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Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Collaborative Approaches in Developing Environmental and Safety Management Systems for Commercial Space Transportation

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) licenses and permits U.S. commercial space launch and reentry activities, and licenses the operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites. ASTs mission is to ensure the protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial space transportation activities and to encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation. AST faces unique challenges of ensuring the protection of public health and safety while facilitating and promoting U.S. commercial space transportation. AST has developed an Environmental Management System (EMS) and a Safety Management System (SMS) to help meet its mission. Although the EMS and SMS were developed independently, the systems share similar elements. Both systems follow a Plan-Do-Act-Check model in identifying potential environmental aspects or public safety hazards, assessing significance in terms of severity and likelihood of occurrence, developing approaches to reduce risk, and verifying that the risk is reduced. This paper will describe the similarities between ASTs EMS and SMS elements and how AST is building a collaborative approach in environmental and safety management to reduce impacts to the environment and risks to the public.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)↗

Developing Probabilistic Safety Performance Margins for Unknown and Underappreciated Risks

Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.

Safety Performance Margin↗

The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security and safeguards.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security & safeguards.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Comparison between the United States and United Kingdom Criticality Safety Personnel Training Program Guidance

The discipline of criticality safety (CS) has been developed in order to maintain safety in operations where significant amounts of fissionable material are to be manipulated. The operation is assessed by an individual or team of CS practitioners and an operational safety envelope is developed. The envelope can consist of limits on materials (i.e. fissionable mass, reflectors, moderators etc.), geometry (i.e. spacing, volume, etc.), and/or proscribed operating procedures which uphold a level of safety margin for personnel and equipment involved. The following paper is an overview of the similarities and differences in guidance on training programs for CS personnel at United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) laboratories. This work was performed under the auspices of Joint Working Group 30 of the Mutual Defence Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developing a Streamlined Approach to Criticality Safety Analyst Training/Qualification

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Criticality Safety Analyst (CSA) Qualification Standard was a multidivisional effort forged in late 2012. The result of the effort is a well-documented and efficient approach to training, encompassing local and national Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) training courses for incoming criticality safety staff, as well as a model for professional development of qualified CSAs at LANL. Five years later, the approach to training and qualification for CSAs has evolved into a streamlined safety management function, integrated in all phases of employee recruitment, development, deployment, and management.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Seventy-Five Years of Nuclear Criticality Safety Documents--A Bibliography

A collection of nuclear criticality documents was begun in the 1970s at the University of California’s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (now Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). Documents in this bibliography are dated as early as 1940. The early documents described experimental work that was of vital importance to the safe use of fissile materials at nuclear reactors, the facilities for preparing or transporting nuclear fuel, or its eventual storage. The experiments were of direct value to support safe operations with fissile materials, but they were also needed for validating early physics data and calculational methods and then for validating computational methods used in criticality safety evaluations. These documents provided information for our computerized bibliographic database. The bibliography was originally intended for use by Livermore staff members but criticality safety "pioneers” encouraged us to make the database available to the broader nuclear safety community and even shared copies of their bibliographies and reports. A publication of the bibliography is being prepared and a searchable database is available on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Criticality Safety Program’s NCSP website. The NCSP website also includes links from the bibliography to many full-text documents. The database continues to expand--the information in this paper is based on a “snapshot” of its present status. The “vintage” hardcopy document collection is preserved and is being scanned into digital format.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Status of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project

The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) has continued its work generating evaluations of new and historical criticality benchmark experiments since the last update to the nuclear criticality safety community at the 11th International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety (ICNC 2019) in Paris, France. Three additional versions of the ICSBEP Handbook have been published since that update, and the Technical Review Group (TRG) held two in-person (in 2019 and 2023) and three virtual (2020 and 2021) meetings to review and approve additional benchmarks. The 2019 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook included five new evaluations with 79 new configurations, the 2020 version of the ICSBEP Handbook contained five new evaluations totaling 76 new configurations, and the 2021 version of the ICSBEP handbook contained five new evaluations with a total of 57 different configurations. The ICSBEP TRG met in October and December 2021, to review benchmarks for potential inclusion in the 2022 ICSBEP Handbook, with seven evaluations receiving provisional approval pending resolution of review group comments. Final comment resolution for some of these evaluations is currently underway and handbook publication should be completed soon. The ICSBEP TRG met again in person in April 2023 to review benchmarks for the 2023 ICSBEP Handbook, provisionally approving 7 new evaluations. The ICSBEP continues to deliver high-quality, peer reviewed evaluations of experiments relevant to the nuclear criticality safety community.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Cognitive decision errors and organization vulnerabilities in nuclear power plant safety management: Modeling using the TOGA meta-theory framework

In the field of nuclear power plant (NPP) safety modeling, the perception of the role of socio-cognitive engineering (SCE) is continuously increasing. Today, the focus is especially on the identification of human and organization decisional errors caused by operators and managers under high-risk conditions, as evident by analyzing reports on nuclear incidents occurred in the past. At present, the engineering and social safety requirements need to enlarge their domain of interest in such a way to include all possible losses generating events that could be the consequences of an abnormal state of a NPP. Socio-cognitive modeling of Integrated Nuclear Safety Management (INSM) using the TOGA meta-theory has been discussed during the ICCAP 2011 Conference. In this paper, more detailed aspects of the cognitive decision-making and its possible human errors and organizational vulnerability are presented. The formal TOGA-based network model for cognitive decision-making enables to indicate and analyze nodes and arcs in which plant operators and managers errors may appear. The TOGA's multi-level IPK (Information, Preferences, Knowledge) model of abstract intelligent agents (AIAs) is applied. In the NPP context, super-safety approach is also discussed, by taking under consideration unexpected events and managing them from a systemic perspective. As the nature of human errors depends on the specific properties of the decision-maker and the decisional context of operation, a classification of decision-making using IPK is suggested. Several types of initial situations of decision-making useful for the diagnosis of NPP operators and managers errors are considered. The developed models can be used as a basis for applications to NPP educational or engineering simulators to be used for training the NPP executive staff. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Seventy-five years of nuclear criticality safety documents - a bibliography

A collection of nuclear criticality documents was begun in the 1970's at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (now Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). Documents in this bibliography are dated as early as 1940. The early documents described experimental work that was of vital importance to the safe use of fissile materials at nuclear reactors, the facilities for preparing or transporting nuclear fuel, or its eventual storage. The experiments were of direct value to support safe operations with fissile materials but they were also needed for validating early physics data and calculational methods and then for validating computational methods used in criticality safety evaluations. These documents provided information for our computerized bibliographic database. The bibliography was originally intended for use by Livermore staff members but criticality safety 'pioneers' encouraged us to make the database available to the broader nuclear safety community and even shared copies of their bibliographies and reports. A publication of the bibliography is being prepared and a searchable database is available on the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program's NCSP web site. The NCSP web site also includes links from the bibliography to many full-text documents. The database continues to expand--the information in this paper is based on a 'snapshot' of its present status. The 'vintage' hardcopy document collection is preserved and is being scanned into digital format. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of criticality safety validation guidance for NRC-regulated activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k{sub eff} calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1) Inappropriate critical experiment selection; 2) Insufficient trending analysis; 3) Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties; 4) Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis; 5) Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses; 6) Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data; 7) Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites; 8) Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty; 9) Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses; and 10) Inadequate validation analysis documentation. The final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developing a streamlined approach to criticality safety analyst training/qualification

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Criticality Safety Analyst (CSA) Qualification Standard was a multi-divisional effort forged in late 2012. The result of the effort is a well-documented and efficient approach to training, encompassing local and national Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) training courses for incoming criticality safety staff, as well as a model for professional development of qualified CSAs at LANL. Five years later, the approach to training and qualification for CSAs has evolved into a streamlined safety management function, integrated in all phases of employee recruitment, development, deployment, and management. (authors)

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

IEC 62859: A new international standard on the coordination between safety and cybersecurity for nuclear I and C systems - 160

Cybersecurity requirements and controls for digital I and C systems are increasingly added to well-established safety-oriented provisions. Interactions and potential side-effects are possible and must be mastered, taking into account the nuclear I and C system specificities as well as their normative and regulatory contexts. The new international standard IEC 62859 'Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems - Requirements for coordinating safety and cyber security' aims to optimize the integration of cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I and C architecture and systems, to prevent conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions, and to aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and cybersecurity. The paper presents the structure and the key aspects of this standard. IEC 62859 is structured along three main sections: one dealing with the overall I and C architecture, a second one focusing on the system level, a third one dealing with organizational and procedural issues. The paper also discusses related work in the nuclear industry, and in other sectors. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Criticality safety analysis of as-loaded spent nuclear Fuel Casks - 14589

The final safety analysis report (FSAR) or the safety analysis report (SAR) for a particular spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cask (both bare fuel and canister-based) system documents models and calculations used to demonstrate that a system meets the regulatory requirements under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of spent fuel storage, as well as the normal and accident conditions of transportation. FSAR/SAR calculations and approved content specifications are intended to be bounding in nature to certify cask systems for a variety of fuel characteristics with simplified SNF loading requirements. Therefore, in general, loaded cask systems possess excess and uncredited criticality margins (i.e., the difference between the licensing basis and the as-loaded calculations). This uncredited margin could be quantified by (1) employing more detailed cask-specific evaluations that credit the actual as-loaded cask inventory and (2) taking into account full (actinide and fission product) burnup credit. This uncredited criticality margin could be used to offset uncertainties in the safety basis to account for the effects of system aging during extended dry storage prior to transportation. Additionally, the uncredited criticality margin could also potentially be credited to offset increases in SNF system reactivity that may occur over a repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the system undergoes degradation and internal geometry changes. This paper summarizes an assessment of cask-specific as-loaded criticality margins for 215 loaded casks of SNF stored at eight reactor sites under fully flooded conditions to assess the margins available during transportation after extended storage. It is observed that the calculated k{sub eff} margin varies from 0.05 to almost 0.3 Δk{sub eff} for the eight selected reactor sites, demonstrating that significant uncredited safety margins are present. In addition, this paper evaluates the sufficiency of this excess margin in applications involving direct disposal of currently loaded SNF canisters (for canister-based systems) in a repository. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Overview and Current Progress of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Training and Education Program

Since 2011, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has been providing a two-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities, and, in 2017, an additional course was proposed for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs). In addition to hands-on training, other NCSP-funded tasks include training on sensitivity/uncertainty methods, NCS resource pipeline tasks, development of NCS guides, maintenance and development of Nuclear Criticality Safety Education Training (NCSET) modules and designing of a new subcritical assembly for hands-on training purposes. This paper provides an overview of the NCSP training and education program. The status of the NCSP hands-on training program will also be provided.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Update for Gas-Cooled Experiments

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) supports neutron irradiation of several types of experiments. One such experiment type is referred to as a gas leadout. Gas leadout experiments actively flow gas through the experiment which allows for active temperature control. It also allows for in-situ data of the experiment. For example, fission gas migration through a fuel sample can be monitored via activity of the sweep gas. Historically, ex-pile equipment and fission product monitors were housed in shielded ATR cubicles. Due to other facility updates, cubicle space is no longer available for gas leadout experiment equipment. To support continued operation of gas leadout experiments, ATR completed a safety basis update that supports a new housing for leadout equipment that may process potentially contaminated gas. In addition to the structure and associated equipment, technical safety requirements regarding handling and storage of experiments needed to be revised to support fueled gas leadout experiments and associated outage configurations. The safety basis update addressed the full lifecycle of these experiments, including experiment movement and interim storage, and credible abnormal events such as failures or leaks in contaminated gas tubing in occupied areas. This paper discusses the completed analyses performed to support the safety basis update associated with gas leadout experiments, including thermal-hydraulic evaluation, probabilistic analysis, and dose consequence analyses.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Investigating the relation between instantaneous driving decisions and safety critical events in naturalistic driving environment

The availability of large-scale naturalistic driving data provides enormous opportunities for studying relationships between instantaneous driving decisions prior to involvement in safety critical events (SCEs). This study investigates the role of driving instability prior to involvement in SCEs. While past research has studied crash types and their contributing factors, the role of pre-crash behavior in such events has not been explored as extensively. The research demonstrates how measures and analysis of driving volatility can be leading indicators of crashes and contribute to enhancing safety. Highly detailed microscopic data from naturalistic driving are used to provide the analytic framework to rigorously analyze the behavioral dimensions and driving instability that can lead to different types of SCEs such as roadway departures, rear end collisions, and sideswipes. Modeling results reveal a positive association between volatility and involvement in SCEs. Specifically, increases in both lateral and longitudinal volatilities represented by Bollinger bands and vehicular jerk lead to higher likelihoods of involvement in SCEs. Further, driver behavior related factors such as aggressive driving and lane changing also increases the likelihood of involvement in SCEs. Driver distraction, as represented by the duration of secondary tasks, also increases the risk of SCEs. Likewise, traffic flow parameters play a critical role in safety risk. The risk of involvement in SCEs decreases under free flow traffic conditions and increases under unstable traffic flow. Further, the model shows prediction accuracy of 88.1 % and 85.7 % for training and validation data. These results have implications for proactive safety and providing in-vehicle warnings and alerts to prevent the occurrence of such SCEs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗