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A comparison of JPL and European environmental testing standards is presented. The contents include: 1) JPL Environmental Testing Documents; 2) Focus of the Comparison; 3) Test Policy; 4) Documentation; 5) Programmatics; 6) Functional Testing; 7) Reporting; 8) Dynamics Test Levels, Durations, & Margins; 9) Thermal Test Levels, Durations, & Margins; and 10) EMC Test Levels, Durations, & Margins.
Extensive data would be required for the qualification of a fission surface power (FSP) system. The strategy for qualifying a FSP system could have a significant programmatic impact. This paper explores potential options that could be used for qualifying FSP systems, including cost-effective means for obtaining required data. three methods for obtaining qualification data are analysis, non-nuclear testing, and nuclear testing. It has been over 40 years since the US qualified a space reactor for launch. During that time, advances have been made related to all three methods. Perhaps the greatest advancement has occurred in the area of computational tools for design and analysis. Tools that have been developed, coupled with modem computers, would have a significant impact on a FSP qualification. This would be especially true for systems with materials and fuels operating well within temperature, irradiation damage, and burnup limits. The ability to perform highly realistic non-nuclear testing has also advanced throughout the past four decades. Instrumented thermal simulators were developed during the 1970s and 1980s to assist in the development, operation, and assessment of terrestrial fission systems. Instrumented thermal simulators optimized for assisting in the development, operation, and assessment of modem FSP systems have been under development (and utilized) since 1998. These thermal simulators enable heat from fission to be closely mimicked (axial power profile, radial power profile, temperature, heat flux, etc.} and extensive data to be taken from the core region. Both steady-state and transient operation can be tested. For transient testing, reactivity feedback is calculated (or measured in cold/warm criticals) based on reactor temperature and/or dimensional changes. Pin power during a transient is then calculated based on the reactivity feedback that would occur given measured values of temperature and/or dimensional change. In this way nonnuclear testing can be used to provide very realistic information related to nuclear operation. Non-nuclear testing can be used at all levels, including component, subsystem, and integrated system testing. Realistic non-nuclear testing is most useful for systems operating within known temperature, irradiation damage, and burnup capabilities.
The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration has directed NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020, by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage. This decision was reached during the Exploration Systems Architecture Study and confirmed after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by testing existing engine hardware and designs; building on the Apollo Program (1961 to 1975), the Space Shuttle Program (1972 to 2010); and consulting with Apollo-era experts to derive other lessons lived to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.
The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration has directed NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020 by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage (EDS). This decision was reached during the Exploration Systems Architecture Study and confirmed after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by testing existing engine hardware and designs; building on the Apollo Program (1961 to 1975), the Space Shuttle Program (1972 to 2010); and consulting with Apollo era experts to derive other lessons learned to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.
With the increased emphasis on aircraft safety, enhanced performance and affordability, and the need to reduce the environmental impact of aircraft, there are many new challenges being faced by the designers of aircraft propulsion systems. Also the propulsion systems required to enable the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Vision for Space Exploration in an affordable manner will need to have high reliability, safety and autonomous operation capability. The Controls and Dynamics Branch (CDB) at NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) in Cleveland, Ohio, is leading and participating in various projects in partnership with other organizations within GRC and across NASA, the U.S. aerospace industry, and academia to develop advanced controls and health management technologies that will help meet these challenges through the concept of Intelligent Propulsion Systems. This paper describes the current activities of the CDB under the NASA Aeronautics Research and Exploration Systems Missions. The programmatic structure of the CDB activities is described along with a brief overview of each of the CDB tasks including research objectives, technical challenges, and recent accomplishments. These tasks include active control of propulsion system components, intelligent propulsion diagnostics and control for reliable fault identification and accommodation, distributed engine control, and investigations into unsteady propulsion systems.
A human lunar outpost, under NASA study for construction in the 2020's, has potential requirements to transfer electric power up to 50-kW across the lunar surface from 0.1 to 10-km distances. This power would be used to operate surface payloads located remotely from the outpost and/or outpost primary power grid. This paper describes concept designs for state-of-the-art technology power transfer subsystems including AC or DC power via cables, beamed radio frequency power and beamed laser power. Power transfer subsystem mass and performance are calculated and compared for each option. A simplified qualitative assessment of option operations, hazards, costs and technology needs is also described. Based on these concept designs and performance analyses, a DC power cabling subsystem is recommended to minimize subsystem mass and to minimize mission and programmatic costs and risks. Avenues for additional power transfer subsystem studies are recommended.
In accordance with the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration and the nation's desire to again send humans to explore beyond Earth orbit, NASA has been tasked to send human beings to the moon, Mars, and beyond. It has been 30 years since the United States last designed and built a human-rated launch vehicle. NASA is now building the Ares I crew launch vehicle, which will loft the Orion crew exploration vehicle into orbit, and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle, which will launch the Lunar Surface Access Module and Earth departure stage to rendezvous Orion for missions to the moon. NASA has marshaled unique resources from the government and private sectors to perform the technically and programmatically complex work of delivering astronauts to orbit early next decade, followed by heavy cargo late next decade. Our experiences with Saturn and the Shuttle have taught us the value of adhering to sound systems engineering, such as the "test as you fly" principle, while applying aerospace best practices and lessons learned. If we are to fly humans safely aboard a launch vehicle, we must employ a variety of methodologies to reduce the technical, schedule, and cost risks inherent in the complex business of space transportation. During the Saturn development effort, NASA conducted multiple demonstration and verification flight tests to prove technology in its operating environment before relying upon it for human spaceflight. Less testing on the integrated Shuttle system did not reduce cost or schedule. NASA plans a progressive series of demonstration (ascent), verification (orbital), and mission flight tests to supplement ground research and high-altitude subsystem testing with real-world data, factoring the results of each test into the next one. In this way, sophisticated analytical models and tools, many of which were not available during Saturn and Shuttle, will be calibrated and we will gain confidence in their predictions, as we gain hands-on experience in operating the first of two new launch vehicle systems. The Ares I-1 flight test vehicle (FTV) will incorporate a mix of flight and mockup hardware, reflecting a configuration similar in mass, weight, and shape (outer mold line or OML) to the operational vehicle. It will be powered by a four-segment reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB), which is currently in Shuttle inventory, and will be modified to include a fifth, inert segment that makes it approximately the same size and weight as the five segment RSRB, which will be available for the second flight test in 2012. The Ares I-1 vehicle configuration is shown. Each test flight has specific objectives appropriate to the design analysis cycle in progress. The Ares I-1 demonstration test, slated for April 2009, gives NASA its first opportunity to gather critical data about the flight dynamics of the integrated launch vehicle stack, understand how to control its roll during flight, and other characterize the severe stage separation environment that the upper stage will experience during future operational flights. NASA also will begin the process of modifying the launch infrastructure and fine-tuning ground and mission operational scenarios, as NASA transitions from the Shuttle to the Ares/Orion system.
The performance of ISS spacecraft materials and systems on prolonged exposure to the low-Earth orbit (LEO) space flight is reported in this paper. In-flight data, flight crew observations, and the results of ground-based test and analysis directly supporting programmatic and operational decision-making are presented. The space flight environments definitions (both natural and induced) used for ISS design, material selection, and verification testing are shown, in most cases, to be more severe than the actual flight environment accounting for the outstanding performance of ISS as a long mission duration spacecraft. No significant ISS material or system failures have been attributed to spacecraft-environments interactions. Nonetheless, ISS materials and systems performance data is contributing to our understanding of spacecraft material interactions in the spaceflight environment so as to reduce cost and risk for future spaceflight projects and programs. Orbital inclination (51.6o) and altitude (nominally near 360 km) determine the set of natural environment factors affecting the functional life of materials and systems on ISS. ISS operates in an electrically conducting environment (the F2 region of Earth s ionosphere) with well-defined fluxes of atomic oxygen, other charged and neutral ionospheric plasma species, solar UV, VUV, and x-ray radiation as well as galactic cosmic rays, trapped radiation, and solar cosmic rays (1-4). The LEO micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment is an especially important determinant of spacecraft design and operations (5, 6). The magnitude of several environmental factors varies dramatically with latitude and longitude as ISS orbits the Earth (1-4). The high latitude orbital environment also exposes ISS to higher fluences of trapped energetic electrons, auroral electrons, solar cosmic rays, and galactic cosmic rays (1-4) than would be the case in lower inclination orbits, largely as a result of the overall shape and magnitude of the geomagnetic field (1-4). As a result, ISS exposure to many environmental factors can vary dramatically along a particular orbital ground track, and from one ground track to the next, during any 24-hour period.
Requirements driving the HHC work and deliverables are derived from the Human Research Program requirements, as well as Agency standards regarding the maintenance of human health and performance and a programmatic review of the existing evidence to support identified risks. Agency human health and performance standards define acceptable risk for each type and duration of exploration mission. It is critical to have the best available scientific and clinical evidence in setting and validating these standards. In addition, it is imperative that the best available evidence on preventing and mitigating human health and performance risks is incorporated into exploration mission and vehicle designs.
In a crewed spacecraft environment, atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) and moisture control are crucial. Hamilton Sundstrand has developed a stable and efficient amine-based CO2 and water vapor sorbent, SA9T, that is well suited for use in a spacecraft environment. The sorbent is efficiently packaged in pressure-swing regenerable beds that are thermally linked to improve removal efficiency and minimize vehicle thermal loads. Flows are all controlled with a single spool valve. This technology has been baselined for the new Orion spacecraft. However, more data was needed on the operational characteristics of the package in a simulated spacecraft environment. A unit was therefore tested with simulated metabolic loads in a closed chamber at Johnson Space Center during the last third of 2006. Those test results were reported in a 2007 ICES paper. A second test article was incorporated for a third phase of testing, and that test article was modified to allow pressurized gas purge regeneration on the launch pad in addition to the standard vacuum regeneration in space. Metabolic rates and chamber volumes were also adjusted to reflect current programmatic standards. The third phase of tests was performed during the spring and summer of 2007. Tests were run with a range of operating conditions, varying: cycle time, vacuum pressure (or purge gas flow rate), air flow rate, and crew activity levels. Results of this testing are presented and potential flight operational strategies discussed.
NASA Headquarters Environmental Management Division supports NASA's mission to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research by integrating environmental considerations into programs and projects early-on, thereby proactively reducing NASA's exposure to institutional, programmatic and operational risk. As part of this effort, NASA established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) as a resource for detecting, analyzing, and communicating environmental regulatory risks to the NASA stakeholder community. The RRAC PC focuses on detecting emerging environmental regulations and other operational change drivers that may pose risks to NASA programs and facilities, and effectively communicating the potential risks. For example, regulatory change may restrict how and where certain activities or operations may be conducted. Regulatory change can also directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Regulatory change can result in significant adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities due to NASA's stringent performance requirements for materials and components related to human-rated space vehicles. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented a system for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the process utilized by the RRACPC to communicate regulatory change and the associated potential risks within NASA, as well as the process for communicating and cooperating with other government agencies and industry partners, both domestic and international, to ensure mission success.
An overview of NASA s electrochemical energy storage programs for NASA Exploration missions is being presented at the 10th Electrochemical Power Sources R&D Symposium, which is being held in Williamsburg, VA on August 20-23, 2007. This public domain venue, which is sponsored by the U.S. Navy and held every two years, serves as a forum for the dissemination of research and development results related to electrochemical energy storage technology programs that are currently being supported and managed within governmental agencies. Technology areas of primary interest include batteries, fuel cells, and both overview and focused presentations on such are given by both governmental and contractual researchers. The forum also provides an opportunity to assess technology areas of mutual interest with respect to establishing collaborative and/or complementary programmatic interactions.
The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project is a software-based technique that will identify and quantify the medical needs and health risks of exploration crew members during space flight and evaluate the effectiveness of potential mitigation strategies. The IMM Project employs an evidence-based approach that will quantify probability and consequences of defined in-flight medical risks, mitigation strategies, and tactics to optimize crew member health. Using stochastic techniques, the IMM will ultimately inform decision makers at both programmatic and institutional levels and will enable objective assessment of crew health and optimization of mission success using data from relevant cohort populations and from the astronaut population. The objectives of the project include: 1) identification and documentation of conditions that may occur during exploration missions (Baseline Medical Conditions List [BMCL), 2) assessment of the likelihood of conditions in the BMCL occurring during exploration missions (incidence rate), 3) determination of the risk associated with these conditions and quantify in terms of end states (Loss of Crew, Loss of Mission, Evacuation), 4) optimization of in-flight hardware mass, volume, power, bandwidth and cost for a given level of risk or uncertainty, and .. validation of the methodologies used.
Identification, resolution, and avoidance of technical and programmatic issues are important for ensuring safe and successful space missions. Although the importance of applying lessons learned to reduce risk is frequently stressed, there is little material available to help technical and management personnel research and document lessons learned. Collecting, researching, identifying, and documenting lessons learned that will be useful to current and future management and engineering personnel is not always a straightforward task. This white paper presents lessons learned and best practices concerning the research and documentation of technical and organizational lessons learned. It is intended to enable organizations to initiate or improve lessons learned research and documentation efforts. The content of this white paper is based on four technical lessons learned projects conducted by the United Space Alliance (USA) Flight Design and Dynamics Department, in support of the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Design and Dynamics Division. Each project published a report, titled as follows: (1) GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38; (2) Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions; (3) Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report; and (4) Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned. The four projects were different in availability of subject matter experts and primary source material, subject scope, and the level of effort required to produce the final report. However, generic lessons can be drawn from all of them. The best practices will be discussed by the phases of report research and development: (1) Defining Report Requirements, Project Organization, and Schedule; (2) Collection and Analysis of Source Material; (3) Writing and Integrating the Report; and (4) Review and Revision of the Report.
This paper is a discussion of how the many long-lead development elements required for the realization of a future nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) system can be effectively leveraged from the ongoing work being conducted on the J-2X engine program for the Constellation Program. Development studies conducted to date for NTP forward planning have identified a number of technical areas that will require advancement to acceptable technology readiness levels (TRLs) before they can be utilized in NTP system development. These include high-temperature, high-area ratio nozzle extension; long-life, low-NPSP. turbomachinery; and low-boiloff propellant management; and a qualified nuclear fuel element. The current J-2X program is working many of these areas that can be leveraged to support NTP development in a highly compatible and synergistic fashion. In addition to supporting technical development, there are other programmatic issues being worked in the J-2X program that can be leveraged by a future NTP development program. These include compliance with recently-evolved space system requirements such as human-rating, fault tolerance and fracture control. These and other similar mandatory system requirements have been adopted by NASA and can result in a significant technical impact beyond elevation of the root technologies required by NTP. Finally, the exploitation of experience, methodologies, and procedures developed by the J-2X program in the areas of verification, qualification, certification, altitude simulation testing, and facility definition will be especially applicable to a future NTP system. The similarities in system mission (in-space propulsion) and operational environment (vacuum, zero-gee) between J-2X and NTP make this highly synergistic. Thus, it can be $hown that the collective benefit of leveraging experience and technologies developed during the J-2X program can result in significant savings in development cost and schedule for NTP.
The next chapter in NASA's history also promises to write the next chapter in America's history, as the Agency makes measurable strides toward developing new space transportation capabilities that wi!! put astronauts on course to explore the Moon as the next giant leap toward the first human footprint on Mars. This paper will present top-level plans and progress being made toward fielding the Ares I crew launch vehicle in the 2013 timeframe and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle in the 2018 timeframe. It also gives insight into the objectives for the first test flight, known as the Ares I-X, which is scheduled for April 2009. The U.S. strategy to scientifically explore space will fuel innovations such as solar power and water recycling, as well as yield new knowledge that directly benefits life on Earth. For the Ares launch vehicles, NASA is building on heritage hardware and unique capabilities; as well as almost 50 years of lessons learned from the Apollo Saturn, Space Shuttle, and commercial launch vehicle programs. In the Ares I Project's inaugural year, extensive trade studies and evaluations were conducted to improve upon the designs initially recommended by the Exploration Systems Architecture Study, resulting in significant reduction of near-term and long-range technical and programmatic risks; conceptual designs were analyzed for fitness against requirements; and the contractual framework was assembled to enable a development effort unparalleled in American space flight since the Space Shuttle. The Exploration Launch Projects team completed the Ares I System Requirements Review (SRR) at the end of 2006--the first such engineering milestone for a human-rated space transportation system in over 30 years.
This paper discusses the performance analysis effort being carried out in the NASA Deep Space Network. The activity involves root cause analysis of failures and assessment of key performance metrics. The root cause analysis helps pinpoint the true cause of observed problems so that proper correction can be effected. The assessment currently focuses on three aspects: (1) data delivery metrics such as Quantity, Quality, Continuity, and Latency; (2) link-performance metrics such as antenna pointing, system noise temperature, Doppler noise, frequency and time synchronization, wide-area-network loading, link-configuration setup time; and (3) reliability, maintainability, availability metrics. The analysis establishes whether the current system is meeting its specifications and if so, how much margin is available. The findings help identify the weak points in the system and direct attention of programmatic investment for performance improvement.
This paper presents a design alternative and the rationale for a stage separation system based on Metering Adiabatic Gas Struts (MAG Struts) for the Ares 1 launch vehicle. The MAG Strut separation system was proposed as an alternative to the current Ares 1 separation system, which relies on small solid rocket motors to provide the main separation force. This paper will describe technical issues that were addressed during the trade study and present a conceptual design of the strut system that best resolved the issues. Needed development testing and programmatic considerations will be addressed as part of the paper.