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831 records · Page 47
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Shape Memory Composite Hybrid Hinge

There are two conventional types of hinges for in-space deployment applications. The first type is mechanically deploying hinges. A typical mechanically deploying hinge is usually composed of several tens of components. It is complicated, heavy, and bulky. More components imply higher deployment failure probability. Due to the existence of relatively moving components among a mechanically deploying hinge, it unavoidably has microdynamic problems. The second type of conventional hinge relies on strain energy for deployment. A tape-spring hinge is a typical strain energy hinge. A fundamental problem of a strain energy hinge is that its deployment dynamic is uncontrollable. Usually, its deployment is associated with a large impact, which is unacceptable for many space applications. Some damping technologies have been experimented with to reduce the impact, but they increased the risks of an unsuccessful deployment. Coalescing strain energy components with shape memory composite (SMC) components to form a hybrid hinge is the solution. SMCs are well suited for deployable structures. A SMC is created from a high-performance fiber and a shape memory polymer resin. When the resin is heated to above its glass transition temperature, the composite becomes flexible and can be folded or packed. Once cooled to below the glass transition temperature, the composite remains in the packed state. When the structure is ready to be deployed, the SMC component is reheated to above the glass transition temperature, and it returns to its as-fabricated shape. A hybrid hinge is composed of two strain energy flanges (also called tape-springs) and one SMC tube. Two folding lines are placed on the SMC tube to avoid excessive strain on the SMC during folding. Two adapters are used to connect the hybrid hinge to its adjacent structural components. While the SMC tube is heated to above its glass transition temperature, a hybrid hinge can be folded and stays at folded status after the temperature is reduced to below its glass transition temperature. After the deployable structure is launched in space, the SMC tube is reheated and the hinge is unfolded to deploy the structure. Based on test results, the hybrid hinge can achieve higher than 99.999% shape recovery. The hybrid hinge inherits all of the good characteristics of a tape-spring hinge such as simplicity, light weight, high deployment reliability, and high deployment precision. Conversely, it eliminates the deployment impact that has significantly limited the applications of a tape-spring hinge. The deployment dynamics of a hybrid hinge are in a slow and controllable fashion. The SMC tube of a hybrid hinge is a multifunctional component. It serves as a deployment mechanism during the deployment process, and also serves as a structural component after the hinge is fully deployed, which makes a hybrid hinge much stronger and stiffer than a tape-spring hinge. Unlike a mechanically deploying hinge that uses relatively moving components, a hybrid hinge depends on material deformation for its packing and deployment. It naturally eliminates the microdynamic phenomenon.

Fang, Houfei↗
NASA NTRS2014

Let's Exploit Available Knowledge on Vegetation Fluorescence

The potential to measure vegetation fluorescence from space (1) and to derive from it direct information on the gross primary productivity (GPP) of terrestrial ecosystems is probably the most thrilling development in remote sensing and global ecology of recent years, as it moves Earth observation techniques from the detection of canopy biophysics (e.g., fraction of absorbed radiation) and biochemistry (chlorophyll and nitrogen content) to the realm of ecosystem function. The existence of a functional relationship between fluorescence and photosynthesis has been elucidated over the last decade by several laboratories, notably as part of the preliminary studies of the European Space Agency Fluorescence Explorer (FLEX) Earth Explorer Mission. The empirical observation presented by Guanter et al. (2) of a linear relationship between fluorescence radiance and GPP, however, provides the first experimental confirmation of the feasibility of the approach— already thoroughly tested at leaf level—at the desired scale, despite the confounding effects associated with the satellite detection of such a faint signal. A word of clarification is needed here. The use of fluorescence as a probe of leaf photochemistry has been a staple of plant ecophysiology for decades, rooted in a sound understanding of photosynthetic energy dissipation. However, most past studies had to rely for the interpretation of results on active (pulse-saturated) techniques, making them unsuitable for remote-sensing applications. Over recent years, however, novel process based models have been developed for the interpretation of steady-state, solar-induced fluorescence at the leaf to canopy scale (3). We are therefore in a position to move beyond the mere empirical observation of an association between GPP and fluorescence radiance. In particular, Guanter et al. (2) base their analysis on the assumption of a constant ratio between photosynthetic and fluorescence light use efficiencies (equation 3 in ref. 2).We know, however, that the ratio is not constant, but changes widely in response to light, CO2, stomatal limitations, and extreme stress (4, 5). What’s more, we can make sense of such changes, thus extracting valuable information from the very scatter that is apparent in their data. However, this process will require the availability of more tailored instruments, such as the one planned for the FLEX mission. As already stressed by Guanter et al. (2), the spatial resolution of the Global Ozone Monitoring Experiment-2 sensor (40 × 80 km) makes it difficult to compare meaningfully the fluorescence signal with ground measurements, when only 60–70% of the footprint consists of the desired land-cover type (table S1 in ref. 2), suggesting that this could be largely responsible for the low signals observed in European grasslands. Moreover, the overpass time of the MetOp-A satellite (9:30 AM) implies that fluorescence is generally measured under light-limiting conditions, when fluorescence is only marginally affected by stomatal closure even under stress conditions. This result could explain the seasonal mismatch with daily GPP observed in natural ecosystems in the absence of irrigation (figure 4 in ref. 2). We hope, therefore, that this welcome contribution to this fast-advancing field will help demonstrate the potential of the new technique, and pave the way for more refined studies under both a technological and scientific point of view.

Space↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗