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815 records · Page 46

TH-A-19A-07: The Effect of Particle Tracking Step Size Limit On Monte Carlo- Computed LET Spectrum of Therapeutic Proton Beams

Purpose: To investigate the effect of charged particle tracking step size limit in the determination of the LET spectrum of therapeutic proton beams using Monte Carlo simulations. Methods: The LET spectra at different depths in a water phantom from a 79.7 MeV spot-scanning proton beam were calculated using Geant4. Five different tracking step limits 0.5 mm, 0.1 mm, 0.05 mm, 0.01 mm and 1 μm were adopted. The field size was set to 10×10 cm{sup 2} on the isocenter plane. A 40×40×6 cm{sup 3} water phantom was modelled as the irradiation target. The voxel size was set to 1×1×0.5 mm{sup 3} to obtain high resolution results. The LET spectra were scored ranging from 0.01 keV/μm to 10{sup 4}keV/μm in the logarithm scale. In addition, the proton energy spectra at different depths were also scored. Results: The LET spectra calculated using different step size limits were compared at four depths along the Bragg curve. At any depths, the spread of the LET spectra increases with the decrease of step size limit. In the dose buildup region (z = 1.9 cm) and in the region proximal to the Bragg peak (z = 3.95 cm), the frequency mean LET does not vary with decreasing step size limit. At Bragg peak (z = 4.75 cm) and in the distal edge (z = 4.85 cm), frequency mean LET decreases with decreasing step size limit. The energy spectrum at any specified depths does not vary with the step size limit. Conclusion: The calculated LET has a spectral distribution rather than a single value at any depths along the Bragg curve and the spread of the computed spectrum depends on the tracking step limit. Incorporating the LET spectrum distribution into the robust IMPT optimization plan may provide more accurate biological dose distribution than using the dose- or fluence-averaged LET. NIH Program Project Grant P01CA021239.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Dosimetry is Key to Good Epidemiology: Workers at Mallinckrodt Chemical Works had Seven Different Source Exposures

Mallinckrodt Chemical Works was the earliest uranium processing facility in the Manhattan Project, beginning in 1942. Even then, concern existed about possible health effects resulting from exposure to radiation and pitchblende dust. This concern was well founded as the facility processed Belgian Congo pitchblende ore that was up to 60% pure uranium with high 235 U content and up to 100 mg of radium per ton. Workers were exposed to external gamma radiation plus internal radiation from inhalation and ingestion of pitchblende dust (uranium, radium, and silica). Multiple sources of exposure were available for organ dose reconstruction to a degree unique for an epidemiologic study. Personal film badge measures available from 1945 captured external exposures. Additional external exposure included 15,518 occupational medical x-rays and 210 radiation exposure records from other facilities outside of Mallinckrodt employment. Organ dose calculations considered organ-specific coefficients that account for photon energy and job-specific orientation of workers to the radiation source during processing. Intakes of uranium and radium were based on 39,451 uranium urine bioassays and 2,341 breath radon measurements, and International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 68 biokinetic models were used to estimate organ-specific radiation absorbed dose. Estimates of exposure to airborne radon and its short-lived progeny were based on radon measurements in work areas where radium-containing materials were handled or stored, together with estimated exposure times in these areas based on job titles. Dose estimates for radon and its short-lived progeny were based on models and methods recently recommended in ICRP Publication 137. This comprehensive dosimetric approach follows methods outlined by the National Council on Radiation Protection Scientific Committee 6-9 for the Million Worker Study. Annual doses were calculated for six organs: lung, brain, heart, kidney, colon and red bone marrow. Finally, evaluation and adjustment for individual cumulative measures of pitchblende dust inhalation were made for lung and kidney diseases.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Worker Safety and Health and Nuclear Safety Quarterly Performance Analysis (January - March 2008)

The DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to 'implement comprehensive management and independent assessments that are effective in identifying deficiencies and broader problems in safety and security programs, as well as opportunities for continuous improvement within the organization' and to 'regularly perform assessments to evaluate implementation of the contractor's processes for screening and internal reporting.' LLNL has a self-assessment program, described in ES&H Manual Document 4.1, that includes line, management and independent assessments. LLNL also has in place a process to identify and report deficiencies of nuclear, worker safety and health and security requirements. In addition, the DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to evaluate 'issues management databases to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions' (page 14, DOE Enforcement Process Overview, December 2007). LLNL requires that all worker safety and health and nuclear safety noncompliances be tracked as 'deficiencies' in the LLNL Issues Tracking System (ITS). Data from the ITS are analyzed for worker safety and health (WSH) and nuclear safety noncompliances that may meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). This report meets the expectations defined by the DOE Office of Enforcement to review the assessments conducted by LLNL, analyze the issues and noncompliances found in these assessments, and evaluate the data in the ITS database to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions. The report attempts to answer three questions: (1) Is LLNL evaluating its programs and state of compliance? (2) What is LLNL finding? (3) Is LLNL appropriately managing what it finds? The analysis in this report focuses on data from the first quarter of 2008 (January through March). This quarter is analyzed within the context of information identified in previous quarters to include April 2007 through March 2008. The results from analyzing the deficiencies are presented in accordance with the two primary NTS reporting thresholds for WSH and nuclear safety noncompliances: (1) those related to certain events or conditions and (2) those that are management issues. In addition, WSH noncompliances were also analyzed to determine if any fell under the 'other significant condition' threshold. This report also identifies noncompliance topical areas that may have issues that do not meet the NTS reporting threshold but should remain under observation. These are placed on the 'watch list' for continued analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Performance Analysis: ITS Data through September 30, 2009

Data from ITS was analyzed to understand the issues at LLNL and to identify issues that may require additional management attention and these that meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). In this report we discuss assessments and issues entered in ITS and compare the number and type presently entered in ITS to previous time periods. Issues reported in ITS were evaluated and discussed. The analysis identified two noncompliances that meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE NTS. All of the data in ITS is analyzed; however, the primary focus of this report is to meet requirements for performance analysis of specific functional areas. The DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to 'implement comprehensive management and independent assessments that are effective in identifying deficiencies and broader problems in safety and security programs, as well as opportunities for continuous improvement within the organization' and to 'regularly perform assessments to evaluate implementation of the contractor's's processes for screening and internal reporting.' LLNL has a self-assessment program, described in the document applicable during this time period, ES&H Manual Document 4.1, that includes line, management and independent assessments. LLNL also has in place a process to identify and report deficiencies of nuclear, worker safety and health and security requirements. In addition, the DOE Office of Enforcement expects that 'issues management databases are used to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions' (page 15, DOE Enforcement Process Overview, June 2009). LLNL requires that all worker safety and health and nuclear safety noncompliances be tracked as 'deficiencies' in the LLNL Issues Tracking System (ITS). Data from the ITS are analyzed for worker safety and health (WSH) and nuclear safety noncompliances that may meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). This report meets the expectations defined by the DOE Office of Enforcement to evaluate implementation of internal processes for screening and reporting, review the assessments conducted by LLNL, analyze the noncompliances found in these assessments, and evaluate the data in the ITS database to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions. The report attempts to answer three questions: (1) Is LLNL evaluating its programs and state of compliance; (2) What is LLNL finding; and (3) Is LLNL appropriately managing what it finds? The results from analyzing the deficiencies are presented in accordance with the two primary NTS reporting thresholds for WSH and nuclear safety noncompliances: (1) those related to certain events or conditions and (2) those that are management issues. In addition, WSH noncompliances were also analyzed to determine if any fell under the 'other significant condition' threshold. This report identifies deficiencies that meet the criteria for reporting to the DOE NTS; topics and subtopics that should remain under observation because the number of entries meets the test criteria or because of management concern; and topics and subtopics that are determined to no longer require observation. Topics and subtopics that are identified for continued observation are placed on a 'watch list.' The purpose of the watch list is for the Performance Analysis and Reporting Section (PARS) of the Contactor Assurance Office to analyze these topics and subtopics in future performance analysis reports.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Key metrics of progress in the NIF ignition implosions and future challenges on the path to higher yields

Successful demonstration of an implosion that meets the physics metrics for ignition on the National Ignition Facility (NIF) in August 2021 and demonstration of target energy gain G > 1 in December 2022 represented the culmination of more than a decade of research on the NIF. An in-depth analysis of the key ignition metrics achieved on the NIF over the past decade shows sustained progress toward identifying and mitigating degradation effects. Ignition implosions on the NIF have progressed from early experiments whose compressed fuel conditions were degraded by a factor of 10–20 below the ignition threshold with yields of only 1%–2% of the laser energy, to current experiments that significantly exceed the ignition threshold and in the best experiments achieve yields greater than twice the laser energy. It is very likely that NIF can get more than 20 MJ of yield and possibly 50–70 MJ yields when fully optimized at an ultraviolet laser energy of 2.6 MJ following the completion of the NIF Extended Yield Capability Project. Achieving these higher yields will also require improvements to capsules at larger size and possibly with alternate materials, as well as an improved understanding of hohlraum and capsule physics. Now that NIF has achieved ignition, the design of a Next Generation High Energy Density Facility that could achieve the National Nuclear Security Administration long-term goal of substantially higher yields than the NIF can proceed with a more confident physics base. We evaluate these opportunities including possible applications for inertial fusion energy and likely challenges to achieving this level of performance over the next decade.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗