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814 records · Page 46

Optical spectroscopy and modeling of uranium gas-phase oxidation: Progress and perspectives

We report that studies related to U gas-phase oxidation through plasma- and thermo-chemistry are important for many fields, including environmental monitoring, forensic analysis, debris analysis in a weapon detonation event, and nucleation physics. Recently, significant efforts have been made to understand the chemical pathways involved in the progression from U atoms to diatoms (UO) and polyatomic molecules (UxOy), employing optical spectroscopy tools and computational modeling. In many studies, laser ablation of U or a U-containing flow reactor are used as a highly resource-efficient, repeatable, tunable, and lab-scale testbed for studying gas-phase oxidation in U plasmas. The spectroscopic analysis of high-temperature gas-phase oxidation of U is challenging due to the congested U spectra, resolution limitations of instrumentation, and the numerous chemical reaction pathways possible. This article focuses on the current understanding and challenges related to studying U plasma chemistry, specifically U gas-phase oxidation and molecular formation, via optical spectroscopy of plasmas and associated computational and spectral modeling. The physical and chemical processes involved in the evolution from U atoms to U oxide molecules to nanoparticles and agglomerates (i.e., debris) are discussed in the context of optical spectroscopic studies. The article concludes by highlighting opportunities for future research efforts based on existing knowledge published in the literature.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Hanford Single-Shell Tank and Double-Shell Tank Integrity Programs - 16390

Waste at Hanford is stored in 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks. Concerns related to aging radioactive waste storage facilities throughout the DOE complex led to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developing guidelines for structural integrity programs for tank systems. The committee of experts who developed these guidelines is commonly known as the Tank Structural Integrity Panel (TSIP). The DOE has subsequently adopted these guidelines, and requires site operators to have a program consistent with them. The Double-Shell Tank (DST) integrity is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods. In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of 241-AY-102 was leaking. WRPS contracted a panel of experts from industry and academia to provide advice and recommendations for the DST Integrity Program. The panel focused on three concerns: - No Early warning - Determine why the existing DST Integrity Program did not predict a primary tank failure or provide early warning of the pending failure. - Program improvements - Recommend activities to either predict a primary tank failure or increase the probability of early warning. - Forensic recommendations - The panel provided additional recommendations regarding forensic assessment of Tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102) to facilitate a conclusion on why the leak occurred. WRPS has prepared a response to the concerns of the panel coupled with recommendations for project action to strengthen the DST Integrity Program [4]. The purpose of this DST Integrity Improvement Plan is to translate the recommendations to specific project activities that are technically and practically responsive. To improve the understanding of the Single-Shell Tank (SST) integrity, WRPS, the Department of Energy-Office of River Protection tank operations contractor, developed an enhanced Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project (SSTIP) in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity, consisting of various subject matter experts in industry and academia, was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. This panel developed 33 recommendations in four main areas of interest: structural integrity, liner degradation, leak integrity and prevention, and mitigation of contamination migration. In late 2010, seventeen of these recommendations were used to develop the basis for the M-45-10-1 Change Package for the Hanford Federal Agreement and Compliance Order, also known as the Tri-Party Agreement. The change package identified two phases of work for SST integrity. The initial phase, which was completed in 2015, was focused on efforts to envelope the integrity of the tanks. It was divided into two primary areas of investigation: structural integrity and leak integrity. If necessary, based on the outcome from the initial work, a second phase would be focused on further definition of the integrity of the tanks and liners. The two combined phases are designed to support the formal integrity assessment of the Hanford SSTs in 2018 by an Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer. This paper will summarize the current status of the DST and SST Integrity Programs and discuss the ongoing efforts to improve these programs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fukushima Daiichi—A Case Study for BWR Instrumentation and Control Systems Performance During a Severe Accident, Rev 1

This report provides an assessment of the performance of various instrumentation and control (I&C) and monitoring systems, with a focus on the first few days of the Fukushima Daiichi accident starting on March 11, 2011. Similar to what occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident in 1979, operator responses were challenged when information on key parameters was lost, erroneous, or misleading. While numerous improvements in instrumentation capabilities have been made since the TMI-2 event, the accident at Fukushima Daiichi suggests the potential for further improvement. The objective of this research is to review the performance of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 instrumentation systems that could have helped ensure that plant operators and emergency responders had relevant, accurate, and timely knowledge of plant conditions as they managed the accident response. As was the case with TMI-2, forensic analyses of plant instrumentation failures will be a long-term effort. As an introduction to this long-term research, this report focuses on the information available in the control room during the accident and illustrates the challenges to operators in their understanding of plant conditions during the progression of the accident. I&C systems monitor the success or failure of achievement of light water reactor safety principles in which the protection of the reactor fuel, reactor coolant system, and reactor containment is accomplished. This report (1) provides an overview of the safety principles; (2) notes parameters associated with the boiling water reactor (BWR)/3 and BWR/4 protection, actuation, and monitoring systems as they relate to the achievement of these principles; (3) presents data from past research on predicted instrumentation performance during severe accidents, and (4) assesses performance of the key I&C and monitoring systems associated with BWR/3 and BWR/4 reactors like those at Fukushima Daiichi. Lessons learned or potential improvements associated with the performance of these systems in the context of severe accidents are delineated. As background information, an overview of key BWR/3- and BWR/4-Mark I reactor designs (BWR/3 and BWR/4 with a Mark I containment) reactor protection, engineered safety features actuation, and accident monitoring systems is provided. A brief description of plant safety systems used to prevent or mitigate reactor accidents is also provided. This background information provides context for the brief discussion of previous research that has been conducted on BWR severe accidents and for the discussion of the accident sequences, which led to core damage at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3. The progression of the accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 occurred very much as predicted in prior severe accident research conducted in the United States and internationally, given the complete station blackout that occurred when the tsunami generated by one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded rolled onshore.

Accident Tolerant Equipment↗

Analysis of geological materials containing uranium using laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy

Laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) is a rapid atomic emission spectroscopy technique that can be configured for a variety of applications including space, forensics, and industry. LIBS can also be configured for stand-off distances or in-situ, under vacuum, high pressure, atmospheric or different gas environments, and with different resolving-power spectrometers. In this paper, the detection of uranium in a complex geological matrix under different measurement schemes is explored. Although many investigations have been completed in an attempt to detect and quantify uranium in different matrices at in-situ and standoff distances, this work detects and quantifies uranium in a complex matrix under Martian and ambient air conditions. Investigation of uranium detection using a low resolving-power LIBS system at stand-off distances (1.6 m) is also reported. The results are compared to an in-situ LIBS system with medium resolving power and under ambient air conditions. Uranium has many thousands of emission lines in the 200–800 nm spectral region. In the presence of other matrix elements and at lower concentrations, the limit of detection of uranium is significantly reduced. The two measurement methods (low and high resolving-power spectrometers) are compared for limit of detection (LOD). Of the twenty-one potential diagnostic uranium emission lines, seven (409, 424, 434, 435, 436, 591, and 682 nm) have been used to determine the LOD for pitchblende in a dunite matrix using the ChemCam test bed LIBS system. The LOD values determined for uranium transitions in air are 409.013 nm (24,700 ppm), 424.167 nm (23,780 ppm), 434.169 nm (24,390 ppm), 435.574 nm (35,880 ppm), 436.205 nm (19,340 ppm), 591.539 nm (47,310 ppm), and 682.692 nm (18,580 ppm). The corresponding LOD values determined for uranium transitions in 7 Torr CO2 are 424.167 nm (25,760 ppm), 434.169 nm (40,800 ppm), 436.205 nm (32,050 ppm), 591.539 nm (15,340 ppm), and 682.692 nm (29,080 ppm). The LOD values determine for uranium emission lines using the medium resolving power (10,000 λ/Δλ) LIBS system for the dunite matrix in air are 409.013 nm (6120 ppm), 424.167 nm (5356 ppm), 434.169 nm (5693 ppm), 435.574 nm (6329 ppm), 436.205 nm (2142 ppm), and 682.692 nm (10,741 ppm). The corresponding LOD values determined for uranium transitions in a SiO2 matrix are 409.013 nm (272 ppm), 424.167 nm (268 ppm), 434.169 nm (402 ppm), 435.574 nm (1067 ppm), 436.205 nm (482 ppm), and 682.692 nm (720 ppm). The impact of spectral resolution, atmospheric conditions, matrix elements, and measurement distances on LOD is discussed. The measurements will assist one in selecting the proper system components based upon the application and the required analytical performance.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗