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852 records · Page 48
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020) (Rev. 2)

This document provides an updated Hanford Site composite analysis (CA). A Hanford Site CA was prepared and issued in 1998 (PNNL-11800) with an addendum provided in 2002 (PNNL-11800 Addendum 1). The CA was approved in 2002 (Frei, 2002) and has been maintained (DOE/RL-2000-29 and subsequent revisions) to support low-level waste disposal performance assessments (PAs) and disposal authorizations for facilities at the Hanford Site, including the following: Continued operation of the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) and the 200 East and 200 West Low-Level Burial Grounds; Construction of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF); Forthcoming closure of tank residual waste systems such as Waste Management Area (WMA) C. The CA maintenance program resulted in a determination in 2015 (DOE/RL-2015-66) that the Hanford Site CA needed an update for the following reasons: While the initial Hanford Site CA has been maintained since 2001, the accumulation of basis changes reported in the annual summary reports over the succeeding 14 years merit evaluation in an updated analysis; The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters requested in a memorandum in 2015 (Gilbertson and Marcinowski, 2015) that “as soon as the relevant PAs are complete, the CA will be revised to account for all of the new information.” This updated Hanford Site CA accounts for the following new information: 1. Inclusion of a detailed Hanford Site baseline disposition that projects remedial activities through site closure. There have been significant changes through decision making in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) process that were not available when the original CA was produced; 2. Inclusion of an updated inventory basis, new modeling capabilities, and new decisions reached in the associated record of decision (ROD) that was provided by issuance of DOE/EIS-0391 in fiscal year (FY) 2013. Development of a Hanford Site groundwater model from the baseline provided in a technical transfer of models for the Final Tank Closure and Waste Management Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0391) commenced in FY 2014 and resulted in the plateau-to-river (P2R) groundwater flow model that is used in this updated Hanford Site CA; 3. Accounting for pump and treat systems, which were not evaluated in the initial CA. Pump and treat systems have had significant impact on groundwater flow system behavior, contaminant transport, and contaminant removal from Hanford Site groundwater. This process is accounted for in the use of the P2R model for this updated Hanford Site CA; 4. Inclusion of water-level data collected since the initial CA was completed. Data collected as the unconfined aquifer water levels continue to recede since the cessation of large liquid discharges in the late 1990s have led to marked improvement in understanding of the flow system for future conditions, particularly regarding northward flow potential in the critical Gable Gap area. The calibration in the latest version of the P2R model accounts for this information; 5. Inclusion of results from the revised ERDF PA completed in 2013 (WCH-5209) that account for updated inventory and expansion of the ERDF facility to about twice the size that was evaluated in the original CA; 6. Use of updated geoframeworks to provide the structural basis for numerical fate and transport models in the groundwater pathway of this updated CA. The geologic basis for groundwater models has continued to improve with additional data collection and interpretation with the creation and maintenance of the Hanford South Geoframework and the Central Plateau Vadose Zone Geoframework tools; 7. Incorporation of updated tank residual inventory estimates. Tank residual inventory estimates have improved with the incorporation of tank retrieval inventory data for those tanks that have completed retrieval. The CA inventory data package includes this updated information; 8. Incorporation of WMA C PA results. Two additional PAs for tank farm closure decisions are in preparation during the period required to prepare an updated Hanford Site CA: WMA C (FY 2016) and WMA A-AX (in preparation). The WMA C PA results are incorporated into the updated Hanford Site CA, and its grouted residuals model is used as the basis for a release model to account for the other tank farm systems modeling in this updated CA; 9. An update to the IDF PA was submitted in FY 2017 and has been reviewed and approved. The results of the IDF PA are incorporated into this updated CA; 10. Updated risk assessment scenarios. The risk assessment scenarios currently in use for Hanford Site CERCLA and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) analyses differ from those evaluated in the initial Hanford Site CA. The representative person exposure scenario evaluated in this updated Hanford Site CA is consistent with recent PAs and CERCLA and RCRA analyses as the Hanford Site. This updated Hanford Site CA provides the following: A comparison of the updated Hanford Site CA all-pathway dose results with the performance measures during the compliance period, which is assumed to begin with site closure in calendar 2070 with the last scheduled disposal action and continue for 1,000 years postclosure (to calendar year 3069); A comparison of Hanford Site CA all-pathway dose results with the performance measures during the postcompliance period to address potential peaks beyond the compliance period. This is accomplished by evaluating dose in the period for 9,000 years following the compliance period (i.e., from calendar year 3070 to 12070).

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DOE OSTI2020

Development of the Intelligent, Preventive Infrared (IR) Inspection System Housed in Hybrid Robotic Platforms

Robots and robotic systems that are designed for inspection, environmental study, and health and safety aid are becoming an increasing necessity. However, there is a number of challenges that accompany robots that are designed for these specific applications. These challenges include: navigating compact, enclosed spaces, travelling over multiple terrains and large obstacles, using the proper sensing and detection methods to assess an environment, and the use of lightweight and durable materials. The robotic platforms currently in development look at all of these challenges and attempt to overcome them. These designs specific use of hybrid robotic platforms, or platform that utilizes soft and rigid materials, allows for a more flexible platform and makes environments more navigable. To further improve the navigation of the platforms and environmental assessment, a novel infrared detection system is housed in the platforms to create a robot that can be used for the applications listed above and more. Objectives: Further develop two types of robotic platforms that utilize additive manufacturing, soft materials, and rigid materials. Continue the development of an intelligent and inhibitory infrared detection system based on an artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm. Continued study and fabrication of active soft materials designed for both sensing and actuation in hybrid robotic systems. Improve additive manufacturing fabrication to design rigid and semi-rigid components for hybrid robotic platforms. Transformable Wheel Robotic Platform: The chassis, wheels, tires and inspection system housing use different additive manufacturing techniques for fabrication. Continued work with additive manufacturing has lead to studies in metal-based printing and modular design and manufacturing. The new platform design with integrated electrical component printed. This will allow integration of the sensor housing onto the platform. Electrical components are being tested for battery life and performance. To improve this performance, such as integration of Lithium Polymer (LiPo) batteries. Snake Robotic Platform: The main focus of the development has centered around liquid-based soft actuators. That act on the principles of electrostatic and hydraulic actuation. A liquid dielectric sits between two compliant electrodes, contained by a flexible polymer shell. The electrodes and film gradually collapse toward each other from one corner of the electrode to the other. When the electrodes and film close together, a majority of the fluid is pushed into the area not covered by an electrode. A thin layer of the liquid dielectric remains between the electrode. The actuators will be stacked to cause large displacement, and move the linkages. The chassis of this platform uses purely additively manufactured linkages. Intelligent, Preventive IR Inspection System: Development of the AI for the system has lead to using a Scikit-Learn which assists in creating predictive models based on Regression, clustering, classification etc. To improve the infrared thermometry for low emissivity sources, work on the fabrication of a tandem photoconductive infrared thermometer was a main focus. Distance-Voltage-Temperature response data has been collected in the range of 7 cm - 100 cm and 200-400 deg. C. Modifications were made to the existing test bench to have a better control over the data. Automated data collection was realized using a Python code and an Arduino controlled stepper motor to increase the sample rate. A protective enclosure has been built around the setup to minimize the effect of the environment on the measurements. To better predict temperature, different AI models are being optimized. The regression model, LARS showed a high accuracy but had convergence issues and only works for the current test set-up. Results: The Transformable Wheel Robot has developed into a more flexible and modular platform. With the improvements to the current work, effort on the tire or soft gripper design been a large focus. The soft grippers will be interchange able to allow for increased performance in identified terrain types. The development of the liquid-based actuators allows the snake robotic platform to achieve the goals of being flexible and able to navigate confined spaces. However, there is room for improvement. Optimization work is currently being done in COMSOL Multiphysics. With the current IR system set-up the LARS model perfectly predicts the data; however, considering the mobility aspect of the project other models will allow for an optimized system. Testing of other model types is currently being done.

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DOE OSTI2020

Benzenesulfonamide Derivatives as Complexants and Extractants for Addressing the Mercury Problem at the Savannah River Site

Mercury (Hg) is a major global pollutant arising from both natural and anthropogenic sources. Its widespread use in medicinal and industrial applications makes it a common chemical exposure and environmental pollutant. It can exist in several forms which include: Metallic mercury (Hg{sup 0}), mercurous (Hg{sub 2}{sup 2+}), mercuric salts (Hg{sup 2+}), and organic mercury (e.g. CH{sub 3}Hg{sup +}), with the latter being the most toxic of all the species. Due to mercury's high toxicity, new approaches towards its detection has received significant attention in the scientific community. Mercury exposure at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has been a recent concern especially with increasing amounts of organic mercury in the saltstone. It originates mainly from its use as an acidic dissolution catalyst of aluminum cladding from target fuels within the uranium and plutonium processing operations [1]. It is present to an amount of about 60 metric tons in the high-level waste (HLW) tanks. Organic Mercury species have been found in low activity waste (LAW) at the site that eventually ends up in the saltstone. Therefore, there is a need for: i) Converting organic mercury to other less toxic forms and ii) Complexation and removal of Hg prior of disposal of LAW in saltstone. Various methods have been developed for selective sensing of mercury in the presence of other toxic metals. These methods include using ligands that can form organo-soluble metal complexes with different optical and spectroscopic properties that can be used for toxic metal sensing. In 2005, our group pioneered an ion-exchange extraction method, in which o-phenylenediamine-derived disulfonamides were used to complex and selectively extract and sense Pb{sup 2+} from aqueous solutions into an organic phase [2,3]. Herein, a disulfonamide and a bis-dansylamide have been shown to extract, complex and sense Hg(II). Ligand 1: The crystal structure of the disulfonamide-Hg complex confirms the complexation of Hg(II) with the ligand. Complexation was corroborated by the {sup 1}H-NMR spectra obtained after contacting solutions of various concentrations of Hg{sup 2+} with 2 mM ligand in chloroform. Distinct resonances are observed at Hg/L ratio of 0.5 that are also observed for the isolated 1:2 complex. In the presence of excess mercury, new resonances, as well as the movement of Et{sub 3}N resonances indicate the formation of a different Hg-sulfonamide-triethylamine complex, presumably having 1:1 Hg:L stoichiometry. The electronic spectra of aqueous phases after extraction show that there was no free ligand absorption at 0.5 eq of Hg, indicating a complete complexation. Complexation was also confirmed by the UV-visible titrations with Hg{sup 2+} at constant ligand concentration. pH-dependent extraction carried out shows that extraction of Hg(II) by ligand 1 was over 90% for most alkaline pHs. Ligand 2: The crystal structure of the Ligand 2 complex formed with Hg(OAc){sub 2} shows a remarkable coordination pattern with 4:2 metal:ligand stoichiometry. The fluorescent bis-dansyl disulfonamide derivative was found to complex and sense HgCl{sub 2} and Hg(OAc){sub 2} by demonstrating fluorescence quenching upon Hg(II) addition in comparison with other metals (Zn(II), Cd(II), Pb(II)). No were observed for Cu(II), Ag(I) and Co(II). We have shown the complexation of Hg(II) by a disulfonamide and a bis-dansyl disulfonamide ligand using several spectroscopic methods. Ligand 1 was able to extract mercury into chloroform and form a complex in the presence of excess mercury by synergistic complexation with triethylamine acting as a co-ligand. X-ray and NMR both confirm a 1:2 HgL{sub 2} stoichiometry. Ligand 2 can be used for sensing of Hg(II) as fluorescence quenching was observed after addition of Hg(II)

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DOE OSTI2022

Tank Waste LDR Organics Data Summary for Sample-and-Send (Rev.1A)

The presence of organic chemicals regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) adds complexity to treating and disposing of the low activity fraction of Hanford tank waste if a low temperature treatment method such as grouting is used (SRNL-STI-2020-00228). The complexity arises from the fact that the baseline vitrification method is considered by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) as providing adequate thermal treatment for organics; a status not automatically extended to a lowtemperature process, such as solidifying the waste in a cementitious waste form. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) LDR program is intended to ensure that wastes are properly treated prior to disposal. Proper treatment makes hazardous waste less harmful to groundwater by reducing the mobility and/or toxicity of the hazardous constituents in the waste. EPA guidance indicates that stabilization/solidification of waste for organics could be considered impermissible dilution under the LDR dilution prohibition. In addition, waste storage activities at Hanford have required transferring and blending waste within the tank system and these activities have potentially altered the concentrations of the hazardous constituents. The LDR dilution prohibition found in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.3 states that “… no generator, transporter, handler, or owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall in any way dilute a restricted waste or the residual from treatment of a restricted waste as a substitute for adequate treatment …”. Hence, if LAW is to be treated using low temperature stabilization (such as cementation), then it is important to demonstrate both how past storage activities have contributed to the removal (by vacuum evaporation), or destruction (by in situ decomposition) of the LDR organics and how future retrieval and waste feed preparation will contribute to their removal (by filtration and ion exchange). Demonstrating these processes helps validate that cementation without additional organic treatment does not necessarily represent impermissible dilution. To aid in implementing cementitious solidification of Low Activity Waste (LAW), WRPS has been developing a regulatory and processing LDR treatment variance strategy termed “Sampleand-Send” that relies, in part, on demonstrating that in situ decomposition reactions along with historic evaporation of tank waste has destroyed or removed most of the LDR organics possibly associated with Hanford Tank Waste (SRNL-STI-2020-00582, SRNL-STI-2021-00453, SRNL-STI-2022-00391). Under the Sample-and-Send concept, Hanford tank waste would be retrieved, processed through a Tank-Side Cesium Removal-like system, and staged as a candidate feed that would then be sampled to confirm the waste acceptance criteria is met for solidification in an LAW cementitious treatment facility. If it can be shown that LDR organics are at concentrations below the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for cementitious stabilization and have been sufficiently removed (by historic evaporation or by filtration and ion exchange during Cs removal), destroyed (by historic in situ decomposition), or are not soluble in LAW above the WAC then additional organic treatment is not needed prior to creating a cementitious final waste form and the concept of Sample-and-Send would be proposed to establish a non-rulemaking site-specific treatment variance using the specified method of treatment “STABL” to remove sampling requirements of the waste form after treatment. Waste not meeting the WAC could either be routed to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for LAW vitrification, or further processed by evaporation or chemical oxidation before solidifying in a cementitious waste form. A key component in implementing the Sample-and-Send strategy is identifying which of the 207 LDR organic compounds associated with the RCRA Part A permit application waste codes for the Double Shell Tanks (DSTs) and Single Shell Tanks (SSTs) and any applicable Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs) from 40 CFR 268.48 should be considered as potentially present and thus subject to regulation. In addition, it is also necessary to understand the solubility volatility, and reactivity of these compounds in LAW to identify which of the potentially present LDR organic compounds are not soluble above regulatory levels or are likely to have been removed by historic evaporation or destroyed by in situ decomposition reactions. If there are potentially present LDR organic compounds that have not been removed or destroyed and are soluble above regulatorily significant concentrations then a treatability variance may be needed for these species to eliminate any concerns pertaining to impermissible dilution. The spreadsheet accompanying this calculation report contains the data and logic computations needed to screen the list of 207 LDR organics associated with Hanford tank waste to identify those potentially present and to indicate which compounds may need to be included in a treatability variance.

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DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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DOE OSTI2020

Zero-Valent Iron Permeable Reactive Barrier to Remediate Volatile Organic Compounds in Groundwater - 20209

The US DOE-SRS, the US EPA, and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control determined it was appropriate to perform a non-time critical removal action at the P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit at the SRS to reduce the mass and downgradient transport of trichloroethylene in the P-Area groundwater plume. Contaminated groundwater discharges to a nearby stream, Steel Creek, within the SRS boundaries, resulting in trichloroethylene concentrations above the maximum contaminant level. Impact to surface water is limited in areal extent and supported by recently collected characterization data. The P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit encompasses the groundwater beneath an industrial area within SRS, P Area, where the P-Reactor once operated. The boundaries of the P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit extend northwest to Steel Creek, northeast toward PAR Pond, and southeast to Meyers Branch. Groundwater in the Upper Three Runs Aquifer of the P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit has been impacted by reactor and facility operations between 1954 and 1991, including tritium and volatile organic compounds. The P-Area surface units contributing to groundwater contamination were remediated as part of the P-Area Operable Unit in 2011. The P-Reactor closure is one of the first of its kind in the DOE Complex and is one of only a few full-sized production reactors in the US to undergo completion of final closure activities. The nature and extent of groundwater contamination was determined using a variety of investigative approaches such as groundwater monitoring wells, direct-push technology, and surface water samples. Groundwater contamination associated with trichloroethylene is primarily exhibited in a narrow plume that extends from the source area at P-Reactor and west to Steel Creek. Maximum contaminant level exceedances in groundwater occur over an area of ∼6.9 hectares for trichloroethylene with concentrations as high as 7.7 milligrams per liter. To the west of the P-Area facility area, the trichloroethylene groundwater plume is controlled by a buried geologic feature, assumed to be an old stream bed, that further narrows the groundwater plume in what has been designated as the 'neck area.' This narrowing of the groundwater plume provides an ideal location for a treatment barrier. The non-time critical removal action alternative chosen is to install a zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier within the neck area of the trichloroethylene groundwater plume, perpendicular to groundwater flow direction. This technology will provide a treatment barrier that will reduce trichloroethylene groundwater concentrations by 90% and has an anticipated useful life of at least 25 years. A pre-design investigation was performed in the neck area to confirm site lithology, hydrogeology, geochemistry, and extent of trichloroethylene contamination prior to a final design. A treatability study, conducted as part of the pre-design investigation, indicated that the subsurface and groundwater in the PArea Groundwater Operable Unit is compatible with the zero-valent iron and will not lead to excessive buildup from mineralization/precipitation or biofouling. Probabilistic modeling was conducted using field and laboratory data to determine the expected performance of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier. The model simulations indicated that a 3.81-centimeter thick barrier would provide greater than 90% reduction of trichloroethylene groundwater concentration. The final design of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier is a barrier that will extend 80.5 linear meters in a 'zigzag' orientation to best transect the trichloroethylene plume and account for varying groundwater flow. The barrier will be installed from 13.7 meters below ground surface to 41.1 meters below ground surface for 65.8 linear meters and from 13.7 meters below ground surface to 36.6 meters below ground surface for 14.6 linear meters, the base of which is 'keyed' into a low permeability zone. The barrier is designed to a thickness of 10.2 centimeters, which was determined to reduce the trichloroethylene groundwater concentrations by greater than 90% with a safety factor of 2.67. A total of approximately 689 metric tons of zero-valent iron will be injected through 22 injection wells spaced 3.66 meters apart, using guar to suspend the zero-valent iron. Zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier construction will be monitored through 23 installed resistivity receivers offset 7.32 meters from the zerovalent iron permeable reactive barrier. The zero-valent iron will be energized with a low-voltage 100 Hertz signal during injection and will be monitored using the resistivity receivers to ensure complete coalescence of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier. The zero-valent iron was sized to have a hydraulic conductivity greater than the natural subsurface, thus promoting groundwater flow through the barrier. As contaminated groundwater contacts the zero-valent iron, volatile organic compounds, including trichloroethylene, are immediately degraded to harmless compounds such as ethylene. The performance of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier will be monitored using three upgradient monitoring well clusters, six downgradient monitoring well clusters, and four in-wall monitoring wells. The in-wall monitoring wells will indicate immediate reduction of trichloroethylene mass in the groundwater and allow analyses of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier health. (authors)

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