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Report summarizes research on failure mode analysis for multicomputer systems where two or more computers may serve as redundant set. Failure modes such as data bus monopolization, shutdown due to transients, loss of control system equalization, memory alteration, and software errors are discussed.
The Dugdale analysis for metals loaded in tension was adapted to model the failure of notched composite laminates loaded in compression. Compression testing details, MTS alignment verification, and equipment needs were resolved. Thus far, only 2 ductile material systems, HST7 and F155, were selected for study. A Wild M8 Zoom Stereomicroscope and necessary attachments for video taping and 35 mm pictures were purchased. Currently, this compression test system is fully operational. A specimen is loaded in compression, and load vs shear-crippling zone size is monitored and recorded. Data from initial compression tests indicate that the Dugdale model does not accurately predict the load vs damage zone size relationship of notched composite specimens loaded in compression.
This paper is a discussion of the safety and cost of underground high-pressure air and gas storage systems based on recent experience with a high-pressure air system installed at Moffett Field, California. The system described used threaded and coupled oil well casings installed vertically to a depth of 1200 ft. Maximum pressure was 3000 psi and capacity was 500,000 lb of air. A failure mode analysis is presented, and it is shown that underground storage offers advantages in avoiding catastrophic consequences from pressure vessel failure. Certain problems such as corrosion, fatigue, and electrolysis are discussed in terms of the economic life of such vessels. A cost analysis shows that where favorable drilling conditions exist, the cost of underground high-pressure storage is approximately one-quarter that of equivalent aboveground storage.
As the design of Micro-Electro-Mechanical System (MEMS) devices matures and their application extends to critical areas, the issues of reliability and long-term survivability become increasingly important. This paper reviews some general approaches to addressing the reliability and qualification of MEMS devices for space applications.
During United States Extravehicular Activity 80 (US EVA 80), water was observed in the helmet of an Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) during cabin repressurization. One of the primary mechanisms that can cause water in the helmet of an EMU is integrated performance induced sublimator carryover. The sublimator is a heat exchanger that removes heat and humidity from the ventilation loop. Water vapor is condensed from the gas and removed by slurper holes in the sublimator. Sublimator carryover is caused by the inability of the EMU sublimator to remove all of the condensed water vapor, resulting in liquid water entering the helmet. To determine if sublimator carryover was a likely cause of the US EVA 80 failure, a comparative analysis of numerous historical EVAs was conducted to calculate the total latent load (total water vapor generated by the crewmember) for numerous historical EVAs and ground tests using the Systems Improved Numerical Differencing Analyzer EMU (SINDA EMU) model. The analysis showed that US EVA 80 was associated with a comparatively high latent load when compared to other EVAs that did not present water in the helmet. Further, this analysis showed that other historical EVAs which had visible water in the helmet were also associated with higher latent loads. This analysis provides evidence that the likely cause of the US EVA 80 water in the helmet event was not the failure of an individual component, but rather sublimator carryover caused by excessive production of water vapor by the crewmember. The evidence from this analysis agrees with results from the Test, Teardown, and Evaluation (TT&E) of the EMU which did not show any failure of individual components of the EMU that would lead to water in the helmet.
Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection, digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Here, this paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the causal factors of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.
Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.
The advanced power electronics and electric machines (APEEM) research group at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed world-class experimental and modeling capabilities for designing and evaluating efficient and reliable power electronics and electric machines thermal management systems. They also design, fabricate and characterize advanced power electronics packaging, and are developing state-of-health monitoring techniques. These researchers deliver safe, reliable, high performing, power-dense components that allow seamless integration between renewable energy sources, electric transportation, and the grid, helping to make widespread electric vehicle (EV) adoption and greenhouse gas emissions reduction more feasible. This document outlines the group's major capabilities in the areas of power electronics; module development and characterization; thermal modeling and management; thermomechanical reliability analysis of devices, modules, inverters/converters, and electric machines; physics-of-failure-based reliability analysis; and microelectronics. It also overviews the group's state-of-the-art equipment for fluid-based thermal management; thermal measurement & characterization; thermomechanical reliability analysis; micro- and power electronics measurement & characterization; and prototype fabrication, as well as the group's world-class modeling and simulation capabilities.
A draft Military Handbook prepared under the sponsorship of the USAF Space Division is presently being distributed throughout the U.S. for review by the aerospace community. This comprehensive document provides recommended guidelines for the acquisition and analysis of structural dynamics and aeroacoustic data, and is intended to reduce the errors and variability commonly found in flight, ground and laboratory dynamic test measurements. In addition to the usual variety of measurement problems encountered in the definition of dynamic loads, the development of design and test criteria, and the analysis of failures, special emphasis is given to certain state-of-the-art topics, such as pyroshock data acquisition and nonstationary random data analysis.
The functional, structural adequacy of a 20 meter long generic space truss (Mini-Mast), subjected to fatigue loading, was examined with respect to the failure modes which are most likely to occur during services. The space truss is made of thin-walled tubes having unidirectional, zero degree layups of Celanese G50 graphite fibers/Narmco 5217 epoxy composites. The approach used to investigate the most probable failure mode of the truss under fatigue loading is to determine the stress level, including the types of stress, in the member first, then followed by failure mode analysis based on the stress level just determined. To begin, an approximate beam-parameter truss (BPT) model is analyzed first, followed by a detailed analysis of the truss using a finite element model (FEM) run with NASTRAN code. The response results of the BPT model are used to compare FEM results and to check any major deviation of trend derived from the FEM. The purpose of the work was to search available fatigue data of the tube material, to conduct approximate dynamical stress analysis of the BPT model, to run detailed dynamical stress analysis of the FEM model using NASTRAN code, and to predict the fatigue life of the truss member based on limited fatigue data.
The failure of fuel pins in nuclear reactors is intrinsically stochastic. Typically, a combination of variation in manufacturing that affects the material characteristics and the fuel assembly dimensions, variation in operating conditions, such as local power, coolant flow rate, and irradiation induced changes in material properties lead to a large uncertainty in failure margin of the fuel pins. Failure, therefore, may occur in exceptional pins with adverse combinations of these variations. Upon a metal fuel pin (U-Pu-Zr/HT9) failure, depressurization of the fuel pin takes place by release of fission gas, liquid sodium bond, and potentially solid fuel particles or molten/eutectic fuel droplets through the hole in cladding. The effect of a fission gas jet on neighbor fuel pins and possible propagation of a clad damage during normal operation was studied experimentally in 1970s and it was found that the post-failure fission gas jet insulates the jet impingement area of the target fuel pin surface and could increase the target pin’s surface temperature by as much as 100 – 200 K during the failed pin depressurization. It was concluded that the effect should not lead to fuel pin failure propagation during normal operation. In accident scenarios of sodium and lead fast reactors such as Unprotected Loss-Of-Flow (ULOF) or Unprotected Transient Over Power (UTOP), the fuel pins can be subjected to higher clad temperatures and fuel pin pressures or fuel clad mechanical/chemical interaction where thermal creep margin becomes significantly lower compared to the normal operation conditions. Therefore, possible stochastic failure and the post-failure fission gas/fuel jet impingement could be critical in order to predict fuel pin failure propagation. Pin depressurization due to fission gas release may degrade the heat transfer by formation of a gas blanket on a neighboring pin surface, which is a local phenomenon, and by causing coolant flow deceleration and starvation, which could affect a surrounding region as well. Furthermore, the potential presence of solid fuel particles or molten fuel at the time of clad failure could boost post-failure jet induced degradation even further. The present study models the U-Pu-Zr/HT9 metal fuel pin failure and stochastic clad damage propagation by biased sampling based on a Cumulative Damage Fraction (CDF) type clad failure criterion and the normal distribution of fuel failure probability density as a function of logarithm of Cumulative Damage Fraction. In addition, the effect of post-failure fission gas jet on heat transfer degradation is modeled for the target pins. This model is called stochastic Clad Damage Propagation (CDAP). The CDAP model is now fully integrated into developmental version of PRONGHORN-SC subchannel analysis code, allowing for modeling local failures and its propagation potential. Section 2 describes the components of the CDAP models. Section 3 describes the model implementation to PRONGHORN-SC and input specifications. Section 4 describes the CDAP model validation coupled to PRONGHORN-SC.
Three questions to which software developers want accurate, precise answers are "How can the software system fail?", "mat bad things will happen if the software fails?t', and "How many failures will the software experience?". Numerous techniques have been devised to answer these questions; three of the best known are: 1) Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 2) Software Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA 3) Software Fault/Failure Modeling. SFTA and SFMECA have been successfully used to analyze the flight software for a number of robotic planetary exploration missions, including Galileo, Cassini, and Deep Space 1. Given the increasing interest in reusing software components from mission to mission, one of us has developed techniques for reusing the corresponding portions of the SFTA and SFMECA, reducing the effort required to conduct these analyses. SFTA has also been shown to be effective in analyzing the security aspects of software systems; intrusion mechanisms and effects can easily be modeled using these techniques. The Bi- Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) method combines a forward search (similar to SFMECA) from potential failure modes to their effects, with a backward search (similar to SFTA) from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. BDSA offers an efficient way to identify latent failures. Recent work has extended BDSA to product-line applications such as flight-instrumentation displays and developed tool support for the reuse of the failure-analysis artifacts within a product line. BDSA has also been streamlined to support those projects having tight cost and/or schedule constraints for their failure analysis efforts. We discuss lessons learned from practice, describe available tools, and identi@ some future directions for the topic. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to estimating the number of failures that a software system will experience during test and operations, as well as the number of faults that have been inserted into that system during its development. One of us has found that the amount of structural change to a system during its development is strongly related to the number of faults inserted into it. Using techniques requiring no additional effort on the part of the development organization, the required measurements of structural evolution can be easily obtained from a development effort's configuration management system and readily transformed into an estimate of fault content. So far, structure-fault relationships have been identified for source code; current work seeks to examine artifacts available earlier in the lifecycle to determine if similar relationships between structure and fault content can be found. In particular, relationships between requirements change requests and the number of faults inserted into the implemented system would provide a significant improvement in our ability to control software quality during the early development phases.
This presentation describes results of Techno-Economic Analysis: to quanitfy Impacts of PV Module Connector Failures on Cost and Performance of Utility Scale Photovoltaic Systems, with example of 100 MW Utility Scale PV System. Results indicate impact on Levelized Cost of Energy on the order of $1.22/MWh in the example.
An analysis of structural failures that have occurred in NASA programs was conducted. Reports of 231 examples of structural failure were reviewed. Attempts were made to identify those factors which contributed to the failures, and recommendations were formulated for actions which would minimize their effects on future NASA programs. Two classes of factors were identified: (1) those associated with deficiencies in existing materials and structures technology and (2) those attributable to inadequate documentation or communication of that technology.
Failure mode analysis of cam contacts on punched card machines
Presented were Reliability Analysis, consisting primarily of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and System Safety Analysis, consisting of Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA), performed to ensure that the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re- Configurable Testbed) Flight System was safely and reliably operated during its Assembly, Integration and Test (AI&T) phase. A tailored approach to the NASA Ground Support Equipment (GSE) standard, NASA-STD-5005C, involving the application of the appropriate Requirements, S&MA discipline expertise, and a Configuration Management system (to retain a record of the analysis and documentation) were presented. Presented were System Block Diagrams of selected GSE and the corresponding FMEA, as well as the PHAs. Also discussed are the specific examples of the FMEAs and PHAs being used during the AI&T phase to drive modifications to the GSE (via "redlining" of test procedures, and the placement of warning stickers to protect the flight hardware) before being interfaced to the Flight System. These modifications were necessary because failure modes and hazards were identified during the analysis that had not been properly mitigated. Strict Configuration Management was applied to changes (whether due to upgrades or expired calibrations) in the GSE by revisiting the FMEAs and PHAs to reflect the latest System Block Diagrams and Bill Of Material. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, and shipped to the launch site without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to safeguard the flight system when it was interfaced to the various GSE were successful.
This study addresses the issue of adjusting the proportion of load transmitted by each hole in a multiple-hole joint so that the joint capacity is a maximum. Specifically two-hole-in-series joints are examined. The results indicate that when each hole reacts 50% of the total load, the joint capacity is not a maximum. One hole generally is understressed at joint failure. The algorithm developed to determine the load proportion at each hole which results in maximum capacity is discussed. The algorithm includes two-dimensional finite-element stress analysis and failure criteria. The algorithm is used to study the effects of joint width, hole spacing, and hole to joint-end distance on load proportioning and capacity. To study hole size effects, two hole diameters are considered. Three laminates are considered: a quasi-isotropic laminate; a cross-ply laminate; and a 45 degree angle-ply laminate. By proportioning the load, capacity can be increased generally from 5 to 10%. In some cases a greater increase is possible.
An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk of spaceflight systems to assess flight readiness and identify risk control measures is presented. This methodology, called Probabilistic Failure Assessment (PFA), combines operating experience from tests and flights with engineering analysis to estimate failure risk. The PFA methodology is of particular value when information on which to base an assessment of failure risk, including test experience and knowledge of parameters used in engineering analyses of failure phenomena, is expensive or difficult to acquire. The PFA methodology is a prescribed statistical structure in which engineering analysis models that characterize failure phenomena are used conjointly with uncertainties about analysis parameters and/or modeling accuracy to estimate failure probability distributions for specific failure modes. These distributions can then be modified, by means of statistical procedures of the PFA methodology, to reflect any test or flight experience. Conventional engineering analysis models currently employed for design of failure prediction are used in this methodology. The PFA methodology is described and examples of its application are presented. Conventional approaches to failure risk evaluation for spaceflight systems are discussed, and the rationale for the approach taken in the PFA methodology is presented. The statistical methods, engineering models, and computer software used in fatigue failure mode applications are thoroughly documented.