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At least 847 records · Page 47

Evaluation of Recent Trailer Contamination and Supersack Integrity Issues

During the period from fiscal year (FY) 2009 to FY 2011, there were a total of 21 incidents involving radioactively contaminated shipment trailers and 9 contaminated waste packages received at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). During this time period, the EnergySolutions (ES) Clive, Utah, disposal facility had a total of 18 similar incidents involving trailer and package contamination issues. As a result of the increased occurrence of such incidents, DOE Environmental Management Headquarters (EM/HQ) Waste Management organization (EM-30) requested that the Energy Facility Contractors’ Group (EFCOG) Waste Management Working Group (WMWG) conduct a detailed review of these incidents and report back to EM-30 regarding the results of this review, including providing any recommendations formulated as a result of the evaluation of current site practices involving handling and management of radioactive material and waste shipments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Overview of IAEA MODARIA II Program Working Group 1 on Assessment and Decision Making of Existing Exposure Situations for NORM and Nuclear Legacy Sites - 18308

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched the Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme in October. As part of the IAEA effort to enhance the capabilities of its Member States in assessing radiological impacts of radionuclides released to the environment from sites that were not operated in accordance with current standards, and to ensure protection of the public and the environment, the MODARIA II Programme aims to: (1) test the performance of models developed for predicting the transfer of radionuclides in the environment and assessing radiological impacts to the public and the environment; (2) develop and improve models for particular environments and, where appropriate, to agree on data sets that are generally applicable for use in testing environmental transfer models; and (3) provide an international forum for the exchange of experiences, ideas and research information. The Programme will run for 3 years from 2016 to 2019. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129). MODARIA II Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision making regarding existing exposure situations due to naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. WG1 was formed as a combination of two MODARIA I WGs: WG1 focused on application of decision-aiding tools in remediation; and WG3 focused on risk assessment for NORM and radioactively contaminated legacy sites (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/default.asp?s=8 and l=129). It was recognized that the decision-making needs will inform the scope of risk assessments, and the risk insights and structured decision analyses will aid in informed decision-making. Therefore, MODARIA II WG1 is focused on developing methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for NORM and nuclear legacy sites, including demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. MODARIA II WG1 has 91 registered participants from 33 Member States and IAEA (as of November 2017), some 30 of whom are actively engaged in various collaborative research and development activities within WG1. Members of WG1 participated in the First Technical Meeting of MODARIA II, which was held in Vienna, Austria from 31 October to 4 November 2016. The group then held its First Interim Meeting in Brussels, Belgium from 26 to 30 June 2017, which included a field trip to the legacy Tessenderlo Chemie (TCH) Phosphate Processing Site. At this meeting, the TCH Site and the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant (PChP) in Ukraine were selected for case studies. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Material Disposal Area B in the USA and the Beaverlodge Uranium Mill and Mill Site in northern Canada were selected as examples for sharing of good practices and lessons learned in risk-informed decision-making for environmental remediation and land conveyance. At the Second Technical Meeting held in Vienna on 30 October to 3 November 2017, an additional NORM site for tin processing in Brazil was added to the case studies, with another NORM site in Yunnan, China included for consideration at the Second Interim Meeting of WG1. The Second Interim Meeting will be held in in early to mid-May, 2018. The group has also decided to prepare an Interim Report by October 2018 to document the WG1 discussions and analyses for the period of 2016-2018, which will be finalized at the conclusion of MODARIA II in October 2019. Initial assignments have been discussed for IM1 participants to collect data, conduct modelling and analyses, and prepare draft sections for the Interim Report. This paper will provide an overview of the work plans for WG1. It will also highlight some near-term activities that the group is currently working on. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Integrated Waste Management Strategy

Key to successful implementation and expansion of nuclear energy in the United States is establishing an effective waste management system to allow routine disposition of spent fuel and all byproduct and waste streams. While it would be possible to manage and dispose wastes that would be generated from the advanced separations proposed in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program under a policy and regulatory framework that is essentially identical to what is currently in place, a more optimal approach exists that, if implemented, could result in a more efficient system for managing and disposing radioactive materials. An Integrated Waste Management Strategy (IWMS) is described here to manage and disposition all wastes from any radioactive operations, including, but not limited to nuclear fuel reprocessing. The IWMS was developed considering the need for a sustainable nuclear fuel cycle effectively integrating waste management in a manner that can be commercialized and eventually adapted to be used internationally. The GNEP Program proposes a combination of thermal and fast reactors, supported by fuel recycling and the use of recovered transuranic materials in nuclear fuel. This comes close to closing the fuel cycle and improves the system for managing and disposing of radioactive wastes derived from electricity generation. As an example, removing actinides and key heat-generating fission products from the waste could permit increased waste loading densities within a geologic repository, allowing for increased disposal capacity in a facility of the same size. As long as the primary function of the repository is not impacted, i.e. controlling the potential radiation dose to the public, the same facility could hold the waste from generating more electricity. This is desirable to support expanded use of nuclear power and sharing the benefits of nuclear energy with the international community while maintaining proliferation resistance and safe waste disposal. This IWMS does not establish a program or propose policy. Rather, it provides a logical basis for radioactive waste disposal on which potential changes to current programs and policies can be formulated and evaluated. The current version of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) could be interpreted to include any and all wastes from fuel reprocessing that are highly radioactive as high level wastes requiring repository disposal regardless of the magnitude or duration of the risks they pose. All wastes generated by the processes being developed under GNEP can be disposed under the current regulations, however, significant efficiencies can be realized if the partitioned wastes can be dispositioned based on their characteristics rather than their origin. This IWMS is based on the premise that the NWPA can be clarified or amended to use a graded scale of waste management considering the actual risks of specific waste streams similar to the structure of chemical waste regulations currently accepted by the public. Such an alternative approach would allow for more efficient, and cost-effective, management and disposal of nuclear waste while safely protecting the public from unacceptable risk.

Deliverable↗

Regulatory Treatment of Non-Core Sources of Radioactivity for Advanced Reactor Designs

The recent resurgence in advance (non-light water) reactor development has been paralleled by the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing pathways. Specifically, the creation of the RIPB Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) approach and subsequent endorsement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now provides advanced reactor vendors with a defined RIPB method to develop an affirmative safety case for licensing. In addition, the Technology Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) has published guidance on developing a license application based on the LMP approach. To support the utilization of risk information as part of advanced reactor design and licensing efforts, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) has developed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for advanced reactors. The standard, which was formerly approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2021 and recently endorsed by the NRC in trial use Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.247, is an integral standard, covering from initiating events to offsite consequence. A major feature of the standard is that it permits the inclusion of any source of radioactivity material at the site within the plant PRA. Therefore, non-core sources of radioactivity, such as fuel storage, fuel processing, and purification systems, can be included within a single comprehensive plant PRA. For those advanced reactor vendors utilizing a RIPB licensing approach, there is an opportunity to include the non-core sources of radioactivity within the RIPB framework for licensing decision-making, such as the categorization of events, classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and evaluation of the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID). For advanced reactor designs that contain multiple non-core sources of radioactivity, or for monolithic plant sites that include associated fuel facilities, this approach could potentially simplify licensing applications through the use of a single, uniform, and consistent decision-making framework across all radioactive sources at the site. In addition, a RIPB approach could provide additional insights regarding plant behavior, flexibility regarding licensing decision-making, and potentially allow the use of risk information as part of the plant oversight process. Risk-informing these aspects of advanced reactor licensing would also be consistent with the NRC’s risk policy statement. However, there is diverse regulation and guidance regarding the licensing of non-core sources of radioactivity and generally limited experience using RIPB approaches for the evaluation as part of licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NUREG/CR-7239, “Review of Fissile Material Exemptions and General Licenses in 10 CFR Part 71,” and Proposed Revisions to Harmonize with IAEA SSR-6 Fissile Material Requirements

Title 10 of the United States (US) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, includes requirements for the transport of fissile material in packages. These regulations provide requirements for packaging that is certified by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to transport fissile material. The regulations also include provisions that allow for shipment in packages that are not required to be certified by the NRC. These provisions include criteria for exemptions from classification as fissile material (§71.15) and permit general licenses for limited quantities of fissile material and plutonium-beryllium special form sources (§71.22 and §71.23, respectively). This paper will discuss recommendations that NRC has made on the use of the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions in a recently published NUREG/CR, and changes to these provisions proposed for an upcoming rulemaking action.NUREG/CR-7239, “Review of Fissile Material Exemptions and General Licenses in 10 CFR Part 71,” was recently developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the NRC. This document provides technical recommendations to fissile material licensees on how to apply the fissile material exemption and general license regulations. This paper will outline this NUREG/CR, including: 1) the technical basis, intent, and anticipated usage of each of the fissile material exemption and general license provisions; 2) the recent regulatory history of the Part 71 fissile material exemptions and general licenses; and 3) example problems which illustrate how the provisions might be applied and justified.In 2012, IAEA made several significant changes to the fissile material requirements in SSR-6, including the fissile exception provisions and provisions similar to the U.S. fissile material general licenses. In 2016, the NRC began a rulemaking effort to consider these changes (among others), and to decide how to best harmonize the domestic U.S. regulations. This paper will review the 2012 changes made to SSR-6, discuss the NRC staff consideration of those changes, and detail the proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 that NRC is considering for the fissile material exemptions and general licenses.

Barto, Andrew↗

Viscous Particle Breakup within a Cooling Nuclear Fireball

Following the surface detonation of a nuclear weapon, the Earth’s crust and immediate surroundings are drawn into the fireball and form melts. Fallout is formed as these melts incorporate radioactive material from the bomb vapor and cool rapidly. The resultant fallout plume and dispersion of radioactive contamination is a function of several factors including weather patterns and fallout particle shapes and size distributions. Accurate modeling of the size distributions of fallout forms an important data point for dispersion codes that calculate the aerial distribution of fallout. While morphological evidence for aggregation of molten droplets is well documented in fallout glass populations, the breakup of these molten droplets has not been similarly studied. This study documents evidence that quenched fallout populations preserve evidence of molten breakup mechanisms.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Development of Mini-Compact Tension Test Method for Determining Fracture Toughness Master Curves for Reactor Pressure Vessel Steels

Small specimens are playing the key role in evaluating properties of irradiated materials. The use of small specimens provides several advantages. Typically, only a small volume of material can be irradiated in a reactor at desirable conditions in terms of temperature, neutron flux, and neutron dose. A small volume of irradiated material may also allow for easier handling of specimens. Smaller specimens reduce the amount of radioactive material, minimizing personnel exposures and waste disposal. However, use of small specimens imposes a variety of challenges as well. These challenges are associated with proper accounting for size effects and transferability of small specimen data to the real structures of interest. Any fracture toughness specimen that can be made out of the broken halves of standard Charpy specimens may have exceptional utility for evaluation of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) since it would allow one to determine and monitor directly actual fracture toughness instead of requiring indirect predictions using correlations established with impact data. The Charpy V-notch specimen is the most commonly used specimen geometry in surveillance programs. Validation of the mini compact tension specimen (mini-CT) geometry has been performed on previously well characterized Midland beltline Linde 80 (WF-70) weld in the unirradiated condition. It was shown that the fracture toughness transition temperature, To, measured by these Mini-CT specimens is almost the same as To value that was derived from various larger fracture toughness specimens. Moreover, an International collaborative program has been established to extend the assessment and validation efforts to irradiated Linde 80 weld metal. The program is underway and involves the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Central Research Institute for Electrical Power Industry (CRIEPI), and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The irradiated Mini-CT specimens from broken halves of previously tested Charpy specimens of Midland beltline weld have been machined and just arrived to ORNL as part of this international collaboration. The ORNL will initiate tests of the irradiated Linde 80 weld in FY2017 and results of this international program will be reported in FY2018.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Assessment and Validation of Mini-Compact Tension Test Specimen Geometry and Progress in Establishing Technique for Fracture Toughness Master Curves for Reactor Pressure Vessel Steels

Small specimens are playing the key role in evaluating properties of irradiated materials. The use of small specimens provides several advantages. Typically, only a small volume of material can be irradiated in a reactor at desirable conditions in terms of temperature, neutron flux, and neutron dose. A small volume of irradiated material may also allow for easier handling of specimens. Smaller specimens reduce the amount of radioactive material, minimizing personnel exposures and waste disposal. However, use of small specimens imposes a variety of challenges as well. These challenges are associated with proper accounting for size effects and transferability of small specimen data to the real structures of interest. Any fracture toughness specimen that can be made out of the broken halves of standard Charpy specimens may have exceptional utility for evaluation of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) since it would allow one to determine and monitor directly actual fracture toughness instead of requiring indirect predictions using correlations established with impact data. The Charpy V-notch specimen is the most commonly used specimen geometry in surveillance programs. Assessment and validation of mini-CT specimen geometry has been performed on previously well characterized HSST Plate 13B, an A533B class 1 steel. It was shown that the fracture toughness transition temperature measured by these Mini-CT specimens is within the range of To values that were derived from various large fracture toughness specimens. Moreover, the scatter of the fracture toughness values measured by Mini-CT specimens perfectly follows the Weibull distribution function providing additional proof for validation of this geometry for the Master Curve evaluation of rector pressure vessel steels. Moreover, the International collaborative program has been developed to extend the assessment and validation efforts to irradiated weld metal. The program is underway and involves ORNL, CRIEPI, and EPRI.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Gamma-Ray Raster Imaging with Robotic Data Collection (FY19 Annual Report)

This project has developed an alternative imaging capability for imaging and quantifying radioactive materials in situ. This approach uses a robotic-mounted gamma-ray detector which can move around an area of interest, sampling the space at a high frequency. By rastering across the area, an image can be created with no collimation and a high efficiency. An open-source robotic platform was programed to search an open area, collecting gamma-ray spectra every second. Informative path planning was used to direct the robot to areas of higher dose. Finally, a Bayesian particle filter was used to locate the source with minimal counting statistics. The use of a robotic mount allows data collection for long periods of time unattended, and it will also eliminate uncertainties in positioning typically introduced by personnel. This approach will be particularly relevant for gloveboxes, shielded cells, or process piping which may have complex, non-uniform distributions of material.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

USE OF SMALL SPECIMENS FOR FRACTURE TOUGHNESS EVALUATION OF RPV STEELS

Small specimens are playing the key role in evaluating properties of irradiated materials. The use of small specimens provides several advantages. Typically, only a small volume of material can be irradiated in a reactor at desirable conditions in terms of temperature, neutron flux, and neutron dose. A small volume of irradiated material may also allow for easier handling of specimens. Smaller specimens reduce the amount of radioactive material, minimizing personnel exposures and waste disposal. However, use of small specimens imposes a variety of challenges as well. These challenges are associated with proper accounting for size effects and transferability of small specimen data to the real structures of interest. Any fracture toughness specimen that can be made out of standard Charpy specimen or its broken half may have exceptional utility for evaluation of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) since it would allow one to determine and monitor directly actual fracture toughness instead of requiring indirect predictions using correlations established with impact data. The Charpy V-notch specimen is the most commonly used specimen geometry in surveillance programs and most likely to be used in advanced reactors as per ASME code.

Sokolov, Mikhail A↗

Determination of Static and Dynamic Crush Strengths of Stainless Steel Honeycomb Material

Honeycomb structures are ideal energy absorbers due to the high axial strength compared to the low density of the material and consistent mechanical properties. Lighter density materials used in honeycomb structures, like aluminum, have been studied intensively because of their use in aerospace applications. However, relatively denser materials like stainless steel have been less studied. The purpose of this project is to determine if 304 Stainless Steel hexagonal honeycomb can be used in applications related to the field of radioactive material packaging by determining the crush strength of the structure.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Contamination control monitoring at the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Plutonium Facility

Plutonium airborne contamination creates a particular hazard because of the possibility of intake by inhalation. To preclude excursions of radioactive materials into the operator’s breathing zone, controls are used to prevent contamination. Measures to control radioactive contamination include eliminating or minimizing the spread of contamination and preventing cross-contamination. Contamination control philosophy at the plutonium facility is conveyed in one simple statement: Detect the contamination closest to the source as possible! Speed and distance when self-monitoring is critical to detecting plutonium contamination. Responding correctly to an alarm or monitor not working properly minimizes the consequences of plutonium contamination. Performing a full body frisking correctly and using the Peerchecking tool also minimize the consequences of plutonium contamination.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Advanced Characterization of Irradiated Fuels and Materials at INL

Advanced characterization of the irradiated fuels and materials is crucial to help understanding the material and fuel property changes under irradiation. Microstructural defect evolution down to nanometer scale could strongly affect the material and fuel performance on macroscale. Radiation-induced material degradation include dimensional instability, hardening and embrittlement, intergranular cracking, radiation-enhanced chemical interaction at the interfaces and breakaway swelling. To mitigate the radiation damage, advanced characterization on irradiated microstructure, microchemistry, micromechanical property and local thermal property is necessary to identify the controlling mechanisms that are responsible to the degradations. This presentation provides a summary of the advanced characterization capabilities at the Irradiation Materials Characterization Laboratory (IMCL), Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), Idaho National Laboratory (INL). It highlights the recently established capabilities including shield sample preparation area (SSPA), shield confinement cells for two focused ion beam (FIB) systems, a shielded electron probe microanalysis (EPMA), the thermal property microscopy (TPM) along with non-shielded instruments like scanning electron microscopy (SEM), X-ray diffractometer, and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). Some examples on advanced characterizations on irradiated structural materials and fuels will be presented. It demonstrates the power of combining sample preparation of highly radioactive materials with the advanced characterization down to atomic resolutions within one facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioactive Waste Management and Nuclear Facility Decommissioning Progress in Iraq - 13216

Management of Iraq's radioactive wastes and decommissioning of Iraq's former nuclear facilities are the responsibility of Iraq's Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST). The majority of Iraq's former nuclear facilities are in the Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center located a few kilometers from the edge of Baghdad. These facilities include bombed and partially destroyed research reactors, a fuel fabrication facility and radioisotope production facilities. Within these facilities are large numbers of silos, approximately 30 process or waste storage tanks and thousands of drums of uncharacterised radioactive waste. There are also former nuclear facilities/sites that are outside of Al-Tuwaitha and these include the former uranium processing and waste storage facility at Jesira, the dump site near Adaya, the former centrifuge facility at Rashdiya and the former enrichment plant at Tarmiya. In 2005, Iraq lacked the infrastructure needed to decommission its nuclear facilities and manage its radioactive wastes. The lack of infrastructure included: (1) the lack of an organization responsible for decommissioning and radioactive waste management, (2) the lack of a storage facility for radioactive wastes, (3) the lack of professionals with experience in decommissioning and modern waste management practices, (4) the lack of laws and regulations governing decommissioning or radioactive waste management, (5) ongoing security concerns, and (6) limited availability of electricity and internet. Since its creation eight years ago, the MoST has worked with the international community and developed an organizational structure, trained staff, and made great progress in managing radioactive wastes and decommissioning Iraq's former nuclear facilities. This progress has been made, despite the very difficult implementing conditions in Iraq. Within MoST, the Radioactive Waste Treatment and Management Directorate (RWTMD) is responsible for waste management and the Iraqi Decommissioning Directorate (IDD) is responsible for decommissioning activities. The IDD and the RWTMD work together on decommissioning projects. The IDD has developed plans and has completed decommissioning of the GeoPilot Facility in Baghdad and the Active Metallurgical Testing Laboratory (LAMA) in Al-Tuwaitha. Given this experience, the IDD has initiated work on more dangerous facilities. Plans are being developed to characterize, decontaminate and decommission the Tamuz II Research Reactor. The Tammuz Reactor was destroyed by an Israeli air-strike in 1981 and the Tammuz II Reactor was destroyed during the First Gulf War in 1991. In addition to being responsible for managing the decommissioning wastes, the RWTMD is responsible for more than 950 disused sealed radioactive sources, contaminated debris from the first Gulf War and (approximately 900 tons) of naturally-occurring radioactive materials wastes from oil production in Iraq. The RWTMD has trained staff, rehabilitated the Building 39 Radioactive Waste Storage building, rehabilitated portions of the French-built Radioactive Waste Treatment Station, organized and secured thousands of drums of radioactive waste organized and secured the stores of disused sealed radioactive sources. Currently, the IDD and the RWTMD are finalizing plans for the decommissioning of the Tammuz II Research Reactor. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review of Exemptions and General Licenses for Fissile Material in 10 CFR 71

Title 10 of the United States (US) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, includes requirements for the transport of fissile material in packages. These regulations provide requirements for packages that are certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to transport fissile material. 10 CFR 71 also includes provisions for exemptions from classification as fissile material (10 CFR 71.15) and permits general licenses for limited quantities of fissile material and plutonium-beryllium special form sources (10 CFR 71.22 and 10 CFR 71.23, respectively). These provisions were extensively revised by the NRC as part of a broad rule-making effort in 2004. The exemption and general license provisions are used frequently for a wide-variety of fissile material shipping operations, and consignors must interpret the regulations for particular shipping situations. The purpose of this document is to provide explanatory information on the background, intent, and anticipated use of the provisions in an effort to assist fissile material licensees in their interpretation and application of the provisions such that criticality safety is ensured during transportation activities. A variety of examples are presented and discussed to illustrate how the regulations should be applied.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

sUAS Support for Mars 2020

The release of airborne radioactive material presents a health risk hazard to many individuals, including emergency responders and the public. Characterizing the unknown radioactive dangers produced during such incidents is essential. An advantage to utilizing unmanned aerial systems in this effort is the reduction of risk to personnel otherwise tasked with characterization, as well as more quickly obtaining data points during cloud immersion. By pairing a continuous air monitor (CAM) and detector with a drone, quantification of unknown material in the plume can be determined, and thus the extent of dose to people in the area can be estimated. A small, low-flow air sampler with a Geiger-Mueller counter may be characterized using experimental measurements of point sources representing a cloud of material and modelled using the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP), a software package for simulating nuclear processes, to find the usefulness and advantages of the system for detection of nuclides of concern in various nuclear plume scenarios. The flying time of small-unmanned aircraft systems (sUASs) is limited; thus, the minimum detectable activity and concentration rates possible must be determined over the system’s window of operation. While the activity concentrations corresponding to external and internal doses of concern can be detected with certainty for 90 Sr and 137 Cs in a plume, those corresponding to 238 Pu are more difficult to detect. The central principle of employing the sUAS is that the cockpit does not have an operator onboard the aircraft; therefore, control of the aircraft must take place by other means. With a sUAS, command and control can be separated into three distinct methods: (1) ground control or remote piloting, (2) semi-autonomous control, and (3) autonomous control. The isotope 238 Pu is used in the space industry, providing long-lived heat generation for fuel in outer space (NASA 2014). Due to the inherent risks with rocket launches to get objects into space, monitoring for release of these hazardous substances is a major undertaking. The current means is through employment of environmental CAMs. It is conceivable, however, that drone monitoring for release of 238 Pu in the event of a space launch mishap would give a greater chance of detection of plutonium particulate, because the particulate’s diffusion in air upon settling to the ground would make the probability of collecting a particle on a filter in a CAM very low.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

New Radiological Material Detection Technologies for Nuclear Forensics: Remote Optical Imaging and Graphene-Based Sensors

We developed new detector technologies to identify the presence of radioactive materials for nuclear forensics applications. First, we investigated an optical radiation detection technique based on imaging nitrogen fluorescence excited by ionizing radiation. We demonstrated optical detection in air under indoor and outdoor conditions for alpha particles and gamma radiation at distances up to 75 meters. We also contributed to the development of next generation systems and concepts that could enable remote detection at distances greater than 1 km, and originated a concept that could enable daytime operation of the technique. A second area of research was the development of room-temperature graphene-based sensors for radiation detection and measurement. In this project, we observed tunable optical and charged particle detection, and developed improved devices. With further development, the advancements described in this report could enable new capabilities for nuclear forensics applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗