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At least 883 records · Page 49
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

The transportation factor in site evaluations for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities - 15460

New facility siting studies will be necessary to fulfill the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2012 recommendation to develop consolidated interim storage (CIS) for spent nuclear fuel in the next decade. Future site evaluations for used nuclear fuel (UNF) storage and disposal facilities must address transportation requirements, especially access to mainline railroads, early in the site selection process. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 2013 proposed a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the BRC recommendations by establishing a pilot interim storage facility by 2021 and a consolidated interim storage facility by 2025. The authors demonstrate that currently available geographic information systems and already adopted siting criteria (defining favorable and unfavorable conditions) allow the identification of the transportation portion of a storage facility siting process to begin without delay. Ready access to the mainline rail system is absolutely critical since existing rail access, or easily constructed access, is a highly favorable condition for successful siting. Despite widespread rail abandonments over the past three decades, vast areas of the United States retain mainline rail service or could connect to existing mainlines by building new rail spurs of less than 25-50 miles. This precondition for transportation planning is critical. Planners need to start with the beginning - availability of rail transportation to and from the interim storage facility/facilities. A second step in transportation screening would be to evaluate those potential site locations within 50 miles of existing mainline railroads using other appropriate variables. This effort could begin with the application of the 1984 repository siting guidelines for transportation (10 CFR 960.5-2-7)[1]. Repository surface facilities have essentially the same transportation requirements as storage facilities. The guidelines in 10 CFR 960 provide a readily available template for evaluating sites based on transportation risks, impacts and costs. Initial site screening, after considering proximity to mainline railroads as the precursory step, should evaluate: 1) proximity to highly populated areas; 2) proximity to interstate highways; 3) proximity to environmentally sensitive areas and lands protected by federal, state, or tribal governments; and 4) proximity to military installations, hazardous materials facilities, or other facilities that might impact transportation safety and security.Several challenges exist which prevent effective transportation planning. The diversity of canister and cask types and SNF characteristics and conditions, the increasingly limited rail access at the shipping sites and the ease with which public attention can be marshalled against a waste management program, all suggest that future efforts need to identify potential storage sites that reduce transportation impacts and costs by reducing near-site transportation construction and reduce total system transportation impacts. This can most easily be accomplished by reducing shipping distances in a process that is easily defined and implemented. The paper concludes that the DOE should develop a site screening and evaluation program with transportation as a central consideration. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Environmental Restoration of Diesel-Range Organics from Project Chariot, Cape Thompson, Alaska - 16147

Cape Thompson, Alaska, is located approximately 120 miles north of Kotzebue, Alaska, within the Ogotoruk Creek valley. The remote Alaskan location is also home to the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Project Chariot study area. Project Chariot was part of the Plowshare Program, created in 1957 by the AEC to study peaceful uses for atomic energy. Project Chariot began in 1958 when a scientific field team chose Cape Thompson as a potential site to excavate a harbor using a series of nuclear explosions. Between 1959 and 1962, AEC was responsible for over 40 pretest bio-environmental and geotechnical studies of the Cape Thompson area. Strong public opposition to the tests developed, which caused the project to be cancelled with no nuclear explosions ever conducted at the site. In the early 1960's, several deep boreholes were drilled to obtain subsurface, temperature, and high-explosive testing data. Refrigerated diesel was used as a drilling fluid to keep the boreholes open so that thermistors could measure subsurface temperatures. The test boreholes were named Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, and X-1. In the summer of 2014, the US Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management (LM) completed the remediation of remnant diesel at these sites. Prior to the 2014 remediation activities, LM conducted two separate characterization field studies to determine the nature and extent of the contamination from the 1960's drilling activities. In 2013, LM developed a remediation plan that was submitted and approved by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC). The 2014 Project Chariot remediation had some unique logistical challenges and historic issues with stakeholders to overcome. Many of the historic issues centered on previous AEC scientific actions and a general mistrust of the government by the local stakeholders. Prior to and during the 2014 remediation work, an outreach campaign was implemented to discuss prior activities at the site and include stakeholders from Point Hope, Alaska, in the remediation-planning process. The remoteness of the region also provided unique logistical challenges. Because of the short field season, LM initiated several subcontracts over a year in advance. The field camp, heavy equipment, and soil storage containers were shipped by barge to the site. Personnel, food, and small materials were flown in by bush plane from Kotzebue, Alaska. Previous site characterization had identified diesel-range organics (DROs) as the primary contaminant. The cleanup levels for the site were provided by the Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) for the Arctic Zone region. The AAC cleanup level for DROs on gravel pads is 500 mg/kg and 12,500 mg/kg tundra in the arctic-zone region. To help determine the extent and direct soil excavation in the field, photoionization detectors (PIDs) were used for field screening. While the PID results provided rough limits for excavation, laboratory confirmation sampling was required to provide actual excavation guidance. All excavation locations remained open until laboratory results met AAC criteria and ADEC approved closure. The laboratory sample protocol required the bush plane to pick up samples almost daily and transfer them to Anchorage for analysis. In order to meet holding time requirements, all laboratory samples were analyzed on an expedited basis. Analytical results and ADEC approval notifications were e-mailed back to the site via satellite connection. A total of 202 laboratory analyses were needed to complete the remediation effort. At each location (Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, and X-1), the boreholes were plugged and abandoned in accordance with ADEC regulations. Contaminated soil was excavated, and the material was placed in super-sacks and hauled to connex boxes located near the sea shore. Approximately 786 tons of material was removed and shipped by barge to the Columbia Ridge Landfill in Arlington, Oregon, for disposal. The well casings were cut and sealed below ground surface. Each location was graded to its original contours and reclaimed with native vegetation, and a geodetic survey was conducted. Tours with leaders of the Village of Point Hope and the land owner (Arctic Slope Regional Corporation) were conducted prior to the final demobilization. All remediation equipment and camp facilities were removed at the completion of the project. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Developments that are making the Versa-Pac Indeed More Versatile (and More Useful to Industry) - 16267

Daher-TLI acquired the assets and employees of Century Industries, a radioactive material packaging manufacturing facility, in 2013. Included in that acquisition was the Versa-Pac Shipping Package. The Versa-Pac is an NRC licensed Type AF packaging (Certificate of Compliance no. USA/9342/AF-96) and was originally designed as a replacement for standard 7A drum-type transportation packaging. It can be used directly or in conjunction with pails, drums or inserts that can be manufactured to accommodate a variety of smaller containers and vessels. The Versa-Pac comes in two sizes, the VP-55 (i.e., 55-gallon drum version) and VP-110 (i.e., 110-gallon drum version). It features a patented design concept in combination with the drum exterior to provide enhanced structural protection to payloads under Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC), per 10CFR71.71 and 10CFR71.73 respectively. Since its introduction in 2010, the Versa-Pac has been utilized mainly as a one-time use package for disposing of radioactive waste. The package is also designed as a reusable package for transporting front-end materials. Discussions with current and prospective clients have resulted in numerous improvements, accomplished and planned, to the package's payload capability through additional engineering analyses and actual design modifications. Revision 10 to the NRC Certificate of Compliance, dated August 6, 2015, introduces an enrichment-loading table that allows shipping larger quantities of U-235 for enrichments less than 100 wt.%. It also authorizes shipment of natural thorium. Other planned and proposed improvements include provisions to transport UF{sub 6} in 1S, 2S, and 5B cylinders, design changes that further increases the amount of U-235 at enrichments less than 100 wt.%, increasing the capacity of the VP-110, developing a lighter 30-gallon version, the VP-30, and introducing content limits specific to uranium-oxides in multiple forms. This paper traces the engineering and design efforts involved in expanding the Versa-Pac's versatility. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Survey and Remediation Project at the DOE Bannister Site - 16280

The Department of Energy Kansas City office has operated the Bannister site with a variety of contractors since the late 1940's. This facility has had a number of missions, some of which included using natural and depleted uranium. In order to prepare for the demolition of the site, ANTECH was contracted to perform radiometric surveys of the areas where these uranium operations took place. In the process of performing these surveys, areas with low levels of fixed radioactive contamination were identified; ANTECH then remediated these areas using a variety of techniques. In all areas surveyed, the only radioactive contaminant of interest was uranium and members of its decay chain. In no cases were other radionuclides found. The detection equipment used for the surveys included a Ludlum model 239- 1F Floor Monitor, a Ludlum 2360 Alpha Beta Data Logger Scaler/Ratemeter, and an ORTEC IDM-200-V High Purity Germanium Detector. The Ludlum instruments were used for bulk surveys and the ORTEC instrument was used to determine an accurate radioactive background spectra and subsequent spectra for areas where radioactive contamination was identified. Contamination was located on concrete floors and columns, cinder block walls, steel beams, inside ductwork and in floor drain piping. After these areas were identified, a number of methods were used to remove the contamination for disposal including scabbling, core drilling and wholesale removal. Extensive use of Pentek scabbling equipment on the concrete sections proved to be very effective at removing the contaminated layer. Upon completion, the waste materials were consolidated and packaged in a strong tight sea land container and shipped to the Energy Solutions waste facility in Utah. The completed work at the Bannister site serves as an example and demonstration of an effective and comprehensive decommissioning project. It involved the integration of a variety of decommissioning activities all executed and managed by a single contractor. These included radiometric measurement surveying using a variety of detection technologies to identify and locate uranium contamination, decontamination and removal of low level radioactive waste including some deconstruction activities and finally the management of low level radioactive waste including packaging, consignment and shipping of waste to a remediation site. The effective and efficient identification and removal of radioactive contamination at the Bannister site has contributed to the overall goal of returning the site to unrestricted use. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Calibration of a Passive Neutron Counter with {sup 242}Pu Standards - 16450

At the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 facility, a large quantity of Heat Source (HS) and MT42 (primarily {sup 242}Pu) has been designated for disposal as TRU waste. The waste, to be packaged in either 55 gal drums or Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs), is scheduled to be assayed with the TA 55 HENC 3 system. The system is owned and operated by the Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) under a contract with the Carlsbad DoE field office. The HENC 3 is a combined passive neutron/gamma assay system. The neutron component of the system was previously calibrated up to 21.9 g of {sup 240}Pu effective. This corresponds to approximately 9 g of typical HS plutonium and 13 g of MT42 waste. In order to reduce packaging efforts and radiation dose for waste handling personnel, LANL has requested an increase in the HENC 3 calibration limit to approximate the maximum allowable shipping and storage limits for TRU waste. To increase the limits, NWP has obtained the use of well characterized MT42 source materials. The sources, developed and owned by LANL, range from to 5 g to 200 g of plutonium enriched to 86.6% {sup 242}Pu. Using these sources in combination, multiple measurements were performed with both 55-gal drums and POCs to determine their suitability for extending the neutron calibration range of the system. The results of the measurements were (1) compared to the existing calibration for consistency and (2) used to extend the calibration range to 307 g of {sup 240}Pu effective. This report will discuss the elements of the neutron component of the HENC 3 system, the calibration extension effort, problems encountered, and the results of the measurements. As a result of the extension, HS and MT42 materials can be assayed in 55-gal drums and POCs up to their allowable shipping limits. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Test Bed: Treatability of Hanford Tank Waste - 18501

In an effort to advance the Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System technology readiness level at the Hanford Site, the effectiveness of a critical technology element, sRF ion-exchange resin, was demonstrated in the selective removal of Cs-137 from 11.5 L of composited Hanford supernate tank waste. Prior to ion-exchange, solids filtration was performed on the tank waste composite. Between the time of filtrate collection and filtrate processing on the ion-exchange columns, additional solids had formed. These secondary solids resulted from the combination of supernates high in fluoride content with supernates high in phosphate content and the relatively short blend time. Samples were collected before, during and after the ion-exchange process for characterization of a full suite of constituents (inorganic, organic, and radionuclides) to aid in the classification of the cesium-removed waste for shipping, receiving, treatment, and disposal determinations. Following chemical analysis, the remaining 10.8 L (2.9 gal) of cesium-depleted waste was shipped to an off-site vendor for grout-encapsulation and eventual disposal at the Waste Control Specialists Federal Waste Disposal Facility in Andrews, Texas as low-level waste. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Innovative Decommissioning Strategies for Large Components - 18535

Within decommissioning projects the dismantling of steam generators as well as of the reactor pressure vessel with its internals form important and time consuming tasks. In order to optimize these, the reactor pressure vessel will be segmented into larger pieces in-situ and the larger pieces will be further segmented in a post segmentation area in order to suit the dimensional and radiological requirements of the final waste package. A similar approach is used also for the dismantling of Steam Generators. NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services has combined the two principles 'Rip / Store / Ship' and 'In-situ segmentation' to firstly segment the steam generator in-situ and then pack and ship all resulting parts allowing decontamination within 20' container to an existing decontamination facility. The aim is to free release 90 - 95% of the material. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Richard Hodes Memorial Award Lecture - Development and Certification of New Type-B Containers for the Recovery of High-Activity Sealed Sources - 18710

The US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has successfully completed a project to design, test, and certify two new Type-B transportation packages. Since about 2011 a shortage of these containers has significantly constrained the recovery and disposal of commercially licensed high activity radioactive sealed sources. These new packages will enable NNSA/OSRP to transport a majority of the high-activity Cs-137 and Co-60 devices encountered in the coming years and decades. The 435-B is an unshielded, leak-tight container, which can be used to ship common shielded devices, such as the teletherapy source drawers and irradiators that contain high-activity Co-60 and Cs-137 sources. The 380-B is a much larger, leak-tight, lead-shielded Type B cask capable of transport by truck, rail, ship, or air. Additionally, to encourage and facilitate the development of transportation capacity, DOE/NNSA intends to make the design documentation available at no cost to commercial vendors. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Criticality Safety Aspects of Higher Fissile Gram Equivalent at the AMWTF - 19296

Operating since 2003, the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility (AMWTF) has used high-tech characterization equipment, robotics, and automated treatment processes to accomplish its mission. The facility was designed to treat contact handled waste up to 325 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE). As the lower fissile mass drums and boxes were treated and shipped for disposal, other high fissile mass containers needed to be treated and shipped. The facility's mission evolved to include treating containers with up to 3,000 FGE. The nuclear criticality safety group has worked diligently with operations to increase AMWTF's fissile mass limits. As operations change across the Department of Energy facility, the nuclear criticality safety groups must work with operations to meet the mission. How Fluor Idaho LLC is accomplishing this task with respect to criticality safety is the subject of this paper. The signature piece of equipment at AMWTF is the Supercompactor, a giant hydraulic ram capable of exerting 4 million pounds of force that can reduce a 55-gal drum to a 5-inch puck. By compacting waste, the Department of Energy can put more waste into the limited storage space of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Compaction also reduces the number of trips required to transport waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. There are two box-lines with hydraulic manipulators, nondestructive assay systems for drums and boxes, along with real-time-radiography. The plant's operations are highly automated. As time passed, AMWTF was tasked to treat drums that were not treatable with current operations. Based on analysis and experience of the nuclear criticality safety personnel, we have changed the fissile limits while maintaining a critically safe environment for the facility. Credit was taken for form, geometry, and lack of moderation in the material being treated. As the need arose to process higher FGE containers, more controls were identified for the treatment process. Criticality safety evaluations were expanded to 1,000 FGE for operational flexibility. Those evaluations included the box-line, the hot maintenance cell, and conveyors. Later, criticality safety evaluations were written to allow tanks to be processed in a box-line, as well as the use of a port in the box-line. Criticality safety evaluations for the box-line, hot maintenance cell, and conveyor were expanded to 3,000 FGE. The criticality safety officer is onsite and actively involved in operations. By expanding the nuclear criticality safety operating parameters, the AMWTF will meet the 2008 Record of Decision in which the Department of Energy directed 8,700 cubic meters of waste to be treated at the facility. (author)

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DOE OSTI2019

Panel Session 51: Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future (3/5)

This panel focused on the retrieval, characterization, treatment, certification, and shipping of transuranic (TRU) waste at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, Idaho, USA. The INL began receiving TRU waste from offsite generators (primarily the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, USA) beginning in 1954. Until 1970, the INL Site disposed of barrels, boxes, and other debris in a shallow, unlined landfill. Beginning in 1970, the INL Site began storing TRU waste on an asphalt pad, which was then covered with several feet of soil. This practice continued until the late 1980's at which time a large air support building was erected over the waste. In the mid-to-late 1990's, the air support building was removed and a massive building was constructed over the entire dirt mound. Contractors retrieved the waste from the early 2000's through February 2017 to support an Idaho Settlement Agreement milestone that required the retrieval of 65,000 cubic meters of TRU waste and removal from Idaho. This panel focused on the Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future. The Idaho Transuranic Waste Program includes buried and stored waste retrieval and processing of contact- and remote-handled transuranic waste. Over the duration of the program, the Idaho site has conducted targeted retrieval of buried waste from the 1950's and 1960's; designed, permitted, built, operated, and completed the mission of a facility to process 65,000 cubic meters of waste; and shipped more than 57,000 cubic meters of waste to WIPP. Presentation proposed: Transuranic Waste Challenges and Solutions (Hoss Brown, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), John McCoy, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), James Malmo, US DOE (USA), Doug Pruitt, Department of Energy Idaho Field Office (USA), Kenneth Princen, US DOE (USA))

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DOE OSTI2019

Offsite Source Recovery Program; High Activity Beta Gamma Removal, Transport and Disposition - 19663

The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security's (ORS) Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been tasked with the removal and disposition of radioactive sealed sources in the interest of national security and public health and safety. It is the mission of the program to recover radioactive sources to prevent them from falling into the hands of individuals who would use this material for malicious intent. OSRP is a collaborative effort involving Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). At the inception of the program, Pu-239 was the only isotope acceptable for recovery. As a wider security scope developed, OSRP expanded its mission to include the recovery of other sources that posed a potential risk to national security, health, and safety. Starting in 2004, OSRP began recovering cesium and cobalt devices, largely from medical, research, and industrial facilities. These disused higher-activity devices present a burden to licensees in terms of security, and demand for OSRP's assistance in removing them has been high. Today, OSRP removes around 40 high-activity devices per year in support of domestic demand as well as ORS's Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP). This represents an average of over 50,000 Ci of Cs-137 and Co-60 removed from the private sector each year for permanent disposition. A major component of this effort is the use of the proper shipping container to transport the devices. As a way to increase transportation capabilities ORS has developed two new Type B containers. The most recently completed of these containers, the 435-B, is currently certified to transport Gammators and Gammacell-1000, -3000, and -40 irradiators in an overpack configuration. This provides greater capacity and flexibility to safely and effectively transport these devices, for which acceptable shipping configurations had been previously limited. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Optimization of Energy Absorbing Materials for Radioactive Packaging

Most applications of honeycomb materials are for lightweight structural members. This area of honeycomb material behavior has been extensively researched. In packaging design, honeycomb materials are used for impact energy absorption. Data concerning the deformation of stainless steel honeycomb structures is not widely available. It is being proposed to use honeycomb stainless steel as an impact energy absorber in a new radioactive material shipping package. Honeycomb materials can be useful for energy absorption applications because the geometry causes the structure to have a constant compressive force during buckling. This Finite Element Analysis is used to predict the compressive buckling strength of various honeycomb structures in order to design an energy absorber for a specific package weight and geometry. The model simulates a drop test where a 50 pound plate lands flat on a honeycomb stainless steel structure from a height of 30 feet. Some actual drop tests have already been performed on real specimens. Most of the resulting deformations of these tests include the bottom of the honeycomb structure buckling while the rest of the structure was either slightly deformed or straight. The deformation of the simulated honeycomb specimen matched the deformation from the actual drop tests. This is one verification that the model is working properly. It is evident that after about 2.5% strain the strength is a relatively linear value, and eventually flattens out to about 875 psi. The crush strength measured from the actual drop tests for the same density honeycomb was just over 800 psi. This is further verification that the model is working correctly. The results gathered from the FEA model successfully mirror the results from a real drop test. The deformation looks realistic, and the compressive strength found is consistent with the empirically measured value. Future work for this model includes modeling different density honeycomb structures which have not been tested before. This will allow for optimization of honeycomb stainless steel use for impact absorption in radioactive material shipping packages.

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DOE OSTI2020

Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 145: Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF

Issues associated with establishing a SNF Transportation System in the U.S. are complex. In part, this is because in the US when discussing SNF, there are two distinct categories. The two categories represent significant differences in ownership, transportation-regulator, and even the physical characteristics of the SNF. Specifically, the physical differences in the SNF include size of the rods, associated quantities to be shipped, cladding material, and radionuclide content/enrichment. The first is commercial SNF (i.e., that associated with nuclear power plants), owned by utilities, until a permanent repository is built with DOE obligated by law to then assume the responsibility for shipping and ownership of the SNF. Since no-permanent repository currently exists, most commercial SNF is stored near the reactor in which it was installed, hence requiring no shipments. Although current shipments of commercial SNF are very limited, the few that do occur are generally performed to support a utilities SNF consolidation effort utility and for post irradiation examination/testing. However, with approximately 83,000 metric tons currently being stored at more than 70 sites around the U.S., when a permanent repository becomes available, the required number of shipments will be extensive. The second category is DOE and research reactor fuel. These fuel rods are generally much smaller in length than commercial fuel rods, with the quantity of rods transported in a shipment significantly less than the number of rods in a typical commercial fuel assembly. Currently, most of the SNF shipments within the U.S come from this category. DOE is currently managing about 2500 metric tons of heavy metal of SNF. This panel focused on updates and status of transportation of SNF/UNF. Panelists provided updates and information on continuing impacts, risk assessment, equipment (rail cars, handling, securement), possible rail routing, and proposed inspection equipment/routing prior to shipments. Panelists with presentations: Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation (Daniel Ogg); Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF (Kathy Langan); UNF Transportation: Challenges and Opportunities (Michael Valenzano)

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DOE OSTI2020

MH-1A Sturgis Decommissioning and Dismantlement - 20281

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with its prime contractor, Aptim Federal Services, LLC (APTIM), recycled 5,260 metric tons (11.6 million pounds) of material from Sturgis Barge (Sturgis) during the Decommissioning and Dismantlement of the MH-1A nuclear power reactor. The overall objective of the project was to reduce residual radioactivity associated with MH-1A to levels that permitted release of Sturgis for dismantlement and termination of the Army Reactor Office permit. By effectively applying waste hierarchy's three Rs - reduce, reuse and recycle - the Sturgis project not only minimized the amount of waste that required disposal at landfills, but also reduced the potential for long-term environmental liability emanating from these landfills. The project team completed the physical decommissioning efforts in June 2018 in Galveston, TX. In September 2018, radiological surveys were completed to demonstrate the vessel could be released for shipbreaking. Sturgis was towed from Galveston, TX to Brownsville, TX in late September 2018. Shipbreaking, dismantlement and recycling efforts began in early October 2018 and were completed on 15 March 2019. As part of the decommissioning effort in Galveston, the team shipped 69 shipments (860 metric tons) of low-level radioactive waste and radioactive components to the Waste Control Specialist (WCS) facility in Andrews TX for disposal. Certain radioactive components had to be transferred to the Department of Energy prior to placing the materials into the Federal Waste Facility located within WCS. However, most of the radioactive waste was characterized, profiled, approved and managed under the WCS permitted radioactive waste exemption process authorized and implemented by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the Radioactive Materials Division. This allows LLRW and LLMW to be shipped as regulated waste and then upon receipt at WCS through satisfying the relevant waste acceptance criteria the waste is exempted and placed into the WCS RCRA permitted cell. An additional 35 shipments (544 metric ton) of contaminated hazardous waste water were transported to U.S. Ecology in Robstown, TX for treatment/disposal. An additional 36 shipments (500 metric tons) of non-hazardous wastewater was sent to Republic Waste Services' facility in Fresno, TX. The disposal of these materials required close coordination with State of Texas regulators. During decommissioning, the project team recycled approximately 270 metric tons (600,000 pounds) of lead and steel. As part of the dismantlement in Brownsville, TX the team recycled approximately 5,000 metric tons (11 million pounds) of ferrous and non-ferrous material, limiting our disposal requirements to about 180 metric tons (400,000 pounds) of material (<4% from entire shipbreaking activity). Although the primary hazard being mitigated by this project was radiological, recycling was always a priority for the project. The team strived to achieve sustainability goals as we implemented this one of a kind project. Scrap metal recycling has a large positive impact on the environment and can also favorably impact project disposal costs. Steel is among the most recycled material in the world. Nearly 40% of the world's steel production is made from scrap. Recycling steel also requires 75% less energy than producing it from raw materials. By using recycled steel rather than virgin materials, 2.33 kg of carbon emissions are eliminated per kg of steel [1]. The project recycled more than 4,500 metric tons (10 million pounds) of steel, which eliminated about 10,400 metric tons (23 million pounds) of CO{sub 2}. By implementing a recycling initiative for the Sturgis project, the team was able to realize cost avoidance for disposal of scrap, cost savings from the metals recycled, plus the project provided benefits to the environment through our recycling efforts. Once the dismantlement was complete, the team prepared a detailed decommissioning closure report, which allowed for the termination of the Army Reactor Decommissioning Permit. While it not only reduced any potential long-term environmental liability, this project to decommission and dismantle a floating nuclear power plant is truly unprecedented - it is a prime example of the USACE mission which is: 'Engineering solutions for the Nation's toughest challenges'. This unique, one of a kind, historical power plant was never designed to be taken apart, and the available information about its construction was lacking in many details. The hazards that required mitigation dictated a painstaking and deliberate process in order to avoid any release to the environment and the community, and to protect the health and safety of the workers involved while keeping the waste hierarchy's three R's - reduce, reuse and recycle at the forefront. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project Overcomes Challenges to Complete Treatment of Debris Waste - 20616

The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP), operated by Fluor Idaho for the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, completed the last of its debris waste treatment in the fall of 2019. Concluding that work-scope was certainly not without its challenges. Fluor Idaho and its employees had to adapt to treating extremely challenging waste types, such as high-fissile gram materials and potentially pyrophoric and reactive wastes coming down the stretch. It also had to complete the sizing of large waste boxes from Mound Laboratories in inner-contamination enclosures designed to capture the extremely fine, 'flighty' plutonium-238 in its high-efficiency particulate air filters. Very few waste treatment facilities in the DOE Complex have completed their missions. In fact, most large-scale waste treatment facilities are still under construction with many months or years remaining before 'hot operations' begin. AMWTP is unique because it functioned as a 'one-stop shop.' Transuranic and low-level waste characterization, treatment, certification, and shipping all occurred there. AMWTP concluded the most challenging part of its mission and will continue to ship material out of the state of Idaho for the next decade. This paper will provide a background of the AMWTP mission, and the adaptations to its operating permit, equipment, or treatment processes to address challenging waste types. AMWTP will leave behind a legacy of being one of the most successful waste treatment facilities in the history of the DOE Complex. The facility was well-conceived, well-constructed, and well-executed; it was done right from start to finish. During the course of its waste treatment mission, the facility was required to adapt to changing conditions by treating extremely challenging waste types. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Dose Rate Investigation for Cobalt Isotope Rods Retrieval Campaign

GE-Hitachi (GEH) partnered with Exelon for a first of a kind program to generate cobalt-60 (Co-60) sources at Clinton Power Station (CPS). The cobalt targets are placed within the fuel bundle, double encapsulated in metal rods, and irradiated in the Boiling Water Reactor for activation. After the bundle is discharged, the Co-60 sources are harvested for medical and industrial applications. In order to ensure safe shipment of the Co-60 sources, shielding evaluations are required. As required by 10 CFR 71, a licensing basis evaluation was performed and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and approved as a Letter Authorization. This 10 CFR 71 evaluation utilizes bounding design inputs to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory limits. The retrieval campaign of the Co-60 rods involves disassembly of the bundle/rods, loading into a material basket, and then loading the material basket into GEHitachi's Model 2000 cask that is part of the Type B Transportation Package. As part of conservative decision making, CPS wanted confidence that measurements taken at various locations around the material basket loaded with Co-60 rods are consistent or bounded by the dose rate calculations performed by GEH. This would ensure that after all loading operations are completed, and the Model 2000 package is in the shipping configuration (i.e., cask drained and secured within the Model 2000 overpack), the dose rates would meet 10 CFR 71 shipping requirements. In addition, dose rate predictions were used to develop an ALARA plan at CPS to ensure radiological safety of the workers. To support CPS, a second, more realistic shielding evaluation was performed to verify the as planned loading. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗