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Research and Test Reactor Fuels

PRO-RR is the research reactor focused program element of the broader Proliferation Resistance Optimization program (PRO-X) under the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). PRO-X provides a framework for integrating proliferation resistance in nuclear system designs to minimize weapons usable nuclear materials (WUNM) production and diversion pathways while optimizing systems performance for peaceful use missions. PRO-RR applies the PRO-X mission objectives to research reactor system design. This document serves as one of the foundational documents for the PRO-RR-Fuel System Design technical team by documenting current research reactor fuels usage. The PRO-RR-Fuel System Design technical team consists of subject matter experts from Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). In order to determine the preferred fuel of use in upcoming research and test reactors to optimize proliferation resistance, performance, and safety, it is useful to assess the fuels that have been used in the past, or are currently in use. This report reviews the historical and current fuels used in research and test reactors to inform future fuel selection. Chapter 2 discusses the low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels currently in use in terms of thermal power level and utilization of the reactor. Chapter 3 summarizes the fabrication processes for common fuel types. Chapter 4 discusses in detail the fuel types in use in research and test reactors. A review of the cladding types in use is presented in Chapter 5, and a historical review of research and test reactor fuel fabricators is presented in Chapter 6. The data collection strategy used the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research reactor database [1] as a starting point. Information on the fuel used was gathered on research reactors (other than critical assemblies) that were listed as operational, planned, or in temporary shutdown in the IAEA database. Data on the fuel type, geometry, enrichment, uranium loading, cladding type, and fabricator were collected for each of the reactors available in the public domain. Sources of data included conference papers, journal articles, and facility and fabricator websites. Data on research reactors operating on LEU fuels are presented in Appendix A, while Appendix B presents data collected on all reactors at the time of publication of this report. Appendix C presents data collected on reactors that were part of the M3 research and test reactor conversion program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Bison Verification and Validation Activities for TRISO

Numerical modeling and simulation (M&S) tools play a key role in the research, development, and overall safety assessments of next-generation nuclear energy systems. One such tool, Bison, is a nuclear fuel performance code that is applicable to many fuel forms (e.g., light-water reactor fuel, oxide and metallic fuel for fast reactors, tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) fuel, and plate fuel), and it uses the finite element method to model the thermo- mechanical response of nuclear fuels. One fuel form widely utilized in Generation-IV high-temperature gas-cooled and fluoride- salt-cooled nuclear reactor concepts is TRISO fuel. Recently, Bison’s capabilities were significantly expanded to enable it to model the performance of TRISO particles and compacts. It is important that Bison’s computational results be reliable and predictive, since this code is used to inform high-consequence decisions. The various processes developed to address this issue generally entail two fundamental steps: verification and validation (V&V). Verification ensures that the code functions correctly and is reliable. Code/solution verification, code benchmark, and software quality assurance exercises are examples of verification activities. On the other hand, validation is the process of assessing a code’s capability to accurately model physical problems. Comparisons between code results and experiments quantify the validation level. Application of V&V procedures is crucial to the development of computational tools that are free of coding mistakes and can accurately represent reality. The current study presents an overview of Bison V&V activities relevant to the TRISO fuel concept, which include code/solution verification exercises, CRP-6 Benchmark—a Coordinated Research Program through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—exercises, and validation exercises with the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)- 1/2/3/4 experiment series.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

CRADA FINAL REPORT FOR CRADA NO. CR-08-001 CEMENTITIOUS BARRIERS PARTNERSHIPS

The Cementitious Barriers Partnership (CBP), led by the Savannah River National Laboratory, has achieved its ultimate purpose to support progress in final treatment and disposal of legacy waste and closure of High-Level Waste (HLW) tanks in the DOE complex. The CBP achieved its goal by developing experimental programs with results that supported the development of a reasonable and credible set of software tools to improve understanding and prediction of the structural, hydraulic and chemical performance of cementitious barriers and waste forms used in nuclear applications. These experimental data and software tools are and will continue to reduce the uncertainties in the current methodologies for assessing cementitious barrier performance and increase the consistency and transparency of the assessment process. The CBP has made a significant impact in reducing risk and uncertainties in the performance assessments that directly impact U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental cleanup and closure programs. The CBP has developed an experimentally-based, integrated modeling tool that serves as a screening tool known as the CBP Software Toolbox, Version 3.0. The CBP products reduce the uncertainties of current methodologies for assessing cementitious barrier performance and increasing the consistency and transparency of the DOE assessment process. This CBP Software Toolbox predicts the hydraulic properties and chemical stability of cement matrix phases and release fluxes of constituents, in response to variable boundary conditions. Therefore, the CBP tools are reducing the uncertainty by coupling multiscale and multi-physics processes, including physical-chemical evolution and transport phenomena applied to heterogeneous materials with changing boundary conditions. In addition, the CBP Experimental and Characterization Program has provided test data to support chemical and physical degradation mechanisms for cementitious barriers. These tools have application to low activity waste forms, high level waste tank closure, D&D and entombment of major nuclear facilities, landfill waste acceptance criteria, and in-situ grouting and immobilization of vadose zone contamination. The CBP also provided: 1) a forum for DOE-NRC technical exchange, 2) material characterization to support performance assessment (PA) predictions, 3) uncertainty reduction in PA predictions, 4) base case performance to improve PA predictions, and 5) improvement in understanding and quantification of moisture and contaminant transport used in PAs. Additional CBP accomplishments include: sponsorship of a national test bed workshop to obtain collaboration in establishing the path forward to obtain actual data supporting future predictions of cementitious barrier performance, and participation in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Cooperative Research Project on the use of cementitious barriers for low-level radioactive waste treatment and disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status Report on Activities of the Systems Assessment Task Force, OECD-NEA Expert Group on Accident Tolerant Fuels for LWRs

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development /Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) Nuclear Science Committee approved the formation of an Expert Group on Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) for LWRs (EGATFL) in 2014. Chaired by Kemal Pasamehmetoglu, INL Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science and Technology, the mandate for the EGATFL defines work under three task forces: (1) Systems Assessment, (2) Cladding and Core Materials, and (3) Fuel Concepts. Scope for the Systems Assessment task force (TF1) includes definition of evaluation metrics for ATF, technology readiness level definition, definition of illustrative scenarios for ATF evaluation, and identification of fuel performance and system codes applicable to ATF evaluation. The identification of irradiation facilities around the world that are being used, or are planned to be used, for the irradiation testing of ATF cladding and fuel materials was later added to the TF1 scope (April 2017). The Cladding and Core Materials (TF2) and Fuel Concepts (TF3) task forces have worked to identify gaps and needs for modeling and experimental demonstration; define key properties of interest; identify the data necessary to perform concept evaluation under normal conditions and illustrative scenarios; identify available infrastructure (internationally) to support experimental needs; and make recommendations on priorities. Where possible, considering proprietary and other export restrictions (e.g., International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the Expert Group has facilitated the sharing of data and lessons learned across the international group membership. The Systems Assessment task force is chaired by Shannon Bragg-Sitton (Idaho National Laboratory [INL], U.S.), the Cladding Task Force is chaired by Marie Moatti (Electricite de France [EdF], France), and the Fuels Task Force is chaired by a Masaki Kurata (Japan Atomic Energy Agency [JAEA], Japan). The original Expert Group mandate was established for June 2014 to June 2016. In April 2016 the Expert Group voted to extend the mandate one additional year to June 2017 in order to complete the task force deliverables; this request was subsequently approved by the Nuclear Science Committee. All reports are currently in final draft and will be submitted to NEA for final formatting/editing in October 2017. A final EGATFL meeting will be held at NEA Headquarters in Paris, France on November 2-3, 2017 to resolve any final comments on the task force reports. This report provides brief summary of the Systems Assessment Task Force deliverable report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad range of subjects, including nuclear material accountancy principles, legal definitions and the regulatory base and inspection tools and techniques. This 60% core part is given by representatives from regulatory bodies (The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, Directorate General for Nuclear Energy and Transport), industry (AREVA, British Nuclear Group), and research (Stockholm University, Hamburg University, Joint Research Centre-Institute of Transuranic Elements, and Joint Research Centre-Institute for the Protection of the Citizen). The remaining part is completed with topical lectures addressed by invited lecturers, such as from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the IAEA addressing topics of physical protection, illicit trafficking, the Iraq case study, exercises, including satellite imagery interpretation etc. With this structure of a stable core plus a variable set of invited lectures, the course will remain sustainable and up-to-date. A syllabus provides the students a homogeneous set of information material in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation matters at the European and international level. In this way, the ESARDA TKMWG aims to contribute to a two-fold scientific-technical and political-juridical education and training.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

O-regime dynamics and modeling in Tore Supra

The regime of nonlinear temperature oscillations (O-regime), characteristic of noninductive discharges on Tore Supra [Equipe Tore Supra, Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Plasma Physics and Controlled Nuclear Fusion Research, Nice, France, 1988 (International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1989), Vol. 1, p. 9], is investigated in its triggering and suppressing mechanism. This regime can be described by two nonlinearly coupled equations for the current density j(r) and the electron temperature T{sub e}(r) where the equation coefficients are functions of j and T{sub e} themselves. Both the integrated modeling code CRONOS[V. Basiuk et al., Nucl. Fusion 43, 822 (2003)] and a two-patch predator-prey system with diffusion and noise have been used and results have been compared to the experimental observations of the O-regime. A database of discharges is analyzed which features monotonic, flat, and reversed safety factor (q) profiles in order to characterize the action of external actuators on the regime dynamics with the widest generality. Electron cyclotron current drive and neutral beam injections have been used in order to induce localized perturbations in the total current profile j(r) as well as to change the plasma confinement conditions in the central region. Magnetic shear perturbations and modifications of the heat transport turn out to be the central parameters governing the dynamics of the O-regime.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

CEMENTITIOUS BARRIERS PARTNERSHIP ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RELEVANCE TO THE DOE COMPLEX

The Cementitious Barriers Partnership (CBP) was initiated to reduce risk and uncertainties in the performance assessments that directly impact U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental cleanup and closure programs. The CBP is supported by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) and has been specifically addressing the following critical EM program needs: (i) the long-term performance of cementitious barriers and materials in nuclear waste disposal facilities and (ii) increased understanding of contaminant transport behavior within cementitious barrier systems to support the development and deployment of adequate closure technologies. To accomplish this, the CBP has two initiatives: (1) an experimental initiative to increase understanding of changes in cementitious materials over long times (> 1000 years) over changing conditions and (2) a modeling initiative to enhance and integrate a set of computational tools validated by laboratory and field experimental data to improve understanding and prediction of the long-term performance of cementitious barriers and waste forms used in nuclear applications. In FY10, the CBP developed the initial phase of an integrated modeling tool that would serve as a screening tool which could help in making decisions concerning disposal and tank closure. The CBP experimental programs are underway to validate this tool and provide increased understanding of how CM changes over time and under changing conditions. These initial CBP products that will eventually be enhanced are anticipated to reduce the uncertainties of current methodologies for assessing cementitious barrier performance and increase the consistency and transparency of the DOE assessment process. These tools have application to low activity waste forms, high level waste tank closure, D&D and entombment of major nuclear facilities, landfill waste acceptance criteria, and in-situ grouting and immobilization of vadose zone contamination. This paper summarizes the recent work provided by the CBP to support DOE operations and regulatory compliance and the accomplishments over the past 2 years. Impacts of this work include: (1) a forum for DOE-NRC technical exchange, (2) material characterization to support PA predictions, (3) reducing uncertainty in PA predictions, (4) establishing base case performance to improve PA predictions, and (5) improving understanding and quantification of moisture and contaminant transport used in PAs. Additional CBP accomplishments include: sponsorship of a national test bed workshop to obtain collaboration in establishing the path forward in obtaining actual data to support future predictions on cementitious barrier performance evaluations, and participation in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Cooperative Research Project on the use of cementitious barriers for low-level radioactive waste treatment and disposal.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Summary on the depressurization from supercritical pressure conditions

When a fluid discharges from a high pressure and temperature system, a 'choking' or critical condition occurs, and the flow rate becomes independent of the downstream pressure. During a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA) of a water reactor the break flow will be subject to this condition. An accurate estimation of the critical flow rate is important for the evaluation of the reactor safety, because this flow rate controls the loss of coolant inventory and energy from the system, and thus has a significant effect on the accident consequences[1]. In the design of safety systems for a super critical water reactor (SCWR), postulated LOCA transients are particularly important due to the lower coolant inventory compared to a typical PWR for the same power output. This lower coolant inventory would result in a faster transient response of the SCWR, and hence accurate prediction of the critical discharge is mandatory. Under potential two-phase conditions critical flow is dominated by the vapor content or quality of the vapor, which is closely related with the onset of vaporization and the interfacial interaction between phases [2]. This presents a major challenge for the estimation of the flow rate due to the lack of the knowledge of those processes, especially under the conditions of interest for the SCWR. According to the limited data of supercritical fluids, the critical flows at conditions above the pseudo-critical point seem to be fairly stable and consistent with the subcritical homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM) model predictions, while having a lower flow rate than those in the two-phase region. Thus the major difficulty in the prediction of the depressurization flow rates remains in the region where two phases co-exist at the top of the vapor dome. In this region, the flow rate is strongly affected by the nozzle geometry and tends to be unstable. Various models for this region have been developed with different assumptions, e.g. the HEM and Moody model [3], and the Henry-Fauske non-equilibrium model [4], and are currently used in subcritical pressure reactor safety design[5]. It appears that some of these models could be reasonably extended to above the thermodynamic pseudo-critical point. The more stable and lower discharge flow rates observed in conditions above the pseudo-critical point suggests that even though SCWR's have a smaller coolant inventory, the safety implications of a LOCA and the subsequent depressurization may not be as severe as expected, this however needs to be confirmed by a rigorous evaluation of the particular event and further evaluation of the critical flow rate. This paper will summarize activities on critical flow models, experimental data and numerical modeling during blowdown from supercritical pressure conditions under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on 'Heat Transfer Behaviour and Thermo-hydraulics Code testing for SCWRs'. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Technical Review Report for the Mound 1KW Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Waiver for the Use of Modified Primary Containment Vessel (PCV)

This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) staff, at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), on the Waiver for the Use of Modified Primary Containment Vessels (PCV). The waiver is to be used to support a limited number of shipments of fuel for the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) Project in support of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission. Under the waiver, an inventory of existing national security PCVs will be converted to standard PCVs. Both types of PCVs are currently approved for use by the Office of Nuclear Energy. LLNL has previously reviewed the national security PCVs under Mound 1KW Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Addendum No. 1, Revision c, dated June 2007 (Addendum 1). The safety analysis of the package is documented in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) for the Mound 1KW Package (i.e., the Mound 1KW SARP, or the SARP) where the standard PCVs have been reviewed by LLNL. The Mound 1KW Package is certified by DOE Certificate of Compliance (CoC) number USA/9516/B(U)F-85 for the transportation of Type B quantities of plutonium heat source material. The waiver requests an exemption, claiming safety equivalent to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 71.12, Specific Exemptions, and will lead to a letter amendment to the CoC. Under the waiver, the Office of Radioisotope Power Systems, NE-34, is seeking an exemption from 10 CFR 71.19(d)(1), Previously Approved Package,[5] which states: '(d) NRC will approve modifications to the design and authorized contents of a Type B package, or a fissile material package, previously approved by NRC, provided--(1) The modifications of a Type B package are not significant with respect to the design, operating characteristics, or safe performance of the containment system, when the package is subjected to the tests specified in {section}71.71 and 71.73.' The LLNL staff had previously reviewed a request from Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to reconfigure national security PCVs to standard PCVs. With a nominal 50% reduction in both the height and the volume, the LLNL staff initially deemed the modifications to be significant, which would not be allowed under the provisions of 10 CFR 71.19(d)(1)--see above. As a follow-up, the DOE requested additional clarification from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC concluded that the reconfiguration would be a new fabrication, and that an exemption to the regulations would be required to allow its use, as per the requirements specified in 10 CFR 71.19(c)(1), Previously Approved Package: '(c) A Type B(U) package, a Type B(M) package, or a fissile material package previously approved by the NRC with the designation '-85' in the identification number of the NRC CoC, may be used under the general license of {section}71.17 with the following additional conditions: (1) Fabrication of the package must be satisfactorily completed by December 31, 2006, as demonstrated by application of its model number in accordance with 71.85(c).' Although the preferred approach toward the resolution of this issue would be for the applicant to submit an updated SARP, the applicant has stated that the process of updating the Model Mound 1KW Package SARP is a work that is in progress, but that the updated SARP is not yet ready for submittal. The applicant has to provide a submittal, proving that the package meets the '-96' requirements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1, in order to fabricate approved packagings after December 31, 2006. The applicant has further stated that all other packaging features, as described in the currently approved Model Mound 1KW Package SARP, remain unchanged. This report documents the LLNL review of the waiver request. The specific review for each SARP Chapter is documented.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Blockchain Applications for Nuclear Safeguards

This chapter discusses the benefits and challenges of using distributed ledger technology (DLT) for international nuclear safeguards purposes. The chap-ter introduces the international safeguards system and the role of the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency. The chapter describes the evolution of the safeguards system, the IAEA’s core functions and the technical objectives it seeks to achieve. The chapter explains the benefits and drawbacks of deploying DLT for safeguards and presents potential use cases where the technology could be deployed. It ends with a description of the international com-munity’s current perspectives on deployment.

DLT, blockchain technology, international safeguar↗

Risk bases can complement dose bases for implementing and optimising a radiological protection strategy in urgent and transition emergency phases

Current radiological emergency response recommendations have been provided by the International Commission on Radiological Protection and adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency in comprehensive Safety Standards. These standards provide dose-based guidance for decision making (e.g., on sheltering or relocation) via generic criteria in terms of effective dose in the range from 20 mSv per year, during transition from emergency to existing exposure situation, to 100 mSv, acute or annual, in the urgent phase of a nuclear accident. The purpose of this paper was to examine how such dose reference levels directly translate into radiation-related risks of the main stochastic detrimental health effects (cancer). Methodologies, provided by the World Health Organization after the Fukushima accident, for calculating the lifetime and 20 year cancer risks and for attributing relevant organ doses from effective doses, have been applied here for this purpose with new software, designed to be available for use immediately after a nuclear accident. A new feature in this software is a comprehensive accounting for uncertainty via simulation technique, so that the risks may now be presented with realistic confidence intervals. The types of cancer risks considered here are time-integrated over lifetime and the first 20 years after exposure for all solid cancers and either the most radiation-sensitive types of cancer, i.e., leukaemia and female breast cancer, or the most radiation-relevant type of cancer occurring early in life, i.e., thyroid. It is demonstrated here how reference dose levels translate differently into specific cancer risk levels (with varying confidence interval sizes), depending on age at exposure, gender, time-frame at-risk and type of cancer considered. This demonstration applies German population data and considers external exposures. Further work is required to comprehensively extend this methodology to internal exposures that are likely to be important in the early stages of a nuclear accident. A discussion is provided here on the potential for such risk-based information to be used by decision makers, in the urgent and transition phases of nuclear emergencies, to identify protective measures (e.g., sheltering, evacuation) in a differential way (i.e., for particularly susceptible sub-groups of a population).

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Decommissioning of Research Building B at VNIINM: Main Results

Research building B at the Bochvar High-Technology Research Institute for Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) located within the city limits of a dense residential development was decommissioned in 2013–2015. Radioactively contaminated equipment and utility services were disassembled and removed, building structures were decontaminated, the framework was dismantled, the grounds of the development site were restored, and radioactive waste was transferred to specialized organizations. The framework was liquidated in strict accord with the norms and regulations governing the use of atomic energy.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Computational Errors in the Calculation of Long Radioactive Decay Chains

For safety security of objects utilizing atomic energy, the effect of numerical errors on the calculation of the activity and integrals of the activity in time when using Bateman’s formula and Siewers’ algorithm to calculate radioactive decay chains is investigated. The smallest errors obtain when using Siewers’ algorithm and Bateman’s formula together with long arithmetic. It is shown that the standard calculations of radioactive decay chains according to Bateman’s formula with double precision lead to significant errors. However, these errors have almost no effect on the dose characteristics of mixtures of radionuclides. The analysis is based on data contained in ICRP Publication No. 107.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

What Can and Cannot Be Expected from Tokamak Fusion

This article is a response to the analysis of nuclear fusion by V. V. Orlov and L. I. Ponomarev in their article “Nuclear problems of thermonuclear power generation” [Atomnaya Energiya, 124, No. 2, 105–110 (2018); Atomic Energy, 124, No. 2, 129–138 (2018)], pointing to the decades-long lack-of-progress in thermonuclear energy research. Here, the authors of the article attribute the lack-of-progress to fundamental problems in the nuclear aspects of thermonuclear fusion. Here, the reason for the current stagnation – essentially, the degeneration of thermonuclear fusion that commenced in the 1950s–1970s with rapid development – is presented. The scientific investigations have been and remain within the scope of the Tamm–Sakharov concept of toroidal plasma confinement, which provided the first impetus to progress but soon showed its insufficiency. An additional element is considered – the suppression of plasma cooling by using moving liquid lithium to pump out plasma. For tokamaks this opens up new prospects for obtaining burning plasma suitable for use in hybrid (fission-fusion) reactors.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Time-to-Pinch Investigation of 5 kJ Mather-Type Plasma Focus Device

The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority-Plasma focus (EAEA-PF2) has been upgraded to a 5 kJ plasma focus device. Its characteristics have been investigated at various pressures and different voltages in a 5 kJ Mather-type plasma focus device for Ar gas. Its time-to-pinch has been measured, simulated and analyzed at different operating conditions. It is observed from the results that, the time-to-pinch decreased when either the charging voltage increased or the gas pressure decreased. In addition, the time-to-pinch is estimated theoretically using Lee model RADPF5.15. A comparison between the experimental and theoretical time-to-pinch is discussed. Also, the drive factor of plasma focus is analyzed at different pressures and charging voltages. It is noticed that, the mass and current factors are affected by changing the pressure and voltage. Finally, it is observed that, the drive factor is proportional inversely to the pressure and directly to the charging voltage.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

State of practice and emerging application of analytical techniques of nuclear forensic analysis: highlights from the 4th Collaborative Materials Exercise of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)

Founded in 1996 upon the initiative of the “Group of 8” governments (G8), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is an ad hoc organization of official nuclear forensics practitioners (scientists, law enforcement, and regulators) that can be called upon to provide technical assistance to the global community in the event of a seizure of nuclear or radiological materials. The ITWG is supported by and is affiliated with roughly 40 countries and international partner organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), EURATOM, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Besides providing a network of nuclear forensics laboratories that are able to assist law enforcement during a nuclear smuggling event, the ITWG is also committed to the advancement of the science of nuclear forensic analysis, largely through participation in periodic table top and Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMXs). Exercise scenarios use “real world” samples with realistic forensics investigation time constraints and reporting requirements. These exercises are designed to promote best practices in the field and test, evaluate, and improve new technical capabilities, methods and techniques in order to advance the science of nuclear forensics. The ITWG recently completed its fourth CMX in the 20 year history of the organization. This was also the largest materials exercise to date, with participating laboratories from 16 countries or organizations. Three samples of low enriched uranium were shipped to these laboratories as part of an illicit trafficking scenario, for which each laboratory was asked to conduct nuclear forensic analyses in support of a fictitious criminal investigation. An objective review of the State Of Practice and Art of international nuclear forensic analysis based upon the outcome of this most recent exercise is provided.

ITWG CMX-4↗

An interlaboratory collaboration to determine consensus 231 Pa/ 235 U model ages of a uranium certified reference material for nuclear forensics

Application of the 231 Pa/ 235 U radiochronometer for nuclear forensic investigations is challenged by a lack of certified reference materials with 231 Pa/ 235 U model purification dates. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory completed an interlaboratory study measuring 231 Pa/ 235 U model ages of New Brunswick Laboratory CRM U100. Results from independent laboratories were combined to calculate a consensus 231 Pa/ 235 U model purification date for CRM U100 of March 26, 1959 ± 237 days. This 231 Pa/ 235 U consensus date for CRM U100 may be used by the nuclear forensic community for quality control of 231 Pa/ 235 U radiochronometry measurements of unknown materials.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

International cooperation in age-dating uranium standards for nuclear forensics using the 231 Pa/ 235 U radiochronometer

During 2017–2018 Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the China Institute of Atomic Energy collaborated in an interlaboratory 231 Pa/ 235 U radiochronometry exercise. The laboratories used different analytical methods to obtain a consensus model purification date for CRM U010 of December 28, 1958 ± 198 days and for CRM U850 of May 20, 1958 ± 363 days. These results agree with previously reported model dates using the 230 Th/ 234 U radiochronometer as well as the production histories of these materials. The concordance of interlaboratory data here confirms the ability of laboratories to make reproducible radiochronometry measurements using distinct analytical approaches.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗