Daily artificial gravity partially mitigates vestibular processing changes associated with head-down tilt bedrest
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G. D. Tays↗
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Verification of the Solar Dynamics Observatory High Gain Antenna Pointing Algorithm Using Flight Data
The Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) is a NASA spacecraft designed to study the Sun. It was launched on February 11, 2010 into a geosynchronous orbit, and uses a suite of attitude sensors and actuators to finely point the spacecraft at the Sun. SDO has three science instruments: the Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA), the Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager (HMI), and the Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE). SDO uses two High Gain Antennas (HGAs) to send science data to a dedicated ground station in White Sands, New Mexico. In order to meet the science data capture budget, the HGAs must be able to transmit data to the ground for a very large percentage of the time. Each HGA is a dual-axis antenna driven by stepper motors. Both antennas transmit data at all times, but only a single antenna is required in order to meet the transmission rate requirement. For portions of the year, one antenna or the other has an unobstructed view of the White Sands ground station. During other periods, however, the view from both antennas to the Earth is blocked for different portions of the day. During these times of blockage, the two HGAs take turns pointing to White Sands, with the other antenna pointing out to space. The HGAs handover White Sands transmission responsibilities to the unblocked antenna. There are two handover seasons per year, each lasting about 72 days, where the antennas hand off control every twelve hours. The non-tracking antenna slews back to the ground station by following a ground commanded trajectory and arrives approximately 5 minutes before the formerly tracking antenna slews away to point out into space. The SDO Attitude Control System (ACS) runs at 5 Hz, and the HGA Gimbal Control Electronics (GCE) run at 200 Hz. There are 40 opportunities for the gimbals to step each ACS cycle, with a hardware limitation of no more than one step every three GCE cycles. The ACS calculates the desired gimbal motion for tracking the ground station or for slewing, and sends the command to the GCE at 5 Hz. This command contains the number of gimbals steps for that ACS cycle, the direction of motion, the spacing of the steps, and the delay before taking the first step. The AIA and HMI instruments are sensitive to spacecraft jitter. Pre-flight analysis showed that jitter from the motion of the HGAs was a cause of concern. Three jitter mitigation techniques were developed to overcome the effects of jitter from different sources. The first method is the random step delay, which avoids gimbal steps hitting a cadence on a jitter-critical mode by pseudo-randomly delaying the first gimbal step in an ACS cycle. The second method of jitter mitigation is stagger stepping, which forbids the two antennas from taking steps during the same ACS cycle in order to avoid constructively adding jitter from two antennas. The third method is the inclusion of an instrument No Step Request (NSR), which allows the instruments to request a stoppage in gimbal stepping during the times when they are taking images. During the commissioning phase of the mission, a jitter test was performed onboard the spacecraft. Various sources of jitter, such as the reaction wheels, the High Gain Antenna motors, and the motion of the instrument filter wheels, were examined to determine the level of their effect on the instruments. During the HGA portion of the test, the jitter amplitudes from the single step of a gimbal were examined, as well as the amplitudes due to the execution of various gimbal rates. These jitter levels are compared with the gimbal jitter allocations for each instrument. Additionally, the jitter test provided insight into a readback delay that exists with the GCE. Pre-flight analysis suggested that gimbal steps scheduled to occur during the later portion of an ACS cycle would not be read during that cycle, resulting in a delay in the telemetered current gimbal position. Flight data from the jitter test confirmed this expectation. Analysis is presentehat shows the readback delay does not have a negative impact on gimbal control. The decision was made to consider implementing two of the jitter mitigation techniques on board the spacecraft: stagger stepping and the NSR. Flight data from two sets of handovers, one set without jitter mitigation and the other with mitigation enabled, were examined. The trajectory of the predicted handover was compared with the measured trajectory for the two cases, showing that tracking was not negatively impacted with the addition of the jitter mitigation techniques. Additionally, the individual gimbal steps were examined, and it was confirmed that the stagger stepping and NSRs worked as designed. An Image Quality Test was performed to determine the amount of cumulative jitter from the reaction wheels, HGAs, and instruments during various combinations of typical operations. In this paper, the flight results are examined from a test where the HGAs are following the path of a nominal handover with stagger stepping on and HMI NSRs enabled. In this case, the reaction wheels are moving at low speed and the instruments are taking pictures in their standard sequence. The flight data shows the level of jitter that the instruments see when their shutters are open. The HGA-induced jitter is well within the jitter requirement when the stagger step and NSR mitigation options are enabled. The SDO HGA pointing algorithm was designed to achieve nominal antenna pointing at the ground station, perform slews during handover season, and provide three HGA-induced jitter mitigation options without compromising pointing objectives. During the commissioning phase, flight data sets were collected to verify the HGA pointing algorithm and demonstrate its jitter mitigation capabilities.
Bourkland, Kristin L.↗
Milwaukee Urban Development: Assessing Climate Vulnerability through the InVEST Model on Urban Cooling in Milwaukee Using NASA Earth Observations
Milwaukee’s neighborhoods experience increased social, health, and ecological stress from the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect due to changing land cover and climate. Extreme urban heat disproportionately affects Black and Latine communities due to systematic disinvestment in infrastructure and lack of resources to cope with heat. Our partner, Groundwork Milwaukee, supports Environmental Justice organizing around urban heat in historically redlined neighborhoods. This study explores heat mitigation in Metcalfe Park, one such neighborhood that is a focus area for our partner, as well as across the city and county of Milwaukee. Our team utilized the Natural Capital Project’s Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Tradeoffs (InVEST) Model for urban cooling to model heat mitigation scenarios for Milwaukee in support of Groundwork’s climate resilience and heat mitigation work. The data inputs used in our analysis were Land Use Land Cover (LULC), evapotranspiration, and surface temperature derived from NASA Earth observations, as well as a biophysical table containing land cover class attributes. We developed a heat vulnerability index from American Community Survey datasets and satellite imagery to identify areas in most need of heat mitigation intervention. We found that central and northwest city areas, home to a majority of Milwaukee’s Black and Latine population, have low heat mitigation and high vulnerability to heat impacts compared to the rest of the county. We also found that tree canopy increases across scales are effective in promoting heat mitigation. Our results and end products will bolster the efforts of our partners to make decisions on heat mitigation strategies, build community resilience, and reverse legacies of environmental racism in the face of extreme heat and climate change.
urban heat island↗
Verification of the Solar Dynamics Observatory High Gain Antenna Pointing Algorithm Using Flight Data
The Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO), launched in 2010, is a NASA-designed spacecraft built to study the Sun. SDO has tight pointing requirements and instruments that are sensitive to spacecraft jitter. Two High Gain Antennas (HGAs) are used to continuously send science data to a dedicated ground station. Preflight analysis showed that jitter resulting from motion of the HGAs was a cause for concern. Three jitter mitigation techniques were developed and implemented to overcome effects of jitter from different sources. These mitigation techniques include: the random step delay, stagger stepping, and the No Step Request (NSR). During the commissioning phase of the mission, a jitter test was performed onboard the spacecraft, in which various sources of jitter were examined to determine their level of effect on the instruments. During the HGA portion of the test, the jitter amplitudes from the single step of a gimbal were examined, as well as the amplitudes due to the execution of various gimbal rates. The jitter levels were compared with the gimbal jitter allocations for each instrument. The decision was made to consider implementing two of the jitter mitigating techniques on board the spacecraft: stagger stepping and the NSR. Flight data with and without jitter mitigation enabled was examined, and it is shown in this paper that HGA tracking is not negatively impacted with the addition of the jitter mitigation techniques. Additionally, the individual gimbal steps were examined, and it was confirmed that the stagger stepping and NSRs worked as designed. An Image Quality Test was performed to determine the amount of cumulative jitter from the reaction wheels, HGAs, and instruments during various combinations of typical operations. The HGA-induced jitter on the instruments is well within the jitter requirement when the stagger step and NSR mitigation options are enabled.
Bourkland, Kristin L.↗
Common Infrastructure for Neo Scientific and Planetary Defense Missions
While defending the Earth against collisions with asteroids and comets has garnered increasing attention over the past few decades, our knowledge of the threats and methods of mitigation remain inadequate. There exists a considerable gap in knowledge regarding the size, composition, location, internal structure and formation of near earth asteroids and comets. Although estimates have been made, critical experiments have not yet been conducted on the effectiveness of various proposed mitigation techniques. Closing this knowledge gap is of interest to both the planetary defense and planetary science communities. Increased scientific knowledge of asteroid and comet composition and structure can confirm or advance current theories about the formation of the solar system. This proposal suggests a joint effort between these two communities to provide an economical architecture that supports multiple launches of characterization and mitigation payloads with minimal response time. The science community can use this architecture for characterization missions of opportunity when multiple scientific targets or targets of uncommon scientific value present themselves, while the planetary defense community would be able to fire characterization or mitigation payloads at targets that present a threat to the Earth. Both communities would benefit from testing potential mitigation techniques, which would reveal information on the internal structure of asteroids and comets. In return, the Earth would have the beginnings of a viable response system should an impact threat prove real in the near future.
Adams, Robert↗
Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V
America has begun the development of a new space vehicle system which will enable humans to return to the moon and reach even farther destinations. The system is called Constellation: it has 2 earth-launch vehicles, Ares I and Ares V; a crew module, Orion; and a lander, Altair with descent and ascent stages. Ares V will launch an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Altair into low earth orbit. Ares I will launch the Orion crew module into low earth orbit where it will rendezvous and dock with the Altair and EDS "stack". After rendezvous, the stack will contain four complete rocket systems, each capable of independent operations. Of course this multiplicity of vehicles provides a multiplicity of opportunities for off-nominal behavior and multiple mitigation options for each. Contingency operations are complicated by the issues of crew safety and the possibility of debris from the very large components impacting the ground. This paper examines contingency operations of the EDS in low earth orbit, during the boost to translunar orbit, and after the translunar boost. Contingency operations under these conditions have not been a consideration since the Apollo era and analysis of the possible contingencies and mitigations will take some time to evolve. Since the vehicle has not been designed, much less built, it is not possible to evaluate contingencies from a root-cause basis or from a probability basis; rather they are discussed at an effects level (such as the reaction control system is consuming propellant at a high rate). Mitigations for the contingencies are based on the severity of the off-nominal condition, the time of occurrence, recovery options, options for alternate missions, crew safety, evaluation of the condition (forensics) and future prevention. Some proposed mitigations reflect innovation in thinking and make use of the multiplicity of on-orbit resources including the crew; example: Orion could do a "fly around" to allow the crew to determine the condition and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.
Jaap, John↗
An Earthling to an Astronaut: Medical Challenges
Humans can travel safely into space in low Earth orbit (LEO) or to near-Earth objects if several medical, physiological, environmental, and human factors issues risks are mitigated. Research must be performed in order to set standards in these four areas, and current NASA standards are contained in the Space Flight Human System Standards volumes 1 and 2, and crew medical certification standards. These three sets of standards drive all of the clinical, biomedical research and environmental technology development for the NASA human space flight program. These standards also drive the identification of specific risks to crew health and safety, and we currently manage 65 human system risks within the human space flight program. Each risk has a specific program of research, technology development, and development of operational procedures to mitigate the risks. Some of the more important risks tat will be discussed in this talk include exposure to radiation, behavioral health due to confinement in a closed cabin, physiological changes such as loss of bone, muscle and exercise capability, reduction in immune system capability, environmental threats of maintaining an adequate atmosphere and water for drinking, avoidance of toxic or infectious material, protection of hearing, and human factors issues of equipment and task design. A nutritious and varied food supply must also be provided. All of these risks will be discussed and current strategies for mitigating these risks for long-duration human space flight. In mitigating these 65 human system risks, novel approaches to problem solving must be employed to find the most appropriate research and technology based applications. Some risk mitigations are developed internally to NASA while others are found through research grants, technology procurements, and more recently open innovation techniques to seek solutions from the global technical community. Examples and results will be presented from all of these approaches including the more recent use of prizes to stimulate innovation.
Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
Human System Risk Management for Space Flight
This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.
Davis, Jeffrey↗
Localized Triple Modular Redundancy vs. Distributed Triple Modular Redundancy on a ProASIC3E Reprogrammable FPGA
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) are used in every space application. Currently, most space flight applications use radiation hardened (RH) FPGAs, which are very expensive. There is a desire to use cheaper, commercial off the shelf reprogrammable FPGAs, which are more susceptible to radiation effects known as single-event effects (SEE). The RH parts have SEE and total ionizing dose (TID) hardened elements pre-integrated into the part. This means that the designer does not need to implement any hardening techniques while configuring the device. The COTS parts on the other hand must be mitigated by design in order to insure any form of mitigation. The design techniques this project examines concern the use of localized triple modular redundancy (LTMR) and distributed triple modular redundancy (DTMR). LTMR triples every flip flop in the device architecture while DTMR triples everything except for the global routes (clocks, resets, and enables). The testing was performed on a ProASIC3E FPGA at the Texas A&M cyclotron facility. Two design architectures were used: shift registers and counters, both with LTMR and DTMR mitigation techniques. The test results prove that DTMR is more effective at reducing SEE than LTMR. We also determined that there was not a significant difference between the use of shift registers and counters for test purposes. More testing is required to obtain additional linear energy transfer values for each architecture and mitigation technique in order to determine the most cost-effective method of SEE mitigation.
McGuffey, Alex↗
Designing Graceful Degradation into Complex Systems: The Interaction Between Causes of Degradation and the Association with Degradation Prevention and Recovery
System resilience is critical to safety in air traffic control. An important element of maintaining resilience is the ability of systems to degrade gracefully. Of the available graceful degradation research, a majority of studies have focused primarily on technological causes of degradation only, limiting an ecologically valid understanding of the causes of degradation in air traffic control, and the preventative and mitigative strategies that enable graceful degradation. The current study aimed to address this research gap by investigating causes of degradation in air traffic control across the broad categories of technology, the environment, and the human operator, and the potential interactions between these causes. 12 retired controllers participated in semi-structured interviews focused on previous experience of causes of degradation and mitigation strategies. Findings provide an understanding of causation of degradation in air traffic control, and the prevention and mitigation strategies that moderate the relationship between cause and system effect. Findings confirmed that causes appear to interact to create compound, multiple effects on overall system performance. Findings also revealed prevention and mitigation strategies utilized to moderate the effect of the cause on the system. In order to gain an ecologically valid understanding of the causes of degradation, and effective prevention or mitigation strategies, causes from multiple categories, and the interactions between them, must be identified. Findings have implications for designers of future air traffic control systems to ensure the ability of the system to gracefully degrade, as well as risk assessment and system validation processes.
human performance↗
Designing Graceful Degradation into Complex Systems: The Interaction Between Causes of Degradation and the Association with Degradation Prevention and Recovery
System resilience is critical to safety in air traffic control. An important element of maintaining resilience is the ability of systems to degrade gracefully. Of the available graceful degradation research, a majority of studies have focused primarily on technological causes of degradation only, limiting an ecologically valid understanding of the causes of degradation in air traffic control, and the preventative and mitigative strategies that enable graceful degradation. The current study aimed to address this research gap by investigating causes of degradation in air traffic control (ATC) across the broad categories of technology, the environment, and the human operator, and the potential interactions between these causes. 12 retired controllers (ATCOs - Air Traffic Control Officers) participated in semi-structured interviews focused on previous experience of causes of degradation and mitigation strategies. Findings provide an understanding of causation of degradation in air traffic control, and the prevention and mitigation strategies that moderate the relationship between cause and system effect. Findings confirmed that causes appear to interact to create compound, multiple effects on overall system performance. Findings also revealed prevention and mitigation strategies utilized to moderate the effect of the cause on the system. In order to gain an ecologically valid understanding of the causes of degradation, and effective prevention or mitigation strategies, causes from multiple categories, and the interactions between them, must be identified. Findings have implications for designers of future air traffic control systems to ensure the ability of the system to gracefully degrade, as well as risk assessment and system validation processes.
Graceful Degradation↗
Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations
As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance.
Young, Steven↗
Autonomous Assessment and Predictive Capabilities for Low-Altitude Urban Flight Operations
The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the national airspace will introduce new vehicle types, technologies, and operational paradigms for which safety must be maintained and hazards mitigated. One approach is to attempt to design for possible hazards and unsafe incidents that can occur at different phases of flight (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight) and during ground operations. Another is to mitigate safety incidents by implementing changes to policies, procedures, regulations, and design to cover personnel, equipment, and aircraft during operations. These and other techniques, not described herein, are typically conservative or adhoc in that they reduce the likelihood of risk after safety incidents have occurred. In this work, the goal is to develop a more predictive capability to monitor and mitigate risk and hazards to safety “in-time” enough for decisions to be made. In line with NASA’s Aeronautics Mission Directorate Strategic Thrust 5 [1] (In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance), the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project under which this work falls, is developing and demonstrating innovative and safety-oriented solutions that enable modernization and aviation transformation. To that effect, this work will detail data-driven efforts on the SWS project to develop a number of safety-critical services for in-time monitoring and mitigation of hazards to low-altitude flight operations. First, hazards to these operations are identified based on previous work by NASA [2,3] and others in the aerospace industry. These hazards include (i) unsafe proximity to other vehicles, property, and people on the ground, (ii) critical system failures such as communication signal/GPS loss, unexpected propulsion system degradation, engine/power failure, and (iii) operational/environmental issues such as severe weather and gusty winds. For these hazards, safety metrics, which can be quantified and assessed are defined, models to monitor and predict them are developed, and flight test data is generated to develop, validate, and test these models, considering the complex interplay of the different hazards that define them [4-6]. In addition, the uncertainty in the non-deterministic effects that cannot be modeled nor predicted and unknown unknowns that arise after design/testing and during operations must be handled in rigorous manner. As a result, for each of the developed safety metrics, their dependencies on one another are characterized and a framework for handling the uncertainties inherent in the modeling, algorithms, and measurements required for prediction is also developed [7]. To that effect, this presentation will describe the safety metrics and services already developed and underway under the System-Wide Safety project that utilize data-driven techniques for the identification of anomalies, precursors, and trends (APTs) to monitor and mitigate hazards to safety, in-time, for urban flight operations in low-altitude airspace.
Okolo, Wendy A.↗
Synthetic Failure Mode Generation for Resilience Analysis and Failure Mechanism Discovery
Traditional risk-based design processes seek to mitigate operational hazards by manually identifying possible faults and corresponding mitigation strategies—a tedious process which critically relies on the designer’s limited knowledge. Resilience-based design, on the other hand, seeks to embody generic hazard-mitigating properties in the system to mitigate unknown hazards, often by modelling the system's response to potential hazardous events. This work adapts this approach to the traditional risk-based design process to synthetically generate hazardous modes, by representing them as a unique combination of internal component health-states which can then be injected and simulated in a model of the system failure dynamics. The design process may then reduce the risk of unknown internal hazards by iteratively mitigating the effects of these modes. The performance of this approach is evaluated in a model of an autonomous rover, where cluster analysis shows that elaborating the space of synthetic faults in the drive system using this approach uncovers a wider range of possible hazardous trajectories and failure consequences within each trajectory. However, this increase in hazard information comes at a high computational expense, highlighting the need for advanced, efficient methods to search and sample the hazard space.
Simulation↗
Synthetic Failure Mode Generation for Resilience Analysis and Failure Mechanism Discovery
Traditional risk-based design processes seek to mitigate operational hazards by manually identifying possible faults and corresponding mitigation strategies—a tedious process which critically relies on the designer’s limited knowledge. Resilience-based design, on the other hand, seeks to embody generic hazard-mitigating properties in the system to mitigate unknown hazards, often by modelling the system's response to potential hazardous events. This work adapts this approach to the traditional risk-based design process to synthetically generate hazardous modes, by representing them as a unique combination of internal component health-states which can then be injected and simulated in a model of the system failure dynamics. The design process may then reduce the risk of unknown internal hazards by iteratively mitigating the effects of these modes. The performance of this approach is evaluated in a model of an autonomous rover, where cluster analysis shows that elaborating the space of synthetic faults in the drive system using this approach uncovers a wider range of possible hazardous trajectories and failure consequences within each trajectory. However, this increase in hazard information comes at a high computational expense, highlighting the need for advanced, efficient methods to search and sample the hazard space.
Simulation↗
ISS EVA80 EMU Water in the Helmet Failure and Associated Analytical Response
On March 23rd, 2022, during Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) 80 aboard the International Space Station (ISS) crew identified an 8-10-inch diameter thin film of water in the pressure bubble of the suit during repress. This launched an investigation to determine the cause of the water in the helmet as well as short- and long-term mitigation efforts to enable return to EVA as quickly as possible. The investigation analysis efforts in combination with hardware inspection and testing determined the most likely cause of the water in the helmet to be sublimator carryover as a result of high latent loading put on the system. In parallel with this investigation, efforts were being made to mitigate any future water in the helmet events. The short-term mitigation strategy developed is to install absorbent material in the pressure bubble to capture water as it enters the helmet before it can impact the astronauts. This hardware is referred to as the Helmet Absorption Band (HAB) and Helmet Absorption Pad – Extender (HAP-E). Longer-term mitigation strategies include a device to capture small water events before entering the helmet by installing a water capture system in the vent loop of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). This effort is coined the T2 Water Capture System. Additionally, developing an on-orbit sublimator challenge test which will be able to verify sublimator performance before and after EVAs. The sublimator is the hardware which condenses water vapor and removes it from the vent loop, and this hardware is referred to as the EMU Moisture Injection Test System (EMITS). Based on the investigation and short-term water capture solutions the ISS Program decided to return to nominal EVAs on October 7, 2022. With the addition of the long-term mitigation strategies, the team hopes to be able to prevent any future water in the helmet events.
Veronica Lee Pizor↗
NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process
NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.
conjunction assessment↗
NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process
NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.
conjunction assessment↗