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At least 829 records · Page 46

Characterization of the Potential Hazards Associated with Potential RCRA Treatment Noncompliances

The purpose of this document is to provide a hazard evaluation of the noncompliances and whether any new actions are required to mitigate potential risk to the worker or the public. In short, we have reviewed the noncompliances and have concluded that the possibility of exothermic reactions leading to radioactive release is not credible, and in one case, inconceivable, stemming from the fact that the majority fraction of the waste is compatible with organic absorbents and neutralizers. It is not expected that the noncompliances would generate or produce uncontrolled flammable fumes, gases, extreme heat, pressure, fire, explosions, or violent reactions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Real-time Microseismic Processing for Induced Seismicity Hazard Detection

Induced seismicity is inherently associated with underground fluid injections. If fluids are injected in proximity to a pre-existing fault or fracture system, the resulting elevated pressures can trigger dynamic earthquake slip, which could both damage surface structures and create new migration pathways. The goal of this research is to develop a fundamentally better approach to geological site characterization and early hazard detection. We combine innovative techniques for analyzing microseismic data with a physics-based inversion model to forecast microseismic cloud evolution. The key challenge is that faults at risk of slipping are often too small to detect during the site characterization phase. Our objective is to devise fast-running methodologies that will allow field operators to respond quickly to changing subsurface conditions.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Fish Toxicity Non-Hazardous Waste GAC Data

Attached are the test data generated from the analysis of the Fathead Minnow Hazardous Waste Screen bioassay sample. All testing was conducted under the direct supervision of Joseph A. LeMay.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures

systems the concrete shall not only provide shielding but insures stability of the upright canister, facilitates anchoring, allows ventilation, and provides physical protection against theft, severe weather and natural (seismic) as well as man-made events (blast incidences). Given the need to remain functional for 40 years or even longer in case of interim storage, the concrete outerpack and the internal canister components need to be evaluated with regard to their long-term ability to perform their intended design functions. Just as evidenced by deteriorating concrete bridges, there are reported visible degradation mechanisms of dry storage systems especially when high corrosive environments are considered in maritime locations. The degradation of reinforced concrete is caused by multiple physical and chemical mechanisms, which may be summarized under the heading of environmental aging. The underlying hygro-thermal transport processes are accelerated by irradiation effects, hence creep and shrinkage need to include the effect of chloride penetration, alkali aggregate reaction as well as corrosion of the reinforcing steel. In light of the above, the two main objectives of this project are to (1) develop a probabilistic multi-hazard assessment framework, and (2) through experimental and numerical research perform a comprehensive assessment under combined earthquake loads and aging induced deterioration, which will also provide data for the development and validation of the probabilistic framework.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

LA-UR-14-27684, Analysis of Wildland Fire Hazard to the TWF at Los Alamos National Labs

Wildfires represent an Anticipated Natural Phenomena Hazard for LANL and the surrounding area. The TWF facility is located in a cleared area and is surrounded on three sides by roadway pavement. Therefore, direct propagation of flames to the facility is not considered the most credible means of ignition. Rather, fires started by airborne transport of burning brands constitute the most significant wildland fire threat to the TWF. The purpose of this document is to update LA-UR-13-24529, Airborne Projection of Burning Embers – Planning and Controls for Los Alamos National Laboratory Facilities, to be specific to the TWF site and operations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Radiation Hazard Scale Data Product Review Feedback Report

In support of the Department of Energy (DOE) National nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) assisted in the development of new data templates for disseminating and communicating FRMAC1 data products using the CDC Radiation Hazard Scale communication tool. To ensure these data products will be useful to stakeholders during a radiological emergency, LLNL facilitated opportunities for product socialization and review.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Informing hazardous zones for on-board maritime hydrogen liquid and gas systems

The significantly higher buoyancy of hydrogen compared to natural gas means that hazardous zones defined in the IGF code may be inaccurate if applied to hydrogen. This could place undue burden on ship design or could lead to situations that are unknowingly unsafe. We present dispersion analyses to examine three vessel case studies: (1) abnormal external vents of full blowdown of a liquid hydrogen tank due to a failed relief device in still air and with crosswind; (2) vents due to naturally-occurring boil-off of liquid within the tank; and (3) a leak from the pipes leading into the fuel cell room. The size of the hydrogen plumes resulting from a blowdown of the tank depend greatly on the wind conditions. It was also found that for normal operations releasing a small amount of "boil- off" gas to regulate the pressure in the tank does not create flammable concentrations.

08 HYDROGEN↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2017

Report submitted to regulators (State of Nevada and EPA Region IV). Required to document compliance with 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since nuclear testing ended in 1992, radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2017, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 5.7% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2017 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the adjacent U.S. Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range; this individual received a dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.0000098 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Development of Tritide Dose Assumptions for Tritium Processing and Extraction Facilities MACCS2 Consolidated Hazard Analysis and Documented Safety Analysis Revision

The purpose of this report is to identify the Tritide Dose Assumptions applicable to the Tritium Facilities. These dose assumptions support the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 2 (MACCS2) revision of the Consolidated Hazards Analysis (CHA) and Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Tritium Facilities, including the Tritium Extraction Facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of Tritide Dose Assumptions for Tritium Processing and Extraction Facilities MACCS2 Consolidated Hazard Analysis and Documented Safety Analysis Revision

The purpose of this report is to identify the Tritide Dose Assumptions applicable to the Tritium Facilities. These dose assumptions support the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 2 (MACCS2) revision of the Consolidated Hazards Analysis (CHA) and Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Tritium Facilities, including the Tritium Extraction Facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions (Calendar Year 2018)

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons.The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2018, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.1% to a maximum of 5.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2018 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the northern end of Amargosa Valley; this individual received a potential dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000008 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2019 Notice of Public Training for the Electronic Public Reading Room Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit EPA ID No. NM0890010515

The Department of Energy (DOE); Triad National Security, LLC (Triad); and Newport News Nuclear BWXT-Los Alamos, LLC (N3B) are holding training on the contents and use of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Electronic Public Reading Rooms (EPRRs). The EPRR is an information repository for environmental and administrative information and correspondence required by Permit Section 1.10 of the LANL Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, issued November 2010. LANL Electronic Public Reading Room and the Los Alamos Legacy Cleanup Electronic Public Reading Room can be accessed at http://eprr.lanl.gov.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

High-Performance Computational Modeling of Strong Ground Motion for Seismic Response Analysis with Implications for High-Hazard and/or Nuclear Facilities and Critical Infrastructure at the NNSSNLV-015-19, Year 2

Presentation to be given at the FY 2020 SDRD Annual Meeting, to be held Sept. 23-24, on WebEx. There is one video also attached. This presentation is a reduced slide deck of the recently STIPped version, DOE/NV/03624--0875, presented 9-15-20 at the work in progress seminar. High-Performance Computational Modeling of Strong Ground Motion for Seismic Response Analysis with Implications for High-Hazard and/or Nuclear Facilities and Critical Infrastructure at the NNSSNLV-015-19, Year 2

58 GEOSCIENCES↗