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Custom Equipment Development for Processing of Surplus Plutonium

The Strategic Laboratory Assessment (SLA), a collaborative team of SRNL and ORNL personnel, has been established to advance the objectives of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Project, by identifying and developing technologies to accelerate disposition, reduce life cycle costs, minimize worker radiation exposure, improve worker safety, and minimize Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program risks. [1] The SLA team has identified can cutting and plutonium (Pu) oxide size reduction as two glovebox processes where technology enhancements would be valuable. The DOESTD-3013 package currently in use for Pu downblending requires cutting two nested cans before the inner convenience can that holds the Pu oxide may be accessed for further processing. A rotary tubing-style cutter is used for opening the 3013 packages within the glovebox. Collet changeouts are required between cutting of the outer and inner cans. The SLA team is currently developing and testing an adjustable-clamp can cutter design that eliminates collet changeouts and allows cutting of the outer and inner can at the same time, resulting in significant reduction of radiological dose and process time, as well as improved ergonomics. To meet the Pu oxide particle size requirement, size reduction of Pu oxide agglomerations must be performed within the process gloveboxes. The SLA team has identified jaw crushing technology as an alternative to the currently employed rotary mill. Jaw crusher advantages include reduced dust within the glovebox, increased batch sizes, and easier integration with other glovebox processes due to the flow-through nature of jaw crushing. Commercially manufactured jaw crushers are either too large and/or too heavy for implementation in the SPD gloveboxes, so the SLA team is developing and testing a custom jaw crusher to meet the needs of the SPD Project.

Krementz, Daniel [Savannah River National Laborato↗

Insulation Activation and Contamination in Low-Power Experiments

Among the diverse advanced nuclear reactor concepts being developed are designs that expect to operate at much higher temperatures than conventional light-water reactors, and therefore require alternative materials for components capable of withstanding these extreme temperatures. Insulation is one such component where alternative high-temperature industrial composites are being considered. Low-power experiments can provide an opportunity for advancing our understanding of material behavior under irradiation; however, these experiments are not without occupational hazards. The focus of this paper is the potential for activation of insulating composites when exposed to neutron fluence during reactor experiments, and to discuss the subsequent contamination of the testing area. This paper will also discuss practical measures for preventing the creation and inhalation of activated particulate matter (i.e., dust), such as engineering and administrative controls and personal protective equipment. This paper evaluates the suitability of several insulation materials for use in reactor experiments based on their activation from neutron irradiation. The materials considered are Pyrogel XTE by Aspen Aerogel, Cerablanket and Kaowool by Morgan Advanced Materials, Thermo-12 Gold by Johns Manville, and Maxsil CF6-2000 by McAllister Mills. Although these materials are not yet widely used in the nuclear industry, they are common in other industries due to their thermal insulating properties. These materials produce dust while handling that can pose health and safety hazards, which could be further exacerbated by activation. The analysis presented in this paper utilizes a deterministic method developed to predict the activation source term of the provided insulation materials. The method calculates the atomic density of each element within the composites and simulates their exposure to a specified neutron flux density representative of low power experimental conditions. During the irradiation phase and throughout the extensive cooling period, neutron absorptions and nuclear decays are tracked for relevant isotopes. The residual activity within each composite is then assessed to identify the material with the lowest potential radiological hazard to workers. Dust will be created during installation and removal of insulating materials and may also be generated during the experiment. Contamination of surrounding surfaces due to dispersion is highly likely unless preventative measures are taken. The results of this analysis are used to estimate an internal dose from inhalation of activated dust, which is significantly lower than the allowable whole-body dose. However, the risk of internal exposure may increase if the dust becomes a transport vector for nuclear material. The goals of this paper are to enhance the understanding of the potential activation and contamination hazards from the use of these insulating materials in low-power nuclear experiments and to foster safer work environments through informed decision-making and strategic planning. This work ultimately contributes to a broader understanding of how new non-nuclear materials for advanced reactors impact the radiological safety of co-located workers, helping to ensure the responsible management of radioactive materials during installation and decommissioning activities.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Calendar Year 2023

The U.S. Department of Energy Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Calendar 2023 presents the results of analyses of occupational radiation exposures at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) operations, during calendar year 2023. This report includes occupational radiation exposure data for over 80,000 DOE Federal employees, contractors, and subcontractors as well as members of the public who have worked in or entered controlled areas monitored for exposure to radiation. DOE publishes this annual report to provide DOE Management, Program Offices, workers, health physicists, and other stakeholders an evaluation of DOE-wide performance regarding compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection (10 CFR 835) radiation exposure limits and adherence to as low as reasonably achievable principles. This report provides a discussion regarding radiation protection and exposure reporting requirements. It also includes calendar year (CY) 2023 information and analyses regarding aggregate, individual, site, DOE Program, transient individuals’ dose, as well as a historical review of DOE exposure data. DOE continues to be diligent in protecting its workers and the public from exposure to radiation from DOE operations as illustrated by the results contained in this report.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTAINER MANAGEMENT OF TRANSURANIC (TRU) AND LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORED AT THE CENTRAL WASTE COMPLEX (CWC) AT HANFORD

The Central Waste Complex (CWC) is the interim storage facility for Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (RCRA) mixed waste, transuranic waste, transuranic mixed waste, low-level and low-level mixed radioactive waste at the Department of Energy's (DOE'S) Hanford Site. The majority of the waste stored at the facility is retrieved from the low-level burial grounds in the 200 West Area at the Site, with minor quantities of newly generated waste from on-site and off-site waste generators. The CWC comprises 18 storage buildings that house 13,000 containers. Each waste container within the facility is scanned into its location by building, module, tier and position and the information is stored in a site-wide database. As waste is retrieved from the burial grounds, a preliminary non-destructive assay is performed to determine if the waste is transuranic (TRU) or low-level waste (LLW) and subsequently shipped to the CWC. In general, the TRU and LLW waste containers are stored in separate locations within the CWC, but the final disposition of each waste container is not known upon receipt. The final disposition of each waste container is determined by the appropriate program as process knowledge is applied and characterization data becomes available. Waste containers are stored within the CWC based on their physical chemical and radiological hazards. Further segregation within each building is done by container size (55-gallon, 85-gallon, Standard Waste Box) and waste stream. Due to this waste storage scheme, assembling waste containers for shipment out of the CWC has been time consuming and labor intensive. Qualitatively, the ratio of containers moved to containers in the outgoing shipment has been excessively high, which correlates to additional worker exposure, shipment delays, and operational inefficiencies. These inefficiencies impacted the LLW Program's ability to meet commitments established by the Tri-Party Agreement, an agreement between the State of Washington, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. These commitments require waste containers to be shipped off site for disposal and/or treatment within a certain time frame. Because the program was struggling to meet production demands, the Production and Planning group was tasked with developing a method to assist the LLW Program in fulfilling its requirements. Using existing databases for container management, a single electronic spreadsheet was created to visually map every waste container within the CWC. The file displays the exact location (e.g., building, module, tier, position) of each container in a format that replicates the actual layout in the facility. In addition, each container was placed into a queue defined by the LLW and TRU waste management programs. The queues were developed based on characterization requirements, treatment type and location, and potential final disposition. This visual aid allows the user to select containers from similar queues and view their location within the facility. The user selects containers in a centralized location, rather than random locations, to expedite shipments out of the facility. This increases efficiency for generating the shipments, as well as decreasing worker exposure and container handling time when gathering containers for shipment by reducing movements of waste container. As the containers are collected for shipment, the remaining containers are segregated by queue, which further reduces future container movements.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ELECTRICAL SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT A COMPLEX WIDE TEAMING INITIATIVE

This paper describes the results of a year-long project, sponsored by the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) and designed to improve overall electrical safety performance throughout Department of Energy (DOE)-owned sites and laboratories. As evidenced by focused metrics, the Project was successful primarily due to the joint commitment of contractor and DOE electrical safety experts, as well as significant support from DOE and contractor senior management. The effort was managed by an assigned project manager, using classical project-management principles that included execution of key deliverables and regular status reports to the Project sponsor. At the conclusion of the Project, the DOE not only realized measurable improvement in the safety of their workers, but also had access to valuable resources that will enable them to do the following: evaluate and improve electrical safety programs; analyze and trend electrical safety events; increase electrical safety awareness for both electrical and non-electrical workers; and participate in ongoing processes dedicated to continued improvement.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Radiation Shielding at High-Energy Electron and Proton Accelerators

The goal of accelerator shielding design is to protect the workers, general public, and the environment against unnecessary prompt radiation from accelerator operations. Additionally, shielding at accelerators may also be used to reduce the unwanted background in experimental detectors, to protect equipment against radiation damage, and to protect workers from potential exposure to the induced radioactivity in the machine components. The shielding design for prompt radiation hazards is the main subject of this chapter.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

INNOVATIVE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION IN MANAGEMENT OF REMOTE HANDLED AND LARGE SIZED MIXED WASTE FORMS

CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc. (CH2M HILL) plays a critical role in Hanford Site cleanup for the U. S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection (ORP). CH2M HILL is responsible for the management of 177 tanks containing 53 million gallons of highly radioactive wastes generated from weapons production activities from 1943 through 1990. In that time, 149 single-shell tanks, ranging in capacity from 50,000 gallons to 500,000 gallons, and 28 double-shell tanks with a capacity of 1 million gallons each, were constructed and filled with toxic liquid wastes and sludges. The cleanup mission includes removing these radioactive waste solids from the single-shell tanks to double-shell tanks for staging as feed to the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) on the Hanford Site for vitrification of the wastes and disposal on the Hanford Site and Yucca Mountain repository. Concentrated efforts in retrieving residual solid and sludges from the single-shell tanks began in 2003; the first tank retrieved was C-106 in the 200 East Area of the site. The process for retrieval requires installation of modified sluicing systems, vacuum systems, and pumping systems into existing tank risers. Inherent with this process is the removal of existing pumps, thermo-couples, and agitating and monitoring equipment from the tank to be retrieved. Historically, these types of equipment have been extremely difficult to manage from the aspect of radiological dose, size, and weight of the equipment, as well as their attendant operating and support systems such as electrical distribution and control panels, filter systems, and mobile retrieval systems. Significant effort and expense were required to manage this new waste stream and resulted in several events over time that were both determined to be unsafe for workers and potentially unsound for protection of the environment. Over the last four years, processes and systems have been developed that reduce worker exposures to these hazards, eliminate violations of RCRA storage regulations, reduce costs for waste management by nearly 50 percent, and create a viable method for final treatment and disposal of these waste forms that does not impact retrieval project schedules. This paper is intended to provide information to the nuclear and environmental clean-up industry with the experience of CH2M HILL and ORP in managing these highly difficult waste streams, as well as providing an opportunity for sharing lessons learned, including technical methods and processes that may be applied at other DOE sites.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

AN ENHANCED HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR THE HANFORD TANK FARMS

CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., has expanded the scope and increased the formality of process hazards analyses performed on new or modified Tank Farm facilities, designs, and processes. The CH2M HILL process hazard analysis emphasis has been altered to reflect its use as a fundamental part of the engineering and change control process instead of simply being a nuclear safety analysis tool. The scope has been expanded to include identification of accidents/events that impact the environment, or require emergency response, in addition to those with significant impact to the facility worker, the offsite, and the 100-meter receptor. Also, there is now an expectation that controls will be identified to address all types of consequences. To ensure that the process has an appropriate level of rigor and formality, a new engineering standard for process hazards analysis was created. This paper discusses the role of process hazards analysis as an information source for not only nuclear safety, but also for the worker-safety management programs, emergency management, environmental programs. This paper also discusses the role of process hazards analysis in the change control process, including identifying when and how it should be applied to changes in design or process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Rocket Facility Decommissioning Project: Controlled Explosive Demolition of Neutron-Activated Shield Wall

Located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Test Cell A (TCA) Facility (Figure 1) was used in the early to mid-1960s for testing of nuclear rocket engines, as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program, to further space travel. Nuclear rocket testing resulted in the activation of materials around the reactors and the release of fission products and fuel particles. The TCA facility, known as Corrective Action Unit 115, was decontaminated and decommissioned (D&D) from December 2004 to July 2005 using the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) process, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The SAFER process allows environmental remediation and facility closure activities (i.e., decommissioning) to occur simultaneously, provided technical decisions are made by an experienced decision maker within the site conceptual site model. Facility closure involved a seven-step decommissioning strategy. First, preliminary investigation activities were performed, including review of process knowledge documentation, targeted facility radiological and hazardous material surveys, concrete core drilling and analysis, shield wall radiological characterization, and discrete sampling, which proved to be very useful and cost-effective in subsequent decommissioning planning and execution and worker safety. Second, site setup and mobilization of equipment and personnel were completed. Third, early removal of hazardous materials, including asbestos, lead, cadmium, and oil, was performed ensuring worker safety during more invasive demolition activities. Process piping was to be verified void of contents. Electrical systems were de-energized and other systems were rendered free of residual energy. Fourth, areas of high radiological contamination were decontaminated using multiple methods. Contamination levels varied across the facility. Fixed beta/gamma contamination levels ranged up to 2 million disintegrations per minute (dpm)/100 centimeters squared (cm2) beta/gamma. Removable beta/gamma contamination levels seldom exceeded 1,000 dpm/100 cm2, but, in railroad trenches on the reactor pad containing soil on the concrete pad in front of the shield wall, the beta dose rates ranged up to 120 milli-roentgens per hour from radioactivity entrained in the soil. General area dose rates were less than 100 micro-roentgens per hour. Prior to demolition of the reactor shield wall, removable and fixed contaminated surfaces were decontaminated to the best extent possible, using traditional decontamination methods. Fifth, large sections of the remaining structures were demolished by mechanical and open-air controlled explosive demolition (CED). Mechanical demolition methods included the use of conventional demolition equipment for removal of three main buildings, an exhaust stack, and a mobile shed. The 5-foot (ft), 5-inch (in.) thick, neutron-activated reinforced concrete shield was demolished by CED, which had never been performed at the NTS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Compliance of SLAC_s Laser Safety Program with OSHA Requirements for the Control of Hazardous Energy

SLAC's COHE program requires compliance with OSHA Regulation 29CFR1910.147, 'The control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout)'. This regulation specifies lockout/tagout requirements during service and maintenance of equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up of the equipment, or release of stored energy, could cause injury to workers. Class 3B and Class 4 laser radiation must be considered as hazardous energy (as well as electrical energy in associated equipment, and other non-beam energy hazards) in laser facilities, and therefore requires careful COHE consideration. This paper describes how COHE is achieved at SLAC to protect workers against unexpected Class 3B or Class 4 laser radiation, independent of whether the mode of operation is normal, service, or maintenance.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Personnel Safety for Future Magnetic Fusion Power Plants

The safety of personnel at existing fusion experiments is an important concern that requires diligence. Looking to the future, fusion experiments will continue to increase in power and operating time until steady state power plants are achieved; this causes increased concern for personnel safety. This paper addresses four important aspects of personnel safety in the present and extrapolates these aspects to future power plants. The four aspects are personnel exposure to ionizing radiation, chemicals, magnetic fields, and radiofrequency (RF) energy. Ionizing radiation safety is treated well for present and near-term experiments by the use of proven techniques from other nuclear endeavors. There is documentation that suggests decreasing the annual ionizing radiation exposure limits that have remained constant for several decades. Many chemicals are used in fusion research, for parts cleaning, as use as coolants, cooling water cleanliness control, lubrication, and other needs. In present fusion experiments, a typical chemical laboratory safety program, such as those instituted in most industrialized countries, is effective in protecting personnel from chemical exposures. As fusion facilities grow in complexity, the chemical safety program must transition from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale program that addresses chemical use in larger quantity. It is also noted that allowable chemical exposure concentrations for workers have decreased over time and, in some cases, now pose more stringent exposure limits than those for ionizing radiation. Allowable chemical exposure concentrations have been the fastest changing occupational exposure values in the last thirty years. The trend of more restrictive chemical exposure regulations is expected to continue into the future. Other issues of safety importance are magnetic field exposure and RF energy exposure. Magnetic field exposure limits are consensus values adopted as best practices for worker safety; a typical exposure value is ~1000 times the Earth’s magnetic field, but the Earth’s field is a very low value. Allowable static magnetic field exposure limits have remained constant over the recent past and would appear to remain constant for the foreseeable future. Some existing fusion experiments have suffered from RF energy leakage from waveguides, the typical practice to protect personnel is establishing personnel exclusion areas when systems are operating. RF exposure limits have remained fairly constant for overall body exposures, but have become more specific in the exposure frequency values. This paper describes the occupational limits for those types of exposure, how these exposures are managed, and also discusses the likelihood of more restrictive regulations being promulgated that will affect the design of future fusion power plants and safety of their personnel.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Using Weibull Distribution Analysis to Evaluate ALARA Performance

As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) is the underlying principle for protecting nuclear workers from potential health outcomes related to occupational radiation exposure. Radiation protection performance is currently evaluated by measures such as collective dose and average measurable dose, which do not indicate ALARA performance. The purpose of this work is to show how statistical modeling of individual doses using the Weibull distribution can provide objective supplemental performance indicators for comparing ALARA implementation among sites and for insights into ALARA practices within a site. Maximum likelihood methods were employed to estimate the Weibull shape and scale parameters used for performance indicators. The shape parameter reflects the effectiveness of maximizing the number of workers receiving lower doses and is represented as the slope of the fitted line on a Weibull probability plot. Additional performance indicators derived from the model parameters include the 99th percentile and the exceedance fraction. When grouping sites by collective total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) and ranking by 99th percentile with confidence intervals, differences in performance among sites can be readily identified. Applying this methodology will enable more efficient and complete evaluation of the effectiveness of ALARA implementation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Using Weibull Distribution Analysis to Evaluate ALARA Performance

As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) is the underlying principle for protecting nuclear workers from potential health outcomes related to occupational radiation exposure. Radiation protection performance is currently evaluated by measures such as collective dose and average measurable dose, which do not indicate ALARA performance. The purpose of this work is to show how statistical modeling of individual doses using the Weibull distribution can provide objective supplemental performance indicators for comparing ALARA implementation among sites and for insights into ALARA practices within a site. Maximum likelihood methods were employed to estimate the Weibull shape and scale parameters used for performance indicators. The shape parameter reflects the effectiveness of maximizing the number of workers receiving lower doses and is represented as the slope of the fitted line on a Weibull probability plot. Additional performance indicators derived from the model parameters include the 99th percentile and the exceedance fraction. When grouping sites by collective total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) and ranking by 99th percentile with confidence intervals, differences in performance among sites can be readily identified. Applying this methodology will enable more efficient and complete evaluation of the effectiveness of ALARA implementation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

RADBALL TECHNOLOGY TESTING FOR HOT CELL CHARACTERIZATION

Operations at various U.S. Department of Energy sites have resulted in substantial radiological contamination of tools, equipment, and facilities. It is essential to use remote technologies for characterization and decommissioning to keep worker exposures as low as reasonably achievable in these highly contaminated environments. A significant initial step in planning and implementing D&D of contaminated facilities involves the development of an accurate assessment of the radiological, chemical, and structural conditions inside of the facilities. Collected information describing facility conditions using remote technologies could reduce the conservatism associated with planning initial worker entry (and associated cost).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Dexterity test data contribute to proper glovebox over-glove use

Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA-55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through the use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). The glovebox gloves are the weakest part of this engineering control. The Glovebox Glove Integrity Program, which controls glovebox gloves from procurement to disposal at TA-55, manages this vulnerability. A key element of this program is to consider measures that lower the overall risk of glovebox operations. Proper selection of over-gloves is one of these measures. Line management owning glovebox processes have the responsibility to approve the appropriate personal protective equipment/glovebox glove/over-glove combination. As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) considerations to prevent unplanned glovebox glove openings must be balanced with glove durability and worker dexterity, both of which affect the final overall risk to the worker. In this study, the causes of unplanned glovebox glove openings, the benefits of over-glove features, the effect of over-gloves on task performance using standard dexterity tests, the pollution prevention benefits, and the recommended over-gloves for a task are presented.

57↗

Factors linked to participant attrition in a longitudinal occupational health surveillance program

For occupational medical screening programs focused on long-term health surveillance, participant attrition is a significant barrier to success. Here we investigate demographic, medical history, and clinical data from National Supplemental Screening Program (NSSP) examinees for association with likelihood of return for a second exam (rescreening). A total of 15,733 individuals completed at least one NSSP exam before December 31, 2016; of those, 4832 also completed a second exam on or before December 31, 2019. Stepwise logistic regression models were used to identify variables associated with whether a participant was rescreened in the NSSP. Individuals were less likely to return for rescreening if they had a history of any cancer; cardiovascular problems; diabetes or kidney disease; or if they used insulin. Age at time of first exam and job site category significantly influenced likelihood of return. Workers categorized as “guests” were more likely to return. Participants were less likely to return if they had an abnormal urinalysis, abnormal pulmonary function, pneumoconiosis, aortic atherosclerosis, or hearing loss at their initial exam. Participants who received a chest X-ray at their initial screening were more likely to return. The presence of health problems is strongly linked to screening program attrition. Participants who are older at the time of their initial screening exam are less likely to return. The discovery of several strong demographic, medical, and job associations reveals the importance for medical screening programs to understand and address factors that influence participant retention and, consequently, the effectiveness of long-term health surveillance activities.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

The Association of Inbreeding With Lung Fibrosis Incidence in Beagle Dogs That Inhaled 238PuO2 or 239PuO2.

Studies of health effects in animals after exposure to internally deposited radionuclides were intended to supplement observational studies in humans. Both nuclear workers and Beagle dogs have exhibited plutonium associated lung fibrosis; however, the dogs smaller gene pool may limit the applicability of findings to humans. Data on Beagles that inhaled either plutonium-238 dioxide (238PuO2) or plutonium-239 dioxide (239PuO2) were analyzed. Wright's Coefficient of Inbreeding was used to measure genetic or familial susceptibility and was assessed as an explanatory variable when modeling the association between lung fibrosis incidence and plutonium exposure. Lung fibrosis was diagnosed in approximately 80% of the exposed dogs compared with 23.7% of the control dogs. The maximum degree of inbreeding was 9.4%. Regardless of isotope, the addition of inbreeding significantly improved the model in female dogs but not in males. In female dogs an increased inbreeding coefficient predicted decreased hazard of a lung fibrosis diagnosis. Lung fibrosis was common in these dogs with inbreeding affecting models of lung fibrosis incidence in females but not in males. The apparent protective effect in females predicted by these models of lung fibrosis incidence is likely to be minimal given the small degree of inbreeding in these groups.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

FY08 VPP Program Evaluation

The Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) is a recognized third-party certification of worker safety and health program excellence, based on industry best practices that focus on management leadership and employee involvement, as well as other safety and health program elements. This Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) VPP Program Evaluation is the FY-2008 report of the PNNL VPP Steering Committee regarding the status of VPP at PNNL. It is an update of the previous annual report dated January, 2007 and was completed in January 2008. An annual evaluation of the status of VPP is required of all sites that participate in the DOE-VPP. This report provides a detailed summary of the PNNL VPP Steering Committee’s evaluation of program performance and documents both strengths and improvement opportunities related to the various aspects of the VPP model.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗