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A water-reflected cube of dry plutonium oxide is found to be more reactive than a sphere of the same mass and composition. MCNP6 ® criticality results for a cube, sphere, and cylinder of identical density, mass, and volume are discussed in the context of several hydrogenous reflectors. Similar geometric comparisons are made for a fast metal system based on 240 Pu Jezebel.
Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.
Low-energy beta-emitting radionuclides that were released historically during reactor operations and plutonium separations activities at some U.S. Department of Energy sites have migrated into the groundwater, forming contaminant plumes that are subject to federally regulated remediation actions. At the Hanford Site, the low-energy beta-emitting radionuclides include iodine-129, technetium-99, chlorine-36, carbon-14, and tritium (H-3). All are highly mobile in the subsurface, and except for tritium, and have very long half-lives—thousands to millions of years. The geochemistry and transport behavior of these contaminants in the subsurface present significant challenges for remediation of groundwater to federal drinking water standards (DWS)—the appropriate or relevant and applicable requirements (ARARs) for cleanup. For some of the low-energy beta-emitter contaminants, particularly iodine-129, cleanup and restoration of groundwater to DWS may not be attainable within a reasonable timeframe using currently available treatment technologies.
The Hanford tank farms contain 56 million gallons of waste across 177 tanks. The primary criticality safety concern for the waste is the plutonium inventory in waste solids – approximately 670 kg in total. Criticality safety analysis credits the absorption and dilution properties of the large quantities of other elements (aluminum, chromium, iron, manganese, nickel, silicon, sodium, and zirconium) present in the waste. Of these, iron and manganese are by far the most significant neutron absorbers, particularly for the waste compositions of highest criticality safety concern. The criticality safety analyses at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Vitrification Plant (WTP) and the Savannah River tank farms also credit iron and manganese as the primary neutron absorbers to demonstrate subcriticality.
Global nuclear security is dependent upon the sustained and verifiable control of radiological and nuclear (R/N) materials within nuclear facilities, under the administrative purview of national governments. It is the responsibility of each country to account for their R/N materials holdings and to ensure that they do not escape regulatory control and fall into the wrong hands. The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is tasked with providing support to foreign partners in developing the tools and expertise to detect, disrupt, and investigate R/N materials encountered out of regulatory control, in such circumstances as at border crossings and other checkpoints, or in the course of routine policework. Thankfully, such incidents are infrequent, and NSDD continues to work bilaterally with partner countries to strengthen their capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling and trafficking incidents in their countries. For the vast majority of R/N materials that remain under regulatory control, however, it is critical that their safe storage and use be independently verified. Even a single loss incident of R/N materials, particularly of special nuclear materials (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) has the potential to cause a catastrophe. How can the international community be assured that R/N materials currently under national regulatory control remain there?
The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site houses 56 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste generated from plutonium production from 1944 to 1988. The supernatant waste, currently stored in underground tanks, is intended to be vitrified following filtration and 137 Cs removal at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Vitrification Facility. The WTP Pretreatment Facility will not be operational for several years. The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system is a technology demonstration that will remove cesium from tank waste supernate to support directly feeding LAW to the vitrification facility. The 137 Cs removal is important to meet the WTP LAW contract specification and ultimately for creating a contact-handled waste form. The waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limit for the WTP LAW Facility is <3.18E-5 Ci 137 Cs per mole Na. The TSCR system is skid mounted and employs two key technologies: dead end filtration for solids removal and ion exchange (IX) for cesium removal. Filtration is necessary to protect the functionality of the IX columns. The IX process utilizes sodium form crystalline silicotitanate (CST) IX media produced by UOP Honeywell, LLC (Des Plaines, IL) under the product name IONSIV R9140-B, 18 x 50 mesh, in a lead-lag-polish column configuration. Each column contains a CST bed height of 92 inches and a volume of approximately 157 gallons of CST IX media. The full-scale TSCR operation will run at a residence time of 1.9 bed volumes (BV)/h, which results in a superficial velocity of 7.3 cm/min and a flowrate of ~5 gal/min. Column testing at small (2.5% of the full bed height), medium (12% of the full bed height), and full-height scales has been previously conducted to evaluate process variables and scale up performance of Cs exchange onto the CST. Cesium load performances from various sieve cuts at the small scale indicated that a 30-mesh sieve cut be tested to determine if it better reflects the 12% and full-height column performances at the small scale. Two process flowrates were tested in the small-column configuration with <30-mesh CST and simulant solutions. These tests were compared to full-height column tests at the same residence times to assess CST particle size effect on column scaling. Table S.1 summarizes the observed column performance determined for the two flowrates juxtaposed to the previous work with 5.6 M Na simulant at higher scales (used as benchmarks). The WAC breakthroughs between the small and full-height tests at 1.3 BV/h differed by ~59 BVs. The WAC breakthroughs for small, medium, and full-height tests at 1.8 BV/h were consistent at 240 BVs. The 50% Cs breakthroughs were nominally equivalent for all column tests. The common transition zones and onsets of Cs breakthrough at the 1.8 BV/h tests indicated that the Cs mass transfers were equivalent and thus the <30-mesh CST Cs load performance at the small scale successfully modeled that of the full-height system. It is recommended that the <30-mesh CST be used in subsequent 10-mL CST bed tests.
This article is set during the 1944 and 1945 final push to complete Project Y—the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos—and focuses primarily on overcoming the challenge of creating and demonstrating a successful convergent explosive implosion to turn a subcritical quantity of plutonium into a critical mass. The critical mass would then efficiently yield kilotons of trinitrotoluene (TNT)-equivalent energy in about a microsecond, demonstrating the implosion atomic bomb concept. This work culminated in the Trinity atomic test near Alamogordo on July 16, 1945. This implosion effect demarcated the approach to explosive science and technology the Laboratory has followed ever since, including development of high-explosive synthesis and formulation, small and large test and diagnostic facilities, shock dynamics theory, high-explosive system design engineering, and three-dimensional implosion modeling and simulation using some of the fastest computers in the world. This work also ushered in a period of broader application of precision high explosives in conventional munitions, demolition, mining and oil exploration, and space travel.
In FY2020, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in collaboration with the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics (SCAIDA) at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VT) and funded by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development, began developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytic methods on large-scale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Using the announcement in May 2018 of the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) as a test subject, the goal of this 2-year project is to forecast the SRPPF using only data prior to May 2018. The project work is split into a preliminary prototype development for the first year with an initial evaluation of viability followed by the second year of development to create an integrated prototype system and more extensive performance evaluation. This report documents the results of the preliminary-phase tasks.
The presentation is composed of the slides used in various NEST lectures including: Interaction of Radiation with Matter, Biological and Health Effects of Radiation Exposure, Radionuclide Detection and Dose Assessment, Plutonium, Other Radionuclides Monitored by Bioassay and Case Studies, and, Counting Statistics.
The microstructure of the SC0234 weld was evaluated per DA-SPEC-01067, ''General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) Plutonium-238 Dioxide Fueled Clad Product Specification'' and it was determined that the weld microstructure conformed to the quality requirements. During the examination of weld cross section, the metallographic analysis revealed the presence of a surface crack. Prior visual examination per RPS-TA55-303 had not revealed the crack, nor did the surface photography performed per RPS-TA55-302. The presence of the crack does not violate any of the product specifications called out on DA-SPEC-01067. Although there is a well-documented history of weld hot crack susceptibility in the early development of the DOP-26 iridium alloy, a surface crack such as this had not been documented during welding at Los Alamos. In the interest of better understanding the cause; the product engineer/program recommended further examination of the crack. This report discusses the examination of the crack found in the weld cross section of simulant clad SC0234. Metallography, Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy techniques (EDS) where used in the analysis of the crack and the surrounding weld microstructure.
The Manhattan Project was established in August 1942. Its mission: beat the Nazis to the atomic bomb. Los Alamos was selected as the site for the weapons design laboratory. J. Robert Oppenheimer served as the Laboratory’s director. In early summer 1944, Los Alamos scientists discovered plutonium would not work in a gun assembly. Thus, Oppenheimer reorganized the Laboratory to build an implosion bomb
Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), in close collaboration with the Florida International University Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), successfully executed a technology development activity on behalf of the Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management (DOE EM). The purpose of the activity was to improve the capability of fixative technologies in immobilizing residual contamination when exposed to thermal stressors as postulated in accident scenarios in Basis for Interim Operations (BIO) documents across the DOE EM complex. The effort resulted in the test and evaluation of a down-selected, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) intumescent technology in a radioactive environment at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Building 235-F Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) Facility and highlighted the potential use of this technology as a stand-alone, fire retardant fixative. Furthermore, this activity highlighted significant shortfalls in common fixatives currently used to support decommissioning activities and brought to the forefront the need for a methodical, uniformed approach to certifying fixative technologies for operational use in Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) activities. An essential component of this research was to evaluate the state of industry fixatives currently in use and set the foundation for comparison to alternative technological solutions. A baseline of five (5) commonly used fixatives and decontamination gels (hereafter collectively referred to as fixatives) was conducted, and notable shortfalls and deficiencies were revealed, particularly when exposed to thermal, water, and other environmental stressors. At temperatures as low as 300 °F - 400 °F (148.89 °C – 204.44 °C), all commonly used fixatives melted from the substrates within 3-5 minutes of exposure, resulting in contaminant transport. Significant degradation in terms of mass loss, desiccation, and off-gassing occurred, and the chemical breakdown of the polymer was so complete researchers assessed there would likely have been a release of residual contamination. Additional vulnerabilities became evident when exposed to water immersion and high humidity; existing fixatives took up water, swelling and frequently delaminating from the substrate, once again increasing the likelihood of a contaminant release.
The FY18-20 Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) funded Properties, Theory, and Measurements for Understanding the Function of Heavy Elements Project aim has been to advance heavy element science in a comprehensive project connecting targeted research with Los Alamos mission imperatives. The mechanisms for project implementation were (1) support of a multi-year broad-based postdoctoral fellows project, (2) a summer student fellows research project and two seminar series, and (3) organization of structured workshops and integrated educational and career development opportunities. The project was successfully administered by the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute (GTSI) for Transactinium Science and has shown to be an exceptional investment in supporting the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) mission areas requiring heavy element and actinide science by attracting and funding the future generation of scientists and engineers. This project exhibited its value across the laboratory in heavy element and actinide science areas include materials, material properties, signatures, modeling, predictions, fabrication, detection, disposal, global security implications, forensics, and the specialized science surrounding plutonium, uranium, and their surrogates as fuels for energy and nuclear weapons. In this report, the GTSI project staff documents the “high return on investment” implementation as measured against the successes of previous actinide research and science-based projects and as evidenced by the retention of 30% of G.T. Seaborg Postdoctoral Fellows as permanent employees. With additional funding through LDRD Reserve funding during this project period, the GTSI expanded its support for heavy element and actinide science research with a Visiting Research Seaborg Scholar and a Rapid Response Small Projects call. These innovations have served to advance GTSI pursuits as communicated in our FY21-23 LDRD Proposal Project#: 20210527CR Seaborg Institute: Center for Advancing Actinide Science and Technology at LANL
The Hagan nuclear material storage container was designed in the late 1990’s to provide a robust container for daily use, safe transport within the plutonium facility PF-4, and storage of nuclear material for up to twenty years. There are currently >3000 loaded Hagan containers in use at TA-55. The majority of these are in the TA-55 vault, but they are also used in safes and in floor locations on the main floor of PF-4. The original design criteria are given below
The 239 Pu Jezebel experiment of 1954–1955 was reevaluated for the 2013 edition of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. Experimental logbooks, original drawings, mass accountability statements, internal reports, and published reports were used to model four actual Jezebel assemblies with high fidelity in three dimensions. Because plutonium-alloy part masses from 1954–1955 (the time of the original experiments) were not found, assumptions were made. The most important assumption was that the assembly masses given in Los Alamos report LA-4208 (Ref. 3) in 1969 were correct. With this basic assumption, and using information found in the logbooks and mass accountability statements from 1958–1960, a distribution of the LA-4208 assembly mass among the Pu-alloy parts was postulated. Subsequently, the SF Material Transfer Receipt (November 24, 1954) was found. It lists the masses of the major parts and several minor parts as of late-November 1954. In addition, as-built drawings for the initial delivery of the major parts (October 1954, before they were remachined to reduce their reactivity) were found. These important documents, which were discovered by accident, motivated what we hope will be the final detailed Jezebel reevaluation.
LANL is committed to developing and maintaining a robust workforce with the expertise and skills necessary to meet the Weapons Production expanded mission, which includes the human capital to produce 30 ppy in 2026 while meeting all other plutonium missions.
PPMI is responsible for integrating the planning, execution, and reporting for LANL’s Pit Manufacturing efforts, surplus plutonium disposition activities, the Material Recycle and Recovery (MR&R) program, and other programs of national significance. Our programmatic sponsors rely on PPMI to capitalize on the unique capabilities and expertise in PF-4 (the only Security Cat I/Haz Cat II Pu processing facility in the Nation) and other vital facilities across the laboratory to deliver on mission critical products in support of National Security.
IAEA Priority Objective T2, R&D Need T.2.R6 to “Develop and implement methods to detect signatures of nuclear activities in environmental samples including: Age determination of U and Pu relevant to the origin of nuclear materials”- specific focus on plutonium (Pu) age dating