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Criticality Safety Evaluation of the LLNL Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly (ISSA)

The LLNL Nuclear Criticality Safety Division has developed a training center to illustrate criticality safety and reactor physics concepts through hands-on experimental training. The experimental assembly, the Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly (ISSA), uses surplus highly enriched research reactor fuel configured in a water tank. The training activities will be conducted by LLNL following the requirements of an Integration Work Sheet (IWS) and associated Safety Plan. Students will be allowed to handle the fissile material under the supervision of LLNL instructors. This report provides the technical criticality safety basis for instructional operations with the ISSA experimental assembly.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Summary of the Effort to Use Active-induced Time Correlation Techniques to Measure the Enrichment of HEU

This document summarizes the effort to use active-induced time correlation techniques to measure the enrichment of bulk quantities of enriched uranium. In summary, these techniques use an external source to initiate fission chains, and the time distribution of the detected fission chain neutrons is sensitive to the fissile material enrichment. The number of neutrons emitted from a chain is driven by the multiplication of the item, and the enrichment is closely coupled to the multiplication of the item. As the enrichment increases (decreases), the multiplication increases (decreases) if the geometry is held constant. The time distribution of fission chain neutrons is a complex function of the enrichment and material configuration. The enrichment contributes to the probability of a subsequent fission in a chain via the likelihood of fissioning on an even-numbered isotope versus an odd-numbered isotope. The material configuration contributes to the same probability via solid angle effects for neutrons inducing subsequent fissions and the presence of any moderating material. To simplify the ability to accurately measure the enrichment, an associated particle imaging (API) D-T neutron generator and an array of plastic scintillators are used to simultaneously image the item and detect the fission chain neutrons. The image is used to significantly limit the space of enrichment and material configuration and enable the enrichment to be determined unambiguously.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Fabrication and Characterization of Surrogate TRISO Particles Using 800μm ZrO 2 Kernels

In support of fully ceramic microencapsulated (FCM) fuel development, coating development work is ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to produce tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) coated fuel particles with both UN kernels and surrogate (uranium-free) kernels. The nitride kernels are used to increase fissile density in these SiC-matrix fuel pellets with details described elsewhere. The surrogate TRISO particles are necessary for separate effects testing and for utilization in the consolidation process development. This report focuses on the fabrication and characterization of surrogate TRISO particles which use 800μm in diameter ZrO 2 microspheres as the kernel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nondestructive Assay Data Integration with the SKB-50 Assemblies - FY16 Update

A project to research the application of non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques for spent fuel assemblies is underway at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (for which the Swedish acronym is Clab) in Oskarshamn, Sweden. The research goals of this project contain both safeguards and non-safeguards interests. These nondestructive assay (NDA) technologies are designed to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguard inspectors and others to determine the following technical goals more accurately; Verify initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration for spent fuel assemblies; Detect replaced or missing pins from a given spent fuel assembly to confirm its integrity; and Estimate plutonium mass and related plutonium and uranium fissile mass parameters in spent fuel assemblies. Estimate heat content, and measure reactivity (multiplication).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY 2016 Data Analysis Annual Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 606 sites in 56 countries worldwide. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element in the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings. NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 56 countries around the world. Thirty-seven of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year 2016. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in fiscal year 2016. The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of approximately six from site to site. Some lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have approximately 8,000 occupancies per day and the different types of cargo that travel through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was above 96% for fiscal year 2016. NSDD takes all of these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Applications of Antineutrino Monitoring to Nonproliferation

Antineutrinos are highly penetrating particles emitted by the fission process in operating nuclear power and research reactors. Their rate of emission and energy spectrum can provide useful information about reactor operations, including the existence of the reactor, its power level, and the fissile mass inventories in the core. Because the signal cannot be attenuated or masked, this information can be gathered at long standoff outside the core. Building on our group’s successful experimental demonstrations of plutonium content monitoring at 25 meters from a reactor core, the goal of this project is to demonstrate detectors for reactor monitoring and discovery detectors at increasing standoffs, out to a practical limit of about 1000 kilometers. Our two main goals for FY16 and 17 are: 1) design a detector capable of monitoring nuclear reactor operations at 25 kilometer standoff, and 2) engage in a cooperative effort to monitor a former plutonium production reactor in India (at close range).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comparison Of 252 Cf Time Correlated Induced Fisssion With AmLi Induced Fission On Fresh MTR Research Reactor Fuel

The effective application of international safeguards to research reactors requires verification of spent fuel as well as fresh fuel. To accomplish this goal various nondestructive and destructive assay techniques have been developed in the US and around the world. The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) system developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) combining both neutron and gamma measurement capabilities. Since spent fuel assemblies are stored in water, the system was designed to be watertight to facilitate underwater measurements by inspectors. The AEFC is comprised of six 3 He detectors as well as a shielded and collimated ion chamber. The 3 He detectors are used for active and passive neutron coincidence counting while the ion chamber is used for gross gamma counting. Active coincidence measurement data is used to measure residual fissile mass, whereas the passive coincidence measurement data along with passive gamma measurement can provide information about burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment. In the past, most of the active interrogation systems along with the AEFC used an AmLi neutron interrogation source. Owing to the difficulty in obtaining an AmLi source, a 252 Cf spontaneous fission (SF) source was used during a 2014 field trail in Uzbekistan as an alternative. In this study, experiments were performed to calibrate the AEFC instrument and compare use of the 252 Cf spontaneous fission source and the AmLi (α,n) neutron emission source. The 252 Cf source spontaneously emits bursts of time-correlated prompt fission neutrons that thermalize in the water and induce fission in the fuel assembly. The induced fission (IF) neutrons are also time correlated resulting in more correlated neutron detections inside the 3 He detector, which helps reduce the statistical errors in doubles when using the 252 Cf interrogation source instead of the AmLi source. In this work, two MTR fuel assemblies varying both in size and number of fuel plates were measured using 252 Cf and AmLi active interrogation sources. This paper analyzes time correlated induced fission (TCIF) from fresh MTR fuel assemblies due to 252 Cf and AmLi active interrogation sources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

High power ring methods and accelerator driven subcritical reactor application

High power proton accelerators allow providing, by spallation reaction, the neutron fluxes necessary in the synthesis of fissile material, starting from Uranium 238 or Thorium 232. This is the basis of the concept of sub-critical operation of a reactor, for energy production or nuclear waste transmutation, with the objective of achieving cleaner, safer and more efficient process than today’s technologies allow. Designing, building and operating a proton accelerator in the 500-1000 MeV energy range, CW regime, MW power class still remains a challenge nowadays. There is a limited number of installations at present achieving beam characteristics in that class, e.g., PSI in Villigen, 590 MeV CW beam from a cyclotron, SNS in Oakland, 1 GeV pulsed beam from a linear accelerator, in addition to projects as the ESS in Europe, a 5 MW beam from a linear accelerator. Furthermore, coupling an accelerator to a sub-critical nuclear reactor is a challenging proposition: some of the key issues/requirements are the design of a spallation target to withstand high power densities as well as ensure the safety of the installation. These two domains are the grounds of the PhD work: the focus is on the high power ring methods in the frame of the KURRI FFAG collaboration in Japan: upgrade of the installation towards high intensity is crucial to demonstrate the high beam power capability of FFAG. Thus, modeling of the beam dynamics and benchmarking of different codes was undertaken to validate the simulation results. Experimental results revealed some major losses that need to be understood and eventually overcome. By developing analytical models that account for the field defects, one identified major sources of imperfection in the design of scaling FFAG that explain the important tune variations resulting in the crossing of several betatron resonances. A new formula is derived to compute the tunes and properties established that characterize the effect of the field imperfections on the transverse beam dynamics. The results obtained allow to develop a correction scheme to minimize the tune variations of the FFAG. This is the cornerstone of a new fixed tune non-scaling FFAG that represents a potential candidate for high power applications. As part of the developments towards high power at the KURRI FFAG, beam dynamics studies have to account for space charge effects. In that framework, models have been installed in the tracking code ZGOUBI to account for the self-interaction of the particles in the accelerator. Application to the FFAG studies is shown. Finally, one focused on the ADSR concept as a candidate to solve the problem of nuclear waste. In order to establish the accelerator requirements, one compared the performance of ADSR with other conventional critical reactors by means of the levelized cost of energy. A general comparison between the different accelerator technologies that can satisfy these requirements is finally presented. In summary, the main drawback of the ADSR technology is the high Levelized Cost Of Energy compared to other advanced reactor concepts that do not employ an accelerator. Nowadays, this is a show-stopper for any industrial application aiming at producing energy (without dealing with the waste problem). Besides, the reactor is not intrinsically safer than critical reactor concepts, given the complexity of managing the target interface between the accelerator and the reactor core.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Modeling defect and fission gas properties in U-Si fuels

Uranium silicides, in particular U 3 Si 2 , are being explored as an advanced nuclear fuel with increased accident tolerance as well as competitive economics compared to the baseline UO2 fuel. They benefit from high thermal conductivity (metallic) compared to UO 2 fuel (insulator or semi-conductor) used in current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). The U-Si fuels also have higher fissile density. In order to perform meaningful engineering scale nuclear fuel performance simulations, the material properties of the fuel, including the response to irradiation environments, must be known. Unfortunately, the data available for USi fuels are rather limited, in particular for the temperature range where LWRs would operate. The ATF HIP is using multi-scale modeling and simulations to address this knowledge gap.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Modeling defect and fission gas properties in U-Si fuels

Uranium silicides, in particular U 3 Si 2 , are being explored as an advanced nuclear fuel with increased accident tolerance as well as competitive economics compared to the baseline UO 2 fuel. They benefit from high thermal conductivity (metallic) compared to UO 2 fuel (insulator or semi-conductor) used in current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). The U-Si fuels also have higher fissile density. In order to perform meaningful engineering scale nuclear fuel performance simulations, the material properties of the fuel, including the response to irradiation environments, must be known. Unfortunately, the data available for USi fuels are rather limited, in particular for the temperature range where LWRs would operate. The ATF HIP is using multi-scale modeling and simulations to address this knowledge gap.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Accurate Holdup Calculations with Predictive Modeling & Data Integration

In facilities that process special nuclear material (SNM) it is important to account accurately for the fissile material that enters and leaves the plant. Although there are many stages and processes through which materials must be traced and measured, the focus of this project is material that is “held-up” in equipment, pipes, and ducts during normal operation and that can accumulate over time into significant quantities. Accurately estimating the holdup is essential for proper SNM accounting (vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation), criticality and radiation safety, waste management, and efficient plant operation. Usually it is not possible to directly measure the holdup quantity and location, so these must be inferred from measured radiation fields, primarily gamma and less frequently neutrons. Current methods to quantify holdup, i.e. Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH), primarily rely on simple source configurations and crude radiation transport models aided by ad hoc correction factors. This project seeks an alternate method of performing measurement-based holdup calculations using a predictive model that employs state-of-the-art radiation transport codes capable of accurately simulating such situations. Inverse and data assimilation methods use the forward transport model to search for a source configuration that best matches the measured data and simultaneously provide an estimate of the level of confidence in the correctness of such configuration. In this work the holdup problem is re-interpreted as an inverse problem that is under-determined, hence may permit multiple solutions. A probabilistic approach is applied to solving the resulting inverse problem. This approach rates possible solutions according to their plausibility given the measurements and initial information. This is accomplished through the use of Bayes’ Theorem that resolves the issue of multiple solutions by giving an estimate of the probability of observing each possible solution. To use Bayes’ Theorem, one must have a model y(x) that maps the state variables x (the solution in this case) to the measurements y. In this case, the unknown state variables are the configuration and composition of the heldup SNM. The measurements are the detector readings. Thus, the natural model is neutral-particle radiation transport where a wealth of computational tools exists for performing these simulations accurately and efficiently. The combination of predictive model and Bayesian inference forms the Data Integration with Modeled Predictions (DIMP) method that serves as foundation for this project. The cost functional describing the model-to-data misfit is computed via a norm created by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the model parameters and responses. Since the model y(x) for the holdup problem is nonlinear, a nonlinear optimization on Q is conducted via Newton-type iterative methods to find the optimal values of the model parameters x. This project comprised a collaboration between NC State University (NCSU), the University of South Carolina (USC), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The project was originally proposed in seven main tasks with an eighth contingency task to be performed if time and funding permitted; in fact time did not permit commencement of the contingency task and it was not performed. The remaining tasks involved holdup analysis with gamma detection strategies and separately with neutrons based on coincidence counting. Early in the project, and upon consultation with experts in coincidence counting it became evident that this approach is not viable for holdup applications and this task was replaced with an alternative, but valuable investigation that was carried out by the USC partner. Nevertheless, the experimental 4 measurements at ORNL of both gamma and neutron sources for the purpose of constructing Detector Response Functions (DRFs) with the associated uncertainties were indeed completed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Test report dot 7A type a liquid packaging

This test report documents the performance of Savannah River National Laboratory’s (SRNL’s) U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 7A; General Packaging, Type A shielded liquid shipping packaging and compliance with the regulatory requirements of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The primary use of this packaging design is for the transport of radioactive liquids of up to 1.3 liters in an unshielded configuration and up to 113 mL of radioactive liquids in a shielded configuration, with no more than an A2 quantity in either configuration, over public highways and/or commercial aircraft. The contents are liquid radioactive materials sufficiently shielded and within the activity limits specified in173.435 or 173.433 for A2 (normal form) materials, as well as within the analyzed thermal heat limits. Any contents must be compatibly packaged and must be compatible with the packaging. The basic packaging design is based on the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Model 9979 Type A fissile shipping packaging designed and tested by SRNL. The shielded liquid configuration consists of the outer and inner drums of the 9979 package with additional low density polyethylene (LDPE) dunnage nesting a tungsten shielded cask assembly (WSCA) within the 30-gallon inner drum. The packaging model for the DOT Specification 7A, Type A liquids packaging is HVYTAL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Triso coating development progress for uranium nitride kernels

In support of fully ceramic matrix (FCM) fuel development [1-2], coating development work is ongoing at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to produce tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) coated fuel particles with UN kernels [3]. The nitride kernels are used to increase fissile density in these SiC-matrix fuel pellets with details described elsewhere [4]. The advanced gas reactor (AGR) program at ORNL used fluidized bed chemical vapor deposition (FBCVD) techniques for TRISO coating of UCO (two phase mixture of UO2 and UCx) kernels [5]. Similar techniques were employed for coating of the UN kernels, however significant changes in processing conditions were required to maintain acceptable coating properties due to physical property and dimensional differences between the UCO and UN kernels (Table 1).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Impact of Operating Parameters and Correlated Parameters for Extended BWR Burnup Credit

Applicants for certificates of compliance for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation and dry storage systems perform analyses to demonstrate that these systems are adequately subcritical per the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Parts 71 and 72. For pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF, these analyses may credit the reduction in assembly reactivity caused by depletion of fissile nuclides and buildup of neutron-absorbing nuclides during power operation. This credit for reactivity reduction during depletion is commonly referred to as burnup credit (BUC). US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review BUC analyses according to the guidance in the Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 8, Revision 3, Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transportation and Storage Casks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Neutron Multiplicity Analysis

Neutron multiplicity measurements are widely used for nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM). When combined with isotopic composition information, neutron multiplicity analysis can be used to estimate the spontaneous fission rate and leakage multiplication of SNM. When combined with isotopic information, the total mass of fissile material can also be determined. This presentation provides an overview of this technique.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Isotopic Ratios of Samarium by TIMS for Nuclear Forensic Application

The isotopic ratio of Nd, Sm, and Gd can provide important information regarding fissile material (nuclear devices, reactors), neutron environment, and device yield. These studies require precise measurement of Sm isotope ratios, by either TIMS or MC-ICP-MS. There has been an increasing trend to measure smaller and smaller quantities of Sm bearing samples. In nuclear forensics 10-100 ng of Sm are needed for precise measurement. To measure sub-ng Sm samples using TIMS for nuclear forensic analysis.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Gamma-ray mirror technology for NDA of spent fuel

Direct measurements of gamma rays emitted by fissile material have been proposed as an alternative to measurements of the gamma rays from fission products. From a safeguards applications perspective, direct detection of uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) K-shell fluorescence emission lines and specific lines from some of their isotopes could lead to improved shipper-receiver difference or input accountability at the start of Pu reprocessing. However, these measurements are difficult to implement when the spent fuel is in the line-of-sight of the detector, as the detector is exposed to high rates dominated by fission product emissions. To overcome the combination of high rates and high background, grazing incidence multilayer mirrors have been proposed as a solution to selectively reflect U and Pu hard X-ray and soft gamma rays in the 90 to 420 keV energy into a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector shielded from the direct line-of-sight of spent fuel. Several groups demonstrated that K-shell fluorescence lines of U and Pu in spent fuel could be detected with Ge detectors. In the field of hard X-ray optics the performance of reflective multilayer coated reflective optics was demonstrated up to 645 keV at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility. Initial measurements conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with sealed sources and scoping experiments conducted at the ORNL Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory (IFEL) with spent nuclear fuel further demonstrated the pass-band properties of multilayer mirrors for reflecting specific emission lines into 1D and 2D HPGe detectors, respectively.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A 3S Risk Assessment Approach for Nuclear Power: Safety, Security, and Safeguards

Safety-focused risk analysis and assessment approaches struggle to adequately include malicious, deliberate acts against the nuclear power industry's fissile and waste material, infrastructure, and facilities. Further, existing methods do not adequately address non- proliferation issues. Treating safety, security, and safeguards concerns independently is inefficient because, at best, it may not take explicit advantage of measures that provide benefits against multiple risk domains, and, at worst, it may lead to implementations that increase overall risk due to incompatibilities. What is needed is an integrated safety, security and safeguards risk (or "3SR") framework for describing and assessing nuclear power risks that can enable direct trade-offs and interactions in order to inform risk management processes — a potential paradigm shift in risk analysis and management. These proceedings of the Sandia ePRA Workshop (held August 22-23, 2017) are an attempt to begin the discussions and deliberations to extend and augment safety focused risk assessment approaches to include security concerns and begin moving towards a 3S Risk approach. Safeguards concerns were not included in this initial workshop and are left to future efforts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗