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At least 793 records · Page 44

Autonomous Energy Systems

Energy systems are increasingly complicated by the proliferation of clean energy technologies such as solar, wind, storage, electric vehicles, and building automations. Future energy systems will require secure, autonomous, and reliable communications, control, and interoperability among millions of distributed generation points and billions of buildings, vehicles, and more. To enable effective management of the anticipated growth of distributed devices and the deluge of data and extensive metering that will follow, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed the concept of autonomous energy systems (AES).

autonomous↗

Propagating Mixed Uncertainties in Cyber Attacker Payoffs: Exploration of Two-Phase Monte Carlo Sampling and Probability Bounds Analysis

Securing cyber-systems on a continual basis against a multitude of adverse events is a challenging undertaking. Game-theoretic approaches, that model actions of strategic decision-makers, are increasingly being applied to address cybersecurity resource allocation challenges. Such game-based models account for multiple player actions and represent cyber attacker payoffs mostly as point utility estimates. Since a cyber-attacker’s payoff generation mechanism is largely unknown, appropriate representation and propagation of uncertainty is a critical task. In this paper we expand on prior work and focus on operationalizing the probabilistic uncertainty quantification framework, for a notional cyber system, through: 1) representation of uncertain attacker and system-related modeling variables as probability distributions and mathematical intervals, and 2) exploration of uncertainty propagation techniques including two-phase Monte Carlo sampling and probability bounds analysis.

cyber security↗

Improving Insider Threat Training Awareness and Mitigation Programs at Nuclear Facilities.

In recent years, insider threat programs have become an important aspect of nuclear security, and nuclear security training courses. However, many nuclear security insider threat programs fail to address the insider threat attack and monitoring potential that exists on information technology (IT) systems. This failure is critical because of the importance of information technology and networks in today’s world. IT systems offer an opportunity to perpetrate dangerous insider attacks, but they also present an opportunity to monitor for them and prevent them. This paper suggests a number of best practices for monitoring and preventing insider attacks on IT systems, and proposes the development of a new IT insider threat tabletop that can be used to help train nuclear security practitioners on how best to implement IT insider threat prevention best practices. The development of IT insider threat best practices and a practical tabletop exercise will allow nuclear security practitioners to improve nuclear security trainings as it integrates a critical part of insider threat prevention into the broader nuclear security system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cybersecurity Guidance for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS)

As part of the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G): Cybersecurity for Solar Systems workshop at RE + in Las Vegas, Nevada, NREL researchers discuss an ongoing effort to develop cybersecurity guidance for vendors and operators of distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). This guide will prioritize cybersecurity best practices that can be testing and developed for a potential future standard. This presentation will highlight NREL's ongoing work in this area and future areas of research.

cyber↗

Architecture and Methods for Substation SCADA Cybersecurity: Best Practices

There are over 3000 electricity providers in the United States, encompassing investor and publicly owned utilities as well as electric cooperatives. There has been ongoing trends to increasingly automate and provide remote control and monitoring of electric energy delivery systems. The deployment of computer network technologies has increased the efficiency and reliability of electric power infrastructure. However, the increased use of digital communications has also increased the vulnerability to malicious cyber attacks [1]. In 2004 the National Research Councils (National Academies) formed a committee of specialists to address these vulnerabilities and propose possible solutions with an objective to prioritize the R&D needs for developing countermeasures. The committee addressed many potential concerns in the electric power delivery system and classified them based upon different criteria and presented recommendations to minimize the gap between the academic research directions and the needs of the electric utility industry. The complexity and diversity of the electric power delivery system in the U.S. has opened many ports for attackers and intruders [1]. This complexity and diversity is attributed to the fact that power delivery system is a network of substations, transmission and distribution lines, sub-networks of controlling, sensing and monitoring units, and human operator involvement for running the system [1]. Accordingly, any incident such as the occurrence of a fault or disturbance in this complex network cannot be deferred and should be resolved within an order of milliseconds, otherwise there is risk of large-scale outages similar to the occurrences in India and the U.S. in 2003 [2]. There are three main vulnerabilities in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems commonly identified—physical vulnerability, cyber vulnerability and personal vulnerability [1]. In terms of cyber threats, SCADA systems are the most critical elements in the electric power grid in the U.S. Unauthorized access to a SCADA system could enable/disable unexpected equipment (such as disable the protection system or a circuit breaker) which could cause large scale disruptions of electric power delivery. This paper provides an overview of power system SCADA technologies in transmission substations (Section 2) and summarizes the best practices for implementing a cyber security program. After introducing SCADA system operations in Section 2, a description of the security challenges for SCADA systems is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, NECRC Critical Infrastructure Protection standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 are summarized. An overview of industry best practices is presented in Section 5.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Are Satellites Cyber Physical Systems?

Abstract— Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are a key part of modern infrastructure. However, satellites are often excluded from discussions of CPS, despite their evident cyber-physical attributes, such as the ability to respond to information from its surroundings and adjust accordingly. Through a brief examination of relevant literature, we prove that satellites are CPSs, specifically through payload-bus interactions that occur on a satellite. By establishing satellites as a form of CPS, we hope to encourage its inclusion in discussions for bettering the security of such systems.

Jones, Rachel C.↗

Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS)

To help increase the capacity and efficiency of the nation s airports, a secure wideband wireless communications system is proposed for use on the airport surface. This paper provides an overview of the research and development process for the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). AeroMACS is based on a specific commercial profile of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.16 standard known as Wireless Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access or WiMAX (WiMax Forum). The paper includes background on the need for global interoperability in air/ground data communications, describes potential AeroMACS applications, addresses allocated frequency spectrum constraints, summarizes the international standardization process, and provides findings and recommendations from the world s first AeroMACS prototype implemented in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.

Budinger, James M.↗

Blockchain: Next Generation Supply Chain Security for Energy Infrastructure and NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Compliance

The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires a secure, reliable and trustworthy global supply chain. This is especially true for the grid’s increasing number of networked energy delivery system (EDS) and industrial control systems (ICS) and associated vendors, distributers, integrators and end users. Grid modernization has increased the use of “smart” energy devices that network, digitize, automate and increasingly converge the cyber-physical energy supply chain. In this Energy Internet of Things (EIoT) environment there is an increasing number of both critical cyber assets as well as data speed and size requirements, creating new cyber supply chain security and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) CIP compliance challenges for utilities, regulators and vendors. In realization of these goals, improvements are needed in the process and technology to better monitor, audit and realize cyber security and compliance goals in complex EIoT environments. This paper explores how blockchain technology may present a disruptive solution to facilitate NERC CIP compliance and increase the security of the electricity infrastructure supply chain through a cryptographically signed distributed ledger that provides increased data provenance, attribution and auditability.

Blockchain, Cyber security, grid cyber, NERC CIP, ↗

LIQUIDARMOR CM Flashing and Sealant, High Impact Technology Demonstration

Air leakage is responsible for about 1.1 quads of energy or 6% of the total energy used by commercial buildings in the US. Consequently, infiltration and exfiltration are among the largest envelope-related contributors to the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning loads in commercial buildings. New air sealing technologies have recently emerged that aim to improve the performance of air barrier systems by simplifying their installation procedure. LIQUIDARMORTM CM Flashing and Sealant is an example of these new advanced material technologies. This technology is a spray-applied sealant and liquid flashing and can span gaps that are up to ¼ in. wide without a supporting material. ORNL verified the performance of LIQUIDARMORTM CM with field tests and energy simulations from a building in which LIQUIDARMORTM CM was one of components of the air barrier system. The Homeland Security Training Center (HTC) at the College of DuPage in Glen Ellyn, IL, served as the demonstration site. Blower door test results show the average air leakage rate in the demonstration site to be 0.15 cfm/ft2 at 1.57 psf, or 63% lower than the 0.4 cfm at 1.57 psf specified in the 2015 International Energy Conservation Code (IECC). According to simulation results, HTC lowered its annual heating and cooling cost by about $3,000 or 9% compared to a similar building that lacked an air barrier system. This demonstration project serves as an example of the level of building envelope airtightness that can be achieved by using air barrier materials that are properly installed, and illustrates the energy and financial savings that such an airtight envelope could attain.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Leveraging graph clustering techniques for cyber‐physical system analysis to enhance disturbance characterisation

Abstract Cyber‐physical systems have behaviour that crosses domain boundaries during events such as planned operational changes and malicious disturbances. Traditionally, the cyber and physical systems are monitored separately and use very different toolsets and analysis paradigms. The security and privacy of these cyber‐physical systems requires improved understanding of the combined cyber‐physical system behaviour and methods for holistic analysis. Therefore, the authors propose leveraging clustering techniques on cyber‐physical data from smart grid systems to analyse differences and similarities in behaviour during cyber‐, physical‐, and cyber‐physical disturbances. Since clustering methods are commonly used in data science to examine statistical similarities in order to sort large datasets, these algorithms can assist in identifying useful relationships in cyber‐physical systems. Through this analysis, deeper insights can be shared with decision‐makers on what cyber and physical components are strongly or weakly linked, what cyber‐physical pathways are most traversed, and the criticality of certain cyber‐physical nodes or edges. This paper presents several types of clustering methods for cyber‐physical graphs of smart grid systems and their application in assessing different types of disturbances for informing cyber‐physical situational awareness. The collection of these clustering techniques provide a foundational basis for cyber‐physical graph interdependency analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Blockchain Based Co-Simulation Framework for Integrating DERs to Wholesale Electricity Markets

As the number of distributed energy resources (DERs) continue to increase across energy-delivery systems, there remains a need for integrating their capabilities into traditional grid operations. In this paper, a blockchain-based solution is proposed to facilitate FERC's Order No. 2222 implementations. The presented use-case enables small-scale DERs to participate in wholesale market operations through DER aggregators, while also enabling local distribution system operators to enforce distribution system constraints in a secure and traceable manner. The presented use case is built around the Unified Testing Platform (UTP) being developed as a part of the Blockchain for Optimized Security and Energy Management (BLOSEM) project. This is a multi-lab effort intended to simplify the deployment of blockchain-powered grid solutions by enabling the integration of simulation tools, and blockchain technologies through the use of system-agnostic interfaces that provide a modular, interoperable, and reusable connectivity layer.

blockchain interoperability↗

Flight Test Comparison Between Enhanced Vision (FLIR) and Synthetic Vision Systems

Limited visibility and reduced situational awareness have been cited as predominant causal factors for both Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) and runway incursion accidents. NASA s Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) project is developing practical application technologies with the goal of eliminating low visibility conditions as a causal factor to civil aircraft accidents while replicating the operational benefits of clear day flight operations, regardless of the actual outside visibility condition. A major thrust of the SVS project involves the development/demonstration of affordable, certifiable display configurations that provide intuitive out-the-window terrain and obstacle information with advanced pathway guidance. A flight test evaluation was conducted in the summer of 2004 by NASA Langley Research Center under NASA s Aviation Safety and Security, Synthetic Vision System - Commercial and Business program. A Gulfstream G-V aircraft, modified and operated under NASA contract by the Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, was flown over a 3-week period at the Reno/Tahoe International Airport and an additional 3-week period at the NASA Wallops Flight Facility to evaluate integrated Synthetic Vision System concepts. Flight testing was conducted to evaluate the performance, usability, and acceptance of an integrated synthetic vision concept which included advanced Synthetic Vision display concepts for a transport aircraft flight deck, a Runway Incursion Prevention System, an Enhanced Vision Systems (EVS), and real-time Database Integrity Monitoring Equipment. This paper focuses on comparing qualitative and subjective results between EVS and SVS display concepts.

Arthur, Jarvis J., III↗

How to Handle the Conflict between Safety and Security - 18564

The purpose of safety and security for nuclear activities are the same. They are both necessary measures to protect people and the environment from radioactive material. There are many measures that enhance both the safety and the security but there are also measures serving one area that are in direct conflict with the other. How information is handled is maybe the best example to demonstrate this conflict between interests. In the security field, information is handled on a need-to-know basis, preventing valuable details to fall into hands of antagonists, terrorists etc. The safety culture, on the contrary, is based on knowledge and transparency and it encourages the sharing of information and experience to improve the safety. There is little guidance on how to manage the conflicts between safety and security for a transport system moving nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and especially when there are conflicts between different legislation areas, for example the Act on Nuclear Activities and Safety of Life at Sea. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, transports all Swedish spent fuel and operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants to the central storage facilities in Sweden. To manage the transport system, SKB owns a fleet of packages, road vehicles and an INF 3 ship. For the shipments of nuclear material, the security focus has increased rapidly over the years after the 9/11 attack, followed by regulatory requirements on enhanced security. SKB is currently running a project to further strengthen the transport security, an activity that requires a careful balance between safety and security. This paper describes the methods used and the challenges experienced trying to manage the conflicts between safety and security for the Swedish nuclear transport system. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector

With utilities in the U.S. and around the world increasingly moving toward smart grid technology and other upgrades with inherent cyber vulnerabilities, correlative threats from malicious cyber attacks on the North American electric grid continue to grow in frequency and sophistication. The potential for malicious actors to access and adversely affect physical electricity assets of U.S. electricity generation, transmission, or distribution systems via cyber means is a primary concern for utilities contributing to the bulk electric system. This paper seeks to illustrate the current cyber-physical landscape of the U.S. electric sector in the context of its vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, the likelihood of cyber attacks, and the impacts cyber events and threat actors can achieve on the power grid. In addition, this paper highlights utility perspectives, perceived challenges, and requests for assistance in addressing cyber threats to the electric sector. There have been no reported targeted cyber attacks carried out against utilities in the U.S. that have resulted in permanent or long term damage to power system operations thus far, yet electric utilities throughout the U.S. have seen a steady rise in cyber and physical security related events that continue to raise concern. Asset owners and operators understand that the effects of a coordinated cyber and physical attack on a utility’s operations would threaten electric system reliability–and potentially result in large scale power outages. Utilities are routinely faced with new challenges for dealing with these cyber threats to the grid and consequently maintain a set of best practices to keep systems secure and up to date. Among the greatest challenges is a lack of knowledge or strategy to mitigate new risks that emerge as a result of an exponential rise in complexity of modern control systems. This paper compiles an open-source analysis of cyber threats and risks to the electric grid, utility best practices for prevention and response to cyber threats, and utility suggestions about how the federal government can aid utilities in combating and mitigating risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Space Station Freedom environmental database system (FEDS) for MSFC testing

The Water Recovery Test (WRT) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is the first demonstration of integrated water recovery systems for potable and hygiene water reuse as envisioned for Space Station Freedom (SSF). In order to satisfy the safety and health requirements placed on the SSF program and facilitate test data assessment, an extensive laboratory analysis database was established to provide a central archive and data retrieval function. The database is required to store analysis results for physical, chemical, and microbial parameters measured from water, air and surface samples collected at various locations throughout the test facility. The Oracle Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) was utilized to implement a secured on-line information system with the ECLSS WRT program as the foundation for this system. The database is supported on a VAX/VMS 8810 series mainframe and is accessible from the Marshall Information Network System (MINS). This paper summarizes the database requirements, system design, interfaces, and future enhancements.

Story, Gail S.↗