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NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Flight Safety System Road Test

On February 3, 2005, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) conducted the first Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) test on a moving vehicle -- a van driven around the KSC industrial area. A subset of the Phase III design was used consisting of a single computer, GPS receiver, and UPS antenna. The description and results of this road test are described in this report.AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations.

Simpson, James C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA, Building Tomorrow's Future

We, as NASA, continue to Dare Mighty Things. Here we are in October. In my country, the United States of America, we celebrate the anniversary of Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas, which occurred on October 12, 1492. His story, although happening over 500 years ago, is still very valid today. It is a part of the American spirit; part of the international human spirit. Columbus is famous for discovering the new world we now call America, but he probably never envisioned what great discoveries would be revealed many generations later. But in order for Columbus to begin his great adventure, he needed a business plan. Ho~ would he go about obtaining the funds and support necessary to build, supply, and man the ships required for his travels? He had a lot of obstacles and distractions. He needed a strong, internal drive to achieve his plans and recruit a willing crew of explorers also ready to risk their all for the unknown journey ahead. As Columbus set sail, he said "By prevailing over all obstacles and distractions, one may unfailingly arrive at his chosen goal or destination." Columbus may not have known he was on a journey for all human exploration. Recently, Charlie Bolden, the NASA Administrator, said, "Human exploration is and has always been about making life better for humans on Earth." Today, NASA and the U.S. human spaceflight program hold many of the same attributes as did Columbus and his contemporaries - a willing, can-do spirit. We are on the threshold of exciting new times in space exploration. Like Columbus, we need a business plan to take us into the future. We need to design the best ships and utilize the best designers, with their past knowledge and experience, to build those ships. We need funding and support from governments to achieve these goals of space exploration into the unknown. NASA does have that business plan, and it is an ambitious plan for human spaceflight and exploration. Today, we have a magnificent spaceflight laboratory, built over many years by the United States and other nations. Last month, the last man to step off the moon, Gene Cernan, told the U.S. Congress, "Today the International Space Station, the assembly of which may well go down in history as man's greatest engineering accomplishment of all time, circles the globe sixteen times every day - all in keeping with JFK's challenge to do the other things." The International Space Station (ISS) is a ship which provides an outstanding platform 'for performing spaceborne scientific, engineering, and Earth studies. Numerous nations utilize this unique cooperative partnership by sending scientists, engineers, astronauts, and cosmonauts to the ISS to spend time aboard the station in order to further scientific research, truly an asset for the entire planet.

Mango, Edward↗
NASA NTRS2011

Thermal Properties of Microstrain Gauges Used for Protection of Lithium-Ion Cells of Different Designs

The purpose of this innovation is to use microstrain gauges to monitor minute changes in temperature along with material properties of the metal cans and pouches used in the construction of lithium-ion cells. The sensitivity of the microstrain gauges to extremely small changes in temperatures internal to the cells makes them a valuable asset in controlling the hazards in lithium-ion cells. The test program on lithium-ion cells included various cell configurations, including the pouch type configurations. The thermal properties of microstrain gauges have been found to contribute significantly as safety monitors in lithium-ion cells that are designed even with hard metal cases. Although the metal cans do not undergo changes in material property, even under worst-case unsafe conditions, the small changes in thermal properties observed during charge and discharge of the cell provide an observable change in resistance of the strain gauge. Under abusive or unsafe conditions, the change in the resistance is large. This large change is observed as a significant change in slope, and this can be used to prevent cells from going into a thermal runaway condition. For flexible metal cans or pouch-type lithium-ion cells, combinations of changes in material properties along with thermal changes can be used as an indication for the initiation of an unsafe condition. Lithium-ion cells have a very high energy density, no memory effect, and almost 100-percent efficiency of charge and discharge. However, due to the presence of a flammable electrolyte, along with the very high energy density and the capability of releasing oxygen from the cathode, these cells can go into a hazardous condition of venting, fire, and thermal runaway. Commercial lithium-ion cells have current and voltage monitoring devices that are used to control the charge and discharge of the batteries. Some lithium-ion cells have internal protective devices, but when used in multi-cell configurations, these protective devices either do not protect or are themselves a hazard to the cell due to their limitations. These devices do not help in cases where the cells develop high impedance that suddenly causes them to go into a thermal runaway condition. Temperature monitoring typically helps with tracking the performance of a battery. But normal thermistors or thermal sensors do not provide the accuracy needed for this and cannot track a change in internal cell temperatures until it is too late to stop a thermal runaway.

Jeevarajan, Judith↗
NASA NTRS2005

Hurricane Recovery Report 2004

During August and September 2004, four hurricanes tested the mettle of Space Coast residents and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) leadership and workforce. These threats underscored two important points: the very real vulnerability of KSC and its valuable space program assets to the devastating power of a hurricane, and the planning required to effectively deal with such threats. The damage was significant even though KSC did not experience sustained hurricane-force winds. To better understand and appreciate these points, this report provides an overview of the meteorological history of the Space Coast and what is involved in the planning, preparation, and recovery activities, as well as addressing the impacts of the 2004 hurricane season.

Gordon, Joseph P.↗
NASA NTRS2011

In Situ Surface Characterization

Operation of in situ space assets, such as rovers and landers, requires operators to acquire a thorough understanding of the environment surrounding the spacecraft. The following programs help with that understanding by providing higher-level information characterizing the surface, which is not immediately obvious by just looking at the XYZ terrain data. This software suite covers three primary programs: marsuvw, marsrough, and marsslope, and two secondary programs, which together use XYZ data derived from in situ stereo imagery to characterize the surface by determining surface normal, surface roughness, and various aspects of local slope, respectively. These programs all use the Planetary Image Geometry (PIG) library to read mission-specific data files. The programs themselves are completely multimission; all mission dependencies are handled by PIG. The input data consists of images containing XYZ locations as derived by, e.g., marsxyz. The marsuvw program determines surface normals from XYZ data by gathering XYZ points from an area around each pixel and fitting a plane to those points. Outliers are rejected, and various consistency checks are applied. The result shows the orientation of the local surface at each point as a unit vector. The program can be run in two modes: standard, which is typically used for in situ arm work, and slope, which is typically used for rover mobility. The difference is primarily due to optimizations necessary for the larger patch sizes in the slope case. The marsrough program determines surface roughness in a small area around each pixel, which is defined as the maximum peak-to-peak deviation from the plane perpendicular to the surface normal at that pixel. The marsslope program takes a surface normal file as input and derives one of several slope-like outputs from it. The outputs include slope, slope rover direction (a measure of slope radially away from the rover), slope heading, slope magnitude, northerly tilt, and solar energy (compares the slope with the Sun s location at local noon). The marsuvwproj program projects a surface normal onto an arbitrary plane in space, resulting in a normalized 3D vector, which is constrained to lie in the plane. The marsuvwrot program rotates the vectors in a surface normal file, generating a new surface normal file. It also can change coordinate systems for an existing surface normal file. While the algorithms behind this suite are not particularly unique, what makes the programs useful is their integration into the larger in situ image processing system via the PIG library. They work directly with space in situ data, understanding the appropriate image metadata fields and updating them properly. The secondary programs (marsuvwproj, marsuvwrot) were originally developed to deal with anomalous situations on Opportunity and Spirit, respectively, but may have more general applicability.

Deen, Robert G.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA's Space Launch System Progress Report

Exploration beyond Earth will be an enduring legacy for future generations, confirming America's commitment to explore, learn, and progress. NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) Program, managed at the Marshall Space Flight Center, is responsible for designing and developing the first exploration-class rocket since the Apollo Program's Saturn V that sent Americans to the Moon. The SLS offers a flexible design that may be configured for the MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle and associated equipment, or may be outfitted with a payload fairing that will accommodate flagship science instruments and a variety of high-priority experiments. Both options support a national capability that will pay dividends for future generations. Building on legacy systems, facilities, and expertise, the SLS will have an initial lift capability of 70 metric tons (mT) and will be evolvable to 130 mT. While commercial launch vehicle providers service the International Space Station market, this capability will surpass all vehicles, past and present, providing the means to do entirely new missions, such as human exploration of asteroids and Mars. With its superior lift capability, the SLS can expand the interplanetary highway to many possible destinations, conducting revolutionary missions that will change the way we view ourselves, our planet and its place in the cosmos. To perform missions such as these, the SLS will be the largest launch vehicle ever built. It is being designed for safety and affordability - to sustain our journey into the space age. Current plans include launching the first flight, without crew, later this decade, with crewed flights beginning early next decade. Development work now in progress is based on heritage space systems and working knowledge, allowing for a relatively quick start and for maturing the SLS rocket as future technologies become available. Together, NASA and the U.S. aerospace industry are partnering to develop this one-of-a-kind asset. Many of NASA's space centers across the country will provide their unique expertise to the Space Launch System endeavor. Unique infrastructure to be used includes the Michoud Assembly Facility for tank manufacturing, Stennis Space Center for engine testing, and Kennedy Space Center for processing and launch. As this panel will discuss, the SLS team is dedicated to doing things differently-from applying lean oversight/insight models to smartly using legacy hardware and existing facilities. Building on the foundation laid by over 50 years of human and scientific space flight--and on the lessons learned from the Apollo, Space Shuttle, and Constellation Programs-the SLS team has delivered both technical trade studies and business case analyses to ensure that the SLS architecture will be safe, affordable, reliable, and sustainable.

Singer, Joan A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

A Contemporary Analysis of the O'Neill-Glaser Model for Space-Based Solar Power and Habitat Construction

In 1975 Gerard O Neill published in the journal Science a model for the construction of solar power satellites. He found that the solar power satellites suggested by Peter Glaser would be too massive to launch economically from Earth, but could be financially viable if the workforce was permanently located in free space habitats and if lunar and asteroid materials were used for construction. All new worldwide electrical generating capacity could be then achieved by solar power satellites. The project would financially break even in about 20 years after which it would generate substantial income selling power below fossil fuel prices. Two NASA / Stanford University led studies at Ames Research center during the summers of 1974 and 1976 found the concept technically sound and developed a detailed financial parametric model. Although the project was not undertaken when suggested in the 1970s, several contemporary issues make pursuing the O Neill -- Glaser concept more compelling today. First, our analysis suggests that if in the first ten years of construction that small habitats (compared to the large vista habitats envisioned by O Neill) supporting approximately 300 people were utilized, development costs of the program and the time for financial break even could be substantially improved. Second, the contemporary consensus is developing that carbon free energy is required to mitigate global climate change. It is estimated that 300 GW of new carbon free energy would be necessary per year to stabilize global atmospheric carbon. This is about 4 times greater energy demand than was considered by the O Neill Glaser model. Our analysis suggests that after the initial investments in lunar mining and space manufacturing and transportation, that the profit margin for producing space solar power is very high (even when selling power below fossil fuel prices). We have investigated the financial scaling of ground launched versus space derived space solar power satellites. We find that for the carbon mitigation case even modernized ground launched space solar power satellites are not financially viable. For space derived solar power satellites, however, the increased demand makes them break even substantially sooner and yield much higher profit. Third, current awareness is increasing about the dangers of humanity remaining a single planet species. Our technological power has been increasing relative to the size of the planet Earth. Since the middle of the 20th century our technological power has grown large relative to our planet's size. This presents a very real potential for human self-extinction. We argue that the potential for human self-extinction is increasing with time in proportion to the exponential growth of our technological power making self-extinction likely within this century if humanity remains a single planet species. The O Neill model of multiple independent free space habitats, it is argued, can protect humanity from extinction in the same way that portfolio diversification protects ones assets from total loss. We show that about 1 million people for the electricity only case, and about 1 billion people for the carbon mitigation case, can be provided with permanent space habitats and transportation from Earth in 30 years and can be funded by the space derived solar power satellite program. 1.2 Scope of this Chapter The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the power and importance of the O'Neill-Glaser concept in the context of human survival and maintaining a healthy planet Earth. We argue that at this point in human history our technological power is too dangerous to our selves and our home planet for us not to expand into space. We show by the models presented in the chapter that the imminent dangers of global warming and human self-extinction mandate that humanity move aggressively into the solar system in this generation. We show that the production of solar power satellites using space resources and with a work foe living in space provides a viable financial model to mitigate CO2 preventing the worst global warming scenarios, and safeguards humanity against self-extinction by providing hundreds of habitats and a billion people living in space within about 35 years. To accomplish this goal we need only consider the classic O'Neill-Glaser model which was parameterized for 1970's technological projections. Only habitat size optimization for the first ten years of production is added. This is a conservative approach since the innovations of the last 30 years will make the financial projections more favorable. However, the classic O'Neill-Glaser model represented a broad technological consensus. The model is well documented in the references and our calculations can be easily reproduced In this chapter the economics of the O Neill - Glaser model is compared with models that rely exclusively on Earth launched materials. Although many studies of Earth launched Solar Power Satellites have been made, we found that the NASA "Fresh Look Study" was the most comprehensive and well documented. It also provided one of the most optimistic Earth launch financial projections. We thus chose it for comparison purposes.

Curreri, Peter A.↗
NASA NTRS2012

The Effects of Solar Maximum on the Earth's Satellite Population and Space Situational Awareness

The rapidly approaching maximum of Solar Cycle 24 will have wide-ranging effects not only on the number and distribution of resident space objects, but also on vital aspects of space situational awareness, including conjunction assessment processes. The best known consequence of high solar activity is an increase in the density of the thermosphere, which, in turn, increases drag on the vast majority of objects in low Earth orbit. The most prominent evidence of this is seen in a dramatic increase in space object reentries. Due to the massive amounts of new debris created by the fragmentations of Fengyun-1C, Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 during the recent period of Solar Minimum, this effect might reach epic levels. However, space surveillance systems are also affected, both directly and indirectly, historically leading to an increase in the number of lost satellites and in the routine accuracy of the calculation of their orbits. Thus, at a time when more objects are drifting through regions containing exceptionally high-value assets, such as the International Space Station and remote sensing satellites, their position uncertainties increase. In other words, as the possibility of damaging and catastrophic collisions increases, our ability to protect space systems is degraded. Potential countermeasures include adjustments to space surveillance techniques and the resetting of collision avoidance maneuver thresholds.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

External Tank - The Structure Backbone

The External Tank forms the structural backbone of the Space Shuttle in the launch configuration. Because the tank flies to orbital velocity with the Space Shuttle Orbiter, minimization of weight is mandatory, to maximize payload performance. Choice of lightweight materials both for structure and thermal conditioning was necessary. The tank is large, and unique manufacturing facilities, tooling, handling, and transportation operations were required. Weld processes and tooling evolved with the design as it matured through several block changes, to reduce weight. Non Destructive Evaluation methods were used to assure integrity of welds and thermal protection system materials. The aluminum-lithium alloy was used near the end of the program and weld processes and weld repair techniques had to be refined. Development and implementation of friction stir welding was a substantial technology development incorporated during the Program. Automated thermal protection system application processes were developed for the majority of the tank surface. Material obsolescence was an issue throughout the 40 year program. The final configuration and tank weight enabled international space station assembly in a high inclination orbit allowing international cooperation with the Russian Federal Space Agency. Numerous process controls were implemented to assure product quality, and innovative proof testing was accomplished prior to delivery. Process controls were implemented to assure cleanliness in the production environment, to control contaminants, and to preclude corrosion. Each tank was accepted via rigorous inspections, including non-destructive evaluation techniques, proof testing, and all systems testing. In the post STS-107 era, the project focused on ascent debris risk reduction. This was accomplished via stringent process controls, post flight assessment using substantially improved imagery, and selective redesigns. These efforts were supported with a number of test programs to simulate combined environments. Processing improvements included development and use of low spray guns for foam application, additional human factors considerations for production, use of high fidelity mockups during hardware processing with video review, improved tank access, extensive use of non destructive evaluation, and producibility enhancements. Design improvements included redesigned bipod fittings, a bellows heater, a feedline camera active during ascent flight, removal of the protuberance airload ramps, redesigned ice frost ramps, and titanium brackets replaced aluminum brackets on the liquid oxygen feedline. Post flight assessment improved due to significant addition of imagery assets, greatly improving situational awareness. The debris risk was reduced by two orders of magnitude. During this time a major natural disaster was overcome when Katrina damaged the manufacturing facility. Numerous lessons from these efforts are documented within the paper.

Welzyn, Kenneth↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with a new human-rated system suitable for missions to the Moon and Mars. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station and be capable of carrying crews back to lunar orbit and of supporting missions to Mars orbit. NASA is using its extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize the CLV system design approach, with the objective of reducing total lifecycle costs through operational efficiencies. To provide in-depth data for selecting this follow-on launch vehicle, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the confirmation of the new NASA Administrator. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, with a focus on human rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the reusable Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine to deliver 25 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, was the best choice to reduce the risks associated with fielding a new system in a timely manner. The CLV Project, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operation of this new human-rated system. The CLV Project works closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch system . leveraging a wealth of lessons learned from Shuttle operations. The CL V is being designed to reduce costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting trades studies against the concept design. Innovations such as automated processing will build on lessons learned from the Shuttle, other launch systems, Department of Defense operations experience, and subscale flight tests such as the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DCXA) vehicle operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated cryogen ic propellant loading , and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system. For the CLV, the results of hazard analyses are contributing to an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. Such advances will help streamline the mission operations process for pilots and ground controllers alike. In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.5 billion of its $16 bill ion budget on the Space Shuttle. The ultimate goal of the CLV Project is to deliver a safe, reliable system designed to minimize lifecycle costs so that NASA's budget can be invested in missions of scientific discovery. Lessons learned from developing the CLV will be applied to the growth path for future systems, including a heavy lift launch vehicle.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗
NASA NTRS2012

A Proposed Strategy for the U.S. to Develop and Maintain a Mainstream Capability Suite ("Warehouse") for Automated/Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking in Low Earth Orbit and Beyond

The ability of space assets to rendezvous and dock/capture/berth is a fundamental enabler for numerous classes of NASA fs missions, and is therefore an essential capability for the future of NASA. Mission classes include: ISS crew rotation, crewed exploration beyond low-Earth-orbit (LEO), on-orbit assembly, ISS cargo supply, crewed satellite servicing, robotic satellite servicing / debris mitigation, robotic sample return, and robotic small body (e.g. near-Earth object, NEO) proximity operations. For a variety of reasons to be described, NASA programs requiring Automated/Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking/Capture/Berthing (AR&D) capabilities are currently spending an order-of-magnitude more than necessary and taking twice as long as necessary to achieve their AR&D capability, "reinventing the wheel" for each program, and have fallen behind all of our foreign counterparts in AR&D technology (especially autonomy) in the process. To ensure future missions' reliability and crew safety (when applicable), to achieve the noted cost and schedule savings by eliminate costs of continually "reinventing the wheel ", the NASA AR&D Community of Practice (CoP) recommends NASA develop an AR&D Warehouse, detailed herein, which does not exist today. The term "warehouse" is used herein to refer to a toolbox or capability suite that has pre-integrated selectable supply-chain hardware and reusable software components that are considered ready-to-fly, low-risk, reliable, versatile, scalable, cost-effective, architecture and destination independent, that can be confidently utilized operationally on human spaceflight and robotic vehicles over a variety of mission classes and design reference missions, especially beyond LEO. The CoP also believes that it is imperative that NASA coordinate and integrate all current and proposed technology development activities into a cohesive cross-Agency strategy to produce and utilize this AR&D warehouse. An initial estimate indicates that if NASA strategically coordinates the development of a robust AR&D capability across the Agency, the cost of implementing AR&D on a spacecraft could be reduced from roughly $70M per mission to as low as $7M per mission, and the associated development time could be reduced from 4 years to 2 years, after the warehouse is completely developed. Table 1 shows the clear long-term benefits to the Agency in term of costs and schedules for various missions. (The methods used to arrive at the Table 1 numbers is presented in Appendices A and B.)

Krishnakumar, Kalmanje S.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Orbital Debris Modeling

Presentation outlne: (1) The NASA Orbital Debris (OD) Engineering Model -- A mathematical model capable of predicting OD impact risks for the ISS and other critical space assets (2) The NASA OD Evolutionary Model -- A physical model capable of predicting future debris environment based on user-specified scenarios (3) The NASA Standard Satellite Breakup Model -- A model describing the outcome of a satellite breakup (explosion or collision)

Liou, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2005

Opportunities for Launch Site Integrated System Health Engineering and Management

The launch site processing flow involves operations such as functional verification, preflight servicing and launch. These operations often include hazards that must be controlled to protect human life and critical space hardware assets. Existing command and control capabilities are limited to simple limit checking durig automated monitoring. Contingency actions are highly dependent on human recognition, decision making, and execution. Many opportunities for Integrated System Health Engineering and Management (ISHEM) exist throughout the processing flow. This paper will present the current human-centered approach to health management as performed today for the shuttle and space station programs. In addition, it will address some of the more critical ISHEM needs, and provide recommendations for future implementation of ISHEM at the launch site.

Waterman, Robert D.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Vehicle Assembly Building Fire Mishap Investigation Report. Volume I of V

On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4th floor of D Tower in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull station was activated, and the VAB was evacuated. The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the Launch Control Center (LCC) Crossover. Due to the high visibility of the mishap, the KSC Center Director appointed a Mishap Investigation Board. Damage to government property was limited to the roof and a small number of ceiling tiles that were damaged by the fire fighters during the response. At the time of the mishap, there were hazardous commodities in the VAB including Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) with open grain due to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) igniter inspections. The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. The Board determined the proximate cause of this incident to be torching. HRI was installing a torch applied roof membrane which resulted in the ignition of combustible materials under the membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint. The torch applied roofing method is a universally accepted safe industry practice when applied to non-combustible surfaces. The combination of an open flame torch and combustible materiaLs presents an increased level of risk even with skilled applicators. The addition of high winds to this combination results in a risk the Board thinks can not be adequately mitigated. An appropriate risk assessment and analysis must be performed on the proposed roofing method to be used on high visibility facilities which represent unique national assets even when using common industry practices for repair and modification. The Board identified three root causes which contributed to or created the proximate cause and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap: 1. Combustible materials in existing roof system 2. Wind speed and direction 3. Inadequate fire watch technique. Two contributing factors were identified which may have contributed to the occurrence but, if eliminated or modified, would not have prevented the occurrence: 1. HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof on January 13 because heavy rain was predicted for the next day 2. No guidance on torching in windy conditions A total of 17 significant observations were noted during this investigation, which could lead to another mishap, or increase the severity of a mishap, but were not contributing factors in this mishap.

Kight, Ira↗
NASA NTRS2005

How to Extend the Capabilities of Space Systems for Long Duration Space Exploration Systems

For sustainable Exploration Missions the need exists to assemble systems-of-systems in space, on the Moon or on other planetary surfaces. To fulfill this need new and innovative system architecture is needed that can be satisfied with the present lift capability of existing rocket technology without the added cost of developing a new heavy lift vehicle. To enable ultra-long life missions with minimum redundancy and lighter mass the need exists to develop system soft,i,are and hardware reconfigurability, which enables increasing functionality and multiple use of launched assets while at the same time overcoming any components failures. Also the need exists to develop the ability to dynamically demate and reassemble individual system elements during a mission in order to work around failed hardware or changed mission requirements. Therefore to meet the goals of Space Exploration Missions in hiteroperability and Reconfigurability, many challenges must be addressed to transform the traditional static avionics architecture into architecture with dynamic capabilities. The objective of this paper is to introduce concepts associated with reconfigurable computer systems; review the various needs and challenges associated with reconfigurable avionics space systems; provide an operational example that illustrates the needs applicable to either the Crew Exploration Vehicle or a collection of "Habot like" mobile surface elements; summarize the approaches that address key challenges to acceptance of a Flexible, Intelligent, Modular and Affordable reconfigurable avionics space system.

Marzwell, Neville I.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Flight Safety System September 27, 2005, Aircraft Test

This report describes the first aircraft test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS). The test was conducted on September 27, 2005, near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a privately-owned single-engine plane and evaluated the performance of several basic flight safety rules using real-time data onboard a moving aerial vehicle. This test follows the first road test of AFSS conducted in February 2005 at KSC. AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility (WEF) project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations. The mission rules are configured for each operation by the responsible Range Safety authorities and can be loosely categorized in four major categories: Parameter Threshold Violations, Physical Boundary Violations present position and instantaneous impact point (TIP), Gate Rules static and dynamic, and a Green-Time Rule. Examples of each of these rules were evaluated during this aircraft test.

Simpson, James C.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Characterizing 3D Vegetation Structure from Space: Mission Requirements

Human and natural forces are rapidly modifying the global distribution and structure of terrestrial ecosystems on which all of life depends, altering the global carbon cycle, affecting our climate now and for the foreseeable future, causing steep reductions in species diversity, and endangering Earth s sustainability. To understand changes and trends in terrestrial ecosystems and their functioning as carbon sources and sinks, and to characterize the impact of their changes on climate, habitat and biodiversity, new space assets are urgently needed to produce high spatial resolution global maps of the three-dimensional (3D) structure of vegetation, its biomass above ground, the carbon stored within and the implications for atmospheric green house gas concentrations and climate. These needs were articulated in a 2007 National Research Council (NRC) report (NRC, 2007) recommending a new satellite mission, DESDynI, carrying an L-band Polarized Synthetic Aperture Radar (Pol-SAR) and a multi-beam lidar (Light RAnging And Detection) operating at 1064 nm. The objectives of this paper are to articulate the importance of these new, multi-year, 3D vegetation structure and biomass measurements, to briefly review the feasibility of radar and lidar remote sensing technology to meet these requirements, to define the data products and measurement requirements, and to consider implications of mission durations. The paper addresses these objectives by synthesizing research results and other input from a broad community of terrestrial ecology, carbon cycle, and remote sensing scientists and working groups. We conclude that: (1) current global biomass and 3-D vegetation structure information is unsuitable for both science and management and policy. The only existing global datasets of biomass are approximations based on combining land cover type and representative carbon values, instead of measurements of actual biomass. Current measurement attempts based on radar and multispectral data have low explanatory power outside low biomass areas. There is no current capability for repeatable disturbance and regrowth estimates. (2) The science and policy needs for information on vegetation 3D structure can be successfully addressed by a mission capable of producing (i) a first global inventory of forest biomass with a spatial resolution 1km or finer and unprecedented accuracy (ii) annual global disturbance maps at a spatial resolution of 1 ha with subsequent biomass accumulation rates at resolutions of 1km or finer, and (iii) transects of vertical and horizontal forest structure with 30 m along-transect measurements globally at 25 m spatial resolution, essential for habitat characterization. We also show from the literature that lidar profile samples together with wall-to53 wall L-band quad-pol-SAR imagery and ecosystem dynamics models can work together to satisfy these vegetation 3D structure and biomass measurement requirements. Finally we argue that the technology readiness levels of combined pol-SAR and lidar instruments are adequate for space flight. Remaining to be worked out, are the particulars of a lidar/pol-SAR mission design that is feasible and at a minimum satisfies the information and measurement requirement articulated herein.

Hall, Forrest G.↗