Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 829 records · Page 46

Modification in Applying Appendix D of 40 CFR Part 61 to Heated Solid Radionuclide Materials With High Melting and Boiling Points

Appendix D of Title 40 Part 61 of the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provides a procedure that US Department of Energy (US DOE) facility owners and operators can use to estimate radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere for dose calculations instead of measuring emissions for minor sources under the 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities, regulation. The procedure assumes that any radioactive material heated above 100 °C is completely vaporized and emitted to the atmosphere. In 1991, the US DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) requested approval to use different release fractions (RFs) for uranium because of its high melting and boiling points. In response to the request, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) Region IV approved the use of modified RFs for elemental uranium provided no reaction had taken place to alter its chemical form. In 2015, the ORR requested approval to use different RFs for tungsten, again because of its high melting and boiling points. EPA Region IV approved the use of modified RFs for heated radioactive tungsten metal. In accordance with the two precedents set for heating uranium and radioactive tungsten metals, in 2016, the ORR requested approval to use modified RFs in a similar fashion for other radioactive solid metals and compounds with melting and boiling points above 500 °C that might be heated above 100 °C in future research projects and experiments. EPA Region IV again granted approval to use modified RFs for the list of compounds. This note discusses the proposed modified RFs and their development.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

RADIOACTIVELY POWERED RISING LIGHT CURVES OF TYPE Ia SUPERNOVAE

The rising luminosity of the recent, nearby supernova 2011fe shows a quadratic dependence with time during the first Almost-Equal-To 0.5-4 days. In addition, studies of the composite light curves formed from stacking together many Type Ia supernovae (SNe Ia) have found similar power-law indices for the rise, but may also show some dispersion that may indicate diversity. I explore what range of power-law rises are possible due to the presence of radioactive material near the surface of the exploding white dwarf (WD). I summarize what constraints such a model places on the structure of the progenitor and the distribution and velocity of ejecta. My main conclusion is that for the inferred explosion time for SN 2011fe, its rise requires an increasing mass fraction X {sub 56} Almost-Equal-To (4-6) Multiplication-Sign 10{sup -2} of {sup 56}Ni distributed between a depth of Almost-Equal-To 10{sup -2} and 0.3 M {sub Sun} below the WD's surface. Radioactive elements this shallow are not found in simulations of a single C/O detonation. Scenarios that may produce this material include helium-shell burning during a double-detonation ignition, a gravitationally confined detonation, and a subset of deflagration to detonation transition models. In general, the power-law rise can differ from quadratic depending on the details of the velocity, density, and radioactive deposition gradients in a given event. Therefore, comparisons of this work with observed bolometric rises of SNe Ia would place strong constraints on the properties of the shallow outer layers, providing important clues for identifying the elusive progenitors of SNe Ia.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Status Update on IAEA MODARIA II Working Group 1 (Assessment and Decision Making) - 19391

During WM2018, the work being done under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129) was introduced. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics. Amongst them, Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision aiding tools to address existing exposure situations due to past practices involving naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. Specifically, this covers the development of methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for such complex sites, and includes practical demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. During 2018 WG1 participants met twice to discuss the status and plans of work being conducted by the WG. The group held its Second Interim Meeting from 7 to 11 May 2018 at the Jozef Stefan Institute (JSI) in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The objectives of the meeting were to: (1) Discuss the status of WG1 work; (2) Start preparation of the interim draft version of the MODARIA II WG1 Report (herein referred to as the 'Interim Report'); (3) Review the progress of planned data analyses, model-model comparisons, and model-data comparisons being conducted through case studies for the Tessenderlo Chemie Site in Belgium, the Zapadnoe Uranium Mill Tailings Site in Ukraine, and a Former Tin Processing Facility Site in Brazil; (4) Discuss calculations conducted for a NORM Site in China for potential addition to the WG1 case studies; (5) Report on progress on topical studies and other assignments performed to support the preparation of several sections of the Interim Report; and (6) Discuss plans for incorporating some preliminary case studies considered by MODARIA I WG1 and MODARIA I WG3. During the meeting in Slovenia, WG1 participants also visited the Zirovski vrh (RZV) Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings Site near Ljubljana. From 22 to 25 October 2018, WG1 members also participated in the MODARIA II Third Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria. The meeting facilitated analysis of the progress made so far by the seven working groups, as well as exploration of the dissemination of the results of the MODARIA II Programme through publication in scientific journals dealing with the various subject areas covered by the Programme. WG1 participants focused on the preparation of its Interim Report, and engaged in technical exchanges with the IAEA Le Trench Project on characterization, assessment, remediation and management of buried waste at legacy trench sites, as well as the To Enhance uncertainties Reduction and stakeholders Involvement Towards integrated and graded Risk management of humans and wildlife In long-lasting radiological Exposure Situations (TERRITORIES) project (https://territories.eu/). Currently, WG1 is in the process of preparing a draft report to document the results of its various case studies and special topics, and is preparing for the final Interim Meeting in May 2019 and the final Technical Meeting in October 2019, before the conclusion of the MODARIA II Program at the end of 2019. This paper will provide a status update of these activities, along with preliminary information on the WG1 report, including potential recommendations for future activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Distribution of U, Pu and Np in a Mo-99 Recovery Process using Sachtopore NP (titania based) Absorbent Material

A laboratory scale mockup of a prototypical Mo-99 recovery process has been operated in a radioactive materials hood at Savannah River National Laboratory. This equipment has been operated with realistic concentrations of uranium (U-238), plutonium (94% Pu-239), neptunium (Np-237), and non-radioisotopes of common fission products (including Mo). The goal of this work was to determine the amounts of U, Pu, and Np in the liquid waste streams created by the wash streams for the production process. The key question was how the initial acid wash volume will be handled, as this solution contains residual raffinate which amounted to ~ 3% ofthe mass ofthe feed solution in this experiment. If the initial 1.9 bed volumes (BV) of acid wash were recycled as in this experiment then the combined wash solutions can be expected to contain 0.4 g U/L, 2.7 pg Pu/L and < 14 pg Np/L. If, on the other extreme, the entire acid wash solution was discarded as waste, then the combined wash solutions can be expected to contain 11 g U/L, 3.8 pg Pu/L and ~ 80 pg Np/L. The Sachtopore NP absorbent (for Mo-99 recovery) retains a minuscule fraction ofthe U (2.3 mg U per g titania or 0.03% ofthe U in the feed). The uncertainties are too large to determine how close the absorbent is to saturation with U. Less mass but a higher fraction ofthe total Np was retained by the absorbent (0.7 pg Np per g titania or ~2% of the Np in the feed). As has been reported elsewhere, a large fraction ofthe Pu fed to the titania bed was retained by the absorbent (92% of Pu in the feed or 20 pg per g titania).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288

The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Calibration facility for environment dosimetry instruments

In the last ten years, the nuclear activities, as well as the major nuclear events (see Fukushima accident) had an increasing impact on the environment, merely by contamination with radioactive materials. The most conferment way to quickly identify the presence of some radioactive elements in the environment, is to measure the dose-equivalent rate H. In this situation, information concerning the values of H due only to the natural radiation background must exist. Usually, the values of H due to the natural radiation background, are very low (∼10{sup −9} - 10{sup −8} Sv/h). A correct measurement of H in this range involve a performing calibration of the measuring instruments in the measuring range corresponding to the natural radiation background lead to important problems due to the presence of the natural background itself the best way to overlap this difficulty is to set up the calibration stand in an area with very low natural radiation background. In Romania, we identified an area with such special conditions at 200 m dept, in a salt mine. This paper deals with the necessary requirements for such a calibration facility, as well as with the calibration stand itself. The paper includes also, a description of the calibration stand (and images) as well as the radiological and metrological parameters. This calibration facilities for environment dosimetry is one of the few laboratories in this field in Europe.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.

microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗

A proposed solution to the challenges of disposal of greater than class C low-level radioactive waste - 15172

In 1982, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adopted rules for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. These rules established new standards for the siting, construction, operation and closure of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. The new rules also set out a classification system for low-level radioactive waste based on half-life and concentration of the radionuclides in the waste stream. The defined classes - Class A, Class B and Class C - were based on increasing toxicity with Class A being the least hazardous and Class C being relatively more hazardous. Radioactive waste that could not fit the classification scheme due to its long half-life or its high concentration of radioactive material was deemed to be greater than Class C low-level radioactive waste, with the ascribed acronym 'GTCC' low-level radioactive waste. Such waste was deemed not suitable for shallow land disposal based on the design standards for low-level radioactive waste landfills in place at that time. This resulted in a radioactive waste stream that had no disposal option. To remedy this problem, the US Congress in 1985 stipulated that the US Department of Energy would be responsible for the disposal of GTCC waste. Subsequently, the NRC amended its regulations to require GTCC low-level waste to be disposed in a geologic repository unless the Commission approved proposals for disposal in a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. The Commission did not concurrently establish any specific technical requirements for GTCC disposal in a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility, but did infer that a site-specific performance analysis could be conducted in support of any proposal for land disposal of such waste. In light of this, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) has conducted such a site-specific performance analysis that has indicated the disposal facility at Andrews Texas will perform satisfactorily as a disposal facility for certain types and quantities of GTCC waste. Concurrently with this analysis, WCS has submitted to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality a petition for rulemaking that will permit disposal of GTCC waste in their disposal facility. This paper summarizes the technical and legal analyses that were conducted in support of the proposed rulemaking. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of the 3 m{sup 3} Low Level Radioactive Waste Container in Taiwan - 20037

Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant stopped its business operation in July, 2019, and Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant will also be permanently shut down in 2023. Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act requires a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after being permanently ceased operation. According to the approved decommissioning plan of Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant and the proposed one of Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant, the 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste container is planned to store the low level radioactive wastes with higher radiation produced during the decommissioning. However, 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste containers are not used or developed in Taiwan before. To meet such need, Institute of Nuclear Energy Research develops a new type of 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste container and performs the corresponding analyses and tests based on Guidelines of Applying the Usage License of Low Level Radioactive Waste Containers and Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. In this article, it provides the information of the low level radioactive waste containers that have been approved or is under reviewing in Taiwan, and so do the design specifications of the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container. Besides, the numerical evaluation and test results of the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container are also included in this article. Based on the evaluation and test results, the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container satisfies the requirements of the storage container and industrial package type 2. Institute of Nuclear Energy Research will submit the usage license applications to the authority this year, and the usage licenses would be granted in 2021, expectedly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of Onsite Transportation Safety Documents for Nevada Test Site

Department of Energy (DOE) Orders require each DOE site to develop onsite transportation safety documents (OTSDs). The Nevada Test Site approach divided all onsite transfers into two groups with each group covered by a standalone OTSD identified as Non-Nuclear and Nuclear. The Non-Nuclear transfers involve all radioactive hazardous material in less than Hazard Category (HC)-3 quantities and all chemically hazardous materials. The Nuclear transfers involve all radioactive material equal to or greater than HC-3 quantities and radioactive material mated with high explosives regardless of quantity. Both OTSDs comply with DOE O 460.1B requirements. The Nuclear OTSD also complies with DOE O 461.1A requirements and includes a DOE-STD-3009 approach to hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis as needed. All Nuclear OTSD proposed transfers were determined to be non-equivalent and a methodology was developed to determine if “equivalent safety” to a fully compliant Department of Transportation (DOT) transfer was achieved. For each HA scenario, three hypothetical transfers were evaluated: a DOT-compliant, uncontrolled, and controlled transfer. Equivalent safety is demonstrated when the risk level for each controlled transfer is equal to or less than the corresponding DOT-compliant transfer risk level. In this comparison the typical DOE-STD-3009 risk matrix was modified to reflect transportation requirements. Design basis conditions (DBCs) were developed for each non-equivalent transfer. Initial DBCs were based solely upon the amount of material present. Route-, transfer-, and site-specific conditions were evaluated and the initial DBCs revised as needed. Final DBCs were evaluated for each transfer’s packaging and its contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Understanding Contamination; Twenty Years of Simulating Radiological Contamination

A wide variety of simulated contamination methods have been developed by researchers to reproducibly test radiological decontamination methods. Some twenty years ago a method of non-radioactive contamination simulation was proposed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) that mimicked the character of radioactive cesium and zirconium contamination on stainless steel. It involved baking the contamination into the surface of the stainless steel in order to 'fix' it into a tenacious, tightly bound oxide layer. This type of contamination was particularly applicable to nuclear processing facilities (and nuclear reactors) where oxide growth and exchange of radioactive materials within the oxide layer became the predominant model for material/contaminant interaction. Additional simulation methods and their empirically derived basis (from a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility) are discussed. In the last ten years the INL, working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), has continued to develop contamination simulation methodologies. The most notable of these newer methodologies was developed to compare the efficacy of different decontamination technologies against radiological dispersal device (RDD, 'dirty bomb') type of contamination. There are many different scenarios for how RDD contamination may be spread, but the most commonly used one at the INL involves the dispersal of an aqueous solution containing radioactive Cs-137. This method was chosen during the DARPA projects and has continued through the NHSRC series of decontamination trials and also gives a tenacious 'fixed' contamination. Much has been learned about the interaction of cesium contamination with building materials, particularly concrete, throughout these tests. The effects of porosity, cation-exchange capacity of the material and the amount of dirt and debris on the surface are very important factors. The interaction of the contaminant/substrate with the particular decontamination technology is also very important. Results of decontamination testing from hundreds of contaminated coupons have lead to certain conclusions about the contamination and the type of decontamination methods being deployed. A recent addition to the DARPA initiated methodology simulates the deposition of nuclear fallout. This contamination differs from previous tests in that it has been developed and validated purely to simulate a 'loose' type of contamination. This may represent the first time that a radiologically contaminated 'fallout' stimulant has been developed to reproducibly test decontamination methods. While no contaminant/methodology may serve as a complete example of all aspects that could be seen in the field, the study of this family of simulation methods provides insight into the nature of radiological contamination.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The radium industry in France and the remediation of polluted sites - 15256

According to the French Law of 28 June 2006 relative to the management of radioactive materials and waste, Andra is in charge of a public service mission that involves the clean-up of orphan sites that have been polluted by radioactivity. Andra is currently working, or has worked in the past, on around thirty sites in mainland France. The clean-up strategy is selected after a comparative analysis of the cost and the advantages of the different scenarios based on the ALARA principle. Whenever reasonable, Andra tries to achieve total clean-up, so that the site can be re-used without any constraint. However, for certain cases, it is opted for a less ambitious scenario, which means restricting the possibilities of use of the site after clean-up. In all cases, the chosen scenarios guarantee that there will be no radiological impact on the planned new use of the site. If the site is an orphan site, a National Advisory Committee for Public Funding in the field of Radioactivity (known as CNAR) decides which scenario presents the best cost-benefit profile and whether to provide public subsidies to fund the work. The multidisciplinary composition of the CNAR, with members from public administrations and organizations, politicians, qualified personalities and non-governmental organizations, guarantees a decision that has been carefully considered from all aspects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned From the Cesium Pond Soil Shipping Campaign at Whiteshell Laboratories - 18206

Whiteshell Laboratories (WL), located in Manitoba, Canada is the first major decommissioning project of a nuclear research establishment in Canada. With the focus now active remediation to return the site to green state, the majority of legacy radioactive waste and waste generated from decommissioning and demolition of nuclear facilities must be transported off site to Chalk River Laboratories (CRL), located in Ontario, Canada. No large radioactive waste shipment campaigns have been undertaken by WL until now. A newly established Waste Management Program specifically designed to support the WL Closure Project has executed its first major shipping campaign of radioactive material, making approximately one hundred shipments and reducing WL's total volume of low-level radioactive waste to transport by seven percent. The shipped waste was approximately 1800 m{sup 3} (2600 metric tons) of known Cs-137 contaminated soil material generated from the excavation of an Experimental Cesium Pond Project designed to study the distribution of dose received by organisms living at the mud-water interface from Cs-137 contamination. This paper outlines the cost benefit analysis undertaken to determine the most cost effective method for transporting the radioactively contaminated soil to CRL, storage challenges experienced by both WL and CRL, the selection of the most appropriate waste package, training of shippers, and the continual optimization of increasing the number of generated waste packages and the number of waste packages shipped and accepted at CRL. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Production of an impermeable composite of irradiated graphite and glass by hot isostatic pressing as a long term leach resistant waste form

Around 250,000 tons of irradiated graphite (i-graphite) exists worldwide and can be considered as a current waste or future waste stream. The largest national i-graphite inventory is located in UK (∼ 100,000 tons) with significant quantities also in Russia and France [5]. Most of the i-graphite remains in the cores of shutdown nuclear reactors including the MAGNOX type in UK and the UNGG in France. Whilst there are still operational power reactors with graphite cores, such as the Russian RBMKs and the AGRs in UK, all of them will reach their end of life during the next two decades. The most common reference waste management option of i-graphite is a wet or dry retrieval of the graphite blocks from the reactor core and the grouting of these blocks in a container without further conditioning. This produces large waste package volumes because the encapsulation capacity of the grout is limited and large cavities in the graphite blocks could reduce the packing densities. Packing densities from 0.5 to 1 tons per cubic meter have been assumed for grouting solutions. Furthermore the grout is permeable. This could over time allow the penetration of aqueous phases into the waste block and a potential dissolution and release of radionuclides. As a result particularly highly soluble radionuclides may not be retained by the grout. Vitrification could present an alternative, however a similar waste package volume increase may be expected since the encapsulation capacity of glass is potentially similar to or worse than that of grout. FNAG has developed a process for the production of a graphite-glass composite material called Impermeable Graphite Matrix (IGM) [3]. This process is also applicable to irradiated graphite which allows the manufacturing of an impermeable material without volume increase. Crushed i-graphite is mixed with 20 vol.% of glass and then pressed under vacuum at an elevated temperature in an axial hot vacuum press (HVP). The obtained product has zero or negligible porosity and a water impermeable structure. Structural analysis shows that the glass in the composite has replaced the pores in the graphite structure. The typical pore volume of a graphite material is in the range of 20 vol.%. Therefore no volume increase will occur in comparison with the former graphite material. This IGM material will allow the encapsulation of graphite with package densities larger than 1.5 ton per cubic meter. Therefore a huge volume saving can be achieved by such an alternative encapsulation method. Disposal performance is also enhanced since little or no leaching of radionuclides is observed due to the impermeability of the material NNL and FNAG have proved that IGM can be produced by hot isostatic pressing (HIP) which has several advantages for radioactive materials over the HVP process. - The sealed HIP container avoids the release of any radionuclides. - The outside of the waste package is not contaminated. - The HIP process time is shorter than the HVP process time. The isostatic press avoids anisotropic density distributions. - Simple filling of the HIP container has advantages over the filling of an axial die. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Space reactor assessment and validation study

The present difficulties experienced by the United States in launching payloads into space has suggested a number of problems which are associated with the handling of hazardous materials in spacecraft. The question has arisen as to the safety of launching highly radioactive material such as plutonium-238, related to the possibility of its dispersion into the atmosphere during a launch vehicle explosion. An alternative is the use of a small nuclear reactor which is not started until it is in space and contains little or no radioactivity at launch. A first order assessment of six small reactor concepts with power levels up to 100 MWe was performed. Both the nuclear feasibility of these concepts to operate at their rated power levels between 7 and 10 years and the capability of these concepts to remain subcritical both before and during launch and also in the case of water immersion during a potential launch failure or abort were investigated.

Gedeon, Stephen↗

Advancing Vision-based Feedback and Convolutional Neural Networks for Visual Outlier Detection

Machine learning has matured into a technology that has immediate applicability to the surveillance needs of nuclear material storage containers. These containers at LANL are the barrier preventing release of radioactive material to the workers, public, and environment during the storage period of the material. Annual surveillance activities can only provide coverage on a handful of containers. There is a significant need for surveillance tools to identify potential issues and precursors to containment failure that can be used during opportunistic inspections and, more generally, outside of annual surveillance activities. In this report we provide details on the advancement of our proposed embodiment that combines an automation system for taking pictures and a high-accuracy machine learning-driven object detection software. We further showcase the improvements on the software side with progress on extracting unique identification features and advances in detecting damage. The current state of the system captures subject matter expert training and a space-conscious design whose implementation is envisioned in the near future.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Case Study of Urban Residential Remediation and Restoration in Port Hope, Canada - 13250

The Canadian Municipality of Port Hope, Ontario, is located some 100 km east of Toronto and has been the location of radium and/or uranium refining since the 1930's. Historically, these activities involved materials containing radium-226, uranium, arsenic and other contaminants generated by the refining process. In years past, properties and sites in Port Hope became contaminated from spillage during transportation, unrecorded, un-monitored or unauthorized diversion of contaminated fill and materials, wind and water erosion and spread from residue storage areas. Residential properties in Port Hope impacted by radioactive materials are being addressed by the Canadian federal government under programs administered by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Office (LLRWMO) and the Port Hope Area Initiative Management Office (PHAIMO). Issues that currently arise at these properties are addressed by the LLRWMO's Interim Waste Management Program (IWM). In the future, these sites will be included in the PHAIMO's Small Scale Sites (SSS) remedial program. The LLRWMO has recently completed a remediation and restoration program at a residential property in Port Hope that has provided learnings that will be applicable to the PHAIMO's upcoming SSS remedial effort. The work scope at this property involved remediating contaminated refinery materials that had been re-used in the original construction of the residence. Following removal of the contaminated materials, the property was restored for continued residential use. This kind of property represents a relatively small, but potentially challenging subset of the portfolio of sites that will eventually be addressed by the SSS program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗