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NASA NTRS1998

Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?

Despite efforts to design systems and procedures to support 'correct' and safe operations in aviation, errors in human judgment still occur and contribute to accidents. In this paper we examine how an NDM (naturalistic decision making) approach might help us to understand the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Our strategy was to examine a collection of identified decision errors through the lens of an aviation decision process model and to search for common patterns. The second, and more difficult, task was to determine what might account for those patterns. The corpus we analyzed consisted of tactical decision errors identified by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) from a set of accidents in which crew behavior contributed to the accident. A common pattern emerged: about three quarters of the errors represented plan-continuation errors, that is, a decision to continue with the original plan despite cues that suggested changing the course of action. Features in the context that might contribute to these errors were identified: (a) ambiguous dynamic conditions and (b) organizational and socially-induced goal conflicts. We hypothesize that 'errors' are mediated by underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan. Stressors may further contribute to these effects. Suggestions for improving performance in these error-inducing contexts are discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS1999

Helicopter Safety Research

In response to the President's challenge to reduce civil aviation accidents by a factor of 10 by the year 2022, NASA has embarked on an ambitious safety program in partnership with other government agencies and industry. The helicopter element of the NASA initiative has been guided by a series of accident analyses aimed at identifying the most frequent causes and consequences and initiating research to prevent or mitigate these factors. This talk will summarize the key findings of three of the accident analyses, the major elements of the safety program, and how helicopter safety research relates to the safety program.

Hart, Sandra G.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Risk-based Classification of Incidents

As the penetration of software into safety-critical systems progresses, accidents and incidents involving software will inevitably become more frequent. Identifying lessons from these occurrences and applying them to existing and future systems is essential if recurrences are to be prevented. Unfortunately, investigative agencies do not have the resources to fully investigate every incident under their jurisdictions and domains of expertise and thus must prioritize certain occurrences when allocating investigative resources. In the aviation community, most investigative agencies prioritize occurrences based on the severity of their associated losses, allocating more resources to accidents resulting in injury to passengers or extensive aircraft damage. We argue that this scheme is inappropriate because it undervalues incidents whose recurrence could have a high potential for loss while overvaluing fairly straightforward accidents involving accepted risks. We then suggest a new strategy for prioritizing occurrences based on the risk arising from incident recurrence.

Greenwell, William S.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Synthetic Vision CFIT Experiments for GA and Commercial Aircraft: "A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Lives"

Because restricted visibility has been implicated in the majority of commercial and general aviation accidents, solutions will need to focus on how to enhance safety during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The NASA Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) project is developing technologies to help achieve these goals through the synthetic presentation of how the outside world would look to the pilot if vision were not reduced. The potential safety outcome would be a significant reduction in several accident categories, such as controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT), that have restricted visibility as a causal factor. The paper describes two experiments that demonstrated the efficacy of synthetic vision technology to prevent CFIT accidents for both general aviation and commercial aircraft.

Prinzel, Lawrence J., III↗
NASA NTRS2004

'Systemic Failures' and 'Human Error' in Canadian TSB Aviation Reports Between 1996 and 2002

This paper describes the results of an independent analysis of the primary and contributory causes of aviation accidents in Canada between 1996 and 2003. The purpose of the study was to assess the comparative frequency of a range of causal factors in the reporting of these adverse events. Our results suggest that the majority of these high consequence accidents were attributed to human error. A large number of reports also mentioned wider systemic issues, including the managerial and regulatory context of aviation operations. These issues are more likely to appear as contributory rather than primary causes in this set of accident reports.

Holloway, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Improving Performance of the System Safety Function at Marshall Space Flight Center

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that organizational and management issues were significant contributors to the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the CAIB observed similarities between the organizational and management climate that preceded the Challenger accident and the climate that preceded the Columbia accident. To prevent recurrence of adverse organizational and management climates, effective implementation of the system safety function is suggested. Attributes of an effective system safety program are presented. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) system safety program is analyzed using the attributes. Conclusions and recommendations for improving the MSFC system safety program are offered in this case study.

Kiessling, Ed↗
NASA NTRS2003

Methods Developed by the Tools for Engine Diagnostics Task to Monitor and Predict Rotor Damage in Real Time

Tools for Engine Diagnostics is a major task in the Propulsion System Health Management area of the Single Aircraft Accident Prevention project under NASA s Aviation Safety Program. The major goal of the Aviation Safety Program is to reduce fatal aircraft accidents by 80 percent within 10 years and by 90 percent within 25 years. The goal of the Propulsion System Health Management area is to eliminate propulsion system malfunctions as a primary or contributing factor to the cause of aircraft accidents. The purpose of Tools for Engine Diagnostics, a 2-yr-old task, is to establish and improve tools for engine diagnostics and prognostics that measure the deformation and damage of rotating engine components at the ground level and that perform intermittent or continuous monitoring on the engine wing. In this work, nondestructive-evaluation- (NDE-) based technology is combined with model-dependent disk spin experimental simulation systems, like finite element modeling (FEM) and modal norms, to monitor and predict rotor damage in real time. Fracture mechanics time-dependent fatigue crack growth and damage-mechanics-based life estimation are being developed, and their potential use investigated. In addition, wireless eddy current and advanced acoustics are being developed for on-wing and just-in-time NDE engine inspection to provide deeper access and higher sensitivity to extend on-wing capabilities and improve inspection readiness. In the long run, these methods could establish a base for prognostic sensing while an engine is running, without any overt actions, like inspections. This damage-detection strategy includes experimentally acquired vibration-, eddy-current- and capacitance-based displacement measurements and analytically computed FEM-, modal norms-, and conventional rotordynamics-based models of well-defined damages and critical mass imbalances in rotating disks and rotors.

Baaklini, George Y.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Understanding Columbia's Reentry Problems

Soon after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred last year, a group of CFD analysts from NASA centers and private industry was organized to help determine the cause of the accident. This group was under the direction of the Applied Aeroscience and CFD Branch of the Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division at the Johnson Space Center. For external flow simulations, noncommercial CFD codes that specialize in hypersonic or high Mach number flows were used. These tools were used to determine heating rates, pressures, and temperatures for a large number of vehicle damage scenarios. Lockheed Martin Space Operations was called upon to provide CFD support in the area of internal flows within the shuttle wing cavity, and or these simulations, FLUENT 6.1 was chosen. Two large-scale, simplified models were run to understand the flow patterns once a breach of the internal wing cavity was initiated. The results were primarily used to visualize flow patterns within the wing cavity. The first CFD model included the entire left wing without the wheel. well cavity. The purpose of the first model, which did not include the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) cavity along the wing leading edge, was to visualize the flow field within the wing cavity immediately after the leading edge spar breach, This model assumed that the flow coming into the wing cavity was nom1 to the spar. It included all o f the primary vents that allow for flow between the main cavities of the wing. A six-inch diameter hole was modeled in the spar at the approximate location where the spar breach was judged to have occurred, which was between RCC panels 8 and 9. The results of the modeling showed that at this location, the high temperature, high velocity gas stream entering the wing cavity impinged on the outboard wheel well cavity. Instrumentation in the Shuttle wheel well cavity registered abnormal temperatures during reentry, so the FLUENT results helped support the conclusion of the accident investigation team that the spar breach was in the RCC panel 8-9 area, and that the initial spar breach was likely entering the wing cavity normal to the spar. This model also showed that the flow entering the wing cavity tended to swirl within the cavity just outboard of the wheel well, and did not initially penetrate further into the rear cavities of the wing. The second CFD model was a 2-D simulation of the left wing cavity and the RCC cavity. It was used to visualize the flow through the RCC breach, through the wing spar breach, and into the wing cavity directly outboard of the wheel well. The purpose of this model was to verify whether or not it was possible for the flow to come into the wing cavity normal to the leading edge spar. The results from this 2-D model showed that the internal structure behind the RCC panels probably deflected the flow entering the RCC cavity so that it impinged normal to the spar. As in the 3-D model, this deflected flow stream was found to impinge on the wheel well outer wall. This model again supported the conclusions regarding the location of the spar breach and how the flow behaved inside the wing cavity.

Paul, Thomas H.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Understanding Columbia's Reentry Problems

Soon after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred last year, a group of CFD analysts from NASA centers and private industry was organized to help determine the cause of the accident. This group was under the direction of the Applied Aeroscience and CFD Branch of the Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division at the Johnson Space Center. For external flow simulations, noncommercia2 CFD codes that specialize in hypersonic or high Mach number flows were used. These tools were used to determine heating rates, pressures, and temperatures for a large number of vehicle damage scenarios. Lockheed Martin Space Operations was called upon to provide CFD support in the area of internal flows within the shuttle wing cavity, and for these simulations, FLUENT 6.1 was chosen. Two large-scale, simplified models were m to understand the flow patterns once a breach of the internal wing cavity was initiated. The results were primarily used to visualize flow patterns within the wing cavity. The first CFD model included the entire lee wing without the wheel well cavity. The purpose of the first model, which did not include the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) cavity along the wing leading edge, was to visualize the flow field within the wing cavity immediately after the leading edge spar breach, This model assumed that the flow coming into the wing cavity was normal to the spar. It included all of the primary vents that allow for flow between the main cavities of the wing. A six-inch diameter hole was modeled in the spar at the approximate location where the spar breach was judged to have occurred, which was between RCC panels 8 and 9. The results of the modeling showed that at this location, the high temperature, high velocity gas stream entering the wing cavity impinged on the outboard wheel well cavity. Instrumentation in the Shuttle wheel well cavity registered abnormal temperatures during reentry, so the FLUENT results helped support the conclusion of the accident investigation team that the spar breach was in the RCC panel 8-9 area, and that the initial spar breach was likely entering the wing cavity normal to the spar. This model also showed that the flow entering the wing cavity tended to swirl within the cavity just outboard of the wheel well, and did not initially penetrate further into the rear cavities of the wing. The second CFD model was a 2-D simulation of the left wing cavity and the RCC cavity. It was used to visualize the flow through the RCC breach, through the wing spar breach, and into the wing cavity directly outboard of the wheel well. The purpose of this model was to verify whether or not it was possible for the flow to come into the wing cavity normal to the leading edge spar. The results from this 2-D model showed that the internal structure behind the RCC panels probably deflected the flow entering the RCC cavity so that it impinged normal to the spar. As in the 3-D model, this deflected flow stream was Found to impinge on the wheel well outer wall. This model again supported the conclusions regarding the location of the spar breach and how the flow behaved inside the wing cavity.

Paul, Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2006

Questioning the Role of Requirements Engineering in the Causes of Safety-Critical Software Failures

Many software failures stem from inadequate requirements engineering. This view has been supported both by detailed accident investigations and by a number of empirical studies; however, such investigations can be misleading. It is often difficult to distinguish between failures in requirements engineering and problems elsewhere in the software development lifecycle. Further pitfalls arise from the assumption that inadequate requirements engineering is a cause of all software related accidents for which the system fails to meet its requirements. This paper identifies some of the problems that have arisen from an undue focus on the role of requirements engineering in the causes of major accidents. The intention is to provoke further debate within the emerging field of forensic software engineering.

Johnson, C. W.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Orbiter Return-To-Flight Entry Aeroheating

The Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 began an unprecedented level of effort within the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community to support the Space Shuttle Program. During the approximately six month time frame of the primary Columbia Accident Investigation Board activity, many technical disciplines were involved in a concerted effort to reconstruct the last moments of the Columbia and her crew, and understand the critical events that led to that loss. Significant contributions to the CAIB activity were made by the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community(REF CAIB) in understanding the re-entry environments that led to the propagation of an ascent foam induced wing leading edge damage to a subsequent breech of the wing spar of Columbia, and the subsequent breakup of the vehicle. A core of the NASA hypersonic aerothermodynamics team that was involved in the CAIB investigation has been combined with the United Space Alliance and Boeing Orbiter engineering team in order to position the Space Shuttle Program with a process to perform in-flight Thermal Protection System damage assessments. This damage assessment process is now part of the baselined plan for Shuttle support, and is a direct out-growth of the Columbia accident and NASAs response. Multiple re-entry aeroheating tools are involved in this damage assessment process, many of which have been developed during the Return To Flight activity. In addition, because these aeroheating tools are part of an overall damage assessment process that also involves the thermal and stress analyses community, in addition to a much broader mission support team, an integrated process for performing the damage assessment activities has been developed by the Space Shuttle Program and the Orbiter engineering community. Several subsets of activity in the Orbiter aeroheating communities support to the Return To Flight effort have been described in previous publications (CFD?, Cavity Heating? Any BLT? Grid Generation?). This work will provide a description of the integrated process utilized to perform Orbiter tile damage assessment, and in particular will seek to provide a description of the integrated aeroheating tools utilized to perform these assessments. Individual aeroheating tools will be described which provide the nominal re-entry heating environment characterization for the Orbiter, the heating environments for tile damage, heating effects due to exposed Thermal Protection System substrates, the application of Computational Fluid Dynamics for the description of tile cavity heating, and boundary layer transition prediction. This paper is meant to provide an overall view of the integrated aeroheating assessment process for tile damage assessment as one of a sequence of papers on the development of the boundary layer transition prediction capability in support of Space Shuttle Return To Flight efforts.

Campbell, Charles H.↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA's Radio Frequency Bolt Monitor: A Lifetime of Spinoffs

This story begins in the 1970s, when Dr. Joseph Heyman, a young scientist at NASA s Langley Research Center, was asked to support the investigation of a wind tunnel accident at a sister center. Although the work was outside of his physics background, it sparked a research focus that guided his lengthy NASA career and would earn him a slew of accolades, including NASA s highest award medals for Exceptional Leadership, Exceptional Achievement, and Exceptional Service; the coveted Silver Snoopy Astronaut Award for Space Shuttle Return to Flight; and the Arthur Fleming Award for being one of the Top Ten Federal Scientists in Government Service. He won 30 additional NASA awards, including the Agency s Invention of the Year and the Agency s highest award for technology transfer, and was the only person to ever win 4 R&D 100 Awards. Back in 1973, though, Heyman was a young civil servant with a background in physics who was asked to sit on an accident review panel. The panel met at Ames Research Center, in Moffet Field, California, and after considerable investigation, concluded that a high-pressure pebble heater used for heating gas had failed, due to improperly tightened bolts in a 1,000-pound gate valve control section. The accident showered the facility with incendiary ceramic spheres and nearly a ton of metal, but, luckily, caused no injuries. Heyman returned to Langley and began work on a solution. He developed an ultrasonic device that would measure bolt elongation, as opposed to torque, the factor typically measured in testing bolt preload or tension. Torque measurement can lead to load errors, with miscalculations as high as 80 percent that can be passed over during installation. Bolt stretch, however, is nearly always accurate to 1 percent or better. Within 1 month, he had an acoustic resonance solution that accurately determined bolt elongation. He assumed his work on this project had ended, but it was actually the start of nearly 15 years of work perfecting, improving, inventing, and modifying the "bolt monitor", all the while, filing numerous patents, presenting papers, and holding demonstrations as the technology matured. Industry engineers challenged Heyman s inventiveness, and reminded the physicist that most bolts are not perfect resonators, and that early devices required that the bolt have reasonably flat and parallel faces. The U.S. Geological Survey asked NASA for help in determining the load in mine roof bolts, which are 8- to 10-feet-long and rough cut. To solve that problem, Heyman modified the original device to operate at a lower frequency and to generate propagation modes that could be used to "lock" the instrument on a particular mode. Further work in this vein led to the development of the Pulsed Phase Locked Loop (P2L2) that worked on the mine bolts. The next set of problems involved high-strength bolts with head markings. For this solution, Heyman invented a modified P2L2 that tracked a specific phase point in the measurement wave. This class of instrumentation, well suited to measuring small changes in acoustic velocity, won the NASA "Invention of the Year" award in 1982. Other scientists and engineers have continued the evolution of this technology both inside NASA and outside of the Agency. Within NASA, the technology has been improved for medical applications, with a particular focus on intercranial pressure (ICP) monitoring.

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NASA NTRS2006

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project of NASA s Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies that will enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. This presents a particular challenge in the aviation system where people are key components and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. In the aviation "world", information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data sources for the subjective perspective of the reporter of the incident to aid in understanding why an incident occurred. It explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of textual reports of aviation incident or accidents, and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior (the why of an incident). We have defined a generic structure of information that is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between aviation incidents. Based on this structure, we have introduced the simplifying structure, which we call the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. We believe that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that will aid aviation-safety experts to understand the systemic issues that are conducive to human error.

Maille, Nicolas P.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Research on International Space Station - Building a Partnership for the Future

As its name implies, the International Space Station is a platform where the research programs of 16 partner nations are conducted. While each partner pursues its own research priorities, cooperation and coordination of the various national and agency research programs occurs at multiple levels, from strategic through tactical planning to experiment operations. Since 2000, a significant number of experiments have been carried out in the Russian ISS utilization program, which consists of the Russian national program of fundamental and applied research in 11 research areas and international cooperative programs and contract activities. The US research program began with simple payloads in 2000 and was significantly expanded with the addition of the US Laboratory module Destiny in 2001, and its outfitting with seven research racks to date. The Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) have made use of international cooperative arrangements with both the US and Russia to implement a variety of investigations in diverse research areas, and in the case of ESA included the flights of crewmembers to ISS as part of Soyuz Science Missions. In the future, ESA and JAXA will add their own research modules, Columbus and Kibo, respectively, to expand research capabilities both inside and outside ISS. In the aftermath of the Columbia accident and the temporary grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet, all ISS logistics have relied on Russian Progress and Sopz vehicles. The Russian national program has continued as before the Shuttle accident, as have international cooperative programs and contract activities, both during long-duration expeditions and visiting taxi missions. In several instances, Russian international cooperative activities with JAXA and ESA have also involved the use of US facilities and crewmembers in successful truly multilateral efforts. The US research program was rapidly refocused after the Shuttle accident to rely on greatly reduced upmass, and for the first time in the ISS program, US research hardware was launched on Progress vehicles and returned with crews on Soyuz spacecraft. It is hoped that these small but significant steps in international cooperation will lead to even greater endeavors once the remaining research modules are added to ISS.

Gindl, Heinz↗
NASA NTRS2007

Persistent Seroconversion after Accidental Eye Exposure to Calcifying Nanoparticles

Biosafety of nanomaterials has attracted much attention recently. We report here a case where accidental human eye exposure to biogenic nanosized calcium phosphate in the form of calcifying nanoparticles (CNP) raised a strong IgG immune response against proteins carried by CNP. The antibody titer has persisted over ten years at the high level. The IgG was detected by ELISA using CNPs propagated in media containing bovine and human serum as antigen. The exposure incident occurred to a woman scientist (WS) at a research laboratory in Finland at 1993. CNP, also termed "nanobacteria", is a unique self-replicating agent that has not been fully characterized and no data on biohazards were available at that time. Before the accident, her serum samples were negative for both CNP antigen and anti-CNP antibody using specific ELISA tests (Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland). The accident occurred while WS was harvesting CNP cultures. Due to a high pressure in pipetting, CNP pellet splashed into her right eye. Both eyes were immediately washed with water and saline. The following days there was irritation and redness in the right eye. These symptoms disappeared within two weeks without any treatment. Three months after the accident, blood and urine samples of WS were tested for CNP cultures (2), CNP-specific ELISA tests, and blood cell counts. Blood cell counts were normal, CNP antigen and culture tests were negative. A high IgG anti-CNP antibody titer was detected (see Figure). The antibodies of this person have been used thereafter as positive control and standard in ELISA manufacturing (Nano-Sero IgG ELISA, Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland).

Ciftcioglu, Neva↗
NASA NTRS2006

The Columbia Debris Loan Program; Examples of Microscopic Analysis

Following the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia NASA formed The Columbia Recovery Office (CRO). The CRO was initially formed at the Johnson Space Center after the conclusion of recovery operations on May 1,2003 and then transferred .to the Kennedy Space Center on October 6,2003 and renamed The Columbia Recovery Office and Preservation. An integral part of the preservation project was the development of a process to loan Columbia debris to qualified researchers and technical educators. The purposes of this program include aiding in the advancement of advanced spacecraft design and flight safety development, the advancement of the study of hypersonic re-entry to enhance ground safety, to train and instruct accident investigators and to establish an enduring legacy for Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew. Along with a summary of the debris loan process examples of microscopic analysis of Columbia debris items will be presented. The first example will be from the reconstruction following the STS- 107 accident and how the Materials and Pro~es~steesa m used microscopic analysis to confirm the accident scenario. Additionally, three examples of microstructural results from the debris loan process from NASA internal, academia and private industry will be presented.

Russell, Rick↗
NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

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NASA NTRS2008

Sixty-four-Channel Inline Cable Tester

Faults in wiring are a serious concern for the aerospace and aeronautics (commercial, military, and civil) industries. A number of accidents have occurred because faulty wiring created shorts or opens that resulted in the loss of control of the aircraft or because arcing led to fires and explosions. Some of these accidents have resulted in the massive loss of lives (such as in the TWA Flight 800 accident). Circuits on the Space Shuttle have also failed because of faulty insulation on wiring. STS-93 lost power when a primary power circuit in one engine failed and a second engine had a backup power circuit fault. Cables are usually tested on the ground after the crew reports a fault encountered during flight. Often such failures result from vibration and cannot be replicated while the aircraft is stationary. It is therefore important to monitor faults while the aircraft is in operation, when cables are more likely to fail. Work is in progress to develop a cable fault tester capable of monitoring up to 64 individual wires simultaneously. Faults can be monitored either inline or offline. In the inline mode of operation, the monitoring is performed without disturbing the normal operation of the wires under test. That is, the operations are performed unintrusively and are essentially undetectable for the test signal levels are below the noise floor. A cable can be monitored several times per second in the offline mode and once a second in the inline mode. The 64-channel inline cable tester not only detects the occurrence of a fault, but also determines the type of fault (short/open) and the location of the fault. This will enable the detection of intermittent faults that can be repaired before they become serious problems.

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