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At least 883 records · Page 49

Annual Radioactive Waste Tank Inspection Program - 2018

The Department of Energy (DOE) requires that Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR), the Liquid Waste contractor, maintain a robust and timely Structural Integrity Program for waste tanks that are leak-tight and for waste tanks that have leaked or are suspect. These requirements are promulgated in DOE Manual 435.1-1, Section II.Q.(2). A key aspect of SRR's implementation of these requirements is its annual tank inspection program. In 2018, the SRR Visual and In-Service Inspection Program used two visual imagery techniques to ascertain the integrity of the Savannah River Site (SRS) waste tanks: high resolution digital photography and closed-circuit television. The primary inspection method made use of direct photograph techniques, e.g., making a series of photographs providing detailed views of the tank and wide-angle photography for obtaining overviews of large areas. Closed-circuit television was then typically used to further investigate conditions found during the initial inspection. During 2018, a total of 4,853 photographs were taken and 47 video inspections were performed as part of this inspection program. Of the 51 waste tank systems at SRS that were designed, constructed, and placed into active service storing radioactive liquid waste, 43 remain in active service. Eight tanks have been cleaned, stabilized by filling with engineered grout, and removed from service (also known as operationally closed) -Tanks 5, 6, and 12 (Type I tanks); Tank 16 (Type II tank); and Tanks 17, 18, 19, and 20 (Type IV tanks). For the 43 waste tanks, inspections were successfully conducted in 2018 through all accessible annulus risers and inspection ports for nine Type I tanks, three Type II tanks, and 27 Type III/IIIA tanks; at least one inspection was made in the interior of four Type IV tanks (i.e., the tanks without annular spaces) above the liquid level in the tank. Rainwater continues periodically to be observed migrating into the annuli of some tanks. Evidence of this infiltration was primarily noted by observation of surface stains, and occasionally by calciferous deposits, changed configuration of salt deposits in the associated annulus, and mild surface corrosion. The conditions of the 43 tanks remained essentially unchanged from the conditions reported in 2017. The one key exception was the identification of eight new cracks in the Tank 15 primary tank wall. These newly identified cracks are located at 65, 67, 70, 76, 150, 152, 176 inches and 200 inches above the tank bottom. The identified cracks in Tank 15 do not constitute an impact on the structural integrity of the tank, as evaluated and confirmed in the referenced report, SRNS-STI-2008-00028, A Structural Impact Assessment of Flaws Detected During Ultrasonic Examination of Tank 15, and calculation, T-CLC-H-00890, Calculation of Critical Crack Lengths in HLW Tank 15. The 2018 inspection program confirmed the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of all 43 waste tanks.

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A Structural Integrity Evaluation of the Tank Farm Waste Transfer System

Radioactive supernate, salt, and/or sludge wastes (i.e., high level wastes) are confined in 45 underground storage tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The waste is transported between tanks within and between the F and H area tank farms and other facilities on site via underground and a limited number of aboveground transfer lines. The Department of Energy - Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR) performed a comprehensive assessment of the structural integrity program for the Tank Farm waste transfer system at the SRS. This document addresses the following issues raised during the DOE assessment

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2021

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2021. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2021 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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PUBLIC AND REGULATORY ACCEPTANCE OF BLENDING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE VS DILUTION

On April 21, 2009, the Energy Facilities Contractors Group (EFCOG) Waste Management Working Group (WMWG) provided a recommendation to the Department of Energy's Environmental Management program (DOE-EM) concerning supplemental guidance on blending methodologies to use to classify waste forms to determine if the waste form meets the definition of Transuranic (TRU) Waste or can be classified as Low-Level Waste (LLW). The guidance provides specific examples and methods to allow DOE and its Contractors to properly classify waste forms while reducing the generation of TRU wastes. TRU wastes are much more expensive to characterize at the generator's facilities, ship, and then dispose at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) than Low-Level Radioactive Waste's disposal. Also the reduction of handling and packaging of LLW is inherently less hazardous to the nuclear workforce. Therefore, it is important to perform the characterization properly, but in a manner that minimizes the generation of TRU wastes if at all possible. In fact, the generation of additional volumes of radioactive wastes under the ARRA programs, this recommendation should improve the cost effective implementation of DOE requirements while properly protecting human health and the environment. This paper will describe how the message of appropriate, less expensive, less hazardous blending of radioactive waste is the 'right' thing to do in many cases, but can be confused with inappropriate 'dilution' that is frowned upon by regulators and stakeholders in the public. A proposal will be made in this paper on how to communicate this very complex and confusing technical issue to regulatory bodies and interested stakeholders to gain understanding and approval of the concept. The results of application of the proposed communication method and attempt to change the regulatory requirements in this area will be discussed including efforts by DOE and the NRC on this very complex subject.

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Confocal (micro)-XRF for 3D anlaysis of elements distribution in hot environmental particles

Studies on the fate and transport of radioactive contaminates in the environment are often constrained by a lack of knowledge on the elemental distribution and general behavior of particulate bound radionuclides contained in hot particles. A number of hot particles were previously isolated from soil samples collected at former U.S. nuclear test sites in the Marshall Islands and characterized using non-destructive techniques [1]. The present investigation at HASYLAB is a part of larger research program at ITU regarding the characterization of environmental radioactive particles different locations and source-terms. Radioactive particles in the environment are formed under a number of different release scenarios and, as such, their physicochemical properties may provide a basis for identifying source-term specific contamination regimes. Consequently, studies on hot particles are not only important in terms of studying the elemental composition and geochemical behavior of hot particles but may also lead to advances in assessing the long-term impacts of radioactive contamination on the environment. Six particles isolated from soil samples collected at the Marshall Islands were studied. The element distribution in the particles was determined by confocal {micro}-XRF analysis using the ANKA FLUO beam line. The CRL (compound refractive lens) was used to focus the exciting beam and the polycapillary half lens to collimate the detector. The dimensions of confocal spot were measured by 'knife edge scanning' method with thin gold structure placed at Si wafer. The values of 3.1 x 1.4 x 18.4 {micro}m were achieved if defined as FWHMs of measured L?intensity profiles and when the19.1 keV exciting radiation was used. The collected XRF spectra were analyzed offline with AXIL [2] software to obtain net intensities of element characteristic lines.Further data processing and reconstruction of element distribution was done with the software 'R' [3] dedicated for statistical calculations. In figure 1 the distributions of Pu, Fe and Ti obtained for one of the studied hot particles are presented. The strongest signal was recorded for plutonium; the signals from iron and titanium are respectively 14 and 38 times less. It means that Pu is the most abundant of the observed elements. However, since the light elements are not detectable with the applied measurement conditions, it cannot be definitely stated if plutonium is the main element present in the sample. The isosurfaces are calculated at 20 % of maximum intensity for each element. Please note that the isosurfaces on the drawing are transparent. Changes in the spatial distribution of Pu, Fe, and Ti within the particle are shown in Fig. 2a, 2b, and 2c. Distinct elemental patterns are clearly visible at the higher concentration levels. The distributions of Cr, Cu, and Pb were also reconstructed but the results are not presented here. As it is shown in Fig. 1, the correlation between elements is good at low concentrations but the maxima of concentrations are not strongly correlated (see Fig. 2.). In general, the particle is inhomogeneous in terms of its elemental composition. Similar inhomogeneities were found for other particles with Pu identified as a major element in three of the six particles examined.

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Caustic Precipitation of Plutonium and Uranium with Gadolinium as a Neutron Poison

Here, the caustic precipitation of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) from Pu and U containing waste solutions has been investigated to determine whether gadolinium (Gd) could be used as a neutron poison for precipitation with greater than a fissile mass containing both Pu and enriched U. Precipitation experiments were performed using both actual samples and simulant solutions with a range of 2.6-5.16 g/L U and 0-4.3 to 1 U to Pu. Analyses were performed on solutions at intermediate pH to determine the partitioning of elements for accident scenarios. When both Pu and U were present in the solution, precipitation began at pH 4.5 and by pH 7, 99% of Pu and U had precipitated. When complete neutralization was achieved at pH greater than 14 with 1.2 M excess OH - , greater than 99% of Pu, U, and Gd had precipitated. At pH greater than 14, the particles sizes were larger and the distribution was a single mode. The ratio of hydrogen to fissile atoms in the precipitate was determined after both settling and centrifuging and indicates that sufficient water was associated with the precipitates to provide the needed neutron moderation for Gd to prevent a criticality in solutions containing up to 4.3 to 1 U to Pu and up to 5.16 g/L U.

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Literature review on impact of glycolate on the 2H evaporator and the effluent treatment facility

Glycolic acid (GA) is being studied as an alternate reductant in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) feed preparation process. It will either be a total or partial replacement for the formic acid that is currently used. A literature review has been conducted on the impact of glycolate on two post-DWPF downstream systems - the 2H Evaporator system and the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). The DWPF recycle stream serves as a portion of the feed to the 2H Evaporator. Glycolate enters the evaporator system from the glycolate in the recycle stream. The overhead (i.e., condensed phase) from the 2H Evaporator serves as a portion of the feed to the ETF. The literature search revealed that virtually no impact is anticipated for the 2H Evaporator. Glycolate may help reduce scale formation in the evaporator due to its high complexing ability. The drawback of the solubilizing ability is the potential impact on the criticality analysis of the 2H Evaporator system. It is recommended that at least a theoretical evaluation to confirm the finding that no self-propagating violent reactions with nitrate/nitrites will occur should be performed. Similarly, identification of sources of ignition relevant to glycolate and/or update of the composite flammability analysis to reflect the effects from the glycolate additions for the 2H Evaporator system are in order. An evaluation of the 2H Evaporator criticality analysis is also needed. A determination of the amount or fraction of the glycolate in the evaporator overhead is critical to more accurately assess its impact on the ETF. Hence, use of predictive models like OLI Environmental Simulation Package Software (OLI/ESP) and/or testing are recommended for the determination of the glycolate concentration in the overhead. The impact on the ETF depends on the concentration of glycolate in the ETF feed. The impact is classified as minor for feed glycolate concentrations {le} 33 mg/L or 0.44 mM. The ETF unit operations that will have minor/major impacts are chlorination, pH adjustment, 1st mercury removal, organics removal, 2nd mercury removal, and ion exchange. For minor impacts, the general approach is to use historical process operations data/modeling software like OLI/ESP and/or monitoring/compiled process operations data to resolve any uncertainties with testing as a last resort. For major impacts (i.e., glycolate concentrations > 33 mg/L or 0.44 mM), testing is recommended. No impact is envisaged for the following ETF unit operations regardless of the glycolate concentration - filtration, reverse osmosis, ion exchange resin regeneration, and evaporation.

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Compliance Monitoring Implementation Plan for 40 CFR §191.14(b), Assurance Requirement (Rev. 5)

This Compliance Monitoring Implementation Plan outlines monitoring activities conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to demonstrate compliance with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal regulations at Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, "Environmental Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," Subparts B and C; and the EPA criteria for certifying compliance at 40 CFR Part 194, "Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the Disposal Regulations," Certification Decision, Final Rule. WIPP is a mined repository designed for the permanent disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste, and is located in the Chihuahuan Desert, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. More than three decades of environmental studies of the WIPP site ensure its suitability for TRU waste disposal. Monitoring the WIPP facility is a DOE top priority. Monitoring activities are implemented in compliance with various federal and state of New Mexico regulatory and operational safety requirements. These activities are conducted to ensure environmental protection, public and worker health and safety, and proper characterization of the disposal system. Monitoring activities will continue at WIPP through the operational period and until well after closure of the facility.

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Compliance Monitoring Implementation Plan for 40 CFR §191.14(b), Assurance Requirement (Rev. 6)

This Compliance Monitoring Implementation Plan outlines monitoring activities conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to demonstrate compliance with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal regulations at Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, "Environmental Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," Subparts B and C; and the EPA criteria for certifying compliance at 40 CFR Part 194, "Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the Disposal Regulations," Certification Decision, Final Rule. This plan does not address | monitoring activities intended to demonstrate compliance with 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A. WIPP is a mined repository designed for the permanent disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU)waste located in the Chihuahuan Desert, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The suitability of the WIPP site for TRU waste disposal is supported by more than three decades of environmental studies. Monitoring the WIPP facility is one of the DOE's top priorities. Monitoring activities are implemented in compliance with various federal and state of New Mexico regulatory and operational safety requirements. These activities are conducted to ensure environmental protection, public and worker health and safety, and proper characterization of the disposal system. Monitoring activities will continue at WIPP through the operational period and until well after closure of the facility.

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Nevada National Security Site Industrial Sites Project Closeout - 12498

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is responsible for environmental restoration (ER) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This includes remediation at Industrial Sites where past nuclear testing activities and activities that supported nuclear testing may have or are known to have resulted in the release of contaminants into the environment. Industrial Sites at the NNSS have included nuclear facilities that supported the nuclear rocket/missile development programs, gas stations, landfills, spill sites, ordnance sites, and numerous other waste disposal and release sites. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities neared completion at the end of fiscal year 2011 while other activities required under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) and part of the same NNSS ER Project are forecasted to extend to 2027 or beyond. With the majority of Industrial Sites corrective action units (CAUs) completed (more than 250 CAUs and over 1,800 corrective action sites), it was determined that an activity closeout process should be implemented to ensure that the work completed over the past 15 years is well documented in a comprehensive and concise summary. While the process used to close each individual CAU is described in approved documents, no single document describes in summary fashion the work completed to close the many individual Industrial Sites. The activity closeout process will be used to develop an Industrial Sites closeout document that describes these years of work. This document will summarize the number of Industrial Sites closed under the FFACO and provide general descriptions of projects, contaminants removed, and sites closed in place with corresponding Use Restrictions. Other pertinent information related to Industrial Sites work such as the project history, closure decisions, historical declarations, remediation strategies, and final CAU status will be included in the closeout document, along with a table listing each CAU and corresponding corrective action sites within each CAU. Using this process of conducting the activity closeout and developing a closeout document may prove useful for other ER projects within the DOE complex in describing how a long period of ER can be summarized in a single document. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities were completed over the span of 15 years and involved the investigation, cleanup or Use Restriction, and closure of more than 260 CAUs and over 1,800 sites. These activities will conclude in FY 2012 (with the exception of one CAU). In order to capture the work completed over this length of time and document decisions made during the activities, a closeout effort was initiated. The closeout will review the work conducted during the Industrial Sites activities and produce a single document that summarizes Industrial Sites activities. This closeout is being conducted at an interim stage in the overall NNSA/NSO ER Project since the Soils and UGTA activities will continue for a number of years, but the completion of the Industrial Sites project warrants conducting a closeout now while personnel are available and information is still current. The process followed by NNSA/NSO in conducing project closeout for the Industrial Sites portion of the ER program may prove useful within the DOE complex in demonstrating how a large ER project can be summarized. (authors)

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Cameco Corporation's Approach to Legacy and Ongoing Waste Management Within the Fuel Services Division - 19124

Since 2011, a Fuel Services Division (FSD) employee has been dedicated to oversee divisional waste management with the goal of accelerating the recycle/disposal of accumulated legacy radioactive wastes stored at its Ontario operations in Blind River and Port Hope. The Blind River Refinery (BRR) and Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) were previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, becoming part of Cameco in 1988 and Cameco Fuel Manufacturing (CFM), previously known as Zircatec Precision Industries, becoming part of Cameco in 2006. Accumulated legacy radioactive waste is stored at each of the facilities. This radioactive waste has accumulated from operations beginning in the 1930's in Port Hope and the 1980's in Blind River. Due to minimal commercially available outlets for the disposal and/or treatment of these wastes, the waste was managed onsite by storage in underutilized space in buildings, trailers and/or in the secured yard. This relatively low-cost practice meant that over decades, the inventory increased at an unsustainable rate until available space became a limiting factor. During this time, the labelling, inventory records, characterization details and other history of many of the waste materials was not maintained adequately. Due to the volume of waste that had accumulated, campaigns to address these deficiencies in information were not considered feasible, sustaining the issue of accumulation of low-level radioactive waste. Since 2011, FSD has completed annual campaigns to address the accumulated legacy waste, which has included processing of material for decontamination to meet the unrestricted release criteria under the Canadian Nuclear Substance and Radiation Devices Regulations (NSRDR), disposal of marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) at a permitted landfill in the United States, processing of contaminated materials to reduce the volume of low-level radioactive waste and disposal at a designated facility in Port Hope. In addition FSD has undertaken significant changes to radioactive waste management practices at each of the facilities. Multiple characterization techniques, including visual observation, review of process and other historical records, laboratory analysis and radiation scanning have been utilized in campaign planning to identify the scope and appropriate waste management technique(s) to reduce the inventory of stored material. This divisional waste management program has resulted in a significant change to how radioactive waste is generated, inventoried, characterized and managed within FSD and has increased the visibility within the leadership team of the opportunities and challenges of waste management, such as alignment with decommissioning planning, project planning and budgeting. The heightened awareness has led to better financial and physical resource planning to execute waste projects with a current projected elimination of the legacy waste within FSD by 2025. (authors)

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Tank 30 and 37 Supernatant Sample Cross-Check and Evaporator Feed Qualification Analysis (2012)

This report summarizes the analytical data reported by the F/H and Savannah River National Laboratories for the 2012 cross-check analysis for high level waste supernatant liquid samples from SRS Tanks 30 and 37. The intent of this Tank 30 and 37 sample analyses was to perform cross-checks against routine F/H Laboratory analyses (corrosion and evaporator feed qualification programs) using samples collected at the same time from both tanks as well as split samples from the tanks.

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FY2017 ILAW Glass Corrosion Testing with the Single-Pass Flow-Through Method

The inventory of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) produced at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will be disposed of at the near-surface, on-site Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). When groundwater comes into contact with the waste form, the glass will corrode and radionuclides will be released into the near-field environment. Because the release of the radionuclides is dependent on the dissolution rate of the glass, it is important that the performance assessment (PA) model accounts for the dissolution rate of the glass as a function of various conditions. To accomplish this, an IDF PA glass dissolution model based on Transition State Theory (TST) can be employed. The model is able to account for changes in temperature, exposed surface area, and pH of the contacting solution as well as the effect of silicon solution concentrations, specifically the activity of orthosilicic acid (H4SiO4), whose concentration is directly linked to the glass dissolution rate. In addition, the IDF PA model accounts for the ion exchange process. The effect of temperature, pH, H4SiO4 activity, and the rate of ion exchange can be parameterized and implemented directly into the PA rate model. The rate model parameters are derived from laboratory tests with the single-pass flow-through (SPFT) method. The provided data can be used by glass researchers to further the understanding of ILAW glass behavior, by IDF PA modelers to use the rate model parameters in PA modeling efforts, and by Department of Energy (DOE) contractors and decision makers as they assess the IDF PA program.

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2018 Annual Site Environmental Report Summary

We are committed to act as stewards of our environment to achieve our mission in accordance with all applicable environmental requirements. We set continual improvement objectives and targets, measure and document our progress, and share our results with our workforce, sponsors, and public. We reduce our environmental risk through legacy cleanup, pollution prevention, and long-term sustainability programs.

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Composite Analysis for Low Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site (Annual Status Report, FY 2021)

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1 requirements and as implemented by DOE/RL-2000-29, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office has prepared this annual summary for fiscal year (FY) 2021. Originally reported in PNNL-11800 and PNNL-11800, Addendum 1 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis), the Hanford Site Composite Analysis was approved through issuance of a 2002 memorandum. As required by DOE/RL-2000-29, an annual evaluation of new information and data developed by a number of onsite programs was completed. The reporting period for this annual evaluation is FY 2021 (October 1, 2020 through September 30, 2021).

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Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1 requirements and as implemented by DOE/RL-2000-29, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office has prepared this annual summary for fiscal year (FY) 2022. Originally reported in PNNL-11800 and PNNL-11800, Addendum 1 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis), the Hanford Site Composite Analysis was approved through issuance of a 2002 memorandum.5 As required by DOE/RL-2000-29, an annual evaluation of new information and data developed by several onsite programs was completed. The reporting period for this annual evaluation is FY 2022 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022).

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WASTE PROCESSING ANNUAL NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED R AND D REPORT FOR CY2008

The Engineering and Technology Office of Waste Processing identifies and reduces engineering and technical risks associated with key waste processing project decisions. The risks, and actions taken to mitigate those risks, are determined through technology readiness assessments, program reviews, technology information exchanges, external technical reviews, technical assistance, and targeted technology development and deployment (TDD). The Office of Waste Processing TDD program prioritizes and approves research and development scopes of work that address nuclear safety related to processing of highly radioactive nuclear wastes. Thirteen of the thirty-five R&D approved work scopes in FY2009 relate directly to nuclear safety, and are presented in this report.

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Managing Legacy Records for Formerly Utilized Sites. Remedial Action Program Sites

The Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contracted for support work through private and academic parties through the early 1960's. The work often involved radioactive materials. Residual radioactive contamination was left at some of more than 600 potentially contaminated (candidate) sites, and worker health and safety concerns remain from the site operations and subsequent remediation activities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program to identify and protect records of MED/AEC activities and of remediation work conducted under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) to aid in resolving questions about site conditions, liability, and worker health and safety and to ensure ongoing protectiveness of human health and the environment. This paper discusses DOE activities undertaken to locate records collections, confirm retention schedules and access requirements, and document information about the collections for use by future stewards. In conclusion: DOE-LM recognizes that records and information management is a critical component of effective LTS and M. Records are needed to answer questions about site conditions and demonstrate to the public in the future that the sites are safe. DOE-LM is working to satisfy present needs and anticipate future uses for FUSRAP records, and compile a collection of site and program information from which future stewards can readily locate and retrieve needed information. (authors)

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