Design and Optimization of an Aerosol Optical Cell for Spectroscopy Analysis for Molten Salt Reactor Safeguards_AvilaJuan_Summer Intern Poster Sessions
Summer 2023 Intern Poster Session
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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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The 2022 Hunga eruption exercises the nuclear explosion monitoring community
The 2022 Hunga eruption was a global event recorded by all three Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) International Monitoring System (IMS) geophysical waveform sensor technologies: seismic, infrasound, and hydroacoustic. Large volcanic eruptions are rare and additionally present an opportunity to test seismoacoustic detection, location, and identification methods for nuclear explosion monitoring.
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Integration of the H3D-M400 detector and Spot robot for automated area survey missions
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
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USSP / ISPO Overview and NWAL Related Tasks
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
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In Silico Versus In Situ: The Challenging Landscape of Nuclear Criticality Safety Training
Nuclear criticality safety grew out of the ranks of experimentalists studying the physics of chain-reacting systems at critical experiment facilities. Consequently, critical experiment facilities provide the best forum for conducting training in nuclear criticality safety. As the nuclear renaissance gains traction, there is an increased demand to train personnel in nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Strides have been made in both on-line and virtual reality based NCS training. While these are perhaps a necessary component of NCS training, hands-on training at critical experiments facilities remains the most effective means of developing competency for fissionable material handlers, managers of fissionable material operations, criticality safety analysts, and experimentalists. This paper explores the challenges of developing and maintaining workforce competency in nuclear criticality safety to support safe and efficient fissionable material operations.
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
Lessons Learned From Ventilation and Glovebox Flooding Via Overfilling of the Wet Vacuum System in a Plutonium Facility
In the summer of 2021, operations personnel requested maintenance personnel to fill a wet vacuum (Wetvac) seal water tank in a plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). After the filling was finished, the fill valve of the Wetvac seal water tank was left open and a ‘dead-man’ valve on an isolation line failed to close properly. After a series of other failures, the water exited the glovebox and contaminated three rooms of the first floor of the facility and an underlying area in the basement. A retrospective analysis of this event determined that there was no risk of a criticality due to the inherent design features of the ventilation system. This paper will explain the driving factors behind how this event was able to happen, as well as some of the major lessons learned that can be universally applied to other nuclear facilities. One of the main causes of the event was the delegation of work to maintenance personnel that were not qualified for the work being asked of them. Additionally, there was a lack of coordination between criticality safety engineers and facility operations equipment owners regarding equipment and connections present on the seal water tanks for the Wetvac, specifically the presence of overflow drain lines. The respective criticality safety evaluation credited an overflow drain line being present on the seal water tanks that was later found to have not been present. Lastly, there are lessons to be learned regarding equipment configuration and designing systems with safety in mind.
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Twenty Years and Counting—Where are they? Practical Recommendations for Commercializing AI/ML for Intrusion Detection in the Nuclear Industry
Research and development into applications for improving equipment condition monitoring programs at nuclear facilities has been around since the 1990s. However, while the field has moved from using data-driven machine learning (ML) algorithms for detection and prediction of equipment degradation and failure to prognostic capabilities, these applications are still not widely used in the U.S. nuclear industry. Additionally, there has been significant effort in designing both data-driven and physics-based artificial intelligence (AI) and ML models for many other potential applications in the nuclear industry, including cyber intrusion detection systems (IDS). However, as the last twenty years in condition-based maintenance research has shown us, there are significant hurdles that must be overcome for deployment of IDS on plant systems. This paper provides a discussion on the practical recommendations that researchers should consider for successful adoption of AI/ML IDS in the nuclear industry.
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Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry
Nuclear power plants (NPP) have thousands of digital assets throughout their facility. Typically, NPPs have asset and configuration management programs that capture the make, model, and version of a component. This information, however, usually only includes first- or second-tier components and does not capture the complete enumeration of software components and their dependencies within operational technology (OT) equipment. As seen with recent cyberattacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying if and where an exploitable vulnerability exists within a facility. A software bill of materials (SBOM) provides this detailed enumeration. Further, integrating SBOMs with vulnerability data sources and vulnerability attestation reports can provide improved awareness leading to better cyber risk management and incident response. Preferably, SBOMs are provided by the supplier; however, when an NPP already owns a device, it is less likely they will have a supplier provided-SBOM. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated on installed digital assets. This paper provides an introduction to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy paper titled “Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry,” which describes the SBOM ecosystem and provides a suggested approach to methodically and seamlessly integrate an SBOM program in an NPP.
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Cyber-Informed Engineering Guidance—Implementing CIE in Early Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages
Traditionally, cybersecurity is not considered in the design process. Design engineers typically focus on building safety and reliability into their products and applications. Security against malicious cyber incidents is often an afterthought, resulting in deployment of security solutions during installation or operation. Unfortunately, waiting to consider cybersecurity until later in the systems engineering lifecycle often results in less effective and more expense security. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the concept of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in 2015 to provide a framework that enables cybersecurity to be built into systems beginning at the conceptual design stage. In addition to ongoing research by INL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response has recently developed a National CIE Strategy document for incorporating CIE into the design and operation of infrastructure systems reliant on digital monitoring or controls. This paper provides a brief review of this National CIE Strategy as well as a roadmap to historical, current, and future CIE research by INL through the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development Program. A near-term focus of the DOE-NE’s research and development is to extend the foundational CIE work into detailed guidance for implementation during initial systems engineering stages in nuclear digital instrumentation and control projects and to demonstrate use of the guidance in an integrated energy systems project.
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Responsibly Harnessing the Power of AI
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based applications are on the cusp of offering the public and private sectors tools of tremendous potential that will likely transform the world in much the same way that previous technological revolutions have. To harness these tools, a vast and rapidly increasing assortment of ethical AI guidelines and principles are being developed to manage the myriad of risks these tools pose. Documents, frameworks, standards, and regulations have been developed by private industry, research institutions, governments and nongovernmental organizations, international standards bodies and more. This work details representative approaches to ethically developing, managing, and operating current AI technologies. The various approaches are analyzed for commonality, divergence, and implementation strategy to help develop approaches for managing AI tools in the nuclear landscape. This work will support the creation of a common vocabulary and a deeper understanding of the ethical/ responsible AI landscape and advance the considerations required for structured frameworks in the international safeguards domain.
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Acoustic Monitoring of Pyroprocessing Equipment
This paper provides an introduction to using acoustic monitoring to advance detection techniques for pyroprocessing in support of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. The usage of free air acoustic monitoring has been previously demonstrated at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) facilities such as the Advanced Test Reactor and the National Security Test Range. However, the proposed work revolves around a new deployment environment, the Fuel Conditioning Facility, that brings forward several questions regarding the performance of the technology in non-free air media. The confinement of the pyroprocessing equipment to a heavily shielded hot cell, the atmosphere of the hot cell containing argon gas, and the radiation dose inside the hot cell are all new environments for acoustic monitoring. To our knowledge, acoustic measurements have not been completed in such an environment before. This offers a new opportunity to study not only the acoustic signatures of the equipment inside of the hot cell, but also the propagation of the signals through the hot cell and at distances away from their origination. The objective of this paper is to explain the planned instruments to monitor the Fuel Conditioning Facility in order to evaluate acoustic signals emitted from equipment during various stages of operation. Identifying these signals can potentially enable the identification of specific pieces of equipment used in pyroprocessing and produce information of their operational status. If successful, this type of monitoring could offer a new method to aid in safeguards and proliferation detection of pyroprocessing activities.
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Fault Detection in the Solvent Extraction Process with Non-traditional Sensors
Solvent extraction is used to separate metals or other complexes into two different immiscible liquids and is an essential component of the PUREX Process. Improvements to the solvent extraction process can directly contribute to an organization’s ability to ensure the purity and recovery of special nuclear materials from spent nuclear fuel. Such improvements can benefit nuclear reprocessing efforts, increase fuel reutilization, and limit the concentration of actinides in nuclear waste repositories.
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Sampling and Analysis Plan for Investigation of Undeclared Nuclear Activities - 20104
The nuclear-centered energy policy in South Korea is moving towards a nuclear-free era. It also facilitates an action or progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) launched a new R and D project which attempts to verify nuclear activities via analyzing environmental samples. Environmental samples possibly contain significant radiological information relevant to past undeclared activities. In order to precisely verify them, it is essential to provide 1) the concrete information of target facilities, 2) appropriate methodologies and procedures, and 3) well-suited instrumentation and equipment corresponding to sample signatures. It is also important to provide scientific reliability or validity in any process such as sample collection, handling, transportation and laboratory analysis. Therefore, the information of nuclear facilities (fuel fabrication plant, graphite moderated reactor, reprocessing plant) in North Korea are reviewed in order to determine parameters for appropriate sampling methods representing a facility's characteristics. Secondly, a sampling procedure for radioactive elements is being developed based on international and domestic standards such as ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials), KS (Korean industrial Standards), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) manuals. The procedure contains some specific information including sampling process, sampling tools, amount of sample, sample identification, and other related information. Developing the qualified national guidelines is most important since sampling and analyzing results can be used as evidences of nuclear activities. The guideline developed through this work will clearly define various methodologies such as document verification, sampling procedures, collection methods, sample storage criteria, chain of custody, and transportation conditions. The final objective of this work is to establish the infrastructure and regulatory framework for assessment of nuclear activities, and provide a national guideline for sampling and analysis. This will bring confidence in the results and play a critical role in complete denuclearization progress in South Korea. (authors)
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Molten Salt Sampling Techniques and Analytical Approaches
Recent global interest in pyroprocessing and molten salt reactors has brought salt sampling methods and techniques back to the forefront of nuclear safeguards concerns. Issues with uranium supplies have also encouraged various countries to pursue advanced nuclear fuel cycles. Tracking nuclear material in molten salt has proven to be a challenge and updating molten salt sampling will greatly help in this endeavor. Molten salt is problematic to sample due to salt stratification, lack of homogeneity, solids, and difficulty with hot cell adaptations. Various salt sampling techniques have been used since before the 1960s including surface, spoon/spatula, and bar solidification. Since then, new types of sampling techniques have been developed to improve sampling results. These include rod/dip, pipet, suction, filtered sampling along with devices such as the Valve Core Sampler and the Multi-Level Sampler. These different approaches are being analyzed and improved upon along with developing requirements for an improved salt sampling device. Work continues to develop salt samplers that are more robust, easier to segment, collect at a specific depth, can work with filters, and can collect fines. Sampling parameters are also being narrowed in terms of stirring, settling time, filtration, depth, etc. In the future, we hope to address deficiencies for process control and nuclear material accountancy control by determining the best way to collect samples that minimizes contaminants and is representative. A compilation of salt sampling approaches, analyses techniques, and an evaluation of findings will be presented.
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Molten Salt Sampling and Analysis
Presentation to be given at the annual review meeting for MPACT
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Development of Safeguards Instrumentation and Techniques at the Idaho National laboratory for an Electrochemical Facility
None
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Overview and Current Progress of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Training and Education Program
Since 2011, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has been providing a two-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities, and, in 2017, an additional course was proposed for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs). In addition to hands-on training, other NCSP-funded tasks include training on sensitivity/uncertainty methods, NCS resource pipeline tasks, development of NCS guides, maintenance and development of Nuclear Criticality Safety Education Training (NCSET) modules and designing of a new subcritical assembly for hands-on training purposes. This paper provides an overview of the NCSP training and education program. The status of the NCSP hands-on training program will also be provided.
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Development of a Multi-Sensor Data Science System Used for Signature Development on Solvent Extraction Processes in support of safeguards- an overview
A new nuclear fuel cycle test bed is being built at Idaho National Laboratory to support the purification of special nuclear material recovered from used fuel. The test bed provides an opportunity to research process flow and the application of computational tools in solvent extraction processes. A deeper understanding of process and equipment behavior coupled with real time data collection can indicate whether a process failure is accidental or purposeful. The goal of this project is to develop a system that utilizes non-traditional measurement sources such as vibration, acoustics, current, light, flow, and temperature in conjunction with data-based, machine learning techniques that will allow for signal discovery. This multi-sensor data can support the development of safeguards by design and security by design measures for such a facility. Additionally, it can aid in early detection and identification of removed materials indicating diversion, which is essential for initiating material recovery and actor identification. This overview encompasses the current research and testing of sensors to develop a spectrum of process signatures. To be followed by planned experiments aimed to characterize said signatures and study potential feature extraction techniques to identify a fault in the system (i.e. flow diversion).
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