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At least 829 records · Page 46

Robotic Crane System for the Deconstruction of Chernobyl Unit 4 - 18583

The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) Unit 4 accident occurred on April 26, 1986 leaving a severely damaged reactor building and a highly radioactive area. To minimize the long-term radiological impact to personnel and the environment, Unit 4 was immediately enclosed by a structure named the Object Shelter (OS). To transform the OS into an ecologically safe system, the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) was developed in 1997. The most significant SIP tasks was the design and construction of the New Safe Confinement (NSC). The NSC is a 36,000 tonne arch enclosure that includes a suite of process equipment to address the ruins of Unit 4 while assuring the safety of workers, public, and the environment. The NSC has a span of 257 meters, length of 164 meters, and height of 110 meters and is designed for a 100 years life. The New Safe Confinement was slid from its erection area to directly over Unit 4 (a distance of 327 meters) in November 2016. One of the major mechanical handling systems installed in the NSC is the Main Cranes System (MCS), designed and fabricated by PaR Systems (USA). The planned deconstruction activities require the handling of shielded waste disposal casks containing fuel as well as transporting extremely large structural elements -remotely controlled using video surveillance equipment. The lifting activities required the cranes to be tele-robotically controlled to prevent inadvertent collisions, expedite repetitive and high accuracy functions, protect the equipment and structures within the NSC as well as increase the overall effectiveness of the MCS. In addition, due to the elevated radiation levels, remote deconstruction activities will need to be performed. The MCS has design provisions included for a tele-robotically controlled manipulator and a suite of tooling to be used for multiple activities including concrete coring, cutting, debris collection and other heavy demolition activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration and development of control mechanism for radioactive sources in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia have no nuclear industry. Nevertheless, many radioactive sources, for different purposes, have been used in the country. There is upswing in the number of companies that recruit nuclear technology in their daily work. The National Center for Radiation Protection (NCRP) takes the full commitment and responsibility for monitoring and regulating the movement of radioactive sources in the country. NCRP issues the licenses for import, export, and use of radioactive sources. It, also, protects the country from any trespassing radiation through a sizable net of early warning and radiation monitoring stations along the borders of Saudi Arabia. This paper talks about the procedures of licensing, importing, exporting of radioactive sources. It, also, sheds light on types of implementing radioactive sources in different practices encompass medicine, industry, research. The NCRP has established an electronic web site to ease the communication with all users in the country. This site is yet in the experimental stage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

RCT: 2.05 Contamination Control, Course #8770

This report focuses on the detection and control of radioactive contamination, which are an integral part of an aggressive ALARA program and provide an indication of the effectiveness of engineering controls and proper work practices in preventing the release of radioactive material. Radioactive contamination, if undetected or not properly controlled, can be spread and contaminate areas, equipment, personnel, and the environment.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Removal of Institutional Controls at CERCLA Site ANL-01 Ditches A, B and C at the Materials and Fuels Complex

ANL-01 is a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) site within Operable Unit (OU) 9-04 at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). The ANL-01 site includes the Industrial Waste Pond and its associated ditches. Ditches A, B and C within ANL-01 were remediated in accordance with the Final Record of Decision for Argonne National Laboratory - West (DOE-CH 1998a). Due to the success of the selected and contingent remedies for the ditches and the determination that they are protective of human health and the environment, institutional controls (ICs) are no longer required and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) recommends termination of the ICs. In addition, the documentation requirements of the INL Site-wide Institutional Controls, and Operations and Maintenance Plan for CERCLA Response Actions (DOE-ID 2017) have been met to allow termination to occur.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Technical Basis For Radiological Acceptance Criteria For Uranium At The Y-12 National Security Complex

The purpose of this report is to establish radiological acceptance criteria for uranium. Other factors for acceptance not considered include criticality safety concerns, contaminants to the process stream, and impacts to the Safety Basis for the affected facilities. Three types of criteria were developed in this report. They include limits on external penetrating and non-penetrating radiation and on the internal hazard associated with inhalation of the material. These criteria are intended to alleviate the need for any special controls beyond what are normally utilized for worker protection from uranium hazards. Any proposed exceptions would require case-by-case evaluations to determine cost impacts and feasibility. Since Y-12 has set rigorous ALARA goals for worker doses, the external limits are based on assumptions of work time involved in the movement of accepted material plus the desire that external doses normally received are not exceeded, and set so that no special personnel monitoring would be required. Internal hazard controls were established so that dose contributions from non-uranium nuclides would not exceed 10% of that expected from the uranium component. This was performed using a Hazard Index (HI) previously established for work in areas contaminated with non-uranium nuclides. The radiological acceptance criteria for uranium are summarized in Table 1. Note that these limits are based on the assumption that radioactive daughter products have reached equilibrium.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Protective effect of soybeans as protein source in the diet against cadmium-aorta redox and morphological alteration

We investigated the effects of cadmium exposition on thoracic aorta redox status and morphology, and the putative protective effect of soybeans in the diet. Male Wistar rats were separated into 6 groups: 3 fed with a diet containing casein and 3 containing soybeans, as protein source. Within each protein group, one was given tap water (control) and the other two tap water containing 15 and 100 ppm of Cd{sup 2+}, respectively, for two months. In rats fed with casein diet, 15 ppm of Cd induced an increase of thiobarbituric acid-reactive substances (TBARS), and of the catalase (CAT) and glutathione peroxidase (GPx) activities, which were even higher with 100 ppm of Cd{sup 2+}, in aorta. Also, 100 ppm Cd{sup 2+} exposure increased superoxide dismutase (CuZnSOD) activity; CAT, GPX, SOD, Nrf2 and metallothioneine II mRNA expressions and CAT, GPx and NOX-2 protein levels, compared with control. Aorta endothelial and cytoplasmic alterations were observed. However, with the soybeans diet, 15 and 100 ppm of Cd{sup 2+} did not modify TBARS levels; CAT, GPX and Nrf2 mRNA expressions; CAT, GPx and NOX-2 protein; and the aorta morphology, compared with control. The soybean diet attenuates the redox changes and protects against morphological alterations induced, in a dose-dependent way, by Cd in aorta. - Highlights: • Under casein diet, 100 ppm Cd{sup 2+} in drinking water induces oxidative stress in aorta. • Under casein diet, 100 ppm Cd{sup 2+} increases Nrf2, MT II and NOX2 expressions in aorta. • Under casein diet, 100 ppm Cd{sup 2+} induces morphological changes in rat aorta. • The soybean diet attenuates the redox changes induced by Cd in rat aorta. • The soybean diet attenuates morphological alterations induced by Cd in rat aorta.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Feasibility of critical infrastructure protection using network functions for programmable and decoupled ICS policy enforcement over WAN

Industrial control systems (ICS) represent a major component of our critical infrastructure. With the increasing need for more control and monitoring of such systems, ICS have seen an increase in connectivity to wide area networks (WAN) exposing aging equipment to rapidly evolving cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, the ICS data requires a reliability measure from the networks for critical functions for infrastructure monitoring and control. Especially when remote plant sites are involved such as pipelines, energy distribution networks, and transportation, WAN transport impairments most often provide a best effort delivery with no strict reliability guarantees. Network functions can provide a vendor agnostic, programmable critical infrastructure protection with a single maintenance, policy determination, and reliability assurance surface. A network function (NF) can be utilized for policy enforcement over the communication between remote entities and the main control office. This paper presents the research on transparent integration with existing ICS without disrupting communications, resulting in minimal downtime while decoupling the fast paced evolution of defensive security measures from the upgrade cycle of expensive long term hardware. We report our measurements on the resource requirements and overhead in the network for successful NF insertion under a wide variety of network impairments (network packet delay, reordering, and loss). Our paired NF implementation provides a policy enforcement platform extensible to cover myriad cybersecurity-related communication goals, including packet signing for verification, encryption for data privacy, packet filtering and data diode operation (i.e. protecting against eavesdropping, packet injection, and denial-of-service). Furthermore, bundling communication specifications into packet flows allows for tunability in applying policies as coarse- or fine-grained as the needs of the operator. We report on network function resource requirements in the form of required queue depth and network utilization overhead to inform the decision making against hardware cost constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

High-Frequency Signature-Based Fault Detection for Future MV Distribution Grids: Preprint

Increased deployment of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and microgrids are significantly changing the operation of distribution grid. Increasing penetration of power electronics based DERs also raise several operational problems such as protection coordination issues, voltage raise, recloser synchronization, stability, and frequency control. Legacy systems are designed for unidirectional power flow. Bidirectional power flows, and varying short circuit levels are some of the major challenges in implementing these legacy protection schemes for future power grid with high penetration of power electronics based DERs. Inverter based DER’s can contribute to a maximum of 2 p.u. fault current. Interconnection standards might require even lower fault current contribution. If these protection related challenges are not addressed, it will result in limiting the penetration of DERs in distribution feeders. In this paper, the feasibility of high frequency signature generated by transients is evaluated to identify and locate faults in a distribution system. The paper will discuss the need for an accurate line modeling approach to accurately capture the high frequency signatures. These high frequency signatures are naturally occurring electromagnetic transients for events such as switching events in the network, faults events, etc. This is different than that implemented in transmission systems as the proposed approach utilizes advanced signal processing techniques to retrieve valuable information from the high frequency signatures generated during faults and does not just rely on time delay measurements between reflections of the high frequency signals. In the full paper, information of a modified IEEE distribution feeder test system to accurately model the high frequency signatures will be provided. The distribution lines will be modeled using universal line modeling (ULM) technique in an electromagnetic transients program (EMTP) modeling platform. Different test cases will be simulated and these test cases will include different fault types, multiple fault locations, capacitor bank switching, etc. The feeder system modeled for these simulations will also include power electronics based DERs. Additionally, experimental results demonstrating the high frequency signatures generated due to a transient event in a medium voltage (13.8 kV) distribution line will also be presented in the full paper. Furthermore, the analysis combined with simulation and experimental results in the full paper will help demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of the proposed protection scheme. The developed protection scheme will not just help solve problems generated by bidirectional current flow, varying short-circuit current capacity, but also help in proliferation of DERs in distribution systems.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗

Calculation of the Phenix end-of-life test 'Control Rod Withdrawal' with the ERANOS code

The Inst. of Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) acts as technical support to French public authorities. As such, IRSN is in charge of safety assessment of operating and under construction reactors, as well as future projects. In this framework, one current objective of IRSN is to evaluate the ability and accuracy of numerical tools to foresee consequences of accidents. Neutronic studies step in the safety assessment from different points of view among which the core design and its protection system. They are necessary to evaluate the core behavior in case of accident in order to assess the integrity of the first barrier and the absence of a prompt criticality risk. To reach this objective one main physical quantity has to be evaluated accurately: the neutronic power distribution in core during whole reactor lifetime. Phenix end of life tests, carried out in 2009, aim at increasing the experience feedback on sodium cooled fast reactors. These experiments have been done in the framework of the development of the 4. generation of nuclear reactors. Ten tests have been carried out: 6 on neutronic and fuel aspects, 2 on thermal hydraulics and 2 for the emergency shutdown. Two of them have been chosen for an international exercise on thermal hydraulics and neutronics in the frame of an IAEA Coordinated Research Project. Concerning neutronics, the Control Rod Withdrawal test is relevant for safety because it allows evaluating the capability of calculation tools to compute the radial power distribution on fast reactors core configurations in which the flux field is very deformed. IRSN participated to this benchmark with the ERANOS code developed by CEA for fast reactors studies. This paper presents the results obtained in the framework of the benchmark activity. A relatively good agreement was found with available measures considering the approximations done in the modeling. The work underlines the importance of burn-up calculations in order to have a fine core concentrations mesh for the calculation of the power distribution. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Impact of the Revised 10 CFR 835 on the Neutron Dose Rates at LLNL

In June 2007, 10 CFR 835 [1] was revised to include new radiation weighting factors for neutrons, updated dosimetric models, and dose terms consistent with the newer ICRP recommendations. A significant aspect of the revised 10 CFR 835 is the adoption of the recommendations outlined in ICRP-60 [2]. The recommended new quantities demand a review of much of the basic data used in protection against exposure to sources of ionizing radiation. The International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements has defined a number of quantities for use in personnel and area monitoring [3,4,5] including the ambient dose equivalent H*(d) to be used for area monitoring and instrument calibrations. These quantities are used in ICRP-60 and ICRP-74. This report deals only with the changes in the ambient dose equivalent and ambient dose rate equivalent for neutrons as a result of the implementation of the revised 10 CFR 835. In the report, the terms neutron dose and neutron dose rate will be used for convenience for ambient neutron dose and ambient neutron dose rate unless otherwise stated. This report provides a qualitative and quantitative estimate of how much the neutron dose rates at LLNL will change with the implementation of the revised 10 CFR 835. Neutron spectra and dose rates from selected locations at the LLNL were measured with a high resolution spectroscopic neutron dose rate system (ROSPEC) as well as with a standard neutron rem meter (a.k.a., a remball). The spectra obtained at these locations compare well with the spectra from the Radiation Calibration Laboratory's (RCL) bare californium source that is currently used to calibrate neutron dose rate instruments. The measurements obtained from the high resolution neutron spectrometer and dose meter ROSPEC and the NRD dose meter compare within the range of {+-}25%. When the new radiation weighting factors are adopted with the implementation of the revised 10 CFR 835, the measured dose rates will increase by up to 22%. The health physicists should consider this increase for any areas that have dose rates near a posting limit, such as near the 100 mrem/hr for a high radiation area, as this increase in measured dose rate may result in some changes to postings and consequent radiological controls.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Operational Performance Risk Assessment in Support of A Supervisory Control System

Supervisory control system (SCS) is developed for multi-unit advanced small modular reactors to minimize human interventions in both normal and abnormal operations. In SCS, control action decisions made based on probabilistic risk assessment approach via Event Trees/Fault Trees. Although traditional PRA tools are implemented, their scope is extended to normal operations and application is reversed; success of non-safety related system instead failure of safety systems this extended PRA approach called as operational performance risk assessment (OPRA). OPRA helps to identify success paths, combination of control actions for transients and to quantify these success paths to provide possible actions without activating plant protection system. In this paper, a case study of the OPRA in supervisory control system is demonstrated within the context of the ALMR PRISM design, specifically power conversion system. The scenario investigated involved a condition that the feed water control valve is observed to be drifting to the closed position. Alternative plant configurations were identified via OPRA that would allow the plant to continue to operate at full or reduced power. Dynamic analyses were performed with a thermal-hydraulic model of the ALMR PRISM system using Modelica to evaluate remained safety margins. Successful recovery paths for the selected scenario are identified and quantified via SCS.

Denning, Richard S.↗

Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration and Concept of Operations for a Zero-Knowledge Protocol Passive Imaging Measurement for Arms Control

Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.

Sweany, Melinda Dominique [Sandia National Laborat↗

Operational performance risk assessment in support of a supervisory control system - 251

A supervisory control system is being developed for multiunit advanced small modular reactors to minimize human interventions during normal and abnormal operations. In the supervisory control system, control action decisions are made based on a probabilistic risk assessment that employs event trees and fault trees. Although traditional probabilistic risk assessment tools are implemented, their scope is extended to normal operations, and the application is reversed to assess the success of non-safety related systems and to enable continued operation of the plant. This extended probabilistic risk assessment approach is called operational performance risk assessment (OPRA). OPRA helps to identify available paths, combine control actions for maintaining plant conditions within operational limits, and to quantify the likelihood of success of these operational trajectories to optimize the selection of alternative actions without activating reactor protection system. In this paper, a case study of OPRA in a supervisory control system is demonstrated for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) design, specifically the power conversion system. The scenario investigated involved a condition in which the feedwater control valve that was observed to be drifting to the closed position. Alternative plant configurations that would allow the plant to continue to operate at full or reduced power were identified using OPRA. Dynamic analyses were performed with a thermal-hydraulic model of the ALMR PRISM system using Modelica to evaluate the magnitude of safety margins. Successful recovery paths for the selected scenario were identified and quantified using the supervisory control system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Reference Governor for Plasma-Shape Control in Tokamaks

Tokamaks are torus-shaped devices where a high-temperature, ionized gas (i.e. a plasma) is confined by means of helical magnetic fields. The ultimate goal of tokamaks is producing net electrical energy by means of nuclear-fusion reactions within the plasma. The shape of the plasma inside the tokamak is closely related with its confinement characteristics and, therefore, with the produced fusion power. In order to achieve and maintain plasma shapes that maximize the fusion yield, feedback controllers have been successfully developed during the years. However, machine-protection and plasma-stability requirements impose hard constraints on the plasma-shape targets that can be safely achieved by a feedback controller. In this work, a reference governor is proposed to provide, in real time, plasma-shape targets that fulfill the aforementioned safety requirements. The reference governor calculates such plasma-shape targets in response to changes in the state of the closed-loop system, as well as disturbances in the plasma energy and current. Here, the reference-governor design is based on a dynamical model of the plasma electromagnetic response. Simulation tests of the reference governor have been carried out for different plasma scenarios in the DIII-D tokamak to emulate realistic cases where safety may be compromised.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗