SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Cyber”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 865 records · Page 48

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2022

Robust Model Predictive Control for Attack Mitigation of Virtual Synchronous Generators (VSGs) in an Islanded Microgrid

With the increasing application of power converters in distributed energy systems, power electronics converters face an increasing number of cyber-attacks. To mitigate the cyber-attack impact on voltage source converters (VSCs) and microgrids, a robust model predictive control (RMPC) is proposed for virtual synchronous generators (VSG) in an islanded microgrid. This RMPC is designed to compensate for the frequency deviations, thus maintaining frequency stability of the whole islanded microgrid against cyber threats. Finally, to verify the feasibility of the proposed method, comparisons between the proposed method and the conventional VSC controller are provided in different attack scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Attacks in Vehicular Sensors

Today's modern vehicles contain anywhere from sixty to one-hundred sensors and exhibit the characteristics of Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS). There is a high degree of coupling, cohesiveness, and interactions among vehicle's CPS components (e.g., sensors, devices, systems, systems-of-systems) across sensing, communication, and control layers. Cyber-attacks in the sensing or communication layers can compromise the security of the control layer. This paper provides a detailed review of potential cyber threats related to the sensing layer. Notably, the focus is mainly towards two categories of sensors: vehicle dynamics sensors (e.g., Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS), magnetic encoders, and inertial sensors) and environment sensors (e.g., Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), ultrasonic, camera, Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) systems, and Global Positioning System (GPS) units). Furthermore, the paper also offers perspectives through existing countermeasures from literature and stresses the need for data-driven cybersecurity solutions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Sensor and Actuator Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems with Domain-Aware Operator Theory

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) provide opportunities for cyber attacks to have physical impacts. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a subclass of cyber threats that act stealthily to avoid detection and enable long-term attacks. Here, we build on our past work in APT modelling to combine deception-based sensor bias attacks and direct actuator manipulations in attacks against a hierarchical control system. That past work used the Koopman operator to develop a data-driven, domain-aware, optimization-based attacker model. Using an expansion of this model, we compute several different attacks, including multiple simultaneous attacks, against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. One next step of interest is to construct a defender system, built on the same modelling approach, designed to detect and mitigate such attacks.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗

DOE OSTI2020

Multi-Agent Based Attack-Resilient System Integrity Protection for Smart Grid

Not provided.

Engineering↗

DOE OSTI2021

Towards a New Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risk Analysis Technique

Supply chain cyber-attacks, such as the SolarWinds Orion attack, are occurring with greater frequency. These attacks compromise a digital device before it is sent to customers, bypassing traditional security controls to remain persistent and undetected in operational environments. While supply chain attacks are prevalent, methods for analyzing the risk of these attacks are currently unavailable. This paper proposes new supply chain cyber-attack difficulty and risk metrics to evaluate the relative risk of an attack throughout the supply chain lifecycle. Difficulty metrics for each stakeholder in a digital device’s supply chain (e.g., hardware manufacturing, firmware development, software development, storage, and distribution entities) are calculated using scores from cybersecurity maturity questionnaires in a Bayesian Network leaky Noisy-MAX model. These difficulty metrics are then used to calculate an overall supply chain cyber-attack risk. Vulnerability and recoverability metrics are also proposed to evaluate the relative stakeholder influence in the attack risk. These proposed relative risk metrics enable continuous supply chain monitoring, provide decision-makers with information necessary for improved supplier selection, and help drive improvements in the cybersecurity posture of the stakeholders in their supply chain.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

WPTO Navigator

Protecting hydroelectric plants from incidents that adversely impact their cyber-physical systems presents unique challenges due to the plants’ widely dispersed geographic locations and varied configurations as well as the relative nascent nature of the cyberattacks targeting these facilities. To help hydroelectric plants better respond to and mitigate cybersecurity incidents, this Department of Energy Water Power Technologies Office Navigator aligns the processes within the National Institute of Standards 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide with the emergency actions within the FEMA 64 Emergency Action Plan Framework. This work is to be used at a hydroelectric plant to quickly understand how the plant responds to a cyber incident in relationship to the actions involved in an emergency action plan involving a hydroelectric plant. In addition to this product, there are three other products meant to be distributed to a hydroelectric plant to assist in their cyber incident response and recovery. The first, a report on the processes of building a R&R flip book based on a large set of existing guidance. The second, a handy flip book meant to be distributed to hydroelectric plants to assist them during a cybersecurity incident occurring on a hydroelectic plant. And the third is a comprehensive set of resources to assist an operator in locating appropriate guidance during the recovery process.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Attack Surface of Wind Energy Technologies in the United States

Low cost, reliable electrical energy production from wind relies upon automation and control systems, arguably more so than traditional thermal generation. These same systems, however, can serve as the target of adversaries’ cyber-attacks. Idaho National Laboratory (INL), at the request of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) and Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s (EERE’s) Wind Energy Technologies Office (WETO), evaluated a generalized wind plant architecture to understand the classes of potential threat actors and the vectors that could enable a cyber-attack. This evaluation explores the attack surface of a representative wind plant, identifying potential methods and vectors that an adversary could leverage to conduct a cyber-attack. Included in this assessment are some recommended mitigations and approaches. Each recommendation requires a full security evaluation, cost/benefit analysis, and risk analysis by each owner and operator.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Faster-than-real-time Simulation with Demonstration for Resilient DER Integration

The US electric grid is facing operational, stability, and security challenges. Transmission system operators need some measure of visibility into distribution system renewable generation. Distribution system generation needs to support transmission system voltage. The grid is experiencing an expansion in measurement systems. How to take full advantage of this expansion and defend against attacks, both cyber and physical, poses additional challenges. The Faster-than-real-time Simulation with demonstration for Resilient DER Integration project set out to do the following: a. Flatten the voltage profile through the feeders and system for cost saving and voltage stabilization needs. b. Increase the amount of intermittent distributed energy resources (IDERs) that could be deployed on a utility feeder and provide 100% or more energy needed for the demands on that feeder, and c. based on an accurate model (Digital Twin) of the utilities system, be able to detect any abnormalities on the utilities distribution system. To manage the voltage and increase IDER penetration (a,b), Graph Trace Analysis is employed in a time-series, optimal power flow to coordinate the time-varying feedback control setpoints of a distribution feeder’s utility control devices. Under the coordinated control are a Load Tap Changing Transformer, a voltage regulator, and five switched capacitor banks. The feeder serves over 2000 customers, the feeder secondaries are modeled, and the feeder has 2.3 MW of PV generation, corresponding to a 17.4% penetration of PV generation. The feeder model has over 12,000 components, where every customer load bus and PV generator are modeled. The accuracy of the power flow solution is compared against historical meter voltage measurements, the improvement in conservation voltage reduction energy savings as a function of the coordinated control desired voltage profile is investigated, and the increase in PV penetration of the coordinated control over the existing control is presented. To achieve improved control performance while observing system operation constraints, bellwether Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) voltage measurements are used to adjust the desired voltage profile used by the optimal power flow analysis. To detect and alleviate or negate attacks or failures on the distribution and transmission utility grids (c) the grid needs to be resilient and self-healing. In this project software was designed to do just that. At the center of the software is an Integrated System Model (ISM) that spans from transmission to secondary distribution. The ISM is employed in real-time abnormality detection, voltage stability forecasting, and multi-mode control. Testing results are presented for: 1—attacks on utility infrastructure; 2—energy savings from optimal control; 3—distribution system control response during a low voltage transmission system event; 4—cyber-attacks on PV inverters, where physical inverters are used in hard-ware-in-the-simulation-loop studies. Contributions of this work include real-time analysis that spans from three-phase transmission through secondary distribution; an approach for detecting abnormalities that employs measurements from three independent measurement systems; and a multi-mode distribution system control that responds to cyber-attacks, physical attacks, equipment failures, and transmission system needs.

Integrated System Model, Graph Trace Analysis, Adv↗

DOE OSTI2025

CIE Analysis Process for Engineered Systems

"CIE Analysis Process for Engineered Systems" outlines a comprehensive methodology for integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into both new and existing engineered systems. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER), the process aims to achieve cyber-informed decisions by producing functional security requirements for new systems and retrofitting existing systems to mitigate digital risks. The document details a step-by-step approach, including mission and function definition, digital asset awareness, consequence analysis, and mitigation analysis. It emphasizes the importance of documenting mechanical, electrical, programmable, and network components to protect system functions and provides examples and considerations for each step. The ultimate goal is to ensure that engineered systems remain resilient against cyber threats, maintaining safety, performance, and reliability.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

ARM-IRL: Adaptive Resilience Metric Quantification Using Inverse Reinforcement Learning

The resilience of safety-critical systems is gaining importance due to the rise in cyber and physical threats, especially within critical infrastructure. Traditional static resilience metrics may not capture dynamic system states, leading to inaccurate assessments and ineffective responses to cyber threats. This work aims to develop a data-driven, adaptive method for resilience metric learning. We propose a data-driven approach using inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) to learn a single, adaptive resilience metric. The method infers a reward function from expert control actions. Unlike previous approaches using static weights or fuzzy logic, this work applies adversarial inverse reinforcement learning (AIRL), training a generator and discriminator in parallel to learn the reward structure and derive an optimal policy. The proposed approach is evaluated on multiple scenarios: optimal communication network rerouting, power distribution network reconfiguration, and cyber–physical restoration of critical loads using the IEEE 123-bus system. The adaptive, learned resilience metric enables faster critical load restoration in comparison to conventional RL approaches.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Transmission and Distribution Real-Time Analysis Software for Monitoring and Control: Design and Simulation Testing

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗

DOE OSTI2022

Building Blocks for Secure and Prosperous Defense Critical Supply Chains: A Case Study from Microelectronics

Securing defense-critical supply chains, built on resilient and sustainable microelectronics fabrication and deployment, is a national imperative and one that requires an investment in basic and applied research, development, and deployment into industries in (and out of) the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Critical next steps include the development of pilots for revolutionary concepts in a new formal verification model and the Cyber-Physical Passport (CPP) concept for chain of custody. Critical infrastructure leadership should take action with a sense of urgency. Working in conjunction with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should establish pilot programs with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the service labs to build and test both concepts in legacy and new system development.. Additionally, the Pentagon may be aware that an existing Manufacturing Innovation Institute is piloting, with the semiconductor industry, cyber innovations to provide verifiable security properties and guarantees of physical functions to build a more cyber secure, resilient and efficient micro-electronics supply chain.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Towards generic memory forensic framework for programmable logic controllers

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a microprocessor-based controller that is used to automate physical processes in critical infrastructure and various other industries and manufacturing sectors. Initially, PLCs were completely isolated from the Internet, and cyber security was not incorporated at the time of development. The introduction of industry 4.0 and the evolution of ICS systems to communicate over public IP addresses from the Internet enhanced productivity and efficiency, but Internet connectivity exposed the systems and their vulnerabilities, which led to an increase in cyber attacks. When a system is sabotaged/compromised, security analysts need to get to the root cause of the attack as quickly as possible to recover the system. To do so, memory forensic analysis is critical to provide a unique insight into the run-time memory activities and extract a reliable source of evidence. In this paper, we analyze the memory structure of the Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC. To build a memory profile, we reverse engineer the communication protocol and conduct differential analysis to gain knowledge about the structure of the memory and the low-level representation of control logic instructions. We then identify dynamic and static memory regions by modifying different project fields and conducting differential analysis, which allows us to identify boundaries of critical memory structures and extract important forensic artifacts that can be found in the memory. The Python implementation of the memory profile can help reduce the time and effort required for manual analysis in case of cyber incident or system failure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Development and assessment of a model predictive controller enabling anticipatory control strategies for a heat-pipe system

To support the reliable and resilient operation of modular reactors and microreactors, anticipatory control strategies have been proposed for achieving faster-than-real-time predictions and decision-making capabilities in anticipation of potential anomalies, including setpoint changes and cyber incidents. Here this work presents how anticipatory control strategies can be implemented via model predictive control (MPC) of a single heat pipe’s temperature. Considering the uncertainty in developing and applying MPC, this work evaluates MPC performance given three different model forms: a linear response surface model, an artificial neural network (ANN), and an autoregressive model with exogenous input (ARX). This work also evaluates the impacts of different input biases and variance on MPC performance in order to account for potential sensor reading variations due to cyber incidents. We observe that nonparametric models such as the ANN and ARX result in more fluctuated control actions compared to the MPC applied to the linear response surface model. However, when the cyber incidents are of a large magnitude, the linear response surface model produces smaller feasible regions than the nonparametric models under identical constraints.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cognitive IoT and Edge Computing for Intrusion Detection with Federated TinyML

Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) are rapidly becoming an integral part of the modern society. By 2030, there is estimated to be over 40 billion active and connected IoT devices [1]. This rapid progress also comes with a significant implication on cybersecurity. Back-end infrastructure and systems have a much broader attack than they did previously due to vulnerable IoT/EC devices being connected to wireless networks. This expanding attack surface is a growing concern because IoT/EC are increasingly being used in critical systems such as power grids, health care, and smart homes. To effectively address a problem of this scale, cognitive cyber methods—which can autonomously detect and react to cyber attacks as they develop—are needed. To address this, we bring Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to IoT/EC devices, using tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data against cyber threats, and using Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. We propose a novel three-layer architecture: (1) an IoT layer for tinyML-based inference, (2) an edge layer for ML model training, and (3) a cloud layer for FL operations. Using the publicly available 11-class N-BaIoT dataset [2], we demonstrate that this architecture mitigates resource constraints at the IoT layer while improving detection accuracy over standard two-layer designs. An outlier-resistant scaler, feature reduction, and quantization enable the tinyML model to maintain detection accuracy with a reduced model size. Additionally, federated learning that only utilizes the intersection (across heterogenous devices) of the reduced feature set achieves superior detection accuracy compared to locally trained models.

Li, Mingyan [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000569532640)↗

DOE OSTI2022

Towards Automatic Mapping of Vulnerabilities to Attack Patterns using Large Language Models

With the advent of new devices and applications, cyber attack surface is continuously evolving due to the emergence of new attack techniques and vulnerabilities. Hence, security management tool must assess the cyber risk of an enterprise at regular interval basis through comprehensively identifying associations among attack techniques, weakness, and vulnerabilities. However, existing repositories providing such associations are incomplete (i.e., missing associations), inducing the likelihood of undermining the risk of particular set of attack techniques. Moreover, such associations still rely on manual interpretation, which is slow compared to attack speed and ineffective for the increasing list of vulnerabilities and attack actions. Therefore, there is an urge to develop methodologies for automatically associating vulnerabilities to all relevant attack techniques. In this paper, we present a framework, named VWC-MAP, that can automatically identify all relevant attack techniques of a vulnerability via weakness based on their text descriptions, applying natural language process (NLP) techniques. To achieve that, we present a novel two-tiered classification approach, where the first tier classifies vulnerabilities to weakness, and the second tier classifies weakness to attack techniques. This research has improved the scalability of the current state-of-the-art tool to make vulnerability to weakness mapping significantly faster. Moreover, this paper presents two novel approaches for weakness to attack technique mapping applying Text-to-Text and link prediction techniques. Our experiment results cross-validated through cyber-security experts show that VWC-MAP can associate vulnerabilities to weakness types with 87% accuracy and to new attack patterns with 80% accuracy.

Das, Siddhartha Shankar↗

DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗