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At least 847 records · Page 47
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbital maneuvering system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware are documented. The OMS provides the thrust to perform orbit insertion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, and deorbit. The OMS is housed in two independent pods located one on each side of the tail and consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization; Propellant Storage and Distribution; Orbital Maneuvering Engine; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control. The IOA analysis process utilized available OMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluted and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was asigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Prust, C. D.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the backup flight system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware. The BFS hardware consists of one General Purpose Computer (GPC) loaded with backup flight software and the components used to engage/disengage that unique GPC. Specifically, the BFS hardware includes the following: DDU (Display Driver Unit), BFC (Backup Flight Controller), GPC (General Purpose Computer), switches (engage, disengage, GPC, CRT), and circuit protectors (fuses, circuit breakers). The IOA analysis process utilized available BFS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the failure modes analyzed, 19 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.

Prust, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the mechanical actuation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). The IOA analysis process utilized available MAS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bacher, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Preliminary analysis techniques for ring and stringer stiffened cylindrical shells

This report outlines methods of analysis for the buckling of thin-walled circumferentially and longitudinally stiffened cylindrical shells. Methods of analysis for the various failure modes are presented in one cohesive package. Where applicable, more than one method of analysis for a failure mode is presented along with standard practices. The results of this report are primarily intended for use in launch vehicle design in the elastic range. A Microsoft Excel worksheet with accompanying macros has been developed to automate the analysis procedures.

Graham, J.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Computerized multilevel analysis for multilayered fiber composites

A FORTRAN 4 computer code for the micromechanics, macromechanics, and laminate analysis of multilayered fiber composite structural components is described. The code can be used either individually or as a subroutine within a complex structural analysis/synthesis program. The inputs to the code are constituent materials properties, composite geometry, and loading conditions. The outputs are various properties for ply and composite; composite structural response, including bending-stretching coupling; and composite stress analysis, including comparisons with failure criteria for combined stress. The code was used successfully in the analysis and structural synthesis of flat panels, in the buckling analysis of flat panels, in multilayered composite material failure studies, and lamination residual stresses analysis.

Chamis, C. C.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Computerized multilevel analysis for multilayered fiber composites.

A FORTRAN IV computer code for the micromechanics, macromechanics, and laminate analysis of multilayered fiber composite structural components is described. The code can be used either individually or as a subroutine within a complex structural analysis/synthesis program. The inputs to the code are constituent materials properties, composite geometry, and loading conditions. The outputs are various properties for ply and composite; composite structural response, including bending-stretching coupling; and composite stress analysis, including comparisons with failure criteria for combined stress. The code was used successfully in the analysis and structural synthesis of flat panels, in the buckling analysis of flat panels, in multilayered composite material failure studies, and lamination residual stresses analysis.

Chamis, C. C.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the body flap subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Body Flap (BF) subsystem hardware are documented. The BF is a large aerosurface located at the trailing edge of the lower aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. During the ascent phase of flight, the BF trails in a fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon load relief, trim control, and acts as a heat shield for the main engines. Specifically, the BF hardware comprises the following components: Power Drive Unit (PDU), rotary actuators, and torque tubes. The IOA analysis process utilized available BF hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 35 failure modes analyzed, 19 were determined to be PCIs.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the remote manipulator system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Remote Manipulator System (RMS) are documented. The RMS hardware and software are primarily required for deploying and/or retrieving up to five payloads during a single mission, capture and retrieve free-flying payloads, and for performing Manipulator Foot Restraint operations. Specifically, the RMS hardware consists of the following components: end effector; displays and controls; manipulator controller interface unit; arm based electronics; and the arm. The IOA analysis process utilized available RMS hardware drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware assemblies, components and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 574 failure modes analyzed, 413 were determined to be PCIs.

Tangorra, F.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical (PCIs) items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results coresponding to the Orbiter crew equipment hardware are documented. The IOA analysis process utilized available crew equipment hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 352 failure modes analyzed, 78 were determined to be PCIs.

Sinclair, Susan↗
NASA NTRS1975

Spectrum analysis of acoustic emissions from boron-aluminum composites

Acoustic emissions were monitored from unidirectional tension specimens of boron-aluminum composites. It is shown that a sudden increase in count rate presages final failure. This sudden increase, however, occurs at a variable point relative to final failure load. Spectrum analysis in the range from 1 to 100 kHz was performed on the emissions with the result that no immediately obvious recognition pattern exists to distinguish between types of failure mechanisms. It is suggested that either acoustic emissions cannot be used to distinguish different failure modes in boron-aluminum composites in the frequency range studied or the specimens used had only one failure mode operating with sufficient energy release to be detected. The spectrum analysis did show, however, that the acoustic emissions had frequency components much higher than the frequencies for the fundamental modes of natural vibration of the specimen.

Henneke, E. G., II↗
NASA NTRS1982

Geometrically nonlinear analysis of adhesively bonded joints

A geometrically nonlinear finite element analysis of cohesive failure in typical joints is presented. Cracked-lap-shear joints were chosen for analysis. Results obtained from linear and nonlinear analysis show that nonlinear effects, due to large rotations, significantly affect the calculated mode 1, crack opening, and mode 2, inplane shear, strain-energy-release rates. The ratio of the mode 1 to mode 2 strain-energy-relase rates (G1/G2) was found to be strongly affected by he adhesive modulus and the adherend thickness. The ratios between 0.2 and 0.8 can be obtained by varying adherend thickness and using either a single or double cracked-lap-shear specimen configuration. Debond growth rate data, together with the analysis, indicate that mode 1 strain-energy-release rate governs debond growth. Results from the present analysis agree well with experimentally measured joint opening displacements.

Dattaguru, B.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Geometrically nonlinear analysis of adhesively bonded joints

A geometrically nonlinear finite element analysis of cohesive failure in typical joints is presented. Cracked-lap-shear joints were chosen for analysis. Results obtained from linear and nonlinear analysis show that nonlinear effects, due to large rotations, significantly affect the calculated mode 1, crack opening, and mode 2, inplane shear, strain-energy-release rates. The ratio of the mode 1 to mode 2 strain-energy-release rates (G1/G2) was found to be strongly affected by the adhesive modulus and the adherend thickness. The ratios between 0.2 and 0.8 can be obtained by varying adherend thickness and using either a single or double cracked-lap-shear specimen configuration. Debond growth rate data, together with the analysis, indicate that mode 1 strain-energy-release rate governs debond growth. Results from the present analysis agree well with experimentally measured joint opening displacements. Previously announced in STAR as N83-13497

Dattaguru, B.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Shuttle Stiffener Ring Foam Failure, a Non-Conventional Approach

The Space Shuttle makes use of the excellent properties of rigid polyurethane foam for cryogenic tank insulation and as structural protection on the solid rocket boosters. When foam applications debond, classical methods of analysis do not always provide root cause of the failure of the foam. Realizing that foam is the ideal media to document and preserve its own mode of failure, thin sectioning was seen as a logical approach for foam failure analysis. Thin sectioning in two directions, both horizontal and vertical to the application, was chosen to observe the three dimensional morphology of the foam cells. The cell foam morphology provided a much greater understanding of the failure modes than previously achieved.

Howard, Philip M.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Tensile failure criteria for fiber composite materials

The analysis provides insight into the failure mechanics of these materials and defines criteria which serve as tools for preliminary design material selection and for material reliability assessment. The model incorporates both dispersed and propagation type failures and includes the influence of material heterogeneity. The important effects of localized matrix damage and post-failure matrix shear stress transfer are included in the treatment. The model is used to evaluate the influence of key parameters on the failure of several commonly used fiber-matrix systems. Analyses of three possible failure modes were developed. These modes are the fiber break propagation mode, the cumulative group fracture mode, and the weakest link mode. Application of the new model to composite material systems has indicated several results which require attention in the development of reliable structural composites. Prominent among these are the size effect and the influence of fiber strength variability.

Rosen, B. W.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the extravehicular mobility unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware. The EMU is an independent anthropomorphic system that provides environmental protection, mobility, life support, and communications for the Shuttle crewmember to perform Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in Earth orbit. Two EMUs are included on each baseline Orbiter mission, and consumables are provided for three two-man EVAs. The EMU consists of the Life Support System (LSS), Caution and Warning System (CWS), and the Space Suit Assembly (SSA). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. The majority of these PCIs are resultant from failures which cause loss of one or more primary functions: pressurization, oxygen delivery, environmental maintenance, and thermal maintenance. It should also be noted that the quantity of PCIs would significantly increase if the SOP were to be treated as an emergency system rather than as an unlike redundant element.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗
NASA NTRS1990

An improved approach for flight readiness assessment

An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk for a spaceflight system in order to assess flight readiness is presented. This methodology is of particular value when information relevant to failure prediction, including test experience and knowledge of parameters used in engineering analyses of failure phenomena, is limited. In this approach, engineering analysis models that characterize specific failure modes based on the physics and mechanics of the failure phenomena are used in a prescribed probabilistic structure to generate a failure probability distribution that is modified by test and flight experience in a Bayesian statistical procedure. The probabilistic structure and statistical methodology are generally applicable to any failure mode for which quantitative engineering analysis can be employed to characterize the failure phenomenon and are particularly well suited for use under the constraints on information availability that are typical of such spaceflight systems as the Space Shuttle and planetary spacecraft.

Moore, N. R.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the communication and tracking subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA analysis process utilized available Communication and Tracking hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Gardner, J. R.↗