure limit was set for long-duration spaceflights to celestial bodies. Herein we examine the rationale for the levels proposed to the U.S. Navy and compare this rationale with the one used by NASA to set its limits. We include a critical review of previous studies on the effects of exposure to carbon dioxide and attempt to dissect out the challenges associated with setting fully-defensible limits. We also describe recent experiences with management of carbon dioxide aboard the International Space Station with 13 persons aboard. This includes the tandem operations of the Russian Vozduk and the U.S. Carbon Dioxide Removal System. A third removal system is present while the station is docked to the Shuttle spacecraft, so our experience includes the lithium hydroxide system aboard Shuttle for the removal of carbon dioxide. We discuss strategies for highly-efficient, regenerable removal of carbon dioxide that could meet the 1000-day SMAC of 0.5%, which would apply to long-duration voyages to Mars.

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Inflatable Habitat Health Monitoring: Implementation, Lessons Learned, and Application to Lunar or Martian Habitat Health Monitoring

NASA's exploration mission is to send humans to the Moon and Mars, in which the purpose is to learn how to live and work safely in those harsh environments. A critical aspect of living in an extreme environment is habitation, and within that habitation element there are key systems which monitor the habitation environment to provide a safe and comfortable living and working space for humans. Expandable habitats are one of the options currently being considered due to their potential mass and volume efficiencies. This paper discusses a joint project between the National Science Foundation (NSF), ILC Dover, and NASA in which an expandable habitat was deployed in the extreme environment of Antarctica to better understand the performance and operations over a one-year period. This project was conducted through the Innovative Partnership Program (IPP) where the NSF provided the location at McMurdo Station in Antarctica and support at the location, ILC Dover provided the inflatable habitat, and NASA provided the instrumentation and data system for monitoring the habitat. The outcome of this project provided lessons learned in the implementation of an inflatable habitat and the systems that support that habitat. These lessons learned will be used to improve current habitation capabilities and systems to meet the objectives of exploration missions to the moon and Mars.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS2009

Manual Throttles-Only Control Effectivity for Emergency Flight Control of Transport Aircraft

If normal aircraft flight controls are lost, emergency flight control may be attempted using only the thrust of engines. Collective thrust is used to control flightpath, and differential thrust is used to control bank angle. One issue is whether a total loss of hydraulics (TLOH) leaves an airplane in a recoverable condition. Recoverability is a function of airspeed, altitude, flight phase, and configuration. If the airplane can be recovered, flight test and simulation results on several transport-class airplanes have shown that throttles-only control (TOC) is usually adequate to maintain up-and-away flight, but executing a safe landing is very difficult. There are favorable aircraft configurations, and also techniques that will improve recoverability and control and increase the chances of a survivable landing. The DHS and NASA have recently conducted a flight and simulator study to determine the effectivity of manual throttles-only control as a way to recover and safely land a range of transport airplanes. This paper discusses TLOH recoverability as a function of conditions, and TOC landability results for a range of transport airplanes, and some key techniques for flying with throttles and making a survivable landing. Airplanes evaluated include the B-747, B-767, B-777, B-757, A320, and B-737 airplanes.

Stevens, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Glimpse from the Inside of a Space Suit: What Is It Really Like to Train for an EVA?

The beauty of the view from the office of a spacewalking astronaut gives the impression of simplicity, but few beyond the astronauts, and those who train them, know what it really takes to get there. Extravehicular Activity (EVA) training is an intense process that utilizes NASA's Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) to develop a very specific skill set needed to safely construct and maintain the orbiting International Space Station. To qualify for flight assignments, astronauts must demonstrate the ability to work safely and efficiently in the physically demanding environment of the spacesuit, possess an acute ability to resolve unforeseen problems, and implement proper tool protocols to ensure no tools will be lost in space. Through the insights and the lessons learned by actual EVA astronauts and EVA instructors, this paper twill take you on a journey through an astronaut's earliest experiences working in the spacesuit. termed the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), in the underwater training environment of the NBL. This work details an actual Suit Qualification NBL training event, outlines the numerous challenges the astronauts face throughout their initial training, and the various ways they adapt their own abilities to overcome them. The goal of this paper is to give everyone a small glimpse into what it is really like to work in a spacesuit.

Gast, Matthew A.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Wake Encounter Analysis for a Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Paired Approach Simulation

A Monte Carlo simulation of simultaneous approaches performed by two transport category aircraft from the final approach fix to a pair of closely spaced parallel runways was conducted to explore the aft boundary of the safe zone in which separation assurance and wake avoidance are provided. The simulation included variations in runway centerline separation, initial longitudinal spacing of the aircraft, crosswind speed, and aircraft speed during the approach. The data from the simulation showed that the majority of the wake encounters occurred near or over the runway and the aft boundaries of the safe zones were identified for all simulation conditions.

Mckissick,Burnell T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Pyrotechnic Simulator/Stray-Voltage Detector

The concept for a dual test item has been developed for use in simulating live initiators/detonators during ground testing to verify the proper operation of the safing and firing circuitry for ground and flight systems ordnance as well as continuous monitoring for any stray voltages. Previous ordnance simulators have consisted of fuses, flash bulbs, inert devices with bridge wires, and actual live ordnance items mounted in test chambers. Stray voltage detectors have included devices connected to the firing circuits for continuous monitoring and a final no-voltage test just prior to ordnance connection. The purpose of this combined ordnance simulation and stray-voltage detection is to provide an improved and comprehensive method to ensure the ordnance circuitry is verified safe and operational.

Greenfield, Terry↗