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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Intern Sized Poster for Dosimetry Research

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2024

X-ray Security Imaging on Personal Dosimetry

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Exposure during Transportation of Waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 20445

Safety is a priority for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program. This commitment to safety is integrated into requirements and work procedures at DOE sites across the U.S. that generate low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified waste that is transported to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for permanent disposal. Generators of this waste are responsible for ensuring it is packaged and transported in a safe and compliant manner. These generators and their contracted commercial carriers must comply with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations; the Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC); and other applicable federal, state, and local regulations and requirements. This includes packaging and shipping the waste to meet DOT regulatory radiation dose limits to ensure public safety during transportation. NNSS waste generators have a solid safety record for complying with these stringent regulations as demonstrated by the fact that no shipments exceeding DOT dose rate limits were received at the NNSS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) during FY 2014 through FY 2018. A 2005 study conducted by the Desert Research Institute validated shipments to the NNSS comply with DOT radiation dose limits. In response to recent Nevada stakeholder requests for an updated study, an analysis was conducted to verify and provide evidence that the public continues to be safe from exposure to radioactive waste shipment to the NNSS. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments in transit to the NNSS was evaluated. Three studies were performed: 1. Confirm compliance of waste shipments to the DOT radiation limits using dose rate surveys taken at the generator site and at the disposal site. 2. Estimate the dose to the public from waste shipments using the dosimetry results for disposal site personnel by comparing time of exposure for various individuals/scenarios. 3. Estimate the truck driver dose using the receipt dose rate surveys and time of exposure, and from dosimetry results. Study 1 confirmed compliance with the DOT dose rate limits for a sample of waste shipments (123 of 1,038) received during fiscal year (FY) 2017. Study 2 showed that the average annual radiation equivalent dose for disposal site personnel during FY 2017 was approximately 6.7% [0.415 mSv (41.5 millirem)] of the annual average dose that a person living in the U.S. receives from all sources [6.2 mSv (620 mrem)]. Maximum dose to a member of the public, a person resting/sleeping in an adjacent truck at a rest area to a waste shipment, was 0.0166 mSv (1.66 mrem), which is less than the dose received from a person taking a round trip from the east coast to the west coast of the continental U.S. on an airplane [0.07 mSv (7 mrem) per round trip]. Study 3 showed that the truck driver who made the most shipments of radioactive waste to the NNSS, who drove the most hours (estimated time of exposure 2,520 hours), during FY 2017 had a total dose of 0.15 mSv (15 mrem), which was obtained from their personal dosimeter. The annual dose recorded for disposal site personnel, the dose estimates for the public, and the truck driver dose were all a small percentage of the average radiation dose a person receives from all sources (e.g., background and medical radiation). At these levels, risk should only be described qualitatively. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments to the NNSS were shown to be compliant with the DOT dose rate limits, safe, and very low (i.e., within background levels). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Managing Multi-Instrument Data Streams in Secure Environments

The capture and curation of all primary instrument data is a potentially valuable source of added insight into experiments or diagnostics in laboratory experiments. The data can, when properly curated, enable analysis beyond the current practice that uses just a subset of the as-measured data. Complete curated data can also be input for machine learning and other data exploration tools. Conveniently storing and accessing instrument data requires that the instruments are connected to databases and users through a networking infrastructure. This infrastructure needs to accommodate a wide array of instruments which can range from single laboratory mounted probes for environment monitoring to computers managing multiple instruments. These resources may also include mobile devices on which researchers record instrument and experiment state related notes. These varied data sources bring with them the challenges of different communications capabilities and protocols as well as the primary data typically being produced in proprietary formats. These challenges are further compounded when the instruments need to operate in secure environments such as required in national laboratories. We will discuss the SmartLab, an ongoing effort to set up a system for instrument and simulation data curation at NASA Langley Research Center. We will outline the challenges faced in managing the data sources required for ongoing research activities and the solutions that are being considered and implemented to address those challenges.

instrument data management↗
DOE OSTI2015

The Need for Cyber-Informed Engineering Expertise for Nuclear Research Reactors

Engineering disciplines may not currently understand or fully embrace cyber security aspects as they apply towards analysis, design, operation, and maintenance of nuclear research reactors. Research reactors include a wide range of diverse co-located facilities and designs necessary to meet specific operational research objectives. Because of the nature of research reactors (reduced thermal energy and fission product inventory), hazards and risks may not have received the same scrutiny as normally associated with power reactors. Similarly, security may not have been emphasized either. However, the lack of sound cybersecurity defenses may lead to both safety and security impacts. Risk management methodologies may not contain the foundational assumptions required to address the intelligent adversary’s capabilities in malevolent cyber attacks. Although most research reactors are old and may not have the same digital footprint as newer facilities, any digital instrument and control function must be considered as a potential attack platform that can lead to sabotage or theft of nuclear material, especially for some research reactors that store highly enriched uranium. This paper will provide a discussion about the need for cyber-informed engineering practices that include the entire engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering as referenced in this paper is the inclusion of cybersecurity aspects into the engineering process. A discussion will consider several attributes of this process evaluating the long-term goal of developing additional cyber safety basis analysis and trust principles. With a culture of free information sharing exchanges, and potentially a lack of security expertise, new risk analysis and design methodologies need to be developed to address this rapidly evolving (cyber) threatscape.

CCE↗
DOE OSTI2012

Fuel Cycle Research & Development Technical Monthly-March 2012

Several MPACT BCPs were executed in February, reflecting the shift in MPACT priorities directed late last year. Work continued on the FY2014 IPL, also bringing it in line with the new priorities. Preparations were made for the March MPACT Working Group meeting, in conjunction with Savannah River which is hosting the meeting. Steps were taken to initiate a new project with the World Institute for Nuclear Security, including discussions with WINS staff and preliminary work on the required procurement documentation. Several hardware issues were worked through. The newest detector array is working at LANL. A thorough analysis of previously collected Pu sample data using recently developed analysis code with improved spectral energy calibrations was completed. We now have a significantly better understanding of measurement uncertainties.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS2008

Metrology - Beyond the Calibration Lab

We rely on data from measurements every day; a gas-pump, a speedometer, and a supermarket weight scale are just three examples of measurements we use to make decisions. We generally accept the data from these measurements as "valid." One reason we can accept the data is the "legal metrology" requirements established and regulated by the government in matters of commerce. The measurement data used by NASA, other government agencies, and industry can be critical to decisions which affect everything from economic viability, to mission success, to the security of the nation. Measurement data can even affect life and death decisions. Metrology requirements must adequately provide for risks associated with these decisions. To do this, metrology must be integrated into all aspects of an industry including research, design, testing, and product acceptance. Metrology, the science of measurement, has traditionally focused on the calibration of instruments, and although instrument calibration is vital, it is only a part of the process that assures quality in measurement data. For example, measurements made in research can influence the fundamental premises that establish the design parameters, which then flow down to the manufacturing processes, and eventually impact the final product. Because a breakdown can occur anywhere within this cycle, measurement quality assurance has to be integrated into every part of the life-cycle process starting with the basic research and ending with the final product inspection process. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of metrology in the various phases of a product's life-cycle. For simplicity, the cycle will be divided in four broad phases, with discussions centering on metrology within NASA. .

Mimbs, Scott M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

A secure measurement unit for an inspection system used in nuclear arms-control verification

Verification of arms control treaties may require information barriers to protect sensitive data acquired during the verification process. These information barriers are commonly implemented in software, but must store and operate on data that are vulnerable to attack and tampering. Here, we present a new Secure Measurement Unit based on a modified pipeline SAR ADC architecture. The idea is to move the information barrier back into the digitization process so that prohibited data is never created. A prototype 65nm CMOS Secure Measurement Unit (SMU) was tested using U-235, U-238, Co-60, Cs-137 and Am-241 sources. Here, the prototype accurately digitized allowable signals while being immune to side-channel attacks on signals within preset forbidden regions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2013

Multi-discipline Waste Acceptance Process at the Nevada National Security Site - 13573

The Nevada National Security Site low-level radioactive waste disposal facility acceptance process requires multiple disciplines to ensure the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. These disciplines, which include waste acceptance, nuclear criticality, safety, permitting, operations, and performance assessment, combine into the overall waste acceptance process to assess low-level radioactive waste streams for disposal at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. Four waste streams recently highlighted the integration of these disciplines: the Oak Ridge Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators and Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project material, West Valley Melter, and classified waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2015

Applying a Space-Based Security Recovery Scheme for Critical Homeland Security Cyberinfrastructure Utilizing the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) Based Space Network

Protection of the national infrastructure is a high priority for cybersecurity of the homeland. Critical infrastructure such as the national power grid, commercial financial networks, and communications networks have been successfully invaded and re-invaded from foreign and domestic attackers. The ability to re-establish authentication and confidentiality of the network participants via secure channels that have not been compromised would be an important countermeasure to compromise of our critical network infrastructure. This paper describes a concept of operations by which the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) constellation of spacecraft in conjunction with the White Sands Complex (WSC) Ground Station host a security recovery system for re-establishing secure network communications in the event of a national or regional cyberattack. Users would perform security and network restoral functions via a Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS) from the TDRS constellation. The BSS enrollment only requires that each network location have a receive antenna and satellite receiver. This would be no more complex than setting up a DIRECTTV-like receiver at each network location with separate network connectivity. A GEO BSS would allow a mass re-enrollment of network nodes (up to nationwide) simultaneously depending upon downlink characteristics. This paper details the spectrum requirements, link budget, notional assets and communications requirements for the scheme. It describes the architecture of such a system and the manner in which it leverages off of the existing secure infrastructure which is already in place and managed by the NASAGSFC Space Network Project.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2020

Radiological Recovery Logistics Tool - 20161

Argonne is building and testing a tool, the Radiological Recovery Logistics Tool (RRLT), that can be used during the response and recovery from a radiological or nuclear incident to effectively allocate appropriate commercial and public works equipment to mitigate, remove, and contain radiological contamination. The requirements for this tool - as well as development of the resulting software - is overseen by a steering committee of stakeholders from DHS's National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). One essential requirement is for RRLT to support the efficient and appropriate allocation of resources for a radiological response. Subsequent discussions between ANL and stakeholders have solidified the nature of this support to include identification of the types of resources to be allocated. The study reported in this paper has both factored fundamental concepts and connections out of this identification process and created a Knowledge Base detailing support goals, response scenarios, and efficacy information on dozens of equipment types. In short, RRLT will dynamically apply these findings to situational conditions surrounding contamination incidents. RRLT's Domain, the model of elements, ideas and relationships with which the tool will work, draws concepts from technical reports and stakeholder vocabularies to connect response goals and scenarios to types of equipment that offer utility towards those goals in those scenarios. RRLT's Knowledge Base will contain details on dozens of equipment types and facilitate the operator's discovery and consumption of these details most pertinent to a dynamically selected subset of goals. The core of its Domain Model is based on a report authored by this team. This report [1] contains a comprehensive list of proposed equipment to accomplish various missions or scenarios that might arise after a large-scale radiological contamination incident in an urban environment or critical infrastructure. The report divides potential response and recovery efforts into five support goals: Survey and monitoring of the contaminated area; Mitigation of received dose to first responders: Decontamination (gross and final) of buildings, vehicles, roadways, parks, and other surfaces: Waste management of solid waste generated during recovery operations: and Containment of wastewater and other waste generated during the response and recovery phases. RRLT's development is driven by use cases. A use case is an intention with which a user approaches the software. Use cases are grouped into delivery increments to schedule development, testing, and presentation to stakeholders. This model partitions the system into seven increments: User Arrival and Authentication, Search and Navigation, Equipment Recommendation, Plan Management, Content Management, and Expanded Access. Once a user 15 authenticated, RRLT will present the user with a dashboard that allows them to explore or search RRLT's content. The dashboard will also include a 'Plan' panel for collecting decisions and relevant observations about an incident at hand to facilitate development of an equipment list. RRLT will offer three general modes of access to items in the knowledge base: - Keyword search for direct discovery of items, - Navigation along predetermined paths from recovery goal towards equipment types, and - Interactive guidance towards equipment types by an autonomous software agent: the Equipment Recommendation Wizard. This presentation will detail progress in the development of the RRLT and also discuss opportunities for those interested in providing feedback on its content and functionality. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from Vehicle to Grid Engagement

As the transportation industry continues to become electrified, introduction of additional digital devices within associated actions such as recharging bring additional potential for cybersecurity attacks. Devices that are designed, implemented, and operated with cybersecurity as a crucial consideration exacerbate these concerns by failing to provide strict boundaries on access to and use of the equipment. Emerging use cases such as Vehicle to Grid (V2G) charging may expand the potential physical effects of a cybersecurity attack by providing indirect access to electrical components of a building microgrid or portions of the larger power grid. This paper serves as an overview of findings and recommendations based on cybersecurity testing performed at a V2G implementation site operated by a member of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Establish the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Collaboration [1]. The Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is a signatory of the MOU, and has funded this research paper and associated body of work regarding V2X cybersecurity. Sandia has a large background of previous research focused on Electric Vehicle (EV) cybersecurity, such as reference [2], which includes an overall survey of EV infrastructure cybersecurity and recommendations based on those findings. This report seeks to expand knowledge of EV cybersecurity status and needs by focusing on a specific implementation of V2G charging, and providing recommendations based on the relevant findings. This report serves as a publicly available, sanitized description of applied vulnerability testing on an operational V2G implementation. A more in-depth technical version of the report is provided to the MOU partner, but not available at the time of writing due to inclusion of proprietary information. V2G charging comes with many research problems that must be solved before the technology can securely implemented in sites with unrestricted public access or where cybersecurity attacks could have increased consequences, such as government offices. V2G charging requires many stakeholders such as end users, host sites, equipment vendors, and integrators, which all rely on operational safety and security as well as security and trustworthiness of any associated financial transactions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Feasibility of using reactive silicate particles with temperature-responsive coatings to enhance the security of geologic carbon storage

The large-scale deployment of geologic carbon storage will require minimizing the risk of CO 2 leakage. Here we report on a novel strategy to seal leakage pathways by injecting functionalized reactive calcium silicate (CaSiO 3 ) particles. The particles consist of a mineral silicate core within a temperature-sensitive Poly(N,N-dimethylaminoethyl methacrylate) coating that limits contact between the core and the surrounding CO 2 (aq) above a switching temperature making them relatively unreactive deep in the subsurface. If the CO 2 leaks to shallower depths and cooler temperatures, the coatings would extend and enable the silicate core to react with CO 2(aq) to form solid carbonate precipitates that reduce the permeability of the fracture or flow path. A combined laboratory- and simulation-based investigation was conducted to explore key early-stage research questions related to the feasibility of this leakage management strategy. Sand columns were injected with either coated or uncoated CaSiO 3 particles and the permeability was measured before and after exposure to CO 2 . Experiments were conducted at 35 °C and 70 °C, a range that spans the switching temperature for the coatings. Results show that at the cooler temperature the coating effectively enabled reaction and permeability reduction. At higher temperatures, the coated particles limited mineral carbonation and the permeability decrease was minimal compared to columns with uncoated particles. Here, the morphology and location of the precipitates provides insight about permeability evolution. Model simulations of 2D radial particle transport from an injection point provided insight into the effects of particle size, coating properties, and concentrations of particles in several representative rock formations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This RPP section consists of general statements that are applicable to the NNSS as a whole. The RPP also includes a series of appendices which provide supporting detail for the associated NNSS Tennant Organizations (TOs). Appendix H, “Compliance Demonstration Table,” contains a cross-walk for the implementation of 10 CFR 835 requirements. This RPP does not contain any exemptions from the established 10 CFR 835 requirements. The RSPC and TOs are fully compliant with 10 CFR 835 and no additional funding is required in order to meet RPP commitments. No new programs or activities are needed to meet 10 CFR 835 requirements and there are no anticipated impacts to programs or activities that are not included in the RPP. There are no known constraints to implementing the RPP. No guides or technical standards are adopted in this RPP as a means to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 835.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2011

Improved reconstruction and sensing techniques for personnel screening in three-dimensional cylindrical millimeter-wave portal scanning

The cylindrical millimeter-wave imaging technique, developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and commercialized by L-3 Communications/Safeview in the ProVision system, is currently being deployed in airports and other high security locations to meet person-borne weapon and explosive detection requirements. While this system is efficient and effective in its current form, there are a number of areas in which the detection performance may be improved through using different reconstruction algorithms and sensing configurations. PNNL and Northeastern University have teamed together to investigate higher-order imaging artifacts produced by the current cylindrical millimeter-wave imaging technique using full-wave forward modeling and laboratory experimentation. Based on imaging results and scattered field visualizations using the full-wave forward model, a new imaging system is proposed. The new system combines a multistatic sensor configuration with the generalized synthetic aperture focusing technique (GSAFT). Initial results show an improved ability to image in areas of the body where target shading, specular and higher-order reflections cause images produced by the monostatic system difficult to interpret.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Modeling distributed energy resource aggregations in security constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently issued Order 2222, which requires all wholesale electricity markets in the US to allow distributed energy resources (DERs) to participate in the market as aggregated resources. These DER aggregations may be composed of many individual resources that are offered and dispatched by the market as a single entity. We present here a model of a distributed energy resource aggregator (DERA) that is scheduled by a market operator’s security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). The DERA model includes constraints for battery energy storage systems (BESSs), demand response resources (DRRs), and a simple distributed energy resource (DER). This paper describes a model for each resource type and presents two methods for the DERA to generate market offer curves: a profit-maximizing optimization to compute cost curves and a direct cost algorithm to determine dispatch costs for each resource and combine into cost curves. Once all participating DERAs are scheduled in SCUC/SCED, the model is then modified to dispatch individual DERs to maximize profit or minimize schedule deviation of the DERAs. A simulation of a representative day illustrates the DERA offers, the scheduled generation, and the DERA dispatch. Findings show the potential for unavoidable schedule deviations due to internal DER constraints and due to economic incentives to deviate from the SCUC/SCED schedules. This highlights the importance of DERA offer construction on market efficiency and system reliability. Novel aspects of our approach include: (1) We consider the asymmetry of price incentives impacting DERAs from the wholesale market compared to those impacting consumers from the retail market, as imposed by current regulations and laws. (2) We model aggregate consumer response through statistically parameterizable utility functions rather than a potentially impractical approach of modeling each individual consumer. (3) We show how to use the DERA operational dispatch model to create offers into the wholesale electricity market. (4) We show how DERAs may fail to meet their scheduled dispatch because the market offer format may not permit them to fully express their operational features such as intertemporal costs and constraints to the market.

aggregations↗