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The goal of this project is to develop high-resolution decay energy spectroscopy (DES) of actinides using magnetic microcalorimeters (MMCs). This requires testing different techniques to fully enclose a source inside an absorber and coupling it to an MMC with optimized energy resolution and speed. The goal is to develop DES with MMCs to allow its transfer to the IAEA Nuclear Materials Laboratory (NML).
Quantum sensing has the potential to provide ultrasensitive measurements of physical phenomenon. Unlike quantum computing, quantum sensing is available now, though in general at research laboratories. A notable commercially-available quantum sensing device is the ubiquitous Superconducting Quantum Interference Device (SQUID), which can measure faint magnetic fields such as found in the human brain. Quantum sensing is used for direct measurement of environmental phenomenon, such as electromagnetic fields and accelerations, which then are used for certain applications. For example, quantum sensing of accelerations is useful for Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) applications. It is not clear, however, how quantum sensing can be useful for nuclear safeguards. This report provides first a background in quantum sensing, followed by a survey of potential safeguards utilizations of quantum sensing. Several potential safeguards applications are identified and explored.
When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.
The MRSt spectrometer is a magnetic spectrometer designed for momentum analyzing deuterons (10.7 – 14.2 MeV). The MRSt spectrometer will be attached to the target chamber of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNS), Livermore, California. This document defines the technical requirements for the design, analysis, fabrication, inspection, testing and delivery of the complete set of magnets, vacuum chambers, and accessories to become part of the spectrometer. The interface issues, including the support structures, need to be defined later by LLNS and the vendor, which will require time and dialog before a solution can be found. This “Specification Report for the MRSt-S System”, January 19, 2020 is based on and supersedes an earlier version “Specification Report for the MRSt-S System”, May 1, 2019 The vendor shall check these specifications for possible conflicts between statements in this document. Possible solutions to any such conflicts should be included in the proposal submitted by the vendor. The proposal shall also include the delivery FOB destination LLNS.
A new measurement at LANSCE combined DANCE and NEUANCE at the end of 2020 and 2021. The 233 U material was provided by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (December 2020).Two samples of 10 mg and 20 mg of 233 U have been prepared at LANL by Evelyn M. Bond (December 2020). The experiment was performed in December 2020 and June/July 2021. Data analysis is ongoing to extract capture data knowing fission. LANL is looking forward to delivering the capture/fission ratio from (1-300) keV by the end of the FY2022.
The straight line geometric path distribution of different shapes is a fundamental parameter of any a detector sensitive and in the presence of high energy charged particles such as galactic cosmic rays (GCRs). Knowledge of the straight line path distribution can yield first estimates of the expected energy distribution due to minimum ionizing particles. This predicted shape provides a valuable interpretation tool of spectra of particles that are unlikely to stop in a detector and may present a background or desired signal. These quantities have been calculated many times before including analytically, Coleman (1973), and even in Geant4 software, (Agostinelli, Allison et al. 2003, Santin, Ivanchenko et al. 2005). For this work we utilize the Rapid Adaptable Multi-threaded Particle and Radiation Transport (RAMPART) simulation framework and collect some common shapes all with the same volume to serve as a reference of path lengths and instructions manual for computing other shapes as desired.
Critical assembly measurement and operations are crucial to the development of benchmark data. Knowledge of the prompt neutron lifetime informs on the state of the system’s neutron spectrum. Rossi-alpha analysis can give us time-dependent information on the system. Teflon was selected, via genetic algorithm, as a moderator to target the URR in uranium for CURIE. Rossi-alpha measurements of the assembly's approach to critical using He-3 detectors estimated the prompt neutron decay constant (α) at delayed critical. α values of several subcritical measurements were then used to predict the α value at delayed critical.
Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) produces high yield, high bandwidth signals that must be sent over large distances. A three phase Mach Zehnder modulator system helps resolve many of the issues faced with measuring these signals. This setup requires a three step reconstruction program. The testing results from OMEGA show this setup was successful and is ready for fielding at Inertial Confinement Fusion, including the National Ignition Facility (NIF).
The experiment was performed at the end of the CY20 runcycle and CY21. A total of 20 days were measured using the 20 mg sample, and the 10 mg sample was placed in the beam for a total of 2 days. The rest of the beam time was used to measure radioactive γ sources for energy calibration, background measurements, and tests to define the 233 U windows required during the data taking.
A great deal of progress has been made in improving the data reduction experience for the SANS instruments at the SNS and HFIR at ORNL. The existing data reduction toolset, drtsans, makes it possible to integrate data analysis and visualization tools into the data reduction scripts, thereby providing new opportunities for more automated data processing for users of the SNS and HFIR. Here, the first set of tools developed is described with usage examples.
The evolution of philosophy and computations in the International Data Center (IDC) related to aerosol samples have had profound impacts on the number of recorded detections in the network since routine operations began in 2000. Key decisions from policymakers have been the list of triggering radionuclides, the scheme for categorizing these into interest levels 1-5, and an algorithm for determining when an anthropogenic isotope is seen so often that it is no longer interesting, known as the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). These are described in the Operations Manual of the IDC. Key parameters that are controlled by the IDC but for which the IDC receives occasional input from policymakers include the constants in EWMA and the peak significance threshold for individual gamma rays, the latter of which directly leads to determination of the presence or absence of a radionuclide in a sample. There are also changes in computations which the IDC makes and informs policy makers about, such as changes in how background is computed, which could also affect the ease of detecting a peak – real or false. Rather than focus on the quantitative changes due to computation changes, this work records some thinking on how isotopes and peak significance levels were chosen, and the resulting detections seen over 18 years during the buildup of the International Monitoring System (IMS). These detections are considered on a global scale to try to determine the relative impact on monitoring, and in some cases, the nature of their existence. Repeated detections of 131I and 133I are the most troublesome, but they are not so frequent to be a major problem for the Verification Regime. These detections could probably be handled adequately using scientific methods currently under development for xenon backgrounds. It is also somewhat problematic that top-level analysis of aerosol backgrounds has not been reported previous to this. The steep increase in the rate of detections after 2016 are a concern, either in the actual backgrounds or from changes in the calculations methods used to generate the Reviewed Radionuclide Report (RRR.) Final conclusions of the authors are that the computational stability of the RRR is very important. With computational stability, changes can be usefully analyzed as being due to changes in radioactivity in Earth’s atmosphere This report is a distillation into text of a talk given in the Radionuclide Experts Group (RNEG) in Vienna during Working Group B (WGB) in February of 2019. This report does not directly contain any IDC data, only summaries by year, or by isotope, or by location. No specific IDC detection by time, location, or isotope is included.
Nuclear forensics is a key part of the nuclear security strategy for the United States and the international community. The NACS Division is central to the leadership role that LLNL has had in nuclear forensics over the past 25 years. Our current nuclear forensic program includes conducting R&D on provenance and attribution signatures, collaborating with international partners, training the next generation of nuclear forensic experts, developing test materials for verification and validation exercises, and providing expert advice to national and international policy makers. Key to our success in these areas has been the strong and continuing involvement in nuclear forensic casework obtained through law enforcement and intelligence channels as well as our outstanding analytical capabilities. NACS must continue to conduct forward-thinking R&D in nuclear forensics that supports operational programs and addresses intelligence gaps. To maintain leadership in nuclear forensics, we must attract, develop, and retain the best talent. The NNSA has a central leadership role in developing educational initiatives for nuclear forensics. In concert with the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute, the NACS Division will continue to participate in all nuclear forensic educational initiatives (undergraduate, graduate, postdoctoral) and incorporate LLNL’s D&I vision into its student and postdoc recruitment efforts. We will continue to build formal relationships with key academic partners and institutions with active and emerging nuclear forensic research interests. We will also strengthen relationships with NNSA DNN and SSAA funded university consortia (e.g. NSSC, ACE, CNEC, CVT, ETI, MTV), helping them conduct research of interest and relevance to nuclear forensics, while at the same time evaluating and recruiting promising talent from these programs.
As concerns about the illicit movement of radioactive materials across international borders increase, so too has the need for increased protection of those borders both foreign and domestic. The challenge is not only to detect hidden radioactive materials, but also to distinguish them from legitimate radionuclides such as radio-pharmaceuticals that are often transported across borders and shipped throughout a country. With more than 600 U.S. border sites to protect, screening imported radioactive material requires a careful balance of high throughput and high search efficiency. However, these requirements are difficult to meet as rapid screening operations leave less time for radiation detectors to efficiently evaluate materials. In support of border security, Sandia developed organic glass scintillators.
This report provides a short summary of how four neutron beamline sources at the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory were generated for use in shielding and activation analysis along Second Target Station (STS) neutron beamlines, inside and outside the bunker, and inside instrument caves. Analysis of these sources shows that an angular acceptance of ±2° from the axis of the neutron beamline is all that is needed to accurately model dose rates for these applications. Further analysis shows that the surface area of the tallies used to calculate these sources, and therefore the number of particles in the sources (normalization), should be scaled up to ~19 × 19 cm to provide conservative estimates of dose rate outside the bunker. The spectrum of neutrons entering beamline 11 (ST11), which has the hardest spectrum at high energies and the most neutrons below 100 eV, produces the largest prompt dose rates inside and outside the bunker and the largest number of activation products inside the bunker, therefore, producing the largest residual dose rates.
This report details the characterization of a deuterated scintillation detector for use in neutron spectroscopy via the spectrum unfolding technique. The active volume of the detector consists of a 3-in. diameter by 3 in. depth right circular cylinder that contains 337 cm3 of liquid scintillator EJ-315, deuterated benzene with a D:H ratio of 141:1. A deuterated scintillator is desirable for unfolding fast neutron energy spectra because the backscattering of neutrons from deuterium produces peaks in the pulse height response corresponding to the incident neutron energy. Spectrum unfolding requires the detector’s response to be accurately known for any input neutron energy. The characterization in this report supports using a simulated response matrix calibrated by the measured light output and convolved with the measured resolution to produce a response matrix without bringing the detector to a neutron beam facility for characterization. In particular, characterization measurements were performed that included calibration of the detector’s light output to recoil electrons from gamma sources, calibration of the detector’s resolution to recoil electrons, and calibration of the detector’s light output to recoil protons from a time-tagged neutron source and a monoenergetic 14.1 MeV neutron source.
Supply chain cyber-attacks, such as the SolarWinds Orion attack, are occurring with greater frequency. These attacks compromise a digital device before it is sent to customers, bypassing traditional security controls to remain persistent and undetected in operational environments. While supply chain attacks are prevalent, methods for analyzing the risk of these attacks are currently unavailable. This paper proposes new supply chain cyber-attack difficulty and risk metrics to evaluate the relative risk of an attack throughout the supply chain lifecycle. Difficulty metrics for each stakeholder in a digital device’s supply chain (e.g., hardware manufacturing, firmware development, software development, storage, and distribution entities) are calculated using scores from cybersecurity maturity questionnaires in a Bayesian Network leaky Noisy-MAX model. These difficulty metrics are then used to calculate an overall supply chain cyber-attack risk. Vulnerability and recoverability metrics are also proposed to evaluate the relative stakeholder influence in the attack risk. These proposed relative risk metrics enable continuous supply chain monitoring, provide decision-makers with information necessary for improved supplier selection, and help drive improvements in the cybersecurity posture of the stakeholders in their supply chain.
DICER and DANCE can provide detailed and accurate resonance parameters and on smaller samples than any other facility from sub-thermal energies through the RRR. Many additional experiments of interest to NCSP could easily be performed at DICER and DANCE. DANCE also can provide accurate (n,γ) cross sections in the URR.
Abstract not provided.