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At least 811 records · Page 45

Human Factors Research Needs for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) Design: Enabling the NASA “Sky for All” Future Airspace Vision

Integrated safety management will be paramount for safely enabling the envisioned transformations of the future National Airspace System. Addressing the increasing need for advanced data analytics and fusion of aviation safety data, managed by human decision-makers, is essential for realizing the vision. The proposal, if accepted, will discuss safety management system challenges and how the concept of In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems addresses the need. It will also discuss human factors challenges involved in future integrated safety management, including trust, over-reliance, human-optimized data visualization, human-autonomy teaming, training, communication and dissemination of data, situation awareness, task load, and accountability.

Lawrence J Prinzel III↗

Ensuring Safety of Government Personnel During Suborbital Spaceflight

The NASA Suborbital Crew (SubC) project is focused on enabling flights by NASA civil servants, such as scientists and engineers conducting research, on suborbital vehicles. A broader goal is ensuring that commercial human spaceflight is both viable and safe. Within the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), the SubC project is exploring game-changing methods to perform safety assessments to enable NASA personnel to fly on suborbital missions. Commercial suborbital space flight capabilities are anticipated to be more accessible, affordable, and available than missions to the International Space Station and could provide additional opportunities for testing and qualification of space flight hardware, human-tended microgravity research, and further cutting-edge research enabled by the space environment. Although NASA currently permits human tended suborbital payloads for non-civil servants under auspices of NASA’s Flight Opportunities Program, the SubC effort will enable civil servant scientists, researchers, and even engineers to accompany their experiments and tests into the space microgravity environment. Figure 1 illustrates how the SubC program complements other microgravity experimental platforms. The targeted scope for SubC includes end-to-end suborbital capabilities reaching ~80km with several minutes of sustained microgravity (Table 1). The NASA SubC project office is working with the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) and the commercial suborbital space transportation industry to develop an efficient and holistic approach to a safety review and eventual government participation in suborbital flight. The current FAA certification process for suborbital launches is congressionally mandated to only consider public safety. NASA is responsible for understanding the risks to its employees should they fly on a commercially available suborbital flight. The SubC project is employing a Safety Case approach, applied to commercial suborbital providers, which is not a traditional certification process as was used for the SpaceX Dragon and Boeing Starliner vehicles. Rather, it is an assessment using elements of NASA’s Risk-Informed Safety Case and the Armstrong Flight Research Center’s Airworthiness Assessment process.

Elizabeth C Blome↗

An In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations for Part 139 Airports

Today’s airports are complex multi-faceted ecosystems. Currently, of the 517certificatedairports, 270arerequired to use safety management systems (SMSs) to identify and mitigate known hazards and emergent risks and to voluntarily share safety data with commercial operators and tenants. Airports manage a wide variety of hazards. These traffic hubs have direct responsibilities, such as removing foreign object debris from runways and taxiways and configuring runways to help prevent against incursions and tail strikes during takeoff. To ensure safety in the future NAS, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). An IASMS will employ services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) to identify and mitigate hazards that are proactively and predictively managed based on data analytics of detected anomalies, precursors, and trends. SFCs would scale with airport complexity and environmental conditions using increasingly automated systems to respond proactively to hazards and, by using integrated data sources and predictive safety analytical methods, discover new, never before seen risks.

Ellis, K↗

FFTF Passive Safety Test Data for Benchmarks for New LMR Designs

Liquid Metal Reactors (LMRs) continue to be considered as an attractive concept for advanced reactor design. Software packages such as SASSYS are being used to im-prove new LMR designs and operating characteristics. Significant cost and safety im-provements can be realized in advanced liquid metal reactor designs by emphasizing inherent or passive safety through crediting the beneficial reactivity feedbacks associ-ated with core and structural movement. This passive safety approach was adopted for the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), and an experimental program was conducted to characterize the structural reactivity feedback. The FFTF passive safety testing pro-gram was developed to examine how specific design elements influenced dynamic re-activity feedback in response to a reactivity input and to demonstrate the scalability of reactivity feedback results to reactors of current interest. The U.S. Department of En-ergy, Office of Nuclear Energy Advanced Reactor Technology program is in the pro-cess of preserving, protecting, securing, and placing in electronic format information and data from the FFTF, including the core configurations and data collected during the passive safety tests. Benchmarks based on empirical data gathered during operation of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) as well as design documents and post-irradiation examination will aid in the validation of these software packages and the models and calculations they produce. Evaluation of these actual test data could provide insight to improve analytical methods which may be used to support future licensing applications for LMRs

Wootan, David W.↗

Recent Upgrades at the Safety and Tritium Applied Research Facility

This paper gives a brief overview of the Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility operated by the Fusion Safety Program (FSP) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). FSP researchers use the STAR facility to carry out experiments in tritium permeation and retention in various fusion materials, including wall armor tile materials. FSP researchers also perform other experimentation as well to support safety assessment in fusion development. This lab, in its present two-building configuration, has been in operation for over ten years. The main experiments at STAR are briefly described. This paper discusses recent work to enhance personnel safety at the facility. The STAR facility is a Department of Energy less than hazard category 3 facility; the personnel safety approach calls for ventilation and tritium monitoring for radiation protection. The tritium areas of STAR have about 4 to 12 air changes per hour, with air flow being once through and then routed to the facility vent stack. Additional radiation monitoring has been installed to read the laboratory room air where experiments with tritium are conducted. These ion chambers and bubblers are used to verify that no significant tritium concentrations are present in the experiment rooms. Standby electrical power has been added to the facility exhaust blower so that proper ventilation will now operate during commercial power outages as well as the real-time tritium air monitors.

tritium facility upgrades↗

One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there has not been a single instance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation, but there have been numerous accidents and “close calls.” As the understanding of these environments has increased, the need for a robust nuclear weapon safety philosophy has grown. This paper describes some of the methods used by the Nuclear Weapon Complex today to assure nuclear weapon safety, including testing, modeling, analysis, and design features. Lastly, it also reviews safety’s continued role in the future and examines how nuclear safety’s present maturity can play a role in strengthening security and other areas and how increased coordination can improve safety and reduce long-term cost.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safety Analysis Challenges With Restart of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility

Safety Analysis Challenges With Restart of the Idaho National Laboratory Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility Dr. James Parry David Broussard Anthony LaPorta Douglas Gerstner Battelle Energy Alliance Idaho National Laboratory P.O. Box 1625/MS6194 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 The Transient Reactor Test Facility, commonly referred to as TREAT, is an air-cooled, thermal spectrum test reactor facility designed to: • Induce intense fission heating in the nuclear fuel being tested. • Test nuclear reactor fuels under severe reactor-accident conditions. • Study fuel meltdowns, metal-water reactions, interactions between overheated fuel and coolant, and the transient behavior of fuels for high-temperature systems. • Provide nondestructive test data through neutron radiography of fuel samples. • Allow for the detailed monitoring of the experiments during the test. TREAT was specifically designed to test prototypic-sized reactor fuel pins and bundles under transient power conditions. During its 35 year operating history, it conducted thousands of transient experiments. Today, these capabilities are required for predicting safety margins for next generation fuels and advanced reactor design safety. Even though TREAT has not operated since 1994, return to operable conditions and resumption of testing will occur in FY 2018. This paper discusses the unique challenges with performing and documenting the safety analyses that demonstrate that the TREAT restart may be performed safely. This includes a discussion of 1) the TREAT capability, design, and operations, 2) identification of the format and content of the required safety basis document changes, and 3) demonstration that the consequences of potential accidents during TREAT operations meet the consequence guidelines.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Evaluating Safety with Automated Vehicles at Signalized Intersections: Application of Adaptive Cruise Control in Mixed Traffic

Automated Vehicles (AV) can potentially improve the performance of transportation system by reducing human errors and enhancing mobility and safety. In lower levels of automation, humans are still controlling the vehicle and receiving some advisory information regarding their surrounding environment. This paper investigates the safety impact of low and high levels of AVs, and their interaction with conventional human-driven vehicles at intersections. In order to enhance our understanding of the future interactions between conventional vehicles with AVs, we developed a framework to simulate the mixed traffic environment. Different market penetration scenarios are simulated using VENTOS (VEhicular NeTwork Open Simulator) software. A modified Wiedemann car-following model was calibrated to represent the behavior of human drivers of both conventional and low-level AVs, while an Adaptive Cruise Control model was used to represent high-level AVs. Notably, this study investigates purely the automation improvement in the system. We modified the acceleration and deceleration regimes of the Wiedemann model and tuned it by harnessing real-world connected vehicle data. Next, the simulation was calibrated utilizing two measures of driving volatility to ensure it closely represents the volatility measures of the real-world data. To evaluate the safety performance of a representative intersection under different scenarios, the number of longitudinal conflicts and driving volatility are used as surrogate safety indicators. The results reveal that increase in market penetration rate of LAVs and HAVs substantially improves intersection safety performance by reducing the number of conflicts and driving volatility.

Arvin, Ramin↗

An Overview of the United States Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and Future Challenges

The United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) was formally established in January 1998 as part of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 97-2 implementation plan. The NCSP was initially focused on seven NCSP tasks: Critical Experiments, Benchmarking, Analytical Methods, Nuclear Data, Training and Qualification, Information Preservation and Dissemination, and Applicable Ranges of Bounding Curves and Data. The first NCSP 5-year plan was published in August 1999. Now, more than 20 years later, NCSP continues to serve the United States and the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community around five technical program elements (TPEs): Analytical Methods, Information Preservation and Dissemination, Integral Experiments, Nuclear Data, and Training and Education. NCSP has three chartered support groups, the Criticality Safety Support Group, the Nuclear Data Advisory Group, and the DOE Criticality Safety Coordinating Team, all of which provide technical advisement to the NCS community, to DOE, and to the NCSP manager. NCSP has a comprehensive mission and vision document that provides technical and budget priorities for TPE attributes and goals to ensure that the needs of the NCS community and DOE NCS are prioritized appropriately to meet the goals defined by the 1998 DNFSB recommendation. Like any DOE/NNSA program, NCSP faces significant challenges in the future that involves program funding, rising nuclear facility costs, aging critical assembly infrastructure, knowledge retention, and other issues. This paper discusses NCSP and provides some insights into these and other challenges moving into the future.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Initial results from safety testing of US AGR-2 irradiation test fuel - 18574

Two cylindrical compacts containing tri-structural isotropic (TRISO)-coated particles with kernels that contained a mixture of uranium carbide and uranium oxide (UCO) and two compacts with UO{sub 2}-kernel TRISO particles have undergone 1600 deg. C safety testing. These compacts were irradiated in the US Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification Program's second irradiation test (AGR-2). The time-dependent releases of several radioisotopes ({sup 110m}Ag, {sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 154}Eu, {sup 155}Eu, {sup 90}Sr, and {sup 85}Kr) were monitored while heating the fuel specimens to 1600 deg. C in flowing helium for 300 h. The UCO compacts behaved similarly to previously reported 1600 deg. C-safety-tested UCO compacts from the AGR-1 irradiation. No failed TRISO or failed SiC were detected (based on krypton and cesium release), and cesium release through intact SiC was very low. Release behavior of silver, europium, and strontium appeared to be dominated by inventory originally released through intact coating layers during irradiation but retained in the compact matrix until it was released during safety testing. Both UO{sub 2} compacts exhibited cesium release from multiple particles whose SiC failed during the safety test. Europium and strontium release from these two UO{sub 2} compacts appeared to be dominated by release from the particles with failed SiC. Silver release was characteristically similar to the release from the UCO compacts in that an initial release of the majority of silver trapped in the matrix occurred during ramping to 1600 deg. C. However, additional silver release was observed later in the safety testing due to the UO{sub 2} TRISO with failed SiC. Failure of the SiC layer in the UO{sub 2} fuel may have been dominated by CO corrosion, as opposed to the palladium degradation observed in AGR-1 UCO fuel. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Enhancements to a dissolver burn up credit safety case to reduce further GD use in the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP), Sellafield - 14229

THORP reprocesses fuel from Britain's Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) and fuel from Light Water Reactors (LWRs). The THORP dissolvers use nitric acid poisoned with Gadolinium (Gd) to ensure criticality safety. The dissolver criticality safety case uses a burnup credit approach to determine a minimum required Gd concentration. The burn up credit approach followed originates from a time when fuel receipts for THORP were ongoing and hence models a deliberately conservative and artificial fuel type to cover all potential fuel receipts. External fuel receipts have now ceased and detailed information on post irradiation U and Pu isotopics is available for all fuel scheduled for reprocessing. Work has therefore been undertaken to determine whether the burn up credit safety case could be revised to be more representative of the fuel actually remaining for reprocessing and hence to reduce further the required Gd concentration for the dissolvers. This would ultimately reduce the quantity of high active liquid waste requiring treatment and storage. The great majority of fuel remaining for reprocessing in THORP is AGR fuel, for which the typical burnup is known to be much higher than was previously assumed in the safety case. Pu and U isotopics for irradiated AGR fuel were examined with the fuel inventory code FISPIN. Modelling with the code MONK then showed that the Gd requirement for irradiated AGR fuel of a given burnup was much lower than in the previous safety case due to the change in Pu:U ratio and Pu{sup 240} in Pu for AGR fuel compared with the previous conservative assumptions. The burnup of all remaining LWR fuel was found to be high and hence lower dissolver Gd concentrations could also be tolerated for reprocessing this fuel. The work has concluded that the THORP dissolver Gd concentration can be halved for all remaining LWR and AGR fuel campaigns with a consequent cost saving of ∼ UK pound 4 m in Gd and high active waste processing time. Implementation of this improvement is currently ongoing on the plant. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enhancing Operational Safety via Agentic Dialogue Hazard Identification Analysis

Operational safety in high-stakes domains such as industrial process control, autonomous, and safety-critical systems demand reliable hazard identification. While large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating safety analysis tasks, single-turn, monolithic inference is brittle: it lacks the self-correction, deliberation, and contextual refinement that safety engineers apply iteratively. In this paper, we introduce HAZDIAL, a framework that investigates whether structured agentic dialogue (multi-agent, multi-turn interactions) improves the quality of NLP-based hazard identification over single-pass baselines. We systematically compare two dialogue modalities: adversarial debate and constructive discussion, and propose an genetic algorithm-based agentic interaction optimization. We evaluate all configurations against a curated golden dataset using standard classification metrics (accuracy, precision, recall, F1) and a novel dialogue metrics. This work advances the intersection of dialogue systems, multi-agent reasoning, and AI safety, providing empirical evidence for dialogue-driven hazard analysis.

Das, Sanjay [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000542591915)↗

Test-Based Calibration of Safety Factors for Capacity Models

In this paper, a simple procedure to calibrate the safety factor of capacity models is presented. The calibration can be carried out based on any available database of experimental tests, even of limited size. The procedure aims to assess the model capability of predicting the test results and to calibrate the safety factor so that the capacity equation meets the target reliability level required by the code or sought by the calibrator. After predicting each test of the database with the capacity equation under consideration, the test-prediction pairs are checked for the property of linearity, and the relative error for the properties of homoscedasticity and normality. Once these properties are fulfilled—which may require a nonlinear transformation of the test values and/or the predictions—the closed-form equation proposed in this paper is employed to compute a target design value. The model safety factor is finally obtained by comparing such target design value with the design value obtained from the code. The paper also proposes two approximate analytical equations to compute the tolerance factor, used to attain any given fractile, as a function of the (even small) number of tests, with any assigned confidence level. A fundamental outcome of the procedure is that it yields an objective indicator of the model accuracy, measured by the standard deviation of its error, which may be regarded as a parameter useful for selecting the most reliable model among different competing ones. In the long run, the application of the proposed procedure will allow achieving a uniform reliability level throughout all capacity models used in codes and guidelines. A further advantage is that the partial safety factors so derived can be straightforwardly updated when more experiments become available. Finally, as an example, the proposed procedure is herein applied to the ACI 318 shear design capacity equation for concrete members unreinforced in shear.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Validation of Continuous-Energy ENDF/B-VIII.0 16 O, 56 Fe, and 63,65 Cu Cross Sections for Nuclear Criticality Safety Applications

Recently completed cross-section evaluations sponsored in part by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program were incorporated into the 2018 release of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 cross-section library. Evaluated isotopes of interest to the nuclear data and criticality safety community include 16 O, 56 Fe, and 63,65 Cu. For performance validation, benchmark models defined in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project Handbook were selected based on energy-integrated k eff sensitivities to total cross sections of interest and compared with experimental values. Of the 102 benchmark configurations that were utilized, 63 are sensitive to 16 O, 32 sensitive to 63,65 Cu, and 25 sensitive to 56 Fe. Selected benchmarks were modeled in SCALE 6.2.3 Criticality Safety Analysis Sequence (CSAS) continuous-energy Monte Carlo k eff calculations with ENDF/B-VII.1, with a hybrid ENDF/B-VII.1 with ENDF/B-VIII.0 data substituted for individual isotopes of interest, and with ENDF/B-VIII.0. ENDF/B-VIII.0 showed improved agreement with experimental k eff for 56 Fe, 63 Cu, elemental copper, and full library substitution while producing lessened agreement for 16 O and 65 Cu. Furthermore, with full library and isotope-specific ENDF/B-VIII.0 performance, a best-case ENDF library was formed by excluding underperforming isotopes’ ENDF/B-VIII.0 data, reverting 16 O and 65 Cu cross sections to ENDF/B-VII.1. This resulted in the average relative deviation between calculated and experimental data improving from 1.45σ for the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library to 1.32σ for the best-case library, relative to benchmark uncertainty.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Trends in HFE Methods and Tools and Their Applicability to Safety Reviews

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) conducts human factors engineering (HFE) safety reviews of applicant submittals for new plants and for changes to existing plants. The reviews include the evaluation of the methods and tools (M&T) used by applicants as part of their HFE program. The technology used to perform HFE activities has been rapidly evolving, resulting in a whole new generation of HFE M&Ts. The objectives of this research were to identify the current trends in HFE methods and tools, determine their applicability to NRC safety reviews, and identify topics for which the NRC may need additional guidance to support the NRC's safety reviews. We conducted a survey that identified over 100 new HFE M&Ts. The M&Ts were assessed to identify general trends. Seven trends were identified: Computer Applications for Performing Traditional Analyses, Computer-Aided Design, Integration of HFE Methods and Tools, Rapid Development Engineering, Analysis of Cognitive Tasks, Use of Virtual Environments and Visualizations, and Application of Human Performance Models. We assessed each trend to determine its applicability to the NRC's review by considering (1) whether the nuclear industry is making use of M&Ts for each trend, and (2) whether M&Ts reflecting the trend can be reviewed using the current design review guidance. We concluded that M&T trends that are applicable to the commercial nuclear industry and are expected to impact safety reviews may be considered for review guidance development. Three trends fell into this category: Analysis of Cognitive Tasks, Use of Virtual Environments and Visualizations, and Application of Human Performance Models. The other trends do not need to be addressed at this time.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Recommended Tritium Oxide Deposition Velocity for Use in Savannah River Site Safety Analyses

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has recently questioned the appropriate value for tritium deposition velocity used in the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System Ver. 2 (Chanin and Young 1998) code when estimating bounding dose (95th percentile) for safety analysis (DNFSB 2011). The purpose of this paper is to provide appropriate, defensible values of the tritium deposition velocity for use in Savannah River Site (SRS) safety analyses. To accomplish this, consideration must be given to the re-emission of tritium after deposition. Approximately 85% of the surface area of the SRS is forested. The majority of the forests are pine plantations, 68%. The remaining forest area is 6% mixed pine and hardwood and 26% swamp hardwood. Most of the path from potential release points to the site boundary is through forested land. A search of published studies indicate daylight, tritiated water (HTO) vapor deposition velocities in forest vegetation can range from 0.07 to 2.8 cm/s. Analysis of the results of studies done on an SRS pine plantation and climatological data from the SRS meteorological network indicate that the average deposition velocity during daylight periods is around 0.42 cm/s. The minimum deposition velocity was determined to be about 0.1 cm/s, which is the recommended bounding value. Deposition velocity and residence time (half-life) of HTO in vegetation are related by the leaf area and leaf water volume in the forest. For the characteristics of the pine plantation at SRS the residence time corresponding to the average, daylight deposition velocity is 0.4 hours. The residence time corresponding to the night-time deposition velocity of 0.1 cm/s is around 2 hours. A simple dispersion model which accounts for deposition and re-emission of HTO vapor was used to evaluate the impact on exposure to the maximally exposed offsite individual (MOI) at the SRS boundary (Viner 2012). Under conditions that produce the bounding, 95 th percentile MOI exposure, i.e., low wind speed, weak turbulence, night, low deposition velocity, the effect of deposition and re-emission on MOI exposure was found to be very small. The exposure over the two hour period following arrival of the plume was found to be decreased by less than 0.05 %. Furthermore the sensitivity to deposition velocity was low. Increasing deposition velocity to 0.5 cm/s reduced exposure to 0.3 %. After a 24 hour period, an MOI would have been exposed to all of the released material. Based on the low sensitivity of MOI exposure to the value of deposition velocity when re-emission is considered, it is appropriately conservative to use a 0.0 cm/s effective deposition velocity for safety analysis in the MACCS2 code.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Data Analysis Approaches for the Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization Toolkit

In the past decades, several numerical simulation codes have been employed to simulate accident dynamics (e.g., RELAP5-3D, RELAP-7, MELCOR, MAAP). In order to evaluate the impact of uncertainties into accident dynamics, several stochastic methodologies have been coupled with these codes. These stochastic methods range from classical Monte-Carlo and Latin Hypercube sampling to stochastic polynomial methods. Similar approaches have been introduced into the risk and safety community where stochastic methods (such as RAVEN, ADAPT, MCDET, ADS) have been coupled with safety analysis codes in order to evaluate the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events. These approaches are usually called Dynamic PRA or simulation-based PRA methods. These uncertainties and safety methods usually generate a large number of simulation runs (database storage may be on the order of gigabytes or higher). The scope of this paper is to present a broad overview of methods and algorithms that can be used to analyze and extract information from large data sets containing time dependent data. In this context, “extracting information” means constructing input-output correlations, finding commonalities, and identifying outliers. Some of the algorithms presented here have been developed or are under development within the RAVEN statistical framework.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Defining the State of Safety (SOS) for Lithium-Ion Batteries in EVs: A Discussion

The demand for lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) is skyrocketing, driven by the rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and grid energy storage. However, current LIBs rely on flammable electrolytes, making them susceptible to thermal runaway and fires. Despite ongoing research and development efforts to enhance safety, fire incidents in EVs and energy storage systems persist. As LIB deployment increases, so too does the risk of fires. Therefore, it's crucial to define a "State of Safety" for LIBs - encompassing both operational safety and post-incident safety, such as after a car accident. This concept can help stakeholder and first responders to effectively manage LIB fire risks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗