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NASA NTRS2013

NASA Activity Update for the 2013 Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (UVSI) Yearbook

This year s report offers a high level perspective on some of the UAS related activities in which NASA is involved, both internal and external to the agency. Internally, NASA issued UAS operational policy on certification of NASA UAS and aircrew. A team of NASA UAS experts and operators analyzed all current procedures and best practices to design the policy. An update to the agencies Aircraft Operations Management Manual incorporated a new chapter to address UAS planning, preflight operations, flight operations, flight crew requirements, airworthiness and flight safety reviews. NASA UAS are classified into three categories based on weight and airspeed. Aircrews, including observers, are classified by how they interface with the UAS, and the policy defines qualifications, training, and currency. The NASA flight readiness approval process identifies risks and mitigations in order to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of the risk to an acceptable level. The UAS operations process incorporates all aspects of airworthiness, flight standards and range safety exactly the same processes used for NASA manned aircraft operations. NASA has two internal organizations that routinely operate UAS. The Science Mission Directorate utilizes UAS as part of its Airborne Science Program and is the most frequent operator of NASA UAS in both national and international airspace. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts UAS flight operations in addition to conducting research important to the UAS community. This past year the Science Mission Directorate supported the Hurricane and Severe Storm Sentimental (HS3) Mission with two NASA Global Hawk platforms. HS3 is a five-year mission specifically targeted to investigate the processes that underlie hurricane formation. During the 2012 portion of this mission the Global Hawk overflew hurricanes Leslie and Nadine in the Atlantic Ocean completing 6 flights and accumulating more than 148 flight hours. Another multi-year mission was initiated last year when the Sensor Integrated Environmental Remote Research Aircraft (SIERRA) UAS began surveying faults in California s Surprise Valley. A team of scientists and engineers from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), NASA Ames Research Center, Central Washington University, and Carnegie Mellon University will measure magnetic fields using ground surveys and the SIERRA to map the geophysics below the surface of Surprise Valley. The data collected will be used to generate 3D maps of the geophysical data of the area. The Aeronautics Mission Directorate continues its collaboration with Boeing to conduct UAS flight operations of the X-48C, a modified version of the X-48B originally built by Cranfield Aerospace, United Kingdom. The Aeronautics Mission Directorate utilizes vehicles of this size for a wide variety of research studies. Most of these operations are conducted within restricted airspace. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate also sponsors the UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project, which is working in close cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address critical challenges associated with routine UAS operations in civil airspace. The project is focused on separation assurance and collision avoidance systems and algorithms, command and control for non-military operations including spectrum allocation requirements, human system interaction issues, and safety and certification topics.

Bauer, Jeffrey E.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Spacecraft Charging Issues for Launch Vehicles

Spacecraft charging is well known threat to successful long term spacecraft operations and instrument reliability in orbits that spend significant time in hot electron environments. In recent years, spacecraft charging has increasingly been recognized as a potentially significant engineering issue for launch vehicles used to deploy spacecraft using (a) low Earth orbit (LEO), high inclination flight trajectories that pass through the auroral zone, (b) geostationary transfer orbits that require exposures to the hot electron environments in the Earths outer radiation belts, and (c) LEO escape trajectories using multiple phasing orbits through the Earths radiation belts while raising apogee towards a final Earth escape geometry. Charging becomes an issue when significant areas of exposed insulating materials or ungrounded conductors are used in the launch vehicle design or the payload is designed for use in a benign charging region beyond the Earths magnetosphere but must survive passage through the strong charging regimes of the Earths radiation belts. This presentation will first outline the charging risks encountered on typical launch trajectories used to deploy spacecraft into Earth orbit and Earth escape trajectories. We then describe the process used by NASAs Launch Services Program to evaluate when surface and internal charging is a potential risk to a NASA mission. Finally, we describe the options for mitigating charging risks including modification of the launch vehicle andor payload design and controlling the risk through operational launch constraints to avoid significant charging environments.

Electrostatics↗
NASA NTRS2014

Spacecraft Charging Issues for Launch Vehicles

Spacecraft charging is well known threat to successful long term spacecraft operations and instrument reliability in orbits that spend significant time in hot electron environments. In recent years, spacecraft charging has increasingly been recognized as a potentially significant engineering issue for launch vehicles used to deploy spacecraft using (a) low Earth orbit (LEO), high inclination flight trajectories that pass through the auroral zone, (b) geostationary transfer orbits that require exposures to the hot electron environments in the Earths outer radiation belts, and (c) LEO escape trajectories using multiple phasing orbits through the Earths radiation belts while raising apogee towards a final Earth escape geometry. Charging becomes an issue when significant areas of exposed insulating materials or ungrounded conductors are used in the launch vehicle design or the payload is designed for use in a benign charging region beyond the Earths magnetosphere but must survive passage through the strong charging regimes of the Earths radiation belts. This presentation will first outline the charging risks encountered on typical launch trajectories used to deploy spacecraft into Earth orbit and Earth escape trajectories. We then describe the process used by NASAs Launch Services Program to evaluate when surface and internal charging is a potential risk to a NASA mission. Finally, we describe the options for mitigating charging risks including modification of the launch vehicle and/or payload design and controlling the risk through operational launch constraints to avoid significant charging environments

electrostatics↗
NASA NTRS2019

SCREAM: Space-based Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method

Given both ground-based performance shaping factors (PSFs) collected by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and potential space-based PSFs collected by JSC's HH&P, this year's task is to determine how to combine them for future human reliability analysis (HRA) of space missions. All HRA to date for space missions have been based on ground data (i.e. 1-G environment). There is no space-based HRA approach. The target of this project to produce a "first of its kind" HRA approach for space missions. As humans go beyond Earth orbit and missions become longer, human performance and reliability is expected to degrade. The questions become by how much, when, and what, leading to defining the overall effect on crew risk. Knowing this information earlier rather than later will help us mitigate this risk by vehicle design, crew training, and operational workarounds.

Boyer, Roger L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Crew Health & Performance Capability Development for Exploration: 2022 to 2023 Overview

NASA has identified twenty-eight specific risks to human health and performance that must be adequately understood and addressed to enable future crewed missions to Mars. These risks are due to radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and the effects of living within artificially created and controlled life support environments. Research and technology development is required to better understand these risks and to inform, develop, and test technologies and strategies to mitigate these risks. NASA’s System Capability Leads coordinate across the agency to continually identify, prioritize, and monitor technology investments in support of these future missions. This paper describes progress over the past year in strategic planning, coordination, and technology development related to crew health and performance capabilities that are needed for future Mars missions. Technology maturation progress and future plans are described in the following capability areas: crew health countermeasures; spacesuit physiology and performance; food and nutrition; and exploration medical capabilities.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Systems Engineering Availability and Recommendations for Mission Technical Leaders

In spaceflight missions at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the Mission System Engineer (MSE) is the technical leader of the overall engineering team and also is the Independent Engineering Technical Authority. The responsibility of this role includes the definition of the mission design architecture, concept of operations, and mission requirements, management of risk throughout the development, and verification and validation of the final system performance and function amongst other duties. This responsibility inherently requires time management, enabling focus on a balanced development with appropriate risk. Time is the most valuable resource of the MSE. The system engineer’s availability to interact with the development team (often product or component design leads and technicians, often in different worksites) to discover and mitigate mission risks during development is key to mission success. This paper presents examples from Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Landsat 9, and Neutron star Interior Composition ExploreR (NICER) which represent in-house and out-of-house hardware builds. These examples demonstrate how interactions between the Mission Systems Engineers and other project and partner engineers result in discovery of critical risks, leading to early mitigation with significant cost and performance savings. These three missions would have suffered test failures or on-orbit failures had their MSEs not set aside time to visit engineers and technicians that were working on key pieces of space flight hardware. Availability is more than just time; it is openness to listen to concerns and questions. It begins by building a level of trust in the team that it is safe to ask questions or share concerns without the fear of blame or additional workload. It also requires enabling informal conversations (over lunch, coffee, in the clean room, or at the team members desk, etc.) where key information can be exchanged, and team members may even provide an easy-to-implement mitigation idea for another subsystem. Availability is a highly valuable commodity and completely non-obvious to protect and optimize. The natural tendency of engineers is to keep themselves busy with solving problems that they know about. This paper is encouraging MSEs to resist this tendency to try and solve all the complex problems themselves and actively devote daily time to learning and solving problems that are found with informal communications with other team members.

Lessons Learned↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber100 Compass [SWR 23-64]

Cyber100 Compass ("Compass") is a unique risk assessment framework that will enable grid system planners to understand and mitigate cybersecurity risk for grids transitioning to high levels of renewable generation, including 100%. The idea for Compass was developed by NREL based on past work on high-renewable grids and a series of discussions with DOE. Compass is part of Cyber100, a portfolio of proposed research activities that would greatly expand understanding of cybersecurity for high-renewable grids. Compass is a desktop application designed with a user-friendly interface. The tool gathers information from users, conducts probabilistic backend calculations, and outputs a series of visualizations to help users understand and analyze their cybersecurity risks based on the unique features of their future grid. Compass will take as inputs the values for different conditions and produce a risk score of the resulting grid. By trying different configurations, system planners can compare the resultant risks against their own risk tolerance and decide which system-of-system controls to implement as they transition toward a 100% renewable grid.

Martin, Maurice↗
NASA NTRS1999

NASA Lewis Launch Collision Probability Model Developed and Analyzed

There are nearly 10,000 tracked objects orbiting the earth. These objects encompass manned objects, active and decommissioned satellites, spent rocket bodies, and debris. They range from a few centimeters across to the size of the MIR space station. Anytime a new satellite is launched, the launch vehicle with its payload attached passes through an area of space in which these objects orbit. Although the population density of these objects is low, there always is a small but finite probability of collision between the launch vehicle and one or more of these space objects. Even though the probability of collision is very low, for some payloads even this small risk is unacceptable. To mitigate the small risk of collision associated with launching at an arbitrary time within the daily launch window, NASA performs a prelaunch mission assurance Collision Avoidance Analysis (or COLA). For the COLA of the Cassini spacecraft, the NASA Lewis Research Center conducted an in-house development and analysis of a model for launch collision probability. The model allows a minimum clearance criteria to be used with the COLA analysis to ensure an acceptably low probability of collision. If, for any given liftoff time, the nominal launch vehicle trajectory would pass a space object with less than the minimum required clearance, launch would not be attempted at that time. The model assumes that the nominal positions of the orbiting objects and of the launch vehicle can be predicted as a function of time, and therefore, that any tracked object that comes within close proximity of the launch vehicle can be identified. For any such pair, these nominal positions can be used to calculate a nominal miss distance. The actual miss distances may differ substantially from the nominal miss distance, due, in part, to the statistical uncertainty of the knowledge of the objects positions. The model further assumes that these position uncertainties can be described with position covariance matrices. With these, and some additional simplifying assumptions, a closed-form solution for the probability of collision is obtained. This solution provides clear insights into how each of the independent parameters affects the probability of collision. It shows that for a given maximum probability of collision and prior knowledge of the objects position uncertainties and sizes, only knowledge of the nominal closest approach distance is required to make the launch/no launch decision. The model was completed and used for the mission assurance COLA analysis for the Cassini spacecraft, which was launched on a Titan IV/Centaur rocket on October 15, 1997. Although the model was specifically developed for the Cassini mission, it is clearly applicable for other launches as well. The effect of COLA closures on the launch window is shown. The bar represents the entire 140-min launch window on October 15, 1997; the blackened areas represent the loss of launch opportunities due to the potential for a collision with an orbiting object.

Bollenbacher, Gary↗
DOE OSTI2021

ML Clustering to Identify Natural Gas Pipeline Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

The network of more than 2.5 million miles of natural gas pipelines the U.S. are exposed to a range of vulnerabilities, ranging from extreme weather, to human behavior, and increasingly, to cyber threats. Advanced, data-driven analytics, including the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence, afford an opportunity to identify potential vulnerabilities, better understand risks, and help mitigate vulnerabilities in the network. At NETL, machine learning is being used to explore pipeline vulnerabilities and identify significant clusters of failure events, including failures due to weather, human behavior, and materials. These findings are being used to support the development of new technologies, including sensors, but can also be used to evaluate and inform mitigation strategies to reduce risks and vulnerabilities throughout the network.

Bauer, Jennifer↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Laboratory and Field Arrays: Debris Modeling, Detection,& Mitigation (Task 1)

The statement of project objectives for this task was: develop tools, methods and models to assess, and mitigate the risk of damage to MHK infrastructure from woody debris. Develop the capability to detect woody debris using sonar and/or physical methods for purposes of characterizing debris statistics in river (at UAF’s Tanana River Test Site) and near-shore wave (at Yakutat, AK) environments and to activate debris mitigation measures. Develop debris impact risk maps and tables using statistics on debris size, geometry, type, prevalence, mobility and location. Improve and apply the COUPi discrete element method (DEM) to develop models of debris movement and impact on MHK infrastructure to evaluate risk of damage, and interference, to operations from debris. The proposed final deliverable for the task was a set of tools or techniques for providing estimates of the probability of debris impact, and resulting impact forces, on MHK infrastructure as a function of debris size, type, wave regime, and current velocity. Such estimates are required to assess damage risks to operational MHK infrastructure.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS2011

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance. A fully-instrumented burst test (recording a lower burst pressure than expected) on a flight-certified vessel provided critical understanding of the behavior of Orbiter COPVs. A more accurate model was based on a newly-compiled comprehensive database of Kevlar data from LLNL and elsewhere. Considering hardware changes, operational improvements and reliability model refinements, the mean reliability was determined to be 0.998 for the remainder of the Shuttle Program (from 2007, for STS- 118 thru STS-135). Since limited hardware resources precluded full model validation through multiple tests, additional model confidence was sought through the first-ever Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT) of a flown flight article. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to interpret possible test results. Since the lifetime observed in the ASRT exceeded initial estimates by one to two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle Program deemed there was significant conservatism in the model and accepted continued operation with existing flight hardware. Given the variability in tank-to-tank original prooftest response, a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure COPV residual stress state. Preliminary results showed that patterns of low fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface, together with measured permanent volume growth during proof, could be directly correlated to increased fiber stress ratios on the inside fibers adjacent to the liner, and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Results of a 3-day Pilot Study to Validate Planetary Prebreathe Protocols Using a 56.5 kPa 34% O2, 66% N2 Saturation Cabin Atmosphere

INTRODUCTION: Apollo missions used 100% O2 cabin atmospheres which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activities (EVAs, ‘spacewalks’); however, this atmosphere presented a flammability risk that is no longer acceptable to NASA. Denitrogenation prebreathe protocols used to mitigate DCS risk for Space Shuttle and International Space Station EVAs are validated for the microgravity environment, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory surface EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary/Lunar missions. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA for future Moon and Mars missions as a compromise that balances subsequent pre-EVA prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. Prebreathe validation studies was initiated utilizing a three-story 6m diameter hypobaric chamber at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. Here, we report the results of a 3-day human-in-the-loop system checkout. METHODS: Six volunteers acclimated to the 56.6kPa/34% O2 66% N2 environment for 48hrs prior to conducting a 20-minute prebreathe and a 6-hour simulated EVA at 34kPa/85% O2 / 15% N2. The EVA simulation was designed to include tasks that are physically and ergonomically representative of future planetary EVAs. Decompression stress was evaluated by serial doppler and echocardiographs, as well as by clinical features of DCS signs/symptoms. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: Preliminary data analysis noted venous gas emboli (VGE) in 3 of 6 subjects, with peak Grade II VGE by Doppler and peak E-B score of 5 by cardiac ultrasonography. No volunteers were diagnosed with DCS during this initial test. No acute hypoxic symptoms were noted. Musculoskeletal and gastrointestinal complaints were noted, likely associated with the exercise load and the food system. Validation of exploration prebreathe protocols has since been initiated with an 11-day saturation test using the same facility and protocol.

Alejandro Garbino↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluation of Planetary Extravehicular Activity Prebreathe Protocols using a 56.5 kPa, 34% O2, 66% N2 Saturation Cabin Atmosphere in an 11-day Hypobaric Hypoxia Study

INTRODUCTION: Apollo missions used 100% O2 cabin atmospheres which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during Lunar extravehicular activities (EVAs, ‘spacewalks’); however, this atmosphere presented a flammability risk that is no longer acceptable to NASA. Denitrogenation prebreathe protocols used to mitigate DCS risk for Space Shuttle and International Space Station EVAs are validated for the microgravity environment, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory surface EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary/Lunar missions. A cabin/vehicle “Exploration Atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA for future Moon and Mars missions as a compromise that balances subsequent pre-EVA prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. Prebreathe validation studies were initiated utilizing a three-story 6m diameter hypobaric chamber at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. Here, we report the results of a 11-day human-in-the-loop system checkout. METHODS: Six volunteers lived in a hyboparic chamber for 11 days with an ‘exploration atmosphere’ of 56.6kPa/34% O2 66% N2. Subjects acclimated to the exploration atmosphere for 48hrs and thereafter participated in five 6-hour simulated EVAs at 34kPa/85% O2 / 15% N2 over the course of 11 days. Prior to each simulated EVA, subjects underwent a 20-minute prebreathe at 85% O2. The EVA simulation was designed to include tasks that are physically and ergonomically representative of future planetary EVAs, proportionate to the subject’s VO2max. Decompression stress was evaluated during the simulated EVA by serial doppler and echocardiographs alternating every 15min, as well as clinical monitoring for DCS signs/symptoms. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: Venous gas emboli (VGE) were present in 3 of 6 subjects during EVAs, with peak Grade II VGE as evaluated by Doppler and a peak Eftedal-Brubakk score of 5 by cardiac ultrasonography. Two cases of DCS were diagnosed during the 11-day test chamber. No acute hypoxic symptoms were noted. Musculoskeletal and gastrointestinal complaints were noted, likely associated with the exercise load and the food system. Two cases of DCS (8%) does not cross either accept or reject pre-test criterion, so an additional study is planned for 2023 to meet our pre-test thresholds.

Alejandro Garbino↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Transportation System Liftoff Debris Mitigation Process Overview

Liftoff debris is a top risk to the Space Shuttle Vehicle. To manage the Liftoff debris risk, the Space Shuttle Program created a team with in the Propulsion Systems Engineering & Integration Office. The Shutt le Liftoff Debris Team harnesses the Systems Engineering process to i dentify, assess, mitigate, and communicate the Liftoff debris risk. T he Liftoff Debris Team leverages off the technical knowledge and expe rtise of engineering groups across multiple NASA centers to integrate total system solutions. These solutions connect the hardware and ana lyses to identify and characterize debris sources and zones contribut ing to the Liftoff debris risk. The solutions incorporate analyses sp anning: the definition and modeling of natural and induced environmen ts; material characterizations; statistical trending analyses, imager y based trajectory analyses; debris transport analyses, and risk asse ssments. The verification and validation of these analyses are bound by conservative assumptions and anchored by testing and flight data. The Liftoff debris risk mitigation is managed through vigilant collab orative work between the Liftoff Debris Team and Launch Pad Operation s personnel and through the management of requirements, interfaces, r isk documentation, configurations, and technical data. Furthermore, o n day of launch, decision analysis is used to apply the wealth of ana lyses to case specific identified risks. This presentation describes how the Liftoff Debris Team applies Systems Engineering in their proce sses to mitigate risk and improve the safety of the Space Shuttle Veh icle.

Mitchell, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Human System Risks to Future Space Exploration

NASA is contemplating future human exploration missions to destinations beyond low Earth orbit, including the Moon, deep-space asteroids, and Mars. While we have learned much about protecting crew health and performance during orbital space flight over the past half-century, the challenges of these future missions far exceed those within our current experience base. To ensure success in these missions, we have developed a Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to identify, quantify, and develop mitigation plans for the extraordinary risks associated with each potential mission scenario. The HSRB comprises research, technology, and operations experts in medicine, physiology, psychology, human factors, radiation, toxicology, microbiology, pharmacology, and food sciences. Methods: Owing to the wide range of potential mission characteristics, we first identified the hazards to human health and performance common to all exploration missions: altered gravity, isolation/confinement, increased radiation, distance from Earth, and hostile/closed environment. Each hazard leads to a set of risks to crew health and/or performance. For example the radiation hazard leads to risks of acute radiation syndrome, central nervous system dysfunction, soft tissue degeneration, and carcinogenesis. Some of these risks (e.g., acute radiation syndrome) could affect crew health or performance during the mission, while others (e.g., carcinogenesis) would more likely affect the crewmember well after the mission ends. We next defined a set of design reference missions (DRM) that would span the range of exploration missions currently under consideration. In addition to standard (6-month) and long-duration (1-year) missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), these DRM include deep space sortie missions of 1 month duration, lunar orbital and landing missions of 1 year duration, deep space journey and asteroid landing missions of 1 year duration, and Mars orbital and landing missions of 3 years duration. We then assessed the likelihood and consequences of each risk against each DRM, using three levels of likelihood (Low: less than or equal to 0.1%; Medium: 0.1%–1.0%; High: greater than or equal to 1.0%) and four levels of consequence ranging from Very Low (temporary or insignificant) to High (death, loss of mission, or significant reduction to length or quality of life). Quantitative evidence from clinical, operational, and research sources were used whenever available. Qualitative evidence was used when quantitative evidence was unavailable. Expert opinion was used whenever insufficient evidence was available. Results: A set of 30 risks emerged that will require further mitigation efforts before being accepted by the Agency. The likelihood by consequence risk assessment process provided a means of prioritizing among the risks identified. For each of the high priority risks, a plan was developed to perform research, technology, or standards development thought necessary to provide suitable reduction of likelihood or consequence to allow agency acceptance. Conclusion: The HSRB process has successfully identified a complete set of risks to human space travelers on planned exploration missions based on the best evidence available today. Risk mitigation plans have been established for the highest priority risks. Each risk will be reassessed annually to track the progress of our risk mitigation efforts.

Paloski, W. H.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Long-Term Impacts of Constrained Transmission Deployment on the Cost-Reliability Tradeoff

Traditional Resource Adequacy (RA) frameworks in the U.S. undervalue the contributions of inter-regional transmission to resource adequacy during stress periods, focusing on the availability of nameplate capacity instead. However, availability of nameplate capacity does not always translate into electricity delivery, especially during tail events. Moreover, the rapid deployment of energy-limited resources and increasing electricity demand challenge existing resource adequacy frameworks and couple regional electricity demand and availability of supply via transmission. We propose a two-stage framework that goes beyond the existing capacity-centered approaches to reveal the RA contributions of transmission. In the first stage we introduce a multi-objective optimization framework to quantify the merits of transmission expansion via Pareto Frontiers under alternative futures of no transmission investment, primary energy resources availability and demand growth. The second stage focuses on tail events and leverages the results of the first stage to characterize the risk profile of regional consumers across the U.S. under the alternative energy futures. We find that no new transmission can lead to a more expensive and less reliable national grid across scenarios, however, the impact on regional RA can vary. The probabilistic analysis reveals that transmission investments can alleviate the tail risk of consumers, however, the availability of fuel resources does not always alleviate regional tail risks. Our findings inform policymakers and utilities on the prioritization of transmission investments to mitigate the risk of widespread outages, also for tail events, and ensure reliable and affordable electricity delivery to all.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗