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At least 883 records · Page 49

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗

Modifications to the runner blade to Improve Off - Design Efficiencies of Hydraulic Turbines

Hydroturbines are known to have very high efficiency at their best efficiency point (BEP). However, it has become increasing beneficial to run some hydroturbines at conditions that are significantly different than BEP. This is a direct result of volatile price fluctuations on the electric market, limited storage capabilities, and environmental rules and regulations. Running the hydroturbine at off-design conditions can result in a significant amount of residual swirl in the draft tube. The presence of this residual swirl is particularly detrimental to the performance of Francis hydroturbines since they rely on a pressure head to generate power. Previous research at The Pennsylvania State University numerically discovered that injecting water through the trailing edge of the wicket gates could change the bulk flow direction upstream of the runner blades. In this manner, the flow rate and swirl angle entering the runner blade could be altered to limit residual swirl in the draft tube. The research determined that properly tuned jets could result in a significant improvement in turbine efficiency when the hydroturbine was operating at low flow. However, this required pumping water through channels into a region of relatively high pressure. This pump requirement lessened the effectiveness of the wicket gate trailing edge injection. The concept of water jet injection was further explored in the present work. However, instead of injecting water into a region of relatively high pressure, water jets were placed at the trailing edge of the runner blades where there is a region of relatively low pressure. It was determined that, although this water jet injection improved the off-design efficiency of a low flow case by 0.8%, the hydroturbine now required a larger head in order to maintain the flow rate. The present work found no increase in efficiency for the high flow case with the added water jet injection technique.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Review of Graphite Properties Relevant to Micro-Reactor Design

Microreactors are advanced reactors that are designed to be small, scalable, and portable with up to 20 MW power. These reactors could operate independently, or as part of a microgrid, without need of a frequent refueling. Micro-reactors are designed to be deployable to provide electric power in remote locations, therefore providing greater flexibility. Several micro-reactors are under development in the US. These reactors are based on advanced gas-cooled or heat-pipe concepts. While Graphite can be found in various applications, some high-temperature reactors plan to employ Graphite in their core components due to its role as a moderator and its ability to maintain its structural integrity when subjected to elevated temperatures and high neutron fluence. Although there is significant experience with use of Graphite in nuclear applications, there are still unknowns that should be addressed. Graphite properties depend on the graphite type and affected by the fabrication procedures. Material properties are functions of the temperature and irradiation dose. The fundamental properties also affected by the oxidation environment. Therefore, in-depth understanding of graphite properties, including the effect of irradiation, oxidation and other influencing parameters are required to evaluate the design accurately. This draft aims to provide a comprehensive review of material properties for Graphite relevant to micro reactor design. For this work, two distinct grades of graphite were considered, namely IG-110 and Mersen-2114. Physical, thermal, and mechanical properties for these grades were comparatively evaluated. The properties that are discussed in this draft aim to serve as a basis for design and safety analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ASME Code Activities

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is currently assessing ASME Section III, Division 5 (2017 Edition) and accompanying Code Cases for endorsement Draft Regulatory Guide (DG-1380) and draft NUREG (2245) on the endorsement of Division 5 were issued and public comment phase completed DG-1380 places conditions in the areas of general requirements, mechanical design, metallic materials allowable stresses, and graphite materials/design of Division 5 DG-1380 is a revision to Regulatory Guide 1.87, Revision 1, 1975 (which endorsed the 159X series of ASME Code Cases, with conditions) NRC staff is currently reviewing the low-temperature and elevated temperature Alloy 617 code cases for endorsement Results of the review will be incorporated into DG-1380 and changes will be announced publicly The formal endorsement of Section III, Division 5 and accompanying code cases, with conditions, will be made through Regulatory Guide 1.87, Revision 2

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NRC Perspectives on Waste Incidental to Reprocessing Consultations and Monitoring - 13398

Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to consult with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certain non-high level waste (HLW) determinations. The NDAA also requires NRC to monitor DOE's disposal actions related to those determinations to assess compliance with NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C. The NDAA applies to DOE activities that will remain within the States of South Carolina and Idaho. DOE has chosen to, under DOE Order 435.1, engage in consultation with NRC for similar activities in the State of Washington and New York, however, the NRC has no monitoring responsibilities. In 2007, the NRC developed a draft Final Report for Interim Use entitled, NUREG-1854: NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. Department of Energy Waste Determinations. Since the law was enacted, the DOE and NRC have consulted on three waste determinations within the affected States: (1) the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) within the State of South Carolina in 2005, (2) the INTEC Tank Farm at the Idaho National Laboratory within the State of Idaho in 2006, and (3) the F Tank Farm at SRS in 2011. After the end of consultation and issuance by DOE of the final waste determination, monitoring began at each of these sites, including the development of monitoring plans. In addition to the NDAA sites, DOE has requested NRC consultation support on both individual tanks and the entire C Tank Farm at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in the State of Washington. DOE also requested consultation of waste determinations performed on the melter and related feed tanks at the West Valley site in New York that would be disposed offsite. In the next few years, NRC and DOE will consult on the last of the NDAA waste determinations for a while, the H Tank Farm waste determination at SRS. DOE may identify other activities in the future but largely NRC's role will change from doing both consultation and monitoring to being focused on monitoring activities within NDAA. DOE has identified other activities at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation that would continue consultation activities but outside of the NDAA in the future. During the past seven years of consultations and monitoring a number of lessons learned about the process, communication issues, and technical guidance have been identified. With the change in focus from reviewing initial performance assessments and draft waste determinations to long-term monitoring (e.g., individual waste tank closure, at F Tank Farm or complete tank farm closure at INTEC expected in the near future), the NRC is going to revise and update its guidance over the next few years to reflect the lessons learned and the change in focus. In addition to the lessons learned, improvements in the guidance will have to account possible rule and guidance changes underway within Part 61. This paper will discuss the initial plans, approaches, and time lines to revise the guidance within NUREG-1854, including opportunities for public involvement. (authors)

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Verification of the Accountability Method as a Means to Classify Radioactive Wastes Processed Using THOR Fluidized Bed Steam Reforming at the Studsvik Processing Facility in Erwin, Tennessee, USA - 13087

Studsviks' Processing Facility Erwin (SPFE) has been treating Low-Level Radioactive Waste using its patented THOR process for over 13 years. Studsvik has been mixing and processing wastes of the same waste classification but different chemical and isotopic characteristics for the full extent of this period as a general matter of operations. Studsvik utilizes the accountability method to track the movement of radionuclides from acceptance of waste, through processing, and finally in the classification of waste for disposal. Recently the NRC has proposed to revise the 1995 Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation (1995 BTP on CA) with additional clarification (draft BTP on CA). The draft BTP on CA has paved the way for large scale blending of higher activity and lower activity waste to produce a single waste for the purpose of classification. With the onset of blending in the waste treatment industry, there is concern from the public and state regulators as to the robustness of the accountability method and the ability of processors to prevent the inclusion of hot spots in waste. To address these concerns and verify the accountability method as applied by the SPFE, as well as the SPFE's ability to control waste package classification, testing of actual waste packages was performed. Testing consisted of a comprehensive dose rate survey of a container of processed waste. Separately, the waste package was modeled chemically and radiologically. Comparing the observed and theoretical data demonstrated that actual dose rates were lower than, but consistent with, modeled dose rates. Moreover, the distribution of radioactivity confirms that the SPFE can produce a radiologically homogeneous waste form. The results of the study demonstrate: 1) the accountability method as applied by the SPFE is valid and produces expected results; 2) the SPFE can produce a radiologically homogeneous waste; and 3) the SPFE can effectively control the waste package classification. (authors)

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Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Legacy Tank RH-TRU Sludge Processing and Compliance Strategy - 13255

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) needs to safely and efficiently treat its 'legacy' transuranic (TRU) waste and mixed low-level waste (LLW) from past research and defense activities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) so that the waste is prepared for safe and secure disposal. The TWPC operates an Environmental Management (EM) waste processing facility on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). The TWPC is classified as a Hazard Category 2, non-reactor nuclear facility. This facility receives, treats, and packages low-level waste and TRU waste stored at various facilities on the ORR for eventual off-site disposal at various DOE sites and commercial facilities. The Remote Handled TRU Waste Sludge held in the Melton Valley Storage Tanks (MVSTs) was produced as a result of the collection, treatment, and storage of liquid radioactive waste originating from the ORNL radiochemical processing and radioisotope production programs. The MVSTs contain most of the associated waste from the Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) in the ORNL's Tank Farms in Bethel Valley and the sludge (SL) and associated waste from the Old Hydro-fracture Facility tanks and other Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) tanks. The SL Processing Facility Build-outs (SL-PFB) Project is integral to the EM cleanup mission at ORNL and is being accelerated by DOE to meet updated regulatory commitments in the Site Treatment Plan. To meet these commitments a Baseline (BL) Change Proposal (BCP) is being submitted to provide continued spending authority as the project re-initiation extends across fiscal year 2012 (FY2012) into fiscal year 2013. Future waste from the ORNL Building 3019 U-233 Disposition project, in the form of U-233 dissolved in nitric acid and water, down-blended with depleted uranyl nitrate solution is also expected to be transferred to the 7856 MVST Annex Facility (formally the Capacity Increase Project (CIP) Tanks) for co-processing with the SL. The SL-PFB project will construct and install the necessary integrated systems to process the accumulated MVST Facilities SL inventory at the TWPC thus enabling safe and effective disposal of the waste. This BCP does not include work to support current MVST Facility Surveillance and Maintenance programs or the ORNL Building 3019 U-233 Disposition project, since they are not currently part of the TWPC prime contract. The purpose of the environmental compliance strategy is to identify the environmental permits and other required regulatory documents necessary for the construction and operation of the SL- PFB at the TWPC, Oak Ridge, TN. The permits and other regulatory documents identified are necessary to comply with the environmental laws and regulations of DOE Orders, and other requirements documented in the SL-PFB, Safety Design Strategy (SDS), SL-A-AD-002, R0 draft, and the Systems, Function and Requirements Document (SFRD), SL-X-AD-002, R1 draft. This compliance strategy is considered a 'living strategy' and it is anticipated that it will be revised as design progresses and more detail is known. The design basis on which this environmental permitting and compliance strategy is based is the Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI), TWPC, SL-PFB (WAI-BL-B.01.06) baseline. (authors)

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Waste-Incidental-to-Reprocessing Evaluation for the West Valley Demonstration Project Vitrification Melter - 12167

The Department of Energy (DOE) has determined that the vitrification melter used in the West Valley Demonstration Project can be disposed of as low-level waste (LLW) after completion of a waste-incidental-to-reprocessing evaluation performed in accordance with the evaluation process of DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual. The vitrification melter - which consists of a ceramic lined, electrically heated box structure - was operated for more than 5 years melting and fusing high-level waste (HLW) slurry and glass formers and pouring the molten glass into 275 stainless steel canisters. Prior to shutdown, the melter was decontaminated by processing low-activity decontamination flush solutions and by extracting molten glass from the melter cavity. Because it could not be completely emptied, residual radioactivity conservatively estimated at approximately 170 TBq (4,600 Ci) remained in the vitrification melter. To establish whether the melter was incidental to reprocessing, DOE prepared an evaluation to demonstrate that the vitrification melter: (1) had been processed to remove key radionuclides to the maximum extent technically and economically practical; (2) would be managed to meet safety requirements comparable to the performance objectives for LLW established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and (3) would be managed by DOE in accordance with DOE's requirements for LLW after it had been incorporated in a solid physical form with radionuclide concentrations that do not exceed the NRC concentration limits for Class C LLW. DOE consulted with the NRC on the draft evaluation and gave other stakeholders an opportunity to submit comments before the determination was made. The NRC submitted a request for additional information in connection with staff review of the draft evaluation; DOE provided the additional information and made improvements to the evaluation, which was issued in January 2012. DOE considered the NRC Technical Evaluation Report as well as comments received from other stakeholders prior to making its determination that the vitrification melter is not HLW, does not require permanent isolation in a geologic repository, and can be disposed of as LLW. (authors)

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Evaluation of Final Radiological Conditions at Areas of the Niagara Falls Storage Site Remediated under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program - 12184

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) methods and protocols allow evaluation of remediation and final site conditions to determine if remediated sites remain protective. Two case studies are presented that involve the Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) and associated vicinity properties (VPs), which are being remediated under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are a part of the former Lake Ontario Ordnance Works (LOOW). In response to stakeholders concerns about whether certain remediated NFSS VPs were putting them at risk, DOE met with stakeholders and agreed to evaluate protectiveness. Documentation in the DOE records collection adequately described assessed and final radiological conditions at the completed VPs. All FUSRAP wastes at the completed sites were cleaned up to meet DOE guidelines for unrestricted use. DOE compiled the results of the investigation in a report that was released for public comment. In conducting the review of site conditions, DOE found that stakeholders were also concerned about waste from the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) that was handled at LOOW. DOE agreed to determine if SPRU waste remained at that needed to be remediated. DOE reviewed records of waste characterization, historical handling locations and methods, and assessment and remediation data. DOE concluded that the SPRU waste was remediated on the LOOW to levels that pose no unacceptable risk and allow unrestricted use and unlimited exposure. This work confirms the following points as tenets of an effective long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M) program: - Stakeholder interaction must be open and transparent, and DOE must respond promptly to stakeholder concerns. - DOE, as the long-term custodian, must collect and preserve site records in order to demonstrate that remediated sites pose no unacceptable risk. - DOE must continue to maintain constructive relationships with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and state and federal regulators. After review of historical site documentation, DOE reports, and USACE radiological data, DOE concluded the following: - DOE had access to adequate documentation to evaluate site conditions at the former LOOW. This is important to confirm now, while institutional knowledge of early FUSRAP work remains available. - DOE remediated the completed VPs to conditions that are protective for unrestricted residential use. Sample and walkover gamma scan results indicate that no wastes remain that exceed cleanup criteria. - Process knowledge and field observations establish that Cs-137 is the predominant radionuclide in the KAPL waste stream. Cs-137, a strong gamma emitter, was used as an indicator for remediation of KAPL waste. Other radionuclides were present in much lower relative concentrations and were likely also removed during remediation of the VPs. - KAPL contaminants were removed during remedial activities at the former LOOW as either co-located or co-mingled with other radionuclides. - For the active VPs (VP-E, VP-E', and VP-G), results of DOE's cleanup of the accessible portions of these properties indicate that KAPL waste does not remain at concentrations greater than the DOE cleanup limit: - Inaccessible areas were not associated with historic KAPL waste handling. Therefore, it is unlikely that KAPL waste remains on the active VPs. - Because gamma activity was used by DOE during remediation/verification activities for excavation control, additional USACE cleanup of FUSRAP wastes on these properties will likely result in the remediation of any co-located residual KAPL wastes to acceptable levels or identification of KAPL waste that is not co-located. - Although USACE has not established a cleanup level for Cs-137 on the active NFSS VPs, DOE assessment and remediation data indicate that assessed Cs-137 was remediated and significant Cs-137 is unlikely to remain. Because of the low likelihood of encountering significant KAPL waste on the active NFSS VPs, additional remediation is not anticipated at these properties. - USACE assessment soil sampling results on the NFSS proper indicate that KAPL waste does not exceed the DOE cleanup level for Cs-137. USACE has not established a cleanup level for Cs-137 on NFSS proper. The USACE cleanup of FUSRAP wastes on the NFSS proper will likely result in the remediation of any co-located residual KAPL wastes or identification of KAPL waste that is not co-located. DOE is drafting a report of the investigation of KAPL waste at LOOW. The report will be released to the public for comment when the draft is complete. DOE responses to stakeholder inquiries resulted in a common understanding of site conditions and site risk. DOE expects additional interaction with stakeholders at the former LOOW as USACE completes remediation of the active VPs and the NFSS proper, and these relationships will hopefully have built trust between DOE and the stakeholders that DOE will perform its duties in an open and transparent manner that includes stakeholders as stewards for remediated FUSRAP sites. (authors)

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Experimental test plan for PWR sister rods in the high burnup spent fuel data project

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project (herein referred to as the 'project'), sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), is focused on experimentally defining the effects of long-term storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel (>45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium). The goals of the project are to provide confirmatory data for model validation and potential improvement; to provide input to future dry storage cask design; to support license renewals and new licenses for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation facilities; and to support transportation licensing for high burnup used fuel. In support of these project goals, an instrumented TN-32B bolted-lid cask at the North Anna reactor site will be loaded with intact, HBU PWR fuel assemblies (project assemblies) having four different kinds of cladding: standard Zircaloy-4, low-tin Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO, and M5. In approximately 10 years, the instrumented cask will be opened for inspection and several fuel rods from the project assemblies will be characterized. To support the project goals, the project pulled 25 'sister rods', 9 from the project assemblies and 16 from similar HBU assemblies, for characterization. The 25 sister rods are all high burnup and cover the range of cladding alloys. The 25 sister rods were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in early 2016 for detailed nondestructive and destructive examination. Examinations are intended to provide baseline data on the initial physical state of the cladding and fuel prior to the loading, drying, and long-term dry storage process. Further examinations are focused on determining the effects of temperatures encountered during and following drying. Similar tests will be performed on rods taken from the project assemblies at the end of the storage period (the 'cask rods') to identify any significant changes in the fuel rods that may have occurred during the dry storage period. Additionally, some of the sister rods will be used for separate effects testing to expand the applicability of the project data to the fleet, and to address some of the data-related gaps associated with extended storage and subsequent transportation of high burnup fuel. A draft test plan is being developed that describes the experimental work to be conducted on the sister rods. This paper summarizes the draft test plan and necessary coordination activities for the multi-year experimental program to supply data relevant to the assessment of the safety of long-term storage followed by transportation of high burnup used fuel. (authors)

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A National Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste for Iraq - 16610

Radioactive waste resulted in the past in Iraq from a number of nuclear activities and facilities all of them seriously damaged or destroyed during the Gulf war. The task of decommissioning such facilities and managing the resulting waste is being supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), and the United States (US). A national policy for radioactive waste management for Iraq has been drafted by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST); a draft strategy for radioactive waste management implementation is in preparation. In this framework, Iraq is considering locating a radioactive waste disposal facility at the Al-Tuwaitha site, near the capital city of Bagdad. In the framework of its Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation the EU has recently started a cooperation project named 'Feasibility Study, Basic Design, and Engineering Design of an Engineered Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility' for Iraq (Project IQ4.01/11). The project aims at producing the design of a repository for the radioactive waste resulting from the decommissioning activities and from the continuing use of radioisotopes in medicine and the oil and gas industry in the country. The contract for this cooperation project was awarded by the European Commission in April 2015 to the consortium of two international engineering companies, Nukem Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and DBE Technology GmbH, both of Germany, and Javys a.s., the national waste management agency of Slovakia. The planned Iraqi near-surface repository is constrained by the complex security conditions in the country. This has led to the decision of using whenever possible the Al-Tuwaitha site, were most of the waste is located, as the repository location. The project work will therefore focus on assessing whether and which part of the waste expected to result from the decommissioning and remediation activities is amenable for surface disposal in an appropriately engineered facility. In addition, careful review of the site characteristics shall provide enough elements to justify and validate the political decision of disposing of the waste in Al Tuwaitha. Thereafter, the project work will focus on the conceptual and later the engineering design of the repository. Finally, a Safety Analysis will provide the basis for regulatory decisions about the further steps for realization of the Iraqi final disposal facility. (authors)

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Decontamination and Decommissioning Activities of a Radiopharmaceuticals Production Facility - 18067

On May 2012, Best Medical Belgium S.A. (BMB), a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products located on the nuclear site of Fleurus, was declared bankrupt. According to the Belgian law, ONDRAF/NIRAS (Belgian Radioactive Waste Management Agency) was entrusted with the clean-up and decommissioning operations of the former BMB facilities, nowadays known as 'ONDRAF Site Fleurus' (ONSF). In June 2015, ONSF launched a Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) program, for which Tractebel: - Supports the definition of the clean-up and decommissioning strategies; - Drafts the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) and Safety Analysis Report (SAR) that will be submitted to FANC/AFCN (Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control) in order to get the License for decommissioning; - Drafts the technical specifications of the public tendering process related to the D and D program; - Ensures the day to-day follow-up of the D and D activities on site. Four nuclear buildings are part of the D and D activities. One of them, building 14 (B14), represents the most challenging and extensive task with the clean-up of highly contaminated areas and its further decommissioning up to the final state. This building features two cyclotrons (CGR and IBA cyclotrons) successively used to produce radioisotopes, as well as hot cells and glove boxes used for their purification and the conditioning of the final pharmaceutical product. The present paper aims at presenting the most recent development steps of the clean-up phase regarding the adaptations of existing facilities and the upcoming activities in preparation of the decommissioning activities. To allow the sorting and the treatment of the radioactive material identified in the physical and radiological inventory, several workshops have been implemented within the B14 building in order to deal with radioactive materials arising from the clean-up and D and D activities. Following the conceptual design phase, Tractebel has actively monitored the on-site activities for the construction of those workshops such as: - The modification of the civil works; - The revamping of the ventilation system; - The installation of dedicated lifting equipment and workstations equipped with cutting devices; - The assembly of a docking station for filling the radioactive packages. The removal of the activated concrete surrounding the IBA cyclotron requires the erection of a containment structure and an extension structure. The containment structure, composed of light metallic beams, is located above the cyclotron and its irradiation zones. For operational security reasons and working efficiency, the cutting process of the concrete ceilings and walls will be performed from the top inside the containment structure by means of an eight tons overhead bridge crane. Concrete blocks resulting from the cutting process will then be lifted, without any loss of containment, towards the extension zone of the nuclear zone of the IBA cyclotron for further resizing, sorting and evacuation towards the identified waste routes. To prepare this task which will be performed during the decommissioning phase, Tractebel sets up the necessary technical specifications. (authors)

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Status Update on IAEA MODARIA II Working Group 1 (Assessment and Decision Making) - 19391

During WM2018, the work being done under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129) was introduced. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics. Amongst them, Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision aiding tools to address existing exposure situations due to past practices involving naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. Specifically, this covers the development of methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for such complex sites, and includes practical demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. During 2018 WG1 participants met twice to discuss the status and plans of work being conducted by the WG. The group held its Second Interim Meeting from 7 to 11 May 2018 at the Jozef Stefan Institute (JSI) in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The objectives of the meeting were to: (1) Discuss the status of WG1 work; (2) Start preparation of the interim draft version of the MODARIA II WG1 Report (herein referred to as the 'Interim Report'); (3) Review the progress of planned data analyses, model-model comparisons, and model-data comparisons being conducted through case studies for the Tessenderlo Chemie Site in Belgium, the Zapadnoe Uranium Mill Tailings Site in Ukraine, and a Former Tin Processing Facility Site in Brazil; (4) Discuss calculations conducted for a NORM Site in China for potential addition to the WG1 case studies; (5) Report on progress on topical studies and other assignments performed to support the preparation of several sections of the Interim Report; and (6) Discuss plans for incorporating some preliminary case studies considered by MODARIA I WG1 and MODARIA I WG3. During the meeting in Slovenia, WG1 participants also visited the Zirovski vrh (RZV) Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings Site near Ljubljana. From 22 to 25 October 2018, WG1 members also participated in the MODARIA II Third Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria. The meeting facilitated analysis of the progress made so far by the seven working groups, as well as exploration of the dissemination of the results of the MODARIA II Programme through publication in scientific journals dealing with the various subject areas covered by the Programme. WG1 participants focused on the preparation of its Interim Report, and engaged in technical exchanges with the IAEA Le Trench Project on characterization, assessment, remediation and management of buried waste at legacy trench sites, as well as the To Enhance uncertainties Reduction and stakeholders Involvement Towards integrated and graded Risk management of humans and wildlife In long-lasting radiological Exposure Situations (TERRITORIES) project (https://territories.eu/). Currently, WG1 is in the process of preparing a draft report to document the results of its various case studies and special topics, and is preparing for the final Interim Meeting in May 2019 and the final Technical Meeting in October 2019, before the conclusion of the MODARIA II Program at the end of 2019. This paper will provide a status update of these activities, along with preliminary information on the WG1 report, including potential recommendations for future activities. (authors)

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EM Program Expectations on Implementation of DOE O 458: Radiation Protection of Public/Environment - 19553

DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, was issued in 2011. DOE sites were given 18 months to implement. The revised Order promulgates requirements for property clearance actions and independent verification. DOE Order 458.1 allows for preapproved authorized limits for the clearance of property. However, when property with the potential to contain residual radioactive material does not meet preapproved authorized limits, an authorized limits package must be developed. The Order contains a range of requirements for demonstrating with reasonable assurance that dose constraints are met for any actual or likely future use of the property to be released. EM has developed a draft guidance document that provides the elements of an authorized limits package. These elements are used to review all authorized limits packages that are submitted to EM. Expected elements include property description and process knowledge documentation, current and likely future use, the conceptual site model, dose modeling methodologies, specific authorized limits, dose- or concentration-based constraints, collective dose estimate to the potentially exposed population, stakeholder communications, description of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) analysis, implementation plan, evaluation of difficult to assess surfaces, and independent verification plan. The draft guidance document also provides further explanation of the desired elements of an independent verification (IV) plan. An IV plan should describe the planning phase, implementation phase, assessment phase, and decision phase of an activity. The planning phase includes scope and cost, concurrent with cleanup contractor procurement, and review and approval of site radiological survey clearance program and IV program plans. The implementation phase assures sufficient collection of data and adjustment can be made as necessary. During the assessment phase, data and reports are reviewed, and coordination between the clean-up contractor and IV personnel occurs. A decision of whether or not the clearance actions need to be altered occurs during the decision phase. IV certification that the clearance action is complete also occurs during the decision phase. Issuance of the final guidance document is meant to improve the consultation process and minimize iterative interactions with EM. Standardizing and formalizing property clearance and IV actions also helps assure that cleanup actions are transparent and sustainable for future scrutiny. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

IEEE STD. 1012 and NEI 96-07, Appendix D - Strange bedfellows? - 149

The final draft of a revision to IEEE Std. 1012-2012, 'IEEE Standard for System, Software and Hardware Verification and Validation', is expected to be approved for publication in June 2017. A draft of NEI 96-07, Appendix D, 'Supplemental Guidance for Application of 10 CFR 50.59 to Digital Modifications', has been submitted to the NRC staff for review and endorsement. What, if any, relationship exists between these two documents? How can the nuclear industry utilize the first one to help ensure success when applying the second one? NRC Regulatory Guides only endorse digital system and software related industry standards for application to safety-related systems and components, but the vast majority of digital modifications are made to non-safety related systems and components, so are these industry standards of little or no use when performing digital upgrades to non-safety related equipment? This paper answers these and other related questions and shows how application of a graded approach to verification and validation, utilizing the IEEE Std. 1012 concept of 'integrity level', can increase the likelihood of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation outcome that does not require prior NRC review and approval for non-safety related digital modifications. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Contribution to the IRPHEP handbook since Physor 2018

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) continue to preserve and evaluate integral reactor physics experiment data to support nuclear energy and technology needs. International contributions are collated within the International Handbook of Evaluated Reactor Physics Benchmark Experiments (IRPhEP Handbook). The 2021 edition of the IRPhEP Handbook now contains data for 57 unique nuclear facilities with benchmark specifications for 169 experimental series, of which four are draft evaluations. Distributed with the IRPhEP Handbook and available online is the IRPhEP Database and Analysis Tool (IDAT), allowing users to search and interrogate the data. Since Physor 2018, there have been 11 minor revisions to existing benchmark evaluations, significant revisions to two evaluations, one draft evaluation, and nine new evaluations. The corona virus pandemic has delayed international activities supporting the production of additional content for the IRPhEP Handbook. However, efforts continue for numerous endeavors to complete new reactor physics benchmark evaluations to support current and future validation needs. Those interested in serving as evaluators and/or reviewers are strongly encouraged to participate. This paper provides a summary of IRPhEP content and activities since Physor 2018. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantum-Classical Co-Design Towards Useful Quantum Computers

I am defending my PhD thesis soon at Georgia Institute of Technology. The work contained in Chapter 4, sections 1 through 5, has been done with Sandia during my internship, while everything else has been done independently and through the NDSEG fellowship program while at Georgia Tech. This approval is needed to send the draft to my committee as soon as possible before an August 5th defense date, with the goal of publishing the finished draft by August 23rd.

Miller, Nathan Eli↗