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At least 829 records · Page 46
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NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Flight Test Development Challenges and Success Factors

The NASA Constellation Program's Ares I-X rocket launched successfully on October 28, 2009 collecting valuable data and providing risk reduction for the Ares I project. The Ares I-X mission was formulated and implemented in less than four years commencing with the Exploration Systems Architecture Study in 2005. The test configuration was founded upon assets and processes from other rocket programs including Space Shuttle, Atlas, and Peacekeeper. For example, the test vehicle's propulsion element was a Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor. The Ares I-X rocket comprised a motor assembly, mass and outer mold line simulators of the Ares I Upper Stage, Orion Spacecraft and Launch Abort System, a roll control system, avionics, and other miscellaneous components. The vehicle was 327 feet tall and weighed approximately 1,800,000 pounds. During flight the rocket reached a maximum speed of Mach 4.8 and an altitude of 150,000 feet. The vehicle demonstrated staging at 130,000 feet, tested parachutes for recovery of the motor, and utilized approximately 900 sensors for data collection. Developing a new launch system and preparing for a safe flight presented many challenges. Specific challenges included designing a system to withstand the environments, manufacturing large structures, and re-qualifying heritage hardware. These and other challenges, if not mitigated, may have resulted in test cancellation. Ares I-X succeeded because the mission was founded on carefully derived objectives, led by decisive and flexible management, implemented by an exceptionally talented and dedicated workforce, and supported by a thorough independent review team. Other major success factors include the use of proven heritage hardware, a robust System Integration Laboratory, multi-NASA center and contractor team, concurrent operations, efficient vehicle assembly, effective risk management, and decentralized element development with a centralized control board. Ares I-X was a technically complex test that required creative thinking, risk taking, and a passion to succeed.

Askins, Bruce↗
NASA NTRS2003

Autonomous Mission Manager for Rendezvous, Inspection and Mating

To meet cost and safety objectives, space missions that involve proximity operations between two vehicles require a high level of autonomy to successfully complete their missions. The need for autonomy is primarily driven by the need to conduct complex operations outside of communication windows, and the communication time delays inherent in space missions. Autonomy also supports the goals of both NASA and the DOD to make space operations more routine, and lower operational costs by reducing the requirement for ground personnel. NASA and the DoD have several programs underway that require a much higher level of autonomy for space vehicles. NASA's Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program has ambitious goals of reducing costs by a factor or 10 and improving safety by a factor of 100. DARPA has recently begun its Orbital Express to demonstrate key technologies to make satellite servicing routine. The Air Force's XSS-ll program is developing a protoflight demonstration of an autonomous satellite inspector. A common element in space operations for many NASA and DOD missions is the ability to rendezvous, inspect anclJor dock with another spacecraft. For DARPA, this is required to service or refuel military satellites. For the Air Force, this is required to inspect un-cooperative resident space objects. For NASA, this is needed to meet the primary SLI design reference mission of International Space Station re-supply. A common aspect for each of these programs is an Autonomous Mission Manager that provides highly autonomous planning, execution and monitoring of the rendezvous, inspection and docking operations. This paper provides an overview of the Autonomous Mission Manager (AMM) design being incorporated into many of these technology programs. This AMM provides a highly scalable level of autonomous operations, ranging from automatic execution of ground-derived plans to highly autonomous onboard planning to meet ground developed mission goals. The AMM provides the capability to automatically execute the plans and monitor the system performance. In the event of system dispersions or failures the AMM can modify plans or abort to assure overall system safety. This paper describes the design and functionality of Draper's AMM framework, presents concept of operations associated with the use of the AMM, and outlines the relevant features of the flight demonstrations.

Zimpfer, Douglas J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Model-Based Diagnostics for Propellant Loading Systems

The loading of spacecraft propellants is a complex, risky operation. Therefore, diagnostic solutions are necessary to quickly identify when a fault occurs, so that recovery actions can be taken or an abort procedure can be initiated. Model-based diagnosis solutions, established using an in-depth analysis and understanding of the underlying physical processes, offer the advanced capability to quickly detect and isolate faults, identify their severity, and predict their effects on system performance. We develop a physics-based model of a cryogenic propellant loading system, which describes the complex dynamics of liquid hydrogen filling from a storage tank to an external vehicle tank, as well as the influence of different faults on this process. The model takes into account the main physical processes such as highly nonequilibrium condensation and evaporation of the hydrogen vapor, pressurization, and also the dynamics of liquid hydrogen and vapor flows inside the system in the presence of helium gas. Since the model incorporates multiple faults in the system, it provides a suitable framework for model-based diagnostics and prognostics algorithms. Using this model, we analyze the effects of faults on the system, derive symbolic fault signatures for the purposes of fault isolation, and perform fault identification using a particle filter approach. We demonstrate the detection, isolation, and identification of a number of faults using simulation-based experiments.

Daigle, Matthew John↗
NASA NTRS2011

Prognostics for Ground Support Systems: Case Study on Pneumatic Valves

Prognostics technologies determine the health (or damage) state of a component or sub-system, and make end of life (EOL) and remaining useful life (RUL) predictions. Such information enables system operators to make informed maintenance decisions and streamline operational and mission-level activities. We develop a model-based prognostics methodology for pneumatic valves used in ground support equipment for cryogenic propellant loading operations. These valves are used to control the flow of propellant, so failures may have a significant impact on launch availability. Therefore, correctly predicting when valves will fail enables timely maintenance that avoids launch delays and aborts. The approach utilizes mathematical models describing the underlying physics of valve degradation, and, employing the particle filtering algorithm for joint state-parameter estimation, determines the health state of the valve and the rate of damage progression, from which EOL and RUL predictions are made. We develop a prototype user interface for valve prognostics, and demonstrate the prognostics approach using historical pneumatic valve data from the Space Shuttle refueling system.

Daigle, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2011

Launch Pad Escape System Design (Human Spaceflight)

A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need but is critical for every manned space program. Since men were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years. Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS) is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch. The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when thing's go bad. And things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.

Maloney, Kelli↗
NASA NTRS2011

Rocket Plume Scaling for Orion Wind Tunnel Testing

A wind tunnel test program was undertaken to assess the jet interaction effects caused by the various solid rocket motors used on the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV). These interactions of the external flowfield and the various rocket plumes can cause localized aerodynamic disturbances yielding significant and highly non-linear control amplifications and attenuations. This paper discusses the scaling methodologies used to model the flight plumes in the wind tunnel using cold air as the simulant gas. Comparisons of predicted flight, predicted wind tunnel, and measured wind tunnel forces-and-moments and plume flowfields are made to assess the effectiveness of the selected scaling methodologies.

Brauckmann, Gregory J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Development of the Orion Crew Module Static Aerodynamic Database: Supersonic/Subsonic - Par 2

This work describes the process of developing the nominal static aerodynamic coefficients and associated uncertainties for the Orion Crew Module for Mach 8 and below. The database was developed from wind tunnel test data and computational simulations of the smooth Crew Module geometry, with no asymmetries or protuberances. The database covers the full range of Reynolds numbers seen in both entry and ascent abort scenarios. The basic uncertainties were developed as functions of Mach number and total angle of attack from variations in the primary data as well as computations at lower Reynolds numbers, on the baseline geometry, and using different flow solvers. The resulting aerodynamic database represents the Crew Exploration Vehicle Aerosciences Project's best estimate of the nominal aerodynamics for the current Crew Module vehicle.

Bibb, Karen L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Propulsion Finishing Strong

Numerous lessons have been documented from the Space Shuttle Propulsion elements. Major events include loss of the SRB's on STS-4 and shutdown of an SSME during ascent on STS- 51F. On STS-112 only half the pyrotechnics fired to release the vehicle from the launch pad, a testament for redundancy. STS-91 exhibited freezing of a main combustion chamber pressure measurement and on STS-93 nozzle tube ruptures necessitated a low liquid level oxygen cut off of the main engines. A number of on pad aborts were experienced during the early program resulting in delays. And the two accidents, STS-51L and STS-107, had unique heritage in history from early Program decisions and vehicle configuration. Following STS-51L significant resources were invested in developing fundamental physical understanding of solid rocket motor environments and material system behavior. Human rating of solid rocket motors was truly achieved. And following STS-107, the risk of ascent debris was better characterized and controlled. Situational awareness during all mission phases improved, and the management team instituted effective risk assessment practices. These major events and lessons for the future are discussed. The last 22 flights of the Space Shuttle, following the Columbia accident, were characterized by remarkable improvement in safety and reliability. Numerous problems were solved in addition to reduction of the ascent debris hazard. The propulsion system elements evolved to high reliability and heavy lift capability. The Shuttle system, though not a operable as envisioned in the 1970's, successfully assembled the International Space Station (ISS) and provided significant logistics and down mass for ISS operations. By the end of the Program, the remarkable Space Shuttle Propulsion system achieved very high performance, was largely reusable, exhibited high reliability, and is a heavy lift earth to orbit propulsion system. The story of this amazing system is discussed in detail in the paper.

Owen, James W.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Evolution of Utilizing Manual Throttles to Avoid Excessively Low LH2 NPSP at the SSME Inlet

In the late 1970s, years before the Space Shuttle flew its maiden voyage, it was understood low liquid hydrogen (LH2) Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) at the inlet to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) could have adverse effects on engine operation. A number of failures within both the External Tank (ET) and the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) could result in a low LH2 NPSP condition, which at extremely low levels can result in cavitation of SSME turbomachinery. Operational workarounds were developed to take advantage of the onboard crew s ability to manually throttle down the SSMEs (via the Pilot s Speedbrake/Throttle Controller), which alleviated the low LH2 NPSP condition. Manually throttling the SSME to a lower power level resulted in an increase in NPSP, mainly due to the reduction in frictional flow losses while at the lower throttle setting. Early in the Space Shuttle Program s history, the relevant Flight Rule for the Booster flight controllers in Mission Control did not distinguish between ET and Orbiter MPS failures and the same crew action was taken for both. However, after a review of all Booster operational techniques following the Challenger disaster in the late 1980s, it was determined manually throttling the SSME to a lower power was only effective for Orbiter MPS failures and the Flight Rule was updated to reflect this change. The Flight Rule and associated crew actions initially called for a single throttle step to minimum power level when a low threshold for NPSP was met. As engineers refined their understanding of the NPSP requirements for the SSME (through a robust testing program), the operational techniques evolved to take advantage of the additional capabilities. This paper will examine the evolution of the Flight rule and associated procedure and how increases in knowledge about the SSME and the Space Shuttle vehicle as a whole have helped shape their development. What once was a single throttle step when NPSP decreased to a certain threshold has now become three throttle steps, each occurring at a lower NPSP threshold. Additionally the procedure, which for early Space Shuttle missions required a Return-to-Launch-Site abort, now results in a nominal Main Engine Cut Off and no loss of mission objectives.

Henfling, Rick↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loads and Structural Dynamics Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware

The purpose of this document is to establish requirements relating to the loads and structural dynamics technical discipline for NASA and commercial spaceflight launch vehicle and spacecraft hardware. Requirements are defined for the development of structural design loads and recommendations regarding methodologies and practices for the conduct of load analyses are provided. As such, this document represents an implementation of NASA STD-5002. Requirements are also defined for structural mathematical model development and verification to ensure sufficient accuracy of predicted responses. Finally, requirements for model/data delivery and exchange are specified to facilitate interactions between Launch Vehicle Providers (LVPs), Spacecraft Providers (SCPs), and the NASA Technical Authority (TA) providing insight/oversight and serving in the Independent Verification and Validation role. In addition to the analysis-related requirements described above, a set of requirements are established concerning coupling phenomena or other interaction between structural dynamics and aerodynamic environments or control or propulsion system elements. Such requirements may reasonably be considered structure or control system design criteria, since good engineering practice dictates consideration of and/or elimination of the identified conditions in the development of those subsystems. The requirements are included here, however, to ensure that such considerations are captured in the design space for launch vehicles (LV), spacecraft (SC) and the Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV). The requirements in this document are focused on analyses to be performed to develop data needed to support structural verification. As described in JSC 65828, Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, implementation of the structural verification requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The requirement for and expected contents of the SVP are defined in JSC 65828. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with Technical Authority approval.

George James↗
NASA NTRS2011

Constellation Program Lessons Learned in the Quantification and Use of Aerodynamic Uncertainty

The NASA Constellation Program has worked for the past five years to develop a re- placement for the current Space Transportation System. Of the elements that form the Constellation Program, only two require databases that define aerodynamic environments and their respective uncertainty: the Ares launch vehicles and the Orion crew and launch abort vehicles. Teams were established within the Ares and Orion projects to provide repre- sentative aerodynamic models including both baseline values and quantified uncertainties. A technical team was also formed within the Constellation Program to facilitate integra- tion among the project elements. This paper is a summary of the collective experience of the three teams working with the quantification and use of uncertainty in aerodynamic environments: the Ares and Orion project teams as well as the Constellation integration team. Not all of the lessons learned discussed in this paper could be applied during the course of the program, but they are included in the hope of benefiting future projects.

Walker, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Development of Space Shuttle Rescue and Recovery Operations

As the first Space Shuttle launch was still in our future, many from NASA, the Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA contractors were busy planning for not only a nominal launch and return, but contingency operations at the launch pad and landing sites. Prior to the first launch, detailed coordination, planning and simulations were conducted at all three locations and internal rescue procedures were taught at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Later in the Program, the Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) sites were added in Europe and Africa. For the 51L mission a new TAL site was brought on line in Morocco. However, upon launch, the Shuttle Program experienced it's first lost. During the following months a complete review of all contingency operations (launch and landing) was completed. Many enhancements were made based on the reviews following. A Mode VIII water rescue was developed for NASA by the DoD before the STS-26 launch. Different concepts were explored and being debated by NASA. Training of the contingency forces was required before final decisions were made forcing the teaching of two different sets of procedures. To assist with training, a video was developed for the fire/crash/rescue personnel. This accompanied the detailed extraction procedures that were developed by a combination of KSC and DoD firemen. Training for the fire/crash/rescue personnel at Vandenberg AFB was also being planned before the accident happen. The fire/crash/rescue mockup that was being built at Chanute AFB was diverted to Edwards AFB. Educational Objectives: With the emphasis on Commercial Crew Programs for Space flight it is important that all involved understand what is required to prepare for contingencies. Cost effective means of being prepared for contingencies are needed. Questions: 1. When should planning for nominal and contingency operations begin? 2. What type of training aids are needed for contingency operations? 3. Who were the major contributors to Shuttle contingency operations?

Chandler, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2011

Capabilities, Design, Construction and Commissioning of New Vibration, Acoustic, and Electromagnetic Capabilities Added to the World's Largest Thermal Vacuum Chamber at NASA's Space Power Facility

NASA s human space exploration plans developed under the Exploration System Architecture Studies in 2005 included a Crew Exploration Vehicle launched on an Ares I launch vehicle. The mass of the Crew Exploration Vehicle and trajectory of the Ares I coupled with the need to be able to abort across a large percentage of the trajectory generated unprecedented testing requirements. A future lunar lander added to projected test requirements. In 2006, the basic test plan for Orion was developed. It included several types of environment tests typical of spacecraft development programs. These included thermal-vacuum, electromagnetic interference, mechanical vibration, and acoustic tests. Because of the size of the vehicle and unprecedented acoustics, NASA conducted an extensive assessment of options for testing, and as result, chose to augment the Space Power Facility at NASA Plum Brook Station, of the John H. Glenn Research Center to provide the needed test capabilities. The augmentation included designing and building the World s highest mass capable vibration table, the highest power large acoustic chamber, and adaptation of the existing World s largest thermal vacuum chamber as a reverberant electromagnetic interference test chamber. These augmentations were accomplished from 2007 through early 2011. Acceptance testing began in Spring 2011 and will be completed in the Fall of 2011. This paper provides an overview of the capabilities, design, construction and acceptance of this extraordinary facility.

Motil, Susan M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Research and Technology Development to Advance Environmental Monitoring, Food Systems, and Habitat Design for Exploration Beyond Low Earth Orbit

Exploration missions will carry crews far beyond the relatively safe environs of cis-lunar space. Such trips will have little or no opportunity for resupply or rapid aborts and will be of a duration that far exceeds our experience to date. The challenges this imposes on the requirements of systems that monitor the life support and provide food and shelter for the crew are the focus of much research within the Human Research Program. Making all of these technologies robust and reliable enough for multi-year missions with little or no ability to run for home calls for a thorough understanding of the risks and impacts of failure. The way we currently monitor for microbial contamination of water, air, and surfaces, by sampling and growing cultures on nutrient media, must be reconsidered for exploration missions which have limited capacity for consumables. Likewise, the shelf life of food must be increased so that the nutrients required to keep the crewmembers healthy do not degrade over the life of the mission. Improved formulations, preservation, packaging, and storage technologies are all being investigated for ways slow this process or replace stowed food with key food items grown fresh in situ. Ensuring that the mass and volume of a spacecraft are used to maximum efficiency calls for infusing human factors into the design from its inception to increase efficiency, improve performance, and retain robustness toward operational realities. Integrating the human system with the spacecraft systems is the focus of many lines of investigation.

Sullivan, Thomas A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Human-in-the-Loop Integrated Life Support Systems Ground Testing

Human exploration missions beyond low earth orbit will be long duration with abort scenarios of days to months. This necessitates provisioning the crew with all the things they will need to sustain themselves while carrying out mission objectives. Systems engineering and integration is critical to the point where extensive integrated testing of life support systems on the ground is required to identify and mitigate risks. Ground test facilities (human-rated altitude chamber) at the Johnson Space Center are being readied to integrate all the systems for a mission along with a human test crew. The relevant environment will include deep space habitat human accommodations, sealed atmosphere of 8 psi total pressure and 32% oxygen concentration, life support systems (food, air, water), communications, crew accommodations, medical, EVA, tools, etc. Testing periods will approximate those of the expected missions (such as a near Earth asteroid, Earth-Moon L2 or L1, the moon). This type of integrated testing is needed for research and technology development as well as later during the mission design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) phases of an approved program. Testing will evolve to be carried out at the mission level fly the mission on the ground . Mission testing will also serve to inform the public and provide the opportunity for active participation by international partners.

Henninger, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Launch Vehicle Demonstrator Using Shuttle Assets

The Marshall Space Flight Center Advanced Concepts Office (ACO) has the leading role for NASA s preliminary conceptual launch vehicle design and performance analysis. Over the past several years the ACO Earth-to-Orbit Team has evaluated thousands of launch vehicle concept variations for a multitude of studies including agency-wide efforts such as the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), Constellation, Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV), Heavy Lift Propulsion Technology (HLPT), Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT), and Space Launch System (SLS). NASA plans to continue human space exploration and space station utilization. Launch vehicles used for heavy lift cargo and crew will be needed. One of the current leading concepts for future heavy lift capability is an inline one and a half stage concept using solid rocket boosters (SRB) and based on current Shuttle technology and elements. Potentially, the quickest and most cost-effective path towards an operational vehicle of this configuration is to make use of a demonstrator vehicle fabricated from existing shuttle assets and relying upon the existing STS launch infrastructure. Such a demonstrator would yield valuable proof-of-concept data and would provide a working test platform allowing for validated systems integration. Using shuttle hardware such as existing RS-25D engines and partial MPS, propellant tanks derived from the External Tank (ET) design and tooling, and four-segment SRB s could reduce the associated upfront development costs and schedule when compared to a concept that would rely on new propulsion technology and engine designs. There are potentially several other additional benefits to this demonstrator concept. Since a concept of this type would be based on man-rated flight proven hardware components, this demonstrator has the potential to evolve into the first iteration of heavy lift crew or cargo and serve as a baseline for block upgrades. This vehicle could also serve as a demonstration and test platform for the Orion Program. Critical spacecraft systems, re-entry and recovery systems, and launch abort systems of Orion could also be demonstrated in early test flights of the launch vehicle demo. Furthermore, an early demonstrator of this type would provide a stop-gap for retaining critical human capital and infrastructure while affording the current emerging generation of young engineers opportunity to work with and capture lessons learned from existing STS program offices and personnel, who were integral in the design and development of the Space Shuttle before these resources are no longer available. The objective of this study is to define candidate launch vehicle demonstration concepts that are based on Space Shuttle assets and determine their performance capabilities and how these demonstration vehicles could evolve to a heavy lift capability to low earth orbit.

Threet, Grady E., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA's Human Rating Requirements - A Historical Interpretive Perspective

Section 3.0 of NASA's Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems, NPR 8705.2, represents technical engineering requirements that the Agenc y requires of Human Space Systems. In many cases the requirements are not unlike requirements for any space system, crewed or uncrewed, th ey deal with successfully accomplishing the mission objectives. Howev er, they go one step further and have requirements that go beyond suc cessful completion of the mission and dictate functions or actions ne cessary to assure the survival of the crew. In that regard they are u nique from other space system requirements. Even with their uniquenes s the technical requirements of the NPR 8705.2 have been relatively u nchanged in overall intent over the revisions. They all have provided for system redundancy, crew habitable environment, crew situational awareness, crew operation, system control, emergency egress and abort systems. In a few cases the intent of the requirement was changed in tentionally, either to restrict certain types of systems or their fun ctions, or to encompass lessons learned from previous programs. For t he most part the requirements are non controversial and represent the current best practices for human space systems, however, a few requi rements are always debated and have evolved over revisions of the NPR due to studies conducted with various programs like the Orbital Spac e Plane and the Constellation Programs. Those requirements will be di scussed using results of trade studies conducted during past programs highlighting how these particular requirements have evolved through the revisions of the NPR. Comments will also be provided for requirem ents that although not debated, have provided challenges in interpret ation.

Langford, Gerald↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Main Engine - The Relentless Pursuit of Improvement

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is the only reusable large liquid rocket engine ever developed. The specific impulse delivered by the staged combustion cycle, substantially higher than previous rocket engines, minimized volume and weight for the integrated vehicle. The dual pre-burner configuration permitted precise mixture ratio and thrust control while the fully redundant controller and avionics provided a very high degree of system reliability and health diagnosis. The main engine controller design was the first rocket engine application to incorporate digital processing. The engine was required to operate at a high chamber pressure to minimize engine volume and weight. Power level throttling was required to minimize structural loads on the vehicle early in flight and acceleration levels on the crew late in ascent. Fatigue capability, strength, ease of assembly and disassembly, inspectability, and materials compatibility were all major considerations in achieving a fully reusable design. During the multi-decade program the design evolved substantially using a series of block upgrades. A number of materials and manufacturing challenges were encountered throughout SSME s history. Significant development was required for the final configuration of the high pressure turbopumps. Fracture control was implemented to assess life limits of critical materials and components. Survival in the hydrogen environment required assessment of hydrogen embrittlement. Instrumentation systems were a challenge due to the harsh thermal and dynamic environments within the engine. Extensive inspection procedures were developed to assess the engine components between flights. The Space Shuttle Main Engine achieved a remarkable flight performance record. All flights were successful with only one mission requiring an ascent abort condition, which still resulted in an acceptable orbit and mission. This was achieved in large part via extensive ground testing to fully characterize performance and to establish acceptable life limits. During the program over a million seconds of accumulated test and flight time was achieved. Post flight inspection and assessment was a key part of assuring proper performance of the flight hardware. By the end of the program the predicted reliability had improved by a factor of four. These unique challenges, evolution of the design, and the resulting reliability will be discussed in this paper.

VanHooser, Katherine P.↗