SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Astronauts Carter and Thornton are shown suiting up for work in the WETF (Weightless Environment Training Facility). (The payload mockup shown is not related to the STS-33 mission. It is a mockup of the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), which is scheduled to fly in the early 1990's.)
This report documents the results of the investigation into causes of gas paths on the 20A and 20B case-to-nozzle joints on STS-42. The investigation was conducted by the Investigation Board appointed by the senior vice president and general manager of Space Operations, Mr. R. E. Lindstrom, on 7 Feb. 1992. The probability of gas path occurrence in the nozzle-to-case-joint polysulfide had been identified during joint redesign. However, actual flight gas path incidence has been limited to RSRM-11 and the 20A and 20B segments. The blow-by condition on the 20A segment was a first time occurrence which was a special concern. The investigation covered all technical aspects associated with the gas path and blow-by conditions: materials and processing history, design requirements and as-built compliance to the design, thermal and structural analyses, computer modeling, and laboratory experimentation with the materials involved. The investigation was coordinated with Mr. Ken Jones at NASA Marshall in bi-weekly teleconferences. The Board also supported Dr. James C. Blair's independent NASA investigation team by providing copies of collected data, conducting requested analyses, and supporting several all-day teleconferences to provide understanding and resolve issues. The Dr. Blair support requirement was successfully concluded on 4 Mar. 1992.
The final report for the Clearfield disassembly evaluation and a continuation of the KSC postflight assessment for the 360T026 (STS-47) Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) flight set is provided. All observed hardware conditions were documented on PFOR's and are included in Appendices A, B, and C. Appendices D and E contain the measurements and safety factor data for the nozzle and insulation components. This report, along with the KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report (TWR-64203), represents a summary of the 360T026 hardware evaluation. The as-flown hardware configuration is documented in TWR-60472. Disassembly evaluation photograph numbers are logged in TWA-1987. The 360T026 flight set disassembly evaluations described were performed at the RSRM Refurbishment Facility in Clearfield, Utah. The final factory joint demate occurred on 12 April 1993. Detailed evaluations were performed in accordance with the Clearfield Postflight Engineering Evaluation Plan (PEEP), TWR-50051, Revision A. All observations were compared against limits that are also defined in the PEEP. These limits outline the criteria for categorizing the observations as acceptable, reportable, or critical. Hardware conditions that were unexpected and/or determined to be reportable or critical were evaluated by the applicable CPT and tracked through the PFAR system.
Appendix D, Nozzle Postfire Data of the Final Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report RSRM-29 (STS-54) is provided. Data on the erosion and char of the following are included: forward exit cone assembly, throat assembly, nose inlet, cowl/OBR, fixed housing assembly and aft exit cone assembly.
Appendix C, Nozzle Postflight Observation Records (PFOR's) for the Final Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report RSRM-29 (STS-54) is provided. PFOR data are included on: nozzle joint condition; nose inlet-to-throat joint condition; and nozzle subassembly phenolic bondline condition.
This document is the final report for the postflight assessment of the RSRM-32 (STS-57) flight set. This report presents the disassembly evaluations performed at the Thiokol facilities in Utah and is a continuation of the evaluations performed at KSC (TWR-64239). The PEEP for this assessment is outlined in TWR-50051, Revision B. The PEEP defines the requirements for evaluating RSRM hardware. Special hardware issues pertaining to this flight set requiring additional or modified assessment are outlined in TWR-64237. All observed hardware conditions were documented on PFOR's which are included in Appendix A. Observations were compared against limits defined in the PEEP. Any observation that was categorized as reportable or had no defined limits was documented on a preliminary PFAR by the assessment engineers. Preliminary PFAR's were reviewed by the Thiokol SPAT Executive Board to determine if elevation to PFAR's was required.
Appendix E, Insulation Postfire Data for the Final Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report RSRM-29 (STS-54) is provided. Data on the following are included: nozzle-to-case joint performance; aft dome insulation performance; aft cylinder insulation performance; forward segment star tip insulation performance; and igniter chamber and adapter insulation performance.
The final report for the Clearfield disassembly evaluation and a continuation of the KSC postflight assessment for the RSRM-28 (STS-53) RSRM flight set is presented. All observed hardware conditions were documented on PFOR's and are included in Appendices A through C. Appendices D and E contain the measurements and safety factor data for the nozzle and insulation components. This report, along with the KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report (TWR-64215), represents a summary of the RSRM-28 hardware evaluation. The as-flown hardware configuration is documented in TWR-63638. Disassembly evaluation photograph numbers are logged in TWA-1989. The RSRM-28 flight set disassembly evaluations described were performed at the RSRM Refurbishment Facility in Clearfield, Utah. The final factory joint demate occurred on July 15, 1993. Additional time was required to perform the evaluation of the stiffener rings per special issue 4.1.5.2 because of the washout schedule. The release of this report was after completion of all special issues per program management direction. Detailed evaluations were performed in accordance with the Clearfield PEEP, TWR-50051, Revision A. All observations were compared against limits that are also defined in the PEEP. These limits outline the criteria for categorizing the observations as acceptable, reportable, or critical. Hardware conditions that were unexpected and/or determined to be reportable or critical were evaluated by the applicable team and tracked through the PFAR system.
Filter debris from the Spacelab module D-2 of STS-55 was analyzed for microbial contamination. Debris from cabin and avionics filters was collected by Kennedy Space Center personnel on May 8, 1993, 2 days postflight. Debris weights were similar to those of previous Spacelab missions. Approximately 5.1E+5 colony forming units per gram of debris were enumerated from the cabin and avionics filter debris, respectively. these numbers were similar in previous missions for which the entire contents were analyzed without sorting of the material. Bacterial diversity was small compared to previous missions, with no gram negative bacteria isolated. Only one bacterial species, Corynebacterium pseudodiphtheriticum, was not isolated previously by the laboratory from Spacelab debris. This organism is a normal inhabitant of the pharynx. A table listing all species of bacteria isolated by the laboratory from previous Spacelab air filters debris collection is provided.
The Final Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report 360T021 (RSRM-21, STS-45) is included. All observed hardware conditions were documented on Postflight Observation Reports (PFOR's) and included in Appendices A through E. This report, along with the KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report represents a summary of the 360T021 hardware evaluation.
Appendix B, Case, Seals, and Joints Postflight Observation Records (PFOR's) for the Final Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report for RSRM-29 (STS-54) is included.
KSC Processing Configuration and Data Report is being provided as a historical document and as an enhancement to future RSRM manufacturing and processing operations. The following sections provide information on segment receipt, aft booster build-up, booster assembly, and closeout for STS-56, RSRM flight set 36OL031. Section 2.0 contains a summary of RSRM-031 processing. Section 3.0 discusses any significant problems or special issues that require special attention. Sections 4.0 through 6.0 contain narrative descriptions of all key events, including any related processing problems. Appendix A provides engineering specifications and changes. A list and matrix of all problem reports (PR's) pertinent to this flight set is provided in Appendix B. The matrix was provided by the Thiokol LSS Quality Engineering office. Copies of the PR's generated during the processing of RSRM-031 will be provided upon request. Appendix C contains the motor set status matrix, which provides milestone dates for the RSRM-031 flow. Section 7.0 provides recommendations, if any, for the improvement of flight hardware processing. Section 8.0 contains data sheets that provide flight hardware parts and consumables information installed during the booster build-up and stacking operations by location, lot/serial number, expiration and cure dates/times, and installation dates.
KSC Processing Configuration and Data Report is being provided as a historical document and as an enhancement to future RSRM manufacturing and processing operations. The following sections provide information on segment receipt, aft booster build up, motor assembly, and closeout for STS-51, RSRM flight set 360T033. Section 2.0 contains a summary of RSRM-033 processing. Section 3.0 discusses any significant problems or special issues that require special attention. Sections 4.0 through 6.0 contain narrative descriptions of all key events, including any related processing problems. Appendix A provides engineering specifications and changes. A list and matrix of all problem reports (PR's) pertinent to this flight set is provided in Appendix B. The matrix was provided by the Thiokol LSS Quality Engineering office. Copies of the PR's generated during the processing of RSRM-033 will be provided upon request. Appendix C contains the motor set status matrix, which provides milestone dates for the RSRM-033 flow. Section 7.0 provides recommendations for the improvement of flight hardware processing. Section 8.0 contains data sheets that provide flight hardware parts and consumable information installed during the booster build-up and stacking operations by location, lot/serial number, expiration and cure dates/times, and installation dates.
The STS-51 initial launch attempt of Discovery (OV-103) was terminated on KSC launch pad 39B on 12 Aug. 1993 at 9:12 AM E.S.T. due to a sensor redundancy failure in the liquid hydrogen system of ME-2 (Engine 2033). The event description and time line are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 12 Aug. 1993 at 12:00 AM EST. All space shuttle main engine (SSME) chill parameters and Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.34 seconds a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2033 for exceeding the 1800 spin intra-channel (A1-A2) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel qualification limit. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2032 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 111-101, Fuel Flowrate Intra-Channel Test Channel A disqualification. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to an open circuit in a Fuel Flowrate Sensor. This type of failure has occurred eight previous times in ground testing. The sensor had performed acceptably on three previous flights of the engine and SSME flight history shows 684 combined fuel flow rate sensor channel flights without failure. The disqualification of an Engine 2 (SSME No. 2033) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel was a result of an instrumentation failure and not engine performance. All other engine operations were nominal. This disqualification resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.
The STS-56 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report provides a summary of the Payloads, as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the fifty-fourth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and sixteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-103). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET (ET-54); three SSME's, which were designated as serial numbers 2024, 2033, and 2018 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-058. The lightweight RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L031A for the left SRB and 360L031B for the right SRB.
The maiden voyage of the commercial Spacehab laboratory module onboard the STS-57 mission was integrated with several accelerometer packages, one of which was the Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS). The June 21st 1993, launch was the seventh successful mission for the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Application's (OLMSA) SAMS unit. This flight was also complemented by a second accelerometer system. The Three Dimensional Microgravity Accelerometer (3-DMA), a Code C funded acceleration measurement system, offering an on-orbit residual calibration as a reference for the unit's four triaxial accelerometers. The SAMS accelerometer unit utilized three remote triaxial sensor heads mounted on the forward Spacehab module bulkhead and on one centrally located experiment locker door. These triaxial heads had filter cut-offs set to 5, 50, and 1000 Hz. The mission also included other experiment specific accelerometer packages in various locations.
CONCAP-2-01 (complex autonomous payload, first flight) was the maiden flight of 'CONCAP-2,' a secondary payload, utilizing the get-away special (GAS) carrier system, sponsored by the Consortium for Materials Development in Space (CMDS) at the University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH). A host of materials such as high-T(sub c) superconductor samples, metal films, polymers, carbons, and semiconducting materials were exposed to a low earth orbit (LEO) environment. We have also measured on orbit the changes in the electrical resistance of some of the high-T(sub c) materials plus carbon and silver dosimeters exposed to the space environment. The preliminary results of this experiment are compared with those from EOIM-3, both of which flew on STS-46.
This video covers the STS-59 mission. Video segments include breakfast, suit-up, departure, launch, on-orbit operations, and landing.