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At least 829 records · Page 46

Criticality calculations and shielding analysis of the Missouri S and T research reactor using SCALE-6.2.2 - 25408

A 3D model of the Missouri S and T Research Reactor (MSTR) was developed using SCALE-6.2.2 in this study. The criticality calculation of MSTR was modeled with the CSAS6/KENO-VI sequence within the SCALE-6.2.2 package. The critical control rods height was predicted, and the criticality was achieved when the control rod withdrawn 22.25 in with the k{sub eff} value of 1.0001±0.00083. Then, the neutron source distribution of the critical core was used as a mesh source for the shielding analysis. The shielding analysis was performed using a flexible MAVRIC/FW-CADIS model of the MSTR that could perform and analyze deep penetration shielding problems. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The official website of the U.S. Department of energy's nuclear criticality safety program - 14122

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) mission is to provide sustainable expert leadership, direction, and the technical infrastructure necessary to develop, maintain, and disseminate the essential technical tools, training, and data to support safe, efficient fissionable material operations within the DOE. The NCSP Website site makes a variety of information available to the criticality safety practitioner, including reference materials, training modules and links to related sites. It assists criticality safety personnel to keep abreast of NCSP activities or current developments in criticality safety via a 'What's New' section within the Website. Convenient access to the many useful features of the Website is available via drop-down menus. The Website is also available to non-DOE and international professionals tasked with ensuring safe operations involving fissionable nuclear materials. (authors)

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The development of criticality response materials - 14282

The Sellafield nuclear facility in the UK comprises a highly complex suite of plants and processes. This in turn demands a consistent and high performance from Emergency Response teams and management in order to demonstrate readiness to respond and combat any nuclear emergency. In order to continue to improve such readiness, a comprehensive programme of development has been undertaken by the Licensee. The programme spans the totality of the emergency response cycle which is resolved into three broad areas: Preparedness; Response; Building Specific File. Within these broad categories the focus of the materials changes from broad and general materials in the preparedness section to actual scenario specific materials in the Building Specific Files Sellafield Ltd. provided the scope of work for the totality of the criticality response materials, known collectively as Criticality Accident Response Data (CARD). The UK National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) was challenged to technically underpin, develop and present the information in a format and layout that would satisfy the requirements of consistency, brevity, simplicity and relevance. One of the key areas targeted for improvement, and the focus of this paper, was the criticality accident response information that sits within the Building Specific File. At this level of the emergency response cycle by necessity the information must be detailed and specific and enable the emergency responder to understand the problem and assist in formulating a recovery plan. One of the key challenges faced by NNL and discussed in this paper was how to provide the emergency responder with the greatest amount of relevant information in the simplest form. NNL solved this problem by presenting the information in a 'four-block' format which includes a common set of information in textual and diagrammatic form. This paper presents on overview of the criticality accident specific four-blocker, highlights the problems encountered and focuses on the new and innovative materials developed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Establishing no credible risk of inadvertent criticality for the K-25 demolition project - 14310

Demolition of the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant required establishing a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality because a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) could not be reliably maintained operable as the building was being torn down. Preparation for, and demolition of, the facility was a multi-year long effort with significant changes in approach. The most significant change was to demolish the facility with as much of the process gas equipment and piping left in the facility as possible, rather than removing all process gas equipment and piping from the facility prior to demolishing the building structure only. The contractor had to adapt their approach to accommodate these changes. The normal approach to demolition was to remove all process gas equipment and piping prior to demolition, using Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls based on the double contingency principle, while CAAS coverage was intact. Then, the building structure was demolished with no requirement for a CAAS. This was the method used to demolish the K-33 Building, for example. In the case of K-25 demolition, all equipment and piping that met the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) disposal cell Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) was left in the building and removed as part of the building demolition process. This resulted in significant quantities of fissionable material remaining in the building and being handled during demolition. The NCS Organization worked closely with several groups during preparation activities. A Data Management organization was established to specifically identify every piece of process gas equipment and piping in the facility so that it could be accounted for and characterized. Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) personnel conducted internal visual inspections, by remote camera, of all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3' diameter, to reveal any large deposits that would require removal. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) of the vast majority of equipment and piping was required to quantify the amount of fissionable material remaining. Finally, all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3'' diameter was internally filled with foam, which was credited by NCS with immobilizing the remaining fissionable material such that large migration and accumulation could not occur during demolition activities. NCS personnel worked closely with all of these groups in order to acquire the data and information needed to establish a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality during building demolition. Good communication and a close working relationship between NCS, the various D and D/characterization personnel, and the Department of Energy (DOE) ensured the success of the modified approach to building demolition. The same successful approach is currently underway in the K-27 Building as well. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

UK regulatory review of the double contingency principle in criticality safety - 14379

The UK's regulatory regime is based on Licence Conditions (LCs) attached to a Nuclear Site Licence (NSL) and is non-prescriptive in nature. The law requires licensees to reduce health and safety risks to workers and the public 'so far as is reasonability practicable' (SFAIRP), and this framework provides licensees with flexibility to achieve this. Guidance for inspectors on the assessment of nuclear safety cases has been published in Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and supporting Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs). These guidance documents have recently been reviewed in the light of the Fukushima accident. The opportunity has also been taken to reconsider the use of the Double Contingency Principle used in criticality safety cases, an approach commonly regarded as the preferred means of criticality control internationally and featured in the SAPs and TAGs. Licensees in the UK have adopted several approaches in nuclear criticality safety cases based upon a combination of deterministic and probabilistic safety cases using the Double Contingency Principle and Design Basis Analysis. ONR has developed a targeted intervention to sample a number of nuclear safety cases in order to test the adequacy of methodologies used to secure nuclear criticality safety. This paper reports the results of this intervention and considers the need to review the advice currently given by the UK nuclear regulator, including on use of the Double Contingency Principle. (authors)

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Criticality characteristics of MCCI products possibly produced in reactors of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station - 14408

The damaged Unit 1-3 reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station may contain fuel debris of a significant amount that is in a form of molten-core-concrete-interaction (MCCI) product with porous structure. Such low density MCCI product including fissile material is a great concern for its criticality control, especially under submerged condition, due to its fairly good neutron moderation. This report shows computation results of basic criticality characteristics of the MCCI product, which will facilitate criticality risk assessments during decommissioning of the reactors. The results imply that water bound in concrete may raise the risk from the viewpoints of possibility of criticality events and of effectiveness of mitigation measures such as neutron poison injection into coolant water. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Validation study for crediting chlorine in critically analyses for spent nuclear fuel disposition - 14428

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management practices in the United States rely on dry storage systems that include both canister- and cask-based systems. The United States Department of Energy Used Fuel Disposition Campaign is examining the feasibility of direct disposal of dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs) in a geological repository. One of the major technical challenges for direct disposal is the ability to demonstrate the subcriticality of the DPCs loaded with SNF for the repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the DPCs may undergo degradation over time. Specifically, groundwater ingress into the DPC (i.e., flooding) could allow the system to achieve criticality in scenarios where the neutron absorber plates in the DPC basket have degraded. However, as was shown by Banerjee et al., some aqueous species in the groundwater provide noticeable reactivity reduction for these systems. For certain amounts of particular aqueous species (e.g., chlorine, lithium) in the groundwater, subcriticality can be demonstrated even for DPCs with complete degradation of the neutron absorber plates or a degraded fuel basket configuration. It has been demonstrated that chlorine is the leading impurity, as indicated by significant neutron absorption in the water that is available in reasonable quantities for the deep geological repository media under consideration. This paper presents the results of an investigation of the available integral experiments worldwide that could be used to validate DPC disposal criticality evaluations, including credit for chlorine. Due to the small number of applicable critical configurations, validation through traditional trending analysis was not possible. The bias in the eigenvalue of the application systems due only to the chlorine was calculated using TSURFER analysis and found to be on the order of 100 percent mille (1 pcm = 10-5 k{sub eff}). This study investigated the design of a series of critical configurations with varying amounts of chlorine to address validation gaps. Such integral experiments would support the crediting of the chlorine neutron-absorption properties in groundwater and the demonstration of subcriticality for DPCs in deep geologic repositories with sufficient chlorine availability. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improvements in criticality safety training for plant operators at the Sellafield site - 14431

A large number of plant operators on the Sellafield site require criticality awareness training. Historically, this training had been developed and delivered largely by the Criticality Safety team in isolation, with a heavy focus on the physics of criticality. Feedback from operators indicated that the historic training approach perhaps over emphasised the physics of criticality as an abstract concept, while potentially under emphasising more practical considerations for day to day work on the plants. This paper discusses some of the improvements that have been made to the training courses and the methods of delivery over recent years at Sellafield. (author)

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Reactivity effects at the Mayak production association, January 2, 1958 criticality accident using serpent 2 and openFOAM - 14444

The process nuclear criticality accident that occurred at the Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-40) on January 2, 1958 involving a vessel of uranyl nitrate solution claimed the lives of three workers and left a fourth worker with continuing health problems. There are a myriad of uncertain parameters involved with this accident: What was the molarity of the solution? How much solution was in the vessel at the time of the accident? In what position was the vessel and the solution when it went critical? How important was the impact of reflection due to the workers and/or the floor? These uncertain parameters have made this accident particularly difficult to analyze in the past. This work aims to lower the uncertainty on some of these parameters. A most-probable solution composition is determined by comparing literature on the physical properties of uranyl nitrate solutions to those presented in LA-13638 [1], which describes the accident in question. Using this most-probable solution, the main contributions to the reactivity of the system and hence the eventual accident, are identified through Serpent 2 and OpenFOAM analyses. Serpent 2, a Monte Carlo software tool, is used to perform calculations of the reactivity effects of lowering the vessel toward the floor and the reactivity added by the close proximity of workers. OpenFOAM, a C++ partial differential equation solver toolkit, is used to simulate the fluid inside the vessel as the vessel is tipped. This is done by treating the solution and air inside the vessel as two incompressible, isothermal, and immiscible fluids using a volume of fluid (VoF) approach. The goal of this approach is simply to track the interface between the two fluids, and hence give an accurate description of the geometrical structure of the solution as the vessel is tipped. These two unique tools are then coupled to provide a time-dependent flow simulation to study the effect that the changing geometrical structure had on the criticality of the system, which is novel to the criticality safety field. This work provides a more accurate picture of the accident going forward. (authors)

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Criticality safety analysis of spent fuel storage or handling disposals using burnup credit - loading curve calculation - 14445

MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS Companies have shared their own experience to develop a neutron and criticality calculations chain in order to perform isotopic composition predictions of spent fuel after irradiation in a reactor and criticality analysis of fuel storages taking into account burnup credit. The whole calculation sequence is divided into three steps, all calling SCALE 6.1.2 modules. The first two steps are dedicated to the evaluation of isotopic compositions of burnt fuel. As transport and depletion calculations in three dimensions appears to be way too long for the whole core (about several months), dealing with each fuel assembly one by one is the alternative solution MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS commonly chose to study. Therefore, the first step aims at determining the axial burnup profile of a given fuel assembly using a 3-D model with infinite reflections on lateral axes. The T6-depl sequence of TRITON module coupling KENO-VI and ORIGEN-S was used in this step. Sensitivity studies confirmed that addition of the 8 closest neighbors of the studied fuel assembly in the model has an insignificant impact on the axial burnup profile. However, fuel assemblies in the peripheral zone of the core must be treated separately with a model including the nearest fuel assemblies and the effect of peripheral water. Then, the second phase evaluates the isotopic compositions of each fuel assemblies at the center of the active height with a 2-D model under conservative core conditions. The T-depl sequence of the TRITON module coupling NEWT to ORIGEN-S is called in this step. Each fuel assembly must be studied separately to consider loading pattern changes occurring at each cycle. An infinite model with reflections on lateral axes is used and the closest neighbors of the fuel assembly are limited to 2 pins - which is around the size of the neutrons mean free path in the core. This is an innovative physical trick aiming at compensating for a limited computing power. Finally, isotopic compositions calculated are combined with the axial burnup profile of the first step to extrapolate the concentrations along the whole active length. Data can then be added in any criticality model, such as a spent fuel pit or any disposal handling fuel assemblies. Criticality analyses of burnt fissile material using burnup credit can be managed within a reasonable amount of time, on condition that sufficient proofs of code qualification for the studied range of parameters are provided, especially on fission products isotopic compositions calculation. (authors)

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Evaluation of the concrete shield compositions from the 2010 criticality accident alarm system Benchmark experiments at the CEA VALDUC silene facility - 14454

In October 2010, a series of benchmark experiments were conducted at the French Commissariat a l'energie Atomique et aux energies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and the CEA. The purpose of these experiments was to create three benchmarks for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data used in the analysis of criticality accident alarm systems. This series of experiments consisted of three single-pulsed experiments with the SILENE reactor. For the first experiment, the reactor was bare (unshielded), whereas in the second and third experiments, it was shielded by lead and polyethylene, respectively. The polyethylene shield of the third experiment had a cadmium liner on its internal and external surfaces, which vertically was located near the fuel region of SILENE. During each experiment, several neutron activation foils and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were placed around the reactor. Nearly half of the foils and TLDs had additional high-density magnetite concrete, high-density barite concrete, standard concrete, and/or BoroBond shields. CEA Saclay provided all the concrete, and the US Y-12 National Security Complex provided the BoroBond. Measurement data from the experiments were published at the 2011 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC 2011) and the 2013 Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD 2013) topical meeting. Preliminary computational results for the first experiment were presented in the ICNC 2011 paper, which showed poor agreement between the computational results and the measured values of the foils shielded by concrete. Recently the hydrogen content, boron content, and density of these concrete shields were further investigated within the constraints of the previously available data. New computational results for the first experiment are now available that show much better agreement with the measured values. (authors)

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National criticality experiments research center: Status and update - 14575

Four critical assembly machines (Comet, Planet, Flat-Top, and Godiva-IV) constitute the critical experiment capabilities at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. All four machines are operational. Between these machines, systems ranging from the thermal through the intermediate to the fast spectrum may be assembled. Steady-State, transient, and super-prompt critical conditions may be explored. In this paper, the status and capabilities of NCERC are discussed. (authors)

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Experimental validation of the Cristal V2.0 French criticality calculation package - 14587

A new version of the CRISTAL criticality calculation package, named CRISTAL V2.0 [1], has been developed by IRSN and CEA, in collaboration with AREVA and EDF. Four calculation routes are now available, using nuclear data issued from the JEFF-3.1.1 evaluation: two multigroup routes based on 281 groups cross-sections (APOLLO2 - MORET 5 or APOLLO2-Sn calculations), a pointwise Monte Carlo route (TRIPOLI-4{sup R}) and a criticality standard calculation route. The CRISTAL V2.0 package, which will be delivered soon to OECD/NEA data bank, benefits from a broad validation database covering almost all areas of criticality-safety applications, from fuel fabrication to reprocessing, including transportation. 3,127 critical experiments, corresponding to 342 series, either issued from the OECD/ICSBEP Handbook or performed in French facilities (confidential data) were selected for the CRISTAL V2.0 validation database. Currently, more than 2,300 experiments are already part of the validation database. This validation work highlights an overall consistency to experimental data and inter-comparisons between the different calculation routes mainly show good agreements on a large set of common experiments. (authors)

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Criticality safety analysis of as-loaded spent nuclear Fuel Casks - 14589

The final safety analysis report (FSAR) or the safety analysis report (SAR) for a particular spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cask (both bare fuel and canister-based) system documents models and calculations used to demonstrate that a system meets the regulatory requirements under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of spent fuel storage, as well as the normal and accident conditions of transportation. FSAR/SAR calculations and approved content specifications are intended to be bounding in nature to certify cask systems for a variety of fuel characteristics with simplified SNF loading requirements. Therefore, in general, loaded cask systems possess excess and uncredited criticality margins (i.e., the difference between the licensing basis and the as-loaded calculations). This uncredited margin could be quantified by (1) employing more detailed cask-specific evaluations that credit the actual as-loaded cask inventory and (2) taking into account full (actinide and fission product) burnup credit. This uncredited criticality margin could be used to offset uncertainties in the safety basis to account for the effects of system aging during extended dry storage prior to transportation. Additionally, the uncredited criticality margin could also potentially be credited to offset increases in SNF system reactivity that may occur over a repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the system undergoes degradation and internal geometry changes. This paper summarizes an assessment of cask-specific as-loaded criticality margins for 215 loaded casks of SNF stored at eight reactor sites under fully flooded conditions to assess the margins available during transportation after extended storage. It is observed that the calculated k{sub eff} margin varies from 0.05 to almost 0.3 Δk{sub eff} for the eight selected reactor sites, demonstrating that significant uncredited safety margins are present. In addition, this paper evaluates the sufficiency of this excess margin in applications involving direct disposal of currently loaded SNF canisters (for canister-based systems) in a repository. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Determination of critical experiment correlations using the sampler sequence within scale 6.2 - 14602

The validation of neutron transport methods used in nuclear criticality safety analyses is required by consensus American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standards. In the last decade, there has been an increased interest in correlations among critical experiments used in validation that have shared physical attributes and which impact the independence of each measurement. The statistical methods included in many of the frequently cited guidance documents on performing validation calculations incorporate the assumption that all individual measurements are independent, so little guidance is available to practitioners on the topic. Typical guidance includes recommendations to select experiments from multiple facilities and experiment series in an attempt to minimize the impact of correlations or common-cause errors in experiments. Recent efforts have been made both to determine the magnitude of such correlations between experiments and to develop and apply methods for adjusting the bias and bias uncertainty to account for the correlations. This paper describes recent work performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory using the Sampler sequence from the SCALE code system to develop experimental correlations using a Monte Carlo sampling technique. Sampler will be available for the first time with the release of SCALE 6.2, and a brief introduction to the methods used to calculate experiment correlations within this new sequence is presented in this paper. Techniques to utilize these correlations in the establishment of upper subcritical limits are the subject of a companion paper and will not be discussed here. Example experimental uncertainties and correlation coefficients are presented for a variety of low-enriched uranium water-moderated lattice experiments selected for use in a benchmark exercise by the Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety Subgroup on Uncertainty Analysis in Criticality Safety Analyses. The results include studies on the effect of fuel rod pitch on the correlations, and some observations are also made regarding difficulties in determining experimental correlations using the Monte Carlo sampling technique. (authors)

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Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status of the CERBERUS Evaluation for the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook

Modeling & Simulation (M&S) tools are used to analyze advanced reactor designs and the safety of current nuclear operations. As computers continue to improve, we are able to enhance resolution in our calculations. Therefore, the limitations of simulation capability are in the quality of data that is being used, including our ability to quantify the uncertainty and sensitivity of that data. In order to model systems of interest with increasing accuracy, the industry must improve key nuclear data measurements. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) compiles and evaluates experiment data in a handbook that can be used by criticality safety engineers and others to validate computer codes and cross section libraries at nuclear facilities. Both critical and subcritical experiments are included in the handbook. These experiments, along with differential measurements, can help improve the quality of nuclear data. Concerns regarding the accuracy of Cu nuclear data have been published. The large values and trend of C-E for the Zeus intermediate energy benchmark, being one of the primary examples. Furthermore, very few experiments have been designed to be sensitive to Cu (as shown in Figure 1), so an integral, critical experiment is needed to help resolve these differences.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Status of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project

The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) has continued its work generating evaluations of new and historical benchmark experiments since the last update to the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community at the 12th International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Conference held in 2023. One additional version of the ICSBEP Handbook has been published since that update, and the Technical Review Group (TRG) held two in-person meetings to review and approve additional benchmarks. The 2022 and 2023 editions of the handbook were combined into one release (published in November 2024) and contained 13 new evaluations with 46 different configurations and two major revisions to existing evaluations. The 2024 version of the handbook, currently under publication review, will contain two new evaluations with 15 new configurations and one major revision to HEU-MET-FAST-028, the evaluation of Flattop with a uranium core. The ICSBEP TRG met again in person in April 2025 to review benchmarks for the 2025 ICSBEP Handbook and final comment resolution is currently ongoing. Many of the new benchmarks represent contemporaneous experiments that have been specifically optimized to provide validation cases relevant to the NCS community. One major area of focus for new critical experiments is to target the sparsely populated intermediate energy (or resonance) region. Another focus of many of the new benchmarks is to provide experiments sensitive to different materials, such as chlorine, hafnium, tantalum, titanium, molybdenum, chromium, and polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA, or Lucite). The ICSBEP continues to deliver high-quality, peer reviewed evaluations of integral experiments relevant to the nuclear data community.

HEU-MET-FAST-028↗