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Liquid Metal Intrusion Testing Final Report

Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) is concerned about potential interactions between a tin-antimony pewter material used for localized radiation shielding and stainless-steel containers used for storage and movement of radioactive materials when containers are subjected to elevated temperatures. The specific concern is whether pewter constituents can diffuse into grain boundaries and lead to embrittlement of the stainless steel, potentially compromising the ability of stainless steel components to maintain containment. This work will provide a qualitative and quantitative understanding of the depth of penetration of the pewter coating constituents into stainless steel when the test coupons are subjected to a range of thermal environments. The results of the present work will allow LANL to determine conditions for safely using the pewter lined containers.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

RADIOLOGICAL SEALED SOURCE LIBRARY: A NUCLEAR FORENSICS TOOL

If a terrorist were to obtain and possibly detonate a device that contained radiological material, radiological forensic analysis of the material and source capsule could provide law enforcement with valuable clues about the origin of the radiological material; this information could then provide further leads on where the material and sealed source was obtained, and the loss of control point. This information could potentially be utilized for attribution and prosecution. Analyses of nuclear forensic signatures for radiological materials are generally understood to include isotopic ratios, trace element concentrations, the time since irradiation or purification, and morphology. Radiological forensic signatures for sealed sources provide additional information that leverages information on the physical design and chemical composition of the source capsule and containers, physical markings indicative of an owner or manufacturer. Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory (INL), has been working since 2003 to understand signatures that could be used to identify specific source manufacturers. These signatures include the materials from which the capsule is constructed, dimensions, weld details, elemental composition, and isotopic abundances of the radioactive material. These signatures have been compiled in a library known as the Argonne/INL Radiological Sealed Source Library. Data collected for the library has included open-source information from vendor catalogs and web pages; discussions with source manufacturers and touring of production facilities (both protected through non-disclosure agreements); technical publications; and government registries such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Sealed Source and Device Registry.

National Nuclear Forensics Library↗

Laboratory-Scale Melter Systems for Simulated and Real AP-105 Tank Waste - 19301

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant is being constructed to vitrify the nuclear waste stored in underground tanks on the Hanford Site. Through this conversion process, waste components become partitioned into one of two product streams: glass and off-gas, including condensate. A small-scale melter system is appropriate for analyzing the waste-to-glass process because it does not require the high volumes of input waste or resource commitment of a large-scale melter system while providing dynamic information that can be difficult to determine from batch reactions in a crucible system. A continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM) was sized to collect the relevant process and chemical information from obtainable volumes of Hanford tank waste and designed to operate with a continuous feeding process while periodically pouring glass product and collecting off-gas. Two CLSMs were constructed: one in a non-radioactive environment for processing waste simulants and another in a fume hood capable of handling radioactive material for processing actual Hanford tank waste. Multiple waste simulants were first tested in the non-radioactive CLSM to determine the processability and desired operating window for actual tank waste. About 12 liters of real waste from Hanford tank 241-AP-105 were received, filtered, and ion exchanged for removal of Cs-137. This quantity of waste was vitrified into 9.5 kg of glass product over the course of ∼15 hours of feeding to the CLSM. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Characterization and Remediation of the Hanford 618-10 Burial Ground Vertical Pipe Units - 17121

The 618-10 Burial Ground is approximately 148 m by 143 m (485 feet by 470 feet) and consists of 12 trenches and 94 Vertical Pipe Units (VPU's). It is located approximately 8.1 km (5 miles) north of Richland, Washington in the 600 Area of the Hanford Site. The 618-10 Burial Ground received low- to high-activity waste (e.g., fission products and some plutonium-contaminated waste). Most of the waste originated at the 300 Area laboratory facilities. Lower activity radioactive material and shielded drums were disposed in trenches, while laboratory wastes with higher levels of radiation were disposed in Vertical Pipe Units (VPUs). There are different variants of VPUs. Some VPUs are simply corrugated culverts or standard pipes, 36 cm (14 in.) diameter and 3.1 m to 4.6 m (10- to 15-ft) long, buried vertically. Some VPUs are carbon steel pipes 25 to 61 cm (10 to 24 in.) in diameter and up to 4.6 m (15 ft) in length. The final design of the VPUs is 56 cm (22-in) diameter, 4.4 m (14.4 ft) long waste receptacles constructed by welding five 208 L (55-gallon) bottomless drums together end-to-end and burying them vertically, separated by approximately 3.1 m (10 feet) on center in rows approximately 7.6 m (25 feet) apart. The 618-10 Burial Ground contains approximately 94 VPUs. Historical documents indicate that shielding materials (e.g., concrete or soil) may have been added to the VPUs to reduce dose rates over the openings, and that each VPU was backfilled with sand and capped with concrete at the end of its service life. Historical documents also indicate that the VPUs were covered with approximately 0.6 m (2-ft) of soil when they were closed, and an additional 0.6 m (2-ft) of topsoil was later added for surface stabilization. In general, the process for VPU remediation was as follows: - Installed four cone penetrometers (CPTs) around the exterior of each individual VPU and sent radiation detection probes down the interior of the CPTs to get initial radiation data in order to calculate the overall curie content and create maps showing the dose rate distribution throughout the VPU. - Removed the CPTs and installed a 122 cm (48-in) diameter, 1.3 cm (0.5-in) thick steel over-casing using a vibrating hammer suspended from a crane that encompassed the VPU with some surrounding soil. - Using a Bauer BG-30 drill rig with a specifically designed augur bit and a specially designed confinement system the auger process was used to stabilize and size reduce the contents. - Once the auger reached a depth of 8.5 m (28 feet) the BG-30 drill stem was separated and additional characterization was completed by sending a radiation probe down the center of the drill stem to gather radiological data. - Once auguring and characterization was completed the waste was removed using a specially designed extended clamshell retrieval bucket and placed into individual 2.7 m x 1.5 m x 1.2 m (9-ft x 5-ft x 4-ft) metal boxes. - After the waste was placed into the metal waste boxes a low strength grout was added and the grout and waste material was mixed using a large rake device attached to an excavator. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Update on Development of a U.S. Rail Transport Capability for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste - 19092

This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating and testing prototype railcars that will comply with the safety standard S-2043. This standard was developed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) specifically for railcars used to transport High-Level Radioactive Material (HLRM). AAR defines the term HLRM to include both spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). DOE is in the process of developing and testing prototype railcars that will satisfy Standard S-2043. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Update on Development of a U.S. Rail Transport Capability for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste - 20466

This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating and testing prototype railcars that will comply with the safety standard S-2043. This standard was developed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) specifically for railcars used to transport High-Level Radioactive Material (HLRM). AAR defines the term HLRM to include both spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). DOE is in the process of developing and testing prototype railcars that will satisfy Standard S-2043. This is a technical paper that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract governs the obligations of the parties, and this paper in no manner supersedes, overrides, or amends the Standard Contract. This paper reflects technical work which could support future decision making by the Department of Energy (DOE or Department). No inferences should be drawn from this paper regarding future actions by DOE, which are limited both by the terms of the Standard Contract and a lack of Congressional appropriations for the Department to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act including licensing and construction of a spent nuclear fuel repository. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Excavation and Repackaging of Retrievably-Stored, Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Between 1972 and 1981, remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) wastes generated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) were retrievably stored through shallow land burial in a series of 22 earthen trenches in the northern portion of Solid Waste Storage Area 5 in ORNL's Melton Valley. A Dispute Resolution Agreement signed by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation and DOE specified removal of the buried (stored) waste to allow for repackaging, processing, and offsite disposal at an appropriate facility. A total of 204 concrete casks were successfully retrieved and over-packed from the 22-trench area between November 2004 and June 2006. Wastes originally stored in boxes, drums or placed without packaging was also recovered and repackaged. The repackaged wastes were transported to a nearby temporary storage facility at ORNL pending processing at DOE's Transuranic Waste Processing Center. In summary: The objective of the MVTRU Waste Retrieval Project was to satisfy conditions of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. This remedial action consisted of removal of all buried waste containers and loose items from the 22-trench area. The TRU waste casks were placed in steel overpacks, while other waste boxes, drums, and loose items were placed in steel drums or boxes. The over-packed waste was placed in an approved staging area until it can be accepted for treatment at the ORNL TRU Waste Processing Facility and ultimately disposed. A total of 204 casks were indicated by historical records to have been buried in the 22-Trench area, and 204 casks were found and over-packed during the retrieval operations. The historical records also indicated that some 18 steel or wood boxes, 12 steel drums, and approximately 15 m{sup 3} of loose waste were buried in the trenches. The contents of approximately 12 boxes, 3 drums, and approximately the expected 15 m{sup 3} quantity of loose waste were retrieved and over-packed. One significant deviation from the actions described in the Dispute Resolution Agreement occurred during the excavation of Trench 13. Pyrophoric material was encountered and a reaction occurred, causing a brief flame in the excavator bucket. No personnel contamination or radioactive material release occurred. The waste buried in Trench 13, consisting of approximately eight 208-liter (55-gal) drums and one 114-liter (30-gal) drum, was stabilized in-place due to risks associated with the retrieval and handling of this pyrophoric material. The Dispute Resolution Agreement completion date was revised to allow this material to remain stabilized in place as interim storage until a disposition path is established. The baseline schedule called for site mobilization and preparation to begin in November 2003, soil excavation and waste retrieval to be completed by March 2006, and site restoration and demobilization to be complete by April 2006, with the draft letter of completion submitted in May 2006. Soil excavation and waste retrieval were completed in March 2006 as planned, and no significant deviations to the baseline schedule were encountered. (authors)

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Insulation Activation and Contamination in Low-Power Experiments

Among the diverse advanced nuclear reactor concepts being developed are designs that expect to operate at much higher temperatures than conventional light-water reactors, and therefore require alternative materials for components capable of withstanding these extreme temperatures. Insulation is one such component where alternative high-temperature industrial composites are being considered. Low-power experiments can provide an opportunity for advancing our understanding of material behavior under irradiation; however, these experiments are not without occupational hazards. The focus of this paper is the potential for activation of insulating composites when exposed to neutron fluence during reactor experiments, and to discuss the subsequent contamination of the testing area. This paper will also discuss practical measures for preventing the creation and inhalation of activated particulate matter (i.e., dust), such as engineering and administrative controls and personal protective equipment. This paper evaluates the suitability of several insulation materials for use in reactor experiments based on their activation from neutron irradiation. The materials considered are Pyrogel XTE by Aspen Aerogel, Cerablanket and Kaowool by Morgan Advanced Materials, Thermo-12 Gold by Johns Manville, and Maxsil CF6-2000 by McAllister Mills. Although these materials are not yet widely used in the nuclear industry, they are common in other industries due to their thermal insulating properties. These materials produce dust while handling that can pose health and safety hazards, which could be further exacerbated by activation. The analysis presented in this paper utilizes a deterministic method developed to predict the activation source term of the provided insulation materials. The method calculates the atomic density of each element within the composites and simulates their exposure to a specified neutron flux density representative of low power experimental conditions. During the irradiation phase and throughout the extensive cooling period, neutron absorptions and nuclear decays are tracked for relevant isotopes. The residual activity within each composite is then assessed to identify the material with the lowest potential radiological hazard to workers. Dust will be created during installation and removal of insulating materials and may also be generated during the experiment. Contamination of surrounding surfaces due to dispersion is highly likely unless preventative measures are taken. The results of this analysis are used to estimate an internal dose from inhalation of activated dust, which is significantly lower than the allowable whole-body dose. However, the risk of internal exposure may increase if the dust becomes a transport vector for nuclear material. The goals of this paper are to enhance the understanding of the potential activation and contamination hazards from the use of these insulating materials in low-power nuclear experiments and to foster safer work environments through informed decision-making and strategic planning. This work ultimately contributes to a broader understanding of how new non-nuclear materials for advanced reactors impact the radiological safety of co-located workers, helping to ensure the responsible management of radioactive materials during installation and decommissioning activities.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

Methods of Preventing the Spread of Zinc Contamination During Vacuum Processing

Radioactive zinc, 65 Zn, was detected after a thermal vacuum process that extracted a desired product from articles out of a commercial light water reactor. While the facility is designed to handle radioactive materials, the location of the 65 Zn was in an area that is not designed for gamma emitting contaminants. A series of experiments were conducted to entrain the contaminant in an easily replaceable trap within the process piping. The experiments were conducted with increasing levels of complexity. Initially a simple apparatus was developed to determine the effect of substrate temperature on the vapor capture, this was followed by experiments to determine the effect of filter pore size on pumping and trapping, finally the interactive effects of both pore size and temperature were evaluated. The testing was conducted on a system that used a roughing vacuum pump using model and prototypic materials. It was determined that heating the substrate to nominally 200°C resulted in effective trapping on the model as well as prototypic material.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Release of Cesium-137 Corrective Action Plan

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) was developed by a team chartered by John Sarrao, Deputy Director for Science, Technology, and Engineering (DDSTE), to review and respond to the findings of the Joint National Nuclear Security Administration/Triad National Security (NNSA/Triad) Investigation Team (JIT) Joint Investigation Report for the “Sealed Source Recovery at the University of Washington Harborview Training and Research Facility Results in Release of Cesium-137 on May 2, 2019,” dated March 30, 2020. On May 2, 2019, International Isotopes, Inc. (INIS), a subcontractor to Triad National Security, LLC, inadvertently breached a sealed cesium-137 source at the University of Washington (UW), Harborview Medical Center Research and Training (HRT) building in downtown Seattle while attempting to recover the source for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP). The source breach resulted in contamination of personnel and the HRT building, as well as a release of radioactive material to the environment

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Practical Thermal Evaluation Methods For HAC Fire Analysis In Type B Radiaoactive Material (RAM) Packages

Title 10 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR Part 71.73) requires that Type B radioactive material (RAM) packages satisfy certain Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) thermal design requirements to ensure package safety during accidental fire conditions. Compliance with thermal design requirements can be met by prototype tests, analyses only or a combination of tests and analyses. Normally, it is impractical to meet all the HAC using tests only and the analytical methods are too complex due to the multi-physics non-linear nature of the fire event. Therefore, a combination of tests and thermal analyses methods using commercial heat transfer software are used to meet the necessary design requirements. The authors, along with his other colleagues at Savannah River National Laboratory in Aiken, SC, USA, have successfully used this 'tests and analyses' approach in the design and certification of several United States' DOE/NNSA certified packages, e.g. 9975, 9977, 9978, 9979, H1700, and Bulk Tritium Shipping Package (BTSP). This paper will describe these methods and it is hoped that the RAM Type B package designers and analysts can use them for their applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Passive neutron coincidence counting with plastic scintillators for the characterization of radioactive waste drums

The quantification of radioactive material is essential in the fields of safeguards, criticality control of nuclear processes, dismantling of nuclear facilities and components, or radioactive waste characterization. The Nuclear Measurement Laboratory (LMN) of CEA is involved in the development of time-correlated neutron detection techniques using plastic scintillators. Usually, 3He proportional counters are used for passive neutron coincidence counting owing to their high thermal neutron capture efficiency and gamma insensitivity. However, the global {sup 3}He shortage in the past few years has made these detectors extremely expensive. In addition, contrary to {sup 3}He counters for which a few tens of microseconds are needed to thermalize fast neutrons, in view to maximize the {sup 3}He(n,p){sup 3}H capture cross section, plastic scintillators are based on elastic scattering and therefore the light signal is formed within a few nanoseconds, correlated pulses being detected within a few dozen- or hundred nanoseconds. This time span reflects fission particles time of flight, which allows reducing accordingly the duration of the coincidence gate and thus the rate of random coincidences, which may totally blind fission coincidences when using {sup 3}He counters in case of a high (α,n) reaction rate. However, plastic scintillators are very sensitive to gamma rays, requiring the use of a thick metallic shield to reduce the corresponding background. Cross talk between detectors is also a major issue, which consists on the detection of one particle by several detectors due to elastic or inelastic scattering, leading to true but undesired coincidences. Data analysis algorithms are tested to minimize cross-talk in simultaneously activated detectors. The distinction between useful fission coincidences and the correlated background due to cross-talk, (α,n) and induced (n,2n) or (n,n'γ) reactions, is achieved by measuring 3-fold coincidences. The performances of a passive neutron coincidence counting system for radioactive waste drums using plastic scintillators have been studied using the Monte Carlo radiation transport code MCNPX-PoliMi v2.0 coupled to data processing algorithms developed with ROOT data analysis software. In addition to the correlated background, accidental coincidences are taken into account in the simulation by randomly merging pulses from different calculations with fission and (α,n) sources. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Recent upgrades and new scientific infrastructure of MARIA research reactor, Otwock-Swierk, Poland

The MARIA reactor is open-pool type, water and beryllium moderated. It has two independent primary cooling systems: fuel and pool cooling system. Each fuel assembly is cooled down separately in pressurized channels with individual performances characterization. The fuel assemblies consist of five layers of bent plates or six concentric tubes. Currently it is one of the most powerful research reactors in Europe with operation availability at least up to 2030. Its nominal thermal power is 30 MW. It is characterized by high neutron flux density: up to 3x10{sup 14} n cm{sup -2} s{sup -1} in case of thermal neutrons, and up to 2x10{sup 13} n cm{sup -2} s{sup -1} in case of fast neutrons. The reactor is operated for ca. 4000 h per year. The reactor facility is equipped with fully equipped three hot cells with shielding up to 10{sup 15} Bq. Adjacent to the reactor facility, the radio-pharmaceutics plant (POLATOM) and Material Research Laboratory are located. They are equipped with a number of hot cells with instrumentation. The transport system of radioactive materials from reactor facility to Material Research Laboratory is available. During 2014 the MARIA reactor has been operated with three different types of fuel the same time: previous 36% enriched fuel, and two types of new LEU fuels. In the meantime, molybdenum irradiation programme has been developed. Maria is a multifunctional research tool, with a notable application in production of radioisotopes, radio-pharmaceutics manufacturing (ca. 600 TBq/y), {sup 99}Mo for medical scintigraphy (ca. 6000 TBq/y), neutron transmutation doping of silicon single crystals, wide scientific research based on neutron beams utilization. From the beginning MARIA reactor was intended for loop and fuel testing research activities. Currently it is used mostly as material testing and irradiation facility and for that reason it has wide experimental capabilities. There are eight horizontal irradiation channels from among whom six of them are equipped with instrumentation for condensed matter physics research: - H3 - spectrometer and diffractometer with double monochromator; - H4 - small angle scattering spectrometer; - H5 - polarized neutrons spectrometer; - H6, H7 - two 3-axial crystal neutron spectrometers; - H8 - neutron radiography stand. For two horizontal channels are ongoing exploitation programs: - H2 - station with epithermal neutron beam produced in uranium converter is being developed. Intelligent converter will be installed on the periphery of reactor core. The intensity of the beam will be at the level 2x10{sup 9} n cm{sup -2}s{sup -1} what makes the beam unique in the Europe. - H1 - special pneumatic horizontal mail is being developed for irradiation material samples in the vicinity of the core i.e. in the distal part of the H1 channel. The number of neutron irradiation facilities in MARIA reactor is increasing every year. Numerous of thermal neutron irradiation channels including fast hydraulic rabbit system and large size channels for fast neutron irradiation are used routinely. Recently new in-pile facility with ITER-like neutron energy spectrum for 14 MeV neutron irradiation has been constructed. Taking into account its performance and ability of almost incessant operation the facility appears as one of the most powerful 14 MeV neutron sources. The facility shall be used for material research connected with thermonuclear devices (ITER) and 4. generation nuclear reactors. The system of independent fuels channels used in MARIA reactor appear to be very flexible and very convenient to be used as irradiation channels for uranium targets for {sup 99}Mo production. Currently, MARIA reactor supplies ca. 18% world production of {sup 99}Mo. The MARIA reactor research activities are still extended. The current scientific projects are connected e.g. with silicon neutron transmutation doping, in-pile gamma heating measurements, French calculation codes implementation (TRIPOLI4, APOLLO2). The horizontal neutron beams utilization is also developed. The MARIA reactor, due to its primary application connected with loop and fuel testing, is very convenient for testing the nuclear instrumentation, control and measurement systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Idaho National Laboratory’s Mobile Hot Cell Transportation: Engineering Solutions for Global Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources.

Title: Idaho National Laboratory’s Mobile Hot Cell Transportation: Engineering Solutions for Global Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources. Abstract: The Mobile Hot Cell (MHC), currently under development by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP), is designed to help international partners meet the unique challenges of end-of-life radioactive material management. The MHC will provide a critical resource for countries that require assistance securing and disposing of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) and orphaned sources in challenging environments, allowing these sources to be secured against misuse and nefarious activities. The MHC is a rapidly deployable system for conditioning and preparing end-of-life radioactive sources for transportation or storage. It is designed to handle sources of up to 1,000 Ci Co-60 equivalent while maintaining full radiological and biological containment. It will be deployable within 48 hours of an alert, making it ideal for emergency situations. The MHC features an operational suite for control, support racks for electronics, pneumatics, and welding systems, and a modular robust steel structure providing radiological shielding and internal robotic support. This design allows configurations for multiple device types to be conditioned and the ability to safely manage routine issues such as leaking or damaged sources. The MHC has been designed with the transportation challenges of rapid deployment to difficult environments in mind. The system weighs approximately 150,000 pounds, with individual systems breaking down into pieces not exceeding 20,000 pounds. Components are to be transportable on standard 20ft ISO containers, with shielding shells on 20ft flat racks. It is estimated that a total of eight containers and flat racks will be required. The use of 20ft containers, as opposed to 40ft containers, minimizes the impact on less developed road infrastructures, enabling the MHC to be positioned in constrained environments such as hospital parking lots. The system’s modularity also allows for deployment using smaller equipment, such as a 10-ton boom truck or forklift, which is crucial given the potential logistical challenges in different countries. This transportation strategy, evaluated in collaboration with Utah State University, ensures the MHC can be deployed via ground, rail, sea, or air, addressing the primary concern of international transport logistics.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Decommissioning Demonstration - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station South Yard Facility - 16544

Following the decision to retire Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Southern California Edison (SCE) staffed a multi-discipline team to investigate decommissioning best practices. SCE also tasked this team with reducing the overall radiological footprint and radioactive material inventory in the near term. The SCE decommissioning activities investigation team targeted projects at the facility which could reduce the source term and risk, and investigate management approaches with decommissioning contractors. SCE, through this team, contracted EnergySolutions to provide a solution for processing and disposal of equipment and materials at a storage facility south of the plant. The South Yard Facility included offices, instrument repair facilities, a large machine shop, outage equipment storage, waste management facilities, and decontamination facilities. SCE contracted EnergySolutions to manage, supervise, plan, and provide labor for the disposition of the legacy waste stored at the South Yard to include the Radioactive Equipment/Materials Storage (REMS) Pad and South Yard Facility. Under the Contractor Work Authorization (CWA), SCE authorized EnergySolutions to consolidate, package, transport, and dispose of the Low Level Radioactive Waste (Class A) and Mixed Low Level Radioactive Waste from the aforementioned areas. The scope also included disposition of material that was expected to be free from radiological contamination, but required management as a hazardous waste. The legacy waste consisted of an inventory of containers designated as trash provided by SCE, as well as, all materials stored within the rooms of the SYF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gamma Equipment System Requirements by Application

This document outlines a set of requirements for gamma sensitive systems applied to three different applications: (1) homeland security (search and identification); (2) in-situ quantification; and (3) quantification in a material characterization laboratory. These three applications represent a range of activities that a country might use for locating, identifying, and quantifying radioactive material. These applications require increasing accuracy and system advancements, and skill levels. This document considers systems with various detector types and are characterized by their energy resolution: (1) low resolution (e.g., NaI(Tl) scintillation) and (2) higher resolution (e.g., high-purity germanium [HPGe] solid state) systems. The higher resolution systems also include cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and only mechanically cooled HPGe systems are considered. These detectors and their associated acquisition hardware and analysis software afford a broad range of capabilities with corresponding ranges of complexity, maintainability, and cost. Ultimately, the equipment must meet the measurement goals of the application, and compliance with a given list of hardware specifications does not in itself guarantee meeting those goals. Examples of typical performance objectives for international safeguards applications are documented in International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials (IAEA, STR-368, November 2010). Selection of the detector type best suited to a specific application is often a compromise between “state of the art” or best available option and what is practical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Expanded Content Envelope For The Model 9977 Packaging

An Addendum was written to the Model 9977 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging adding a new content consisting of DOE-STD-3013 stabilized plutonium dioxide materials to the authorized Model 9977 contents. The new Plutonium Oxide Content (PuO{sub 2}) Envelope will support the Department of Energy shipment of materials between Los Alamos National Laboratory and Savannah River Site facilities. The new content extended the current content envelope boundaries for radioactive material mass and for decay heat load and required a revision to the 9977 Certificate of Compliance prior to shipment. The Addendum documented how the new contents/configurations do not compromise the safety basis presented in the 9977 SARP Revision 2. The changes from the certified package baseline and the changes to the package required to safely transport this material is discussed.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Influence of Aqueous Dispersivity on Transport of Radiological Material at LANL MDA G - 20450

Aqueous dispersivity is a phenomenon by which a solute moving in groundwater mixes with water that does not contain the solute and becomes diluted. Solutes take paths of varying lengths through pore networks or experience slower velocities due to interactions with pore walls. Aqueous dispersivity leads to breakthrough curves with earlier arrival than expected in purely advective systems and persistent 'tails,' or late-arriving, dilute concentrations of the solute. Dispersivity can be longitudinal (in the direction of flow) or transverse (orthogonal to flow). LANL has disposed of radioactive material at Material Disposal Area (MDA) G since the late 1950's. Most of the disposed materials at MDA G are low-level waste (LLW), but other types of radioactive wastes are disposed or stored at the site. For example, there is a collection of remote-handled transuranic waste (RH-TRU) waste in 33 shafts, which were intended to be stored retrievably. Aqueous-phase radionuclides included in models of contaminant transport at MDA G are subject to dispersive processes in porous media of the vadose zone and saturated zone. To model dispersivity at MDA G probabilistically, we created site-specific distributions of aqueous dispersivity. First, we performed a comprehensive review of peer-reviewed publications, reports from other performance assessments of MDA G, and documentation from sites that were considered similar based on expert opinion, such as Yucca Mountain. Data were included from a wide range of sources, so that distributions developed based on the data reflect the current state of knowledge in properties of the subsurface environment. Data were grouped based on value type (e.g., determined via experiment or used in a different model), rock type, zone type (saturated or unsaturated), and site, and were weighted in the distributions according to their relevance to the site and zone type. We combined Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping techniques to produce approximate distributions of mean aqueous dispersivity. Distributions of dispersivity for saturated and unsaturated zone transport are differentiated by data weight and the length scales over which transport occurs. We find that underestimating or disregarding transverse dispersivity may lead to overstating simulated well capture in the saturated zone at MDA G. Neglecting transverse dispersivity is a common assumption due in part to use of one-dimensional transport models that do not consider solute spreading orthogonal to flow. Also, we find that variability in longitudinal dispersivity is associated with substantial travel time alterations in the MDA G unsaturated zone and in simulated contaminant breakthrough times at a downstream observation plane in the MDA G saturated zone. Finally, at large scales (>1000 m), a linear trend between the dispersivity coefficient and length over which transport occurs may overestimate the dispersivity coefficient. Future modeling work with application to solute spreading could include interacting advective and diffusive zones in the highly fractured basalt below MDA G. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗